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ABSTRACT 
This study is about public sector performance measurement in the context of developing 
economies; more specifically, the study focuses on local government performance 
measurement systems as applied in Indonesia. Although there have been numerous research 
studies examining performance measurement, most empirical work has been undertaken in the 
context of developed economies. Performance measurement research in the milieu of 
developing economies is still very much underdeveloped and the progress is considerably much 
slower than those in developed economies. This study adopts an interpretive approach and 
applied case study research method in order, to develop an understanding of a) what drives the 
new performance measurement b) how it is designed and c) how it is used? The findings show 
that performance measurement in the context of developing economies tends to be driven by 
different reasons than compared to those developed economies. The findings also indicated 
developing economies encounter various challenges in designing and implementing 
performance measurement which eventually affected the use and usefulness of performance 
measurement. This study thus contributes to improve our understanding of the design, 
implementation and use of performance measurement in the context of developing economies. 
More specifically, it improves our understanding regarding (i) internal and external driving 
forces for performance measurement initiatives in the developing economies, (ii) the 
effectiveness of design, implementation and use, (iii) technical, organisational and institutional 
factors influencing design, implementation and use and the complex interactive effects of these 
three categories of factors, (iv) the interdependence between design, implementation and use, 
and (v) the complex conflicts of interest among different stakeholders in this context.   
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CHAPTER  1                                                                                                        
INTRODUCTION 
1.1    Background  
The intense interest of many governments in performance measurement is reflected in the 
statement: “performance measurement, of necessity usually limited to non-financial measures, 
now pervades all government discourse even if its practice is very diverse” (Jones, 2011, p. 
xxx). Jones (2011) is supported by a study which examines performance measurement in six 
developed economies (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008): Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. Another study (Rhodes et al., 2012)  
provides a brief review of performance measurement initiatives in seven countries. Rhodes et 
al. (2012) however, includes both developed economies (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) 
and developing economies (Brazil, Ghana and Indonesia). Then, a development agency based 
in Germany (GIZ) has reported the establishment and progress of the local/regional 
government performance measurement systems applied in the Philippines, Nepal, Paraguay 
and Indonesia (Taraschewski and Wegener, 2011).  
The performance measurement initiative tried out in Indonesia and discussed in Taraschewski 
and Wegener (2011) is the Evaluasi Penyelenggaraan Pemerintah Daerah (EPPD), or 
‘Evaluation of Local Government Governance.’ The initiative was introduced in February 2008 
through Government Regulation No. 6/2008 and comprises three measurement systems. The 
first is Evaluasi Kinerja Penyelenggaran Pemerintah Daerah (EKPPD) or ‘Evaluation of 
Local Government Governance Performance’ which focuses on measuring the governance 
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aspect of local government and public services it delivers. The EKPPD is an annual 
measurement system.    
The second measurement system is Evaluasi Kemampuan Penyelenggaran Otonomy Daerah 
(EKPOD) or ‘Evaluation of Local Government Capacity to Implement Decentralisation.’ The 
EKPOD is designed to assess the capacity of Indonesian local government to implement 
decentralisation policy. This differs from the EKPPD in that it is conducted conditionally. More 
specifically, the EKPOD is carried out only when the performance of a particular local 
government is judged to have been low for three consecutive years. Finally, the third 
component of EPPD is Evaluasi Daerah Otonom Baru (EDOB) or ‘Evaluation of Newly-
established Local Government.’ The EDOB is specifically designed to assess the newly-
established autonomous regions1 (that is, regions which have been established for less than 
three years). This is conducted every six months. It is unrelated to the first two and is thus not 
included in this study. 
The EKPPD was firstly implemented in October 2008 and used to assess the performance of 
Indonesian local government for the fiscal year ended 31st December 2007. Up until now, local 
government performance evaluation using the EKPPD system has taken place six times. The 
EKPOD however, has not yet been implemented, and this study therefore focuses on the first 
measurement system (EKPPD). An understanding of the EKPPD cannot however be gained in 
isolation from the EKPOD, which this study therefore includes a brief discussion of. This is 
because the EKPPD and EKPOD are interconnected. More specifically, implementation of 
performance evaluation using the EKPOD system is conditional to the results of the 
performance evaluation using the EKPPD system, as indicated earlier. Furthermore, there were 
                                                 
1 The term ‘region(s)’ in this study refers to both local and regional governments.  
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political considerations behind splitting the measurement into EKPPD and EKPOD, as will be 
explored and discussed further in Chapter 6.  
1.2    Motivations 
Research into performance measurement in developed economies has been far more extensive 
than that carried out in the context of developing economies. As a result, research in the former 
context has covered a wide range of topics, such as (i) the evolution of performance 
measurement (see Williams, 2004), (ii) factors which influence performance measurement (see 
for example Cavaluzzo and Ittner, 2004; De Lancer Julnes and Hozler, 2001), (iii) the capacity 
needed by those implementing performance measurement for it to be successful (see for 
example Berman and Wang, 2000), and (iv) the use and usefulness of performance 
measurement (see Propper and Wilson, 2003). There is still however little known about the 
state of performance measurement in the developing economies context.  A theoretical paper 
by Mimba et al. (2007) argues that the increasing demand for performance information in 
developing economies could be connected to the recent public sector reforms (including 
decentralisation) underway in most of these economies. Moreover, Mimba et al. (2007) also 
argue that the specific characteristics of the public sector in developing economies influence 
performance measurement in this context.     
Two studies have focused on performance measurement in Indonesia. The first is the empirical 
study by Mimba et al. (2013) which was based on cases studies of local agencies (public works 
and health) in one district and one municipality in Bali province. The main finding of this study 
suggests that the district head/mayor is seen as the most powerful stakeholder by the heads of 
local agencies; in formulating performance indicators therefore, these local agencies place 
emphasis on the indicators which the district head/mayor is interested in, instead of the 
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indicators which are the interest of other stakeholders (local parliament and the national 
government). A second empirical study was carried out by Akbar et al. (2012). In contrast to 
Mimba et al. (2013), Akbar et al. (2012) was based on a large-scale survey. Its main finding 
suggests that Indonesian local government reports performance merely for the purpose of 
accountability. Both studies rely on institutional theory (i.e. New Institutional Sociology) to 
interpret their findings. 
Akbar et al. (2012) are concerned with a performance measurement system applied by 
Indonesian local government called Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja Instansi Pemerintah 
(LAKIP)2. LAKIP was introduced by the Government of Indonesia much earlier3 than the 
recent measurement system (the EKPPD). While the EKPPD is specifically designed for local 
government, LAKIP is applied to all governmental institutions, including local government. 
Mimba et al. (2013) discuss various types of performance information produced by local 
government, which includes performance information produced from LAKIP but not from the 
EKPPD.    
The fact that the requirement for LAKIP was still in force when the EPPD was introduced in 
2008 provided the motivation for me to conduct this research. I was interested in investigating 
the reasons behind the new performance measurement initiative. If the new measurement 
system was aimed at replacing the existing system, why was LAKIP not terminated when the 
regulation on the EPPD came into effect? I was also interested in understanding the 
characteristics of the EKPPD: what are the specific features of this new measurement system? 
What is obvious is that EKPPD is an entirely top-down approach measurement system. The 
owner of the system is the central government, thus the central government formulated the key 
performance indicators (KPIs). In contrast, although LAKIP was a requirement set down by a 
                                                 
2 In English, LAKIP means ‘Performance and Accountability Report of Governmental Institutions’. 
3 LAKIP was introduced in 1999, through Presidential Instruction No.7/1999. 
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national government regulation, the performance indicators were developed by local 
government itself by referring to the local mid-term and annual plans. More detailed features 
of the EKPPD however require further investigation.  
Mimba et al. (2007) has indicated a connection between the increasing demand for performance 
information in developing economies and pressure from international donor agencies such as 
the World Bank. Other authors also have mentioned the role of international donor agencies 
(particularly the World Bank) in relation to performance measurement in developing 
economies (see Halachmi, 2005a, p. 503; 2005b, p. 256 and Hatry, 2006, p. xiv). Investigating 
the role of international donor agencies in the establishment of the new performance 
measurement initiative in Indonesia was the second motivation of this study. Understanding 
this role may help to explain the underlying interest of international donor agencies in the 
initiative.  
Furthermore, literature on performance measurement in developed economies has widely 
recognised the difficulties of measuring performance in the public sector. These difficulties 
relate to the distinct nature of the public sector compared to its private counterpart, from where 
the performance measurement idea was transplanted (see for example Jones, 1994; Jones and 
Pendlebury, 2010, chapter 2; Propper and Wilson, 2003). The public sector in developing 
economies also differs to that in developed ones as Mimba et al. (2007) have identified. With 
these different characteristics, performance measurement in developing economies is likely to 
face different (or even higher) challenges than in developed economies. This became the third 
motivation for conducting this study. The new measurement system being trialled in Indonesia 
provides a good opportunity to understand the challenges faced by performance measurement 
in developing economies.  
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This study has also been driven by the motivation to investigate use(s) of information produced 
from the EKPPD as the new measurement system being applied in Indonesia. Authors such as 
Newcomer (1997), Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) and Jackson (2011) consider that the 
importance of making sure of ‘use’ is because performance measurement incurs substantive 
costs. Pollit (2000) states that as the actual impact of reforms is very difficult to determine, 
performance information use offers a more traceable measure of success. Thus, research on use 
is important. In addition, Moynihan and Pandey (2010, p. 850) state that the question “why do 
managers use performance information?” is perhaps is the largest question that needs to be 
addressed by scholars working in the field of public sector performance management and 
measurement.  
Finally, performance measurement practices may be found in any type of public sector 
organisation. My particular interest in local government performance measurement was also 
connected to my previous career background as a civil servant in an Indonesian municipality. 
Seven years’ work experience provided me with an understanding of the context (the local 
government setting) and practices applied in this context. Developing expertise in terms of 
theoretical perspectives will help me to see matters related to the local government context in 
a different way. This was also my motivation to choose the topic of performance measurement 
in a local government setting.    
1.3    Objectives  
This study aims to improve our understanding of performance measurement systems applied 
in the context of developing economies; more specifically our understanding in terms of driving 
forces for performance measurement system development in this context, the effectiveness of 
performance measurement systems (assessed at their different stages), the factors influencing 
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the effectiveness of different stages and how the influences of different factors interact with 
each other. Specific to the Indonesian context, this study aims to understand the new 
performance measurement system applied in Indonesia (i.e. the EKPPD), its different elements 
and how these elements fit together.  
To achieve these objectives, I will first 1) define the division of the main phases of performance 
measurement systems and identify what is to be included in each phase, 2) define a 
classification of contingency factors that influence performance measurement systems and 
determine what factors are included in each category, 3) identify which factors influence 
specific phases of performance measurement systems, 4) develop a conceptual framework 
based on different phases of performance measurement systems which can be used to analyse 
the data at the later stage of the study, 5) adjust the conceptual framework with regard to 
contextual factors of the public sector in developing economies,4 and 6) formulate specific 
research questions:5  
1) Why was this new performance measurement system established in Indonesia and 
how? 
2) What system design does the new performance measurement system in Indonesia 
follow? Why was it designed in the way it is and how effectively has the system 
been designed?  
3) How effectively has the new performance measurement system been implemented?   
                                                 
4 Step ‘5’ means the elaboration of the conceptual framework that will be developed in Chapter 2, which will be 
based on the literature on the developed economies with specific characteristics of the public sector in the 
developing economies that have been identified in Mimba et al. (2007), such as high levels of corruption, informal 
practices and local democratic systems, which relate to the direct election system as one of the common reforms 
undertaken in most developing economies. This elaboration will be discussed in Chapter 3. In terms of 
contingency factors that have been examined in the studies focusing on the context of developed economies, 
common factors include technical and organisational factors (Cavaluzzo and Ittner, 2004). Identification of 
various contingencies examined by the existing literature on the developed economies will be discussed in Chapter 
2. 
5 The discussion about the underpinning theories or rationale for each research question  can be found in Section 
4.2.4, p. 96 
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4) Is there any evidence(s) of use(s) of the information produced from this new 
performance measurement system? If there is any evidence, how the information 
has been used?  If there is no evidence, why the information is not used? 
5) Which factors influence design, implementation and use of the new performance 
measurement system in Indonesia? And how the complex interactions between 
technical, organisational and institutional factors work to influence design, 
implementation and use?  
Derived from rational or functional approaches to researching public sector performance 
measurement systems, this study also brings insights from institutional theories, more 
specifically New Institutional Sociology (NIS) to illuminate the findings of this study. The 
theory of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powel, 1983) is particularly relevant for 
this study. I also borrow insights from literature in other fields to address some issues that are 
not discussed in the performance measurement literature: development, political economy and 
local government literature. By so doing, this study, is expected to contribute to the body of 
knowledge on performance measurement in developing economies on the theoretical, 
empirical and methodological levels. 
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1.4    Structure of the Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Structure of the Thesis 
Source: Developed by author   
Chapter 1 Introduction  
Chapter 2 Performance measurement in developed economies  
Chapter 3 Performance measurement in developing economies  
Chapter 4 Methodology  
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Chapter 7 Procedures, Status and Factors Influencing Implementation of the EKPPD 
Chapter 8 Use and Dysfunctional Effects of the EKPPD   
Chapter 9 Discussions and Conclusions  
Literature Review 
Findings 
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As shown in Figure 1.1 above, this thesis consists of nine chapters, detailed as follows: 
Chapter 1 : Provides background, motivations, objectives and contributions, and 
structure of the study.  
Chapter 2 : Introduces important definitions and concepts in performance measurement. 
The core of the chapter relates to the identification of factors that influence 
performance measurement systems at different stages (the development of 
the conceptual framework for the study). Discussion in this chapter is based 
on experiences of developed economies in adopting with performance 
measurement. 
Chapter 3 : Discusses the contextual factors of the public sector in developing economies 
and elaborates them with the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2 
(further development of the conceptual framework), including tracing the 
origin of performance measurement in the context of developing economies.  
Chapter 4 : Introduces methodology adopted in this study. The chapter provides the 
rationale for using the case study method and explains how the case study 
was conducted. The chapter ends with the criteria for research evaluation.  
Chapter 5 : Provides background to the case under investigation. The discussion focuses 
on the implementation of radical decentralisation in 2001, its negative 
implications and the redefinition of Indonesia decentralisation in 2004.  
Chapter 6 : Presents findings of the study related to the design of the new measurement 
system applied in Indonesia. These include the drivers, the roles and interests 
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of international donor agencies, the characteristics of the new measurement 
system and the factors which influenced the design process. 
Chapter 7 : Outlines findings of the study related to the implementation of the new 
measurement system. More specifically, the chapter presents problems 
encountered at different steps of implementation and by different 
stakeholders.  
Chapter 8 : Provides findings related to the use of the new measurement system. The 
chapter explains the reasons for there being no evidence of use of the 
information produced from the new measurement system; it also presents 
some dysfunctional effects. 
Chapter 9 : Offers discussions and conclusions.   
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CHAPTER  2                                                                                                
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN DEVELOPED 
ECONOMIES 
2.1    Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, performance measurement is currently practised in many countries 
around the globe. Its history can be traced back to the early nineteenth century (Williams, 
2004). The New York Bureau of Municipal Research (NYBMR) activities, especially after 
1906, represented the first application of prototypical performance measurement practice 
(Gianakis, 2002;Williams,2003;2004). The establishment of the United States Bureau of 
Efficiency (BoE) in 1916 was also part of the efforts to transplant efficiency techniques applied 
in the private sector to a governmental setting (Lee, 2006). Williams (2004) also notes that by 
1930, performance measurement had become a distinct activity, in the sense that its focus and 
purpose had shifted. The focus had moved from government to government services, and the 
main purpose had changed from political accountability to management effectiveness.6 In the 
1960s and 1970s, various initiatives such as programme budgeting (for example, Program 
Planning and Budgeting Systems, or PPBS) reflected performance measurement attempts 
introduced by the United States government (Gianakis, 2002; Perrin, 1998). Finally, the 
extensive efforts to develop performance measurement in the 1990s are described by Radin 
(2006) as the performance ‘movement’.  
                                                 
6 Williams (2004, p.155) describes that prior to the 1930s, “municipal research included the measurement of 
governance, or the study of how well the government complies with the norm of democratic government.” For 
example, measurement focused on whether “the city has home rule, the characteristics of the city charter, the 
number of elective offices, the size of council, and the terms of office.” After the 1930s, however, the principal 
focus of performance measurement switched to government service; measures of governance were no longer 
included.  
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This chapter presents a review of literature on public sector performance measurement 
undertaken in the context of developed economies. The review focuses on identifying which 
factors influence the design, implementation and use of performance measurement systems. 
Drawing from contingency-based studies as the predominant type of research undertaken in 
public sector performance measurement and drawing insights from an institutional perspective, 
this study classifies and examines three broad categories of factors, namely technical, 
organisational and institutional factors. Bringing insights from institutional perspectives to the 
contingency framework is likely to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the design, 
implementation and use of performance measurement systems in the public sector.  
This chapter begins with definitions and concepts. This section introduces some important 
definitions and concepts for the study, such as the definition of ‘performance’ in the public 
sector and concepts of inputs, outputs and outcomes used as measures of performance in the 
public sector. The next section divides performance measurement systems into three main 
phases: design, implementation and use, and examines what is included in each phase. The 
following section is the core of this chapter, which is essentially the development of the 
conceptual framework for the study. The section is divided into five sub-sections. First of all, 
I present an overview of some studies investigating factors influencing different phases of 
performance measurement systems. Then, the next sub-section discusses differences between 
contingency-based approaches and institutional approaches in studying the design, 
implementation and use of performance measurement systems. In the following sub-section, I 
provide detailed discussions of the factors which influence their design, implementation and 
use. Subsequently, I discuss evidence of the use or non-use of performance information, 
dysfunctional effects of performance measurement systems, and finally my conclusions.    
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2.2    Concepts and Definitions  
The concept of ‘performance’ in the public sector is complex and multidimensional due to the 
distinctive nature of the public sector compared to the private counterpart from which the 
performance measurement techniques were transplanted. 7  Depending on the disciplines 8 
underpinning the study of performance measurement, the complexity and multidimensional 
concept of performance in the public sector can be understood through different ways: for 
example, by looking at the definition of public sector organisations from an accounting 
perspective. Jones (2001) defines public sector organisations as those that “provide services 
free at the point of delivery, financed by taxation” (p. 5454). From this definition, we can infer 
that a universal measure of performance is not available in the public sector. As Jones explains, 
in the context of liberal democracies, resources consumed by the government can be measured 
in monetary terms, because governments have to buy in the same markets in which business 
buy, but the recipients of governmental services do not express their satisfaction in monetary 
terms. This is what explains the absence of a universal measure of performance in the public 
sector.9 
The relentless demand for performance measurement however, is addressed by using non-
financial measures (Jones and Pendlebury, 2010, see p. 18). Two sets of important concepts 
related to non-financial measures are summarised in Figure 2.1 below. The first concept is 
‘inputs’, which represent ‘resources consumed’ by governments, measured primarily using 
                                                 
7 A detailed discussion about the evolution of performance measurement in the public sector can be found in 
Williams (2004). Lee (2006) also provides interesting information about the history of the establishment of the 
Bureau of Efficiency in the United States in 1916 that was also part of the effort to transplant efficiency techniques 
applied in the private sector into a governmental setting.  
8 Performance measurement is a multidisciplinary subject, with economics, public administration, accounting and 
sociology being among the disciplines which have contributed to the performance measurement literature (Van 
Helden et al., 2008). Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) add psychology and social sciences or managerial sciences 
as fields also concerned with performance measurement. 
9 The case is different in private sector organisations, where the value of services provided by a firm is given by 
“the money it collects, from the sales it makes.” As the cost of a service provided is also measured in monetary 
terms, money provides a universal measure of performance in this sector (Jones, 2001, p. 5454).  
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costs but also non-financial measures (e.g. the number of employees). The second concept is 
‘outputs’, which represent services provided by governments; they are mainly measured using 
non-financial measures. Finally, ‘outcomes’ also means services provided by governments, but 
they are measured primarily using qualitative judgements (Jones and Pendlebury, 2010, p. 
21).10  
 
Figure 2.1 Conceptualisation and Measurement of Performance in the Public Sector 
Source: Developed by author, informed by Jones and Pendlebury (2010; 2000) 
A much earlier study (see HM Treasury, 1988) also provides a useful explanation about the 
difference between outputs and outcomes. According to this work, outputs reflect the 
achievement of intermediate objectives – objectives which, if accomplished, are assumed to 
                                                 
10 In the earlier editions, Jones and Pendlebury distinguish between ‘low level outputs’ and ‘high level outputs’ to 
refer to outputs and outcomes respectively (see, for example, Jones and Pendlebury, 2000, ch.1).  
Outcomes
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Inputs
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contribute to the ultimate objectives, whereas ‘outcomes’ manifest the achievement of the 
ultimate objectives (what the organisation is actually trying to achieve).  
As can be seen from Figure 2.1, measures of performance, inputs, outputs and outcomes are 
not at the same levels. They are “best thought of as being hierarchical” (Jones and Pendlebury, 
2010, p. 21). The hierarchical nature of inputs, outputs and outcomes is recognised in the other 
literature as the ‘span’ of performance (see Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008, pp. 15-18). At the 
low levels of the hierarchy, measures of input can be easily counted. Moving to a higher level, 
measures of output still can be easily counted. At the highest level, however, there are 
unmeasurable outcomes. While measures at the lowest level of the hierarchy can be reliably 
measured, they are furthest away from what the government services are ultimately trying to 
achieve. On the other hand, at the highest level, they are what the services are ultimately trying 
to achieve, but cannot be measured. The hierarchical nature of inputs, outputs and outcomes is 
fundamental to the measuring of public sector performance (Jones and Pendlebury, 2000; 2010; 
Schick, 2001).  
The concept of ‘economy’ deals with, among other matters, inputs (see Figure 2.1). The term 
represents the level of spending on a service, but a more accurate definition is the cost to 
provide specific service inputs of a given quality (Jackson, 1988). The questions here will be 
“does a particular output cost more than it needs to?” and “does it cost more than a comparable 
one?” (Jones and Pendlebury, 2000, p. 11). This emphasis on economy forces the use of inputs 
to remain at a minimum level, and the possible sacrifice of the quality of outputs. The concept 
of ‘effectiveness’, on the other hand, is concerned only with outputs (final outputs or outcomes) 
and ignores inputs.11 As most objectives are achievable with unlimited resources, focusing 
solely on effectiveness leads to achieving objectives at any cost, which aside from being 
                                                 
11 For example: “do pupils pass exams?” or “are jobs created as a result of local economic policies?” (Boyne, 
2002, p.18). 
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unrealistic, is undesirable when dealing with public money. Therefore, Jones and Pendlebury 
(2000, p. 11) argue that “the praiseworthy achievement is to satisfy the objectives at the 
minimum cost.” In this sense, the concept of ‘efficiency’ plays an important role.  
Defined as the ratio of outputs to inputs, efficiency captures both economy and effectiveness 
at the same time. As a result, efficiency can stand on its own and has thus been used as a basis 
for performance evaluation in the private sector. In the public sector, however, reliance on 
efficiency is problematic for four reasons. These four reasons are discussed further below and 
refer mainly to Jones and Pendlebury (2000, ch. 1). Firstly, efficiency is defined as a ratio, and 
a ratio is not an absolute. Rather, a ratio only becomes meaningful when the efficiency ratios 
of, say, two organisations are compared, or are from the same organisation but from different 
years. Its meaning is thus relative. Secondly, a ratio can be improved in several ways: (i) 
maintaining the same level of inputs but increasing the outputs, (ii) increasing both outputs and 
inputs but increasing outputs in a greater proportion, (iii) maintaining the level of outputs but 
reducing inputs, and (iv) decreasing both inputs and outputs but decreasing inputs in a greater 
proportion than outputs. These provide the opportunity to present a better ratio without 
performance actually improving.  
The next two reasons are significant and fundamental. If outputs are measured in monetary 
terms, the ability of output measures to capture consumer preferences will determine the quality 
of the ratio. However, the public sector faces a common problem of market failure, with 
nationalised industries occupying the right to monopoly as the classic example. Suppliers 
operating under monopoly rights can improve the efficiency ratio by increasing charges; the 
implication of this strategy, however, is that any operating inefficiency is passed on to the 
consumers, who have no other option except to pay the increased price. In cases where outputs 
cannot be measured in monetary terms, efficiency ratios have to use outputs measured in 
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physical units. The effect of this is that “ratio can no longer be a universal standard because the 
physical output measure is only a surrogate for the ultimate output” (Jones and Pendlebury, 
2000, p.12).  
Ideally, a calculation of the efficiency ratio should use high level outputs (outcomes), but as 
this is impractical,12 low level outputs are often used instead. Two disadvantages of using low 
level outputs in an efficiency ratio are (i) the ratio tells us that the activity is efficient but it only 
achieves very limited objectives cheaply, and (ii) the ratio “can only be used comparatively, 
and even then they can only be used when comparing like goods and services” (Jones and 
Pendlebury, 2000, p. 12). Given the limitations of each concept, economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness should be judged together; focusing on one is insufficient to gauge public sector 
performance. This explains the necessity from an accounting perspective of a multidimensional 
concept of performance in the public sector.  
The public sector also has multiple stakeholders with different objectives and interests.13 These 
multiple objectives tend to be ambiguous and complex, and sometimes even conflict with one 
another (Jackson, 2011; Propper and Wilson, 2003). For example, financial performance is 
usually the treasury’s interest, effectiveness of policy tends to be parliament’s interest, and 
quality of public services, consumers’ interest. Given the different interests, there is unlikely 
to be a uniform definition of public sector performance for these different stakeholders. For 
this reason, Carter (1991) considers the concept of performance in the public sector to be 
“vague”; Bovaird (1996) and Smith (1995) share a similar view. One conclusion to be drawn 
                                                 
12 High level outputs (outcomes) are unmeasurable (see previous explanation, p.16). 
13 The existence of multiple stakeholders also causes complex accountability relationships which eventually 
impact upon performance measurement. A detailed discussion of these complex accountability relationships is 
provided in Smith (1990) and Steward (1984).  
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from this is that what constitutes performance is determined by the stakeholders’ objectives 
and interests.  
Thus, the complex and multidimensional concept of performance is derived from the 
characteristics of the public sector, which is different from the private one. Performance in the 
public sector can be conceptualised into three elements: inputs, outputs and outcomes, which 
can also be expressed as economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. The concepts should, 
however, be judged as a whole. Some authors suggest the inclusion of other performance 
dimensions; van Helden and Reichard (2013), for instance, add ‘equity’ and Boyne (2002) 
argues that a democratic dimension (e.g. participation) should be included.  
Two more points need to be noted here before proceeding to the next section. First, Jones and 
Pendlebury (2010, ch. 2) argue that performance is a part of a process and a learning experience 
gained by the organisation. The actual performance thus cannot be measured, and “measures 
are often referred to as indicators of performance, rather than the performance itself” (p. 26). 
Second, the history of performance measurement implies that the term does not refer to a 
particular empirical technique but instead to the application of “relevant techniques” 14  in 
observing government at work (cf. Williams, 2004). This argument supports the point made by 
Jones (2011) and quoted in the introductory chapter of this thesis regarding the very diverse 
nature of performance measurement practice.  
                                                 
14 Relevant techniques include (i) “budget and cost accounting”, (ii) “collection of data on output of government 
activities and the social conditions that could reasonably be thought to depend to some degree on successful 
government service”, (iii) “the modern survey”, and (iv) “the social survey of 1900”. The last two are relevant to 
the degree to which the techniques allow “the objective observation of the method, efficiency, product or outcome 
of government service” (Williams, 2004, p. 157). 
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2.3    Performance Measurement Systems 
The definition of ‘performance’ in the public sector has been discussed, but not yet the term 
‘measurement’. The earlier accounting literature defines measurement as “assignment of 
numbers to objects” (Ijiri, 1967, p. 22). Meanwhile, the term ‘measuring performance’ is 
defined by Bouckaert and Halligan (2008, p. 26) as “systematically collecting data by 
observing and registering performance related issues for some performance related purposes”. 
The content of ‘a system of measurement’ includes  practices, procedures, criteria, and 
standards that govern the collection of data, the analysis of the data, and the compilation of the 
results into quantitative or qualitative forms, according to Halachmi and Bouckaert, 1996, see 
p. 2), and the real process of measuring performance is complex (Van Dooren, 2005). Table 
2.1 shows ways of dividing performance measurement systems into different phases suggested 
by a number of prominent authors. It also indicates that different terminologies have been 
employed to describe similar phases.  
Authors Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Cavaluzzo and Ittner 
(2004) 
Implementation    Use 
De Lancer Julnes and 
Hozler (2001) 
Adoption    Implementation 
Van Dooren (2005) Adoption    Implementation 
Van Dooren et al. 
(2010) 
Targeting Indicator 
selection 
Data 
collection 
Analysis Reporting  
Bourne et al. (2000) Design  Implementation Use 
Table 2.1 Division of Performance Measurement Systems into Phases 
Source: Developed by author, informed by different sources 
Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) differentiate performance measurement according to two phases: 
implementation and use. Implementation refers to the formulation of, among others, outputs, 
outcomes and efficiency measures. The use of measures informs decision-making processes at 
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managerial level (e.g. setting programmes priorities and allocating resources) and higher levels 
(e.g. developing agencies’ budgets and making funding decisions). De Lancer Julnes and 
Hozler (2001) also identify two stages of a performance measurement system but use the terms 
adoption and implementation. Adoption refers to the development of outputs, outcomes and 
efficiency measures, while implementation means their actual use (e.g. strategic planning, 
resource allocation, internal control and external accountability purposes). Van Doreen (2005) 
uses similar concepts and Van Dooren et al. (2010) propose five phases of ideal performance 
measurement. The first phase is targeting, or deciding what to measure. The second is selection 
of the appropriate performance indicators to be employed. The third phase is collection of 
performance data. The fourth is analysis, which transforms data into information. The final 
phase is reporting performance information in the right formats for different stakeholders and 
users. The first two phases refer to implementation in Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) or adoption 
in De Lancer Julnes and Hozler  (2001). The next three phases (which describe the processes 
undertaken between the phases of formulating and using measures) are, however, not identified 
by either of the earlier authors. 
Bourne et al. (2000) present a study on performance measurement in private companies; their 
phase division of performance measurement systems is however helpful here.  Bourne et al. 
(2000) identify three phases of a performance measurement system: design, implementation 
and use. Design addresses questions of what to measure and how to measure. Implementation 
refers to the phase in which “systems and procedures are put in place to collect and process the 
data that enable the measurements to be made regularly” (p. 758) (this conceptualisation 
encompasses the last three phases proposed by Van Dooren et al. (2010) discussed above). Use 
refers to the use of performance measures as intended.  
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This study differentiates a performance measurement system into three phases: design, 
implementation and use (see Figure 2.2).  
        
Figure 2.2 Phases of a Performance Measurement Systems 
Source: Developed by author, informed by different sources 
In terms of division, the phases are similar to those proposed by Bourne et al. (2000); the 
difference lies in their nature. For Bourne et al. (2000), the three phases are sequential, implying 
that any revision of the system will take place after the system completes its full cycle. Our 
thesis however agrees with Van Helden et al. (2012), that assessment of performance 
measurement systems can take place during any phase; thus necessary corrections can be done 
immediately. The processes involved in each phase are discussed further below. 
2.3.1    Design  
As mentioned above, Bourne et al. (2000) define design as having two stages: identifying what 
to measure and designing measures. Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) identify ‘depth’ of 
performance in terms of three layers: the micro, meso and macro levels. Micro level 
performance is that of an individual public sector organisation and its interface with citizens or 
other organisations. Meso level performance occurs at the level of specific policy fields such 
as education, health, or environment. Finally, macro level performance relates to government-
wide or even country-wide performance. Thus, the first step is to answer the question: are we 
Design 
Implementation Use
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measuring performance at the micro, meso or macro level? Addressing this as the first step of 
designing a performance measurement system is also recommended by Van Dooren et al. 
(2010).  
Next, Smith et al. (2008) argue that a specific and strong conceptual framework is needed as a 
foundation for the measures to be developed. For example, in 1992, Kaplan and Norton 
introduced a widely adopted performance measurement system in the private sector known as 
the balanced scorecard (BSC), which was developed based on a conceptual framework 
consisting of four elements: the financial perspective, business perspective, learning 
perspective and customer perspective. BSC’s conceptual framework stems from the 
assumption that high business performance can be achieved when the four elements are taken 
into account. Performance measures in BSC are then built around these four elements (Kaplan 
and Norton, 1992).     
The third step of design is to formulate measurement techniques, which contains a broader 
meaning than ‘developing measures’ used in Bourne et al. (2000), Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) 
and De Lancer Julnes (2001). Developing measures is limited to the development of output and 
outcome measures. However, a recent trend in performance measurement is to use a composite 
performance system (Hood, 2007; Smith et al., 2008). A composite measure is one obtained 
through combining separate performance indicators into a single index; its use aims to provide 
a bigger picture and to offer a more rounded view of performance.15 Developing a composite 
measure is therefore more complex than merely developing output and outcome measures. For 
instance, formulating a weighting system (the weight to be attached to different aspects of 
                                                 
15  Examples of PMSs adopting composite measures are Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) in 
England (introduced in 2002 and aimed at assessing English local government) and the competitiveness index and 
the World Bank’s governance ratings at the international level (Hood, 2007). 
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performance that form a composite measure) is important; a scoring system also needs to be 
defined. 
It is important to note that public sector organisations are not usually able to choose the 
environment in which they operate. Some are favourable, others unfavourable, and thus the 
same outcomes may not be secured from one to another (Smith , 2006). As Smith states,  
questions therefore arise in terms of: (i) “how much local variation in performance is 
legitimately explained by uncontrollable circumstances?” (ii) “can the performance measures 
be satisfactorily adjusted to account for different environment circumstances so that they do 
offer valid comparison of local institutions?” (p. 76). Andrews et al. (2005) test the influence 
of external constraints on the CPA  and find that its score is significantly influenced by certain 
local government characteristics, such as social diversity and economic prosperity. The study 
concludes that ‘poor’ performance is partly attributable to difficult circumstances rather than 
bad choices. Thus, the CPA regime punishes local governments working under difficult 
conditions and rewards local governments operating under favourable circumstances.  
Local governments also cannot control, for example, the ethnic mix, age profile, morbidity or 
mortality of their local population, at least in the short term (McLean et al., 2007). McLean et 
al. (2007) argue that these factors come under ‘indices of deprivation’ (p. 116), showing that 
deprivation in the domain of education (for example) significantly affects the overall CPA 
score. In other words, the higher the deprivation, the lower the CPA score achieved. As the 
degree of deprivation is not the same across local authorities, its effects can differ according to 
the type of local authority and the CPA domain. Empirical findings from Andrews et al. (2005) 
and McLean et al. (2007) support Smith’s (2006) argument that, “It is for most public services 
manifestly unreasonable and misleading to compare solely on the basis of unadjusted 
performance indicators” (Smith, 2006, p.76). 
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Therefore, Barnow and Heinrich (2010) recognise the importance of developing techniques to 
account for uncontrollable factors or procedures to adjust performance standards, although 
designers rarely go this far. In other words, the ‘design’ phase, should not stop at developing 
measures but should continue the developing procedures to account for uncontrollable factors. 
The objective is to create a fair performance measurement system. Relevant techniques have 
been developed in the education sector (such as the use of value added) but remain under-
developed for other sectors (Propper and Wilson, 2003). The technique isolates the impact that 
the school environment has on student progress between two points in time. The mechanism 
incorporates prior attainment, helping to account for factors beyond the school’s control, such 
as family background and other personal characteristics. The development of net outcome 
measures is much less advanced in other sectors. Barnow and Heinrich (2010) also show that 
there are still few cases where “adjustments to performance standards have been considered, 
and even fewer in which they have actually been applied” (p. 68).  
2.3.2    Implementation  
As defined earlier, implementation covers all the steps needing to be undertaken from the time 
the system is ready to be put in place until performance information has been produced and is 
ready to be used by stakeholders. The main steps include data collection, data analysis and 
reporting the performance information in whatever forms are specified in the system design of 
the performance measurement systems. Bourne et al.’s (2000) conceptualisation of 
‘implementation’ agrees with Poister’s (2003) definition:  
Implementation of a performance measurement system means collecting 
and processing all the required data within deadlines, ‘running the data’ 
and disseminating performance reports to the designated users on a timely 
basis, and reviewing the data to track performance and use this 
information as an additional input into decision making. It also includes 
initiating quality assurance procedures and instituting checks in data 
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collection procedures where practical to identify “stray values” and 
otherwise erroneous data. (Poister, 2003, p. 30)  
The phase of implementation may also include pilot testing for a new performance 
measurement system and user training (Jääskeläinen and Sillanpää, 2013; Van Helden et al., 
2012). In the case of the Governmental Performance Results Act (GPRA) 1993 in the US, for 
example, the first four years were used as a pilot test.16 Epstein (1996) notes that many critical 
issues and obstacles were discovered during the pilot test which implies that the problems took 
years to overcome before the real implementation of the GPRA could be done. Epstein (1996) 
is supported by Berman and Wang (2000), who suggest: “initial small-scale efforts help 
identify and address capacity shortfalls” (p. 417). A new system of measurement for research 
performance in the UK called the Research Excellence Framework (REF) also went through a 
pilot test in 2010 before the first real research performance assessment  took place in 2014.  
2.3.3    Use  
The increased interest in performance measurement has been driven by the fundamental 
premise that it is critical to ensuring improvement to the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
service delivery. This is especially pertinent given the limited amount of public resources 
available (Jones, 2001): 
This increase in measurement has a fundamental premise: that – given 
scarce resources – explicit measurement of the quantity, if not quality, of 
services provided, linked to measurement of resources consumed, 
produces better services. (Jones, 2001, p.5461) 
The key words in the quote above are ‘resources consumed’, ‘quantity’ of services and ‘quality’ 
of services. As defined earlier, resources consumed to provide public services means inputs. 
                                                 
16 The legislation on the GPRA was signed by the President Clinton on 3 August, 1993 but the first year of its 
requirement only came into effect at the beginning of October 1997 (Radin 2000; 1998). 
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The link between inputs and quantity of services is efficiency; the link between inputs and 
quality of services is effectiveness (see discussion in Section 2.2). 
Other literature suggests that the value of performance measurement relates to improved 
accountability as well as improved performance (Ammons and Rivenbark, 2008; Barnow and 
Heinrich, 2010; Halachmi, 2002; 2005b; Perrin, 1998; Wholey and Hatry, 1992). 
Accountability needs to be improved because “taxpayers want to know what they are getting 
for their tax dollars…” (Greiner, 1996, p. 36). The usefulness of performance measurement in 
terms of accountability derives from two assumptions: namely, that performance measurement 
helps an organisation to achieve its objectives and to provide stakeholders with relevant 
information (Lee, 2008). Recent literature also indicates the possibility for performance 
measurement to expand still further to address the fiscal problems faced by many developed 
economies following the 2007-09 global financial and economic crises (Talbot, 2010; Van 
Dooren et al., 2010) and the scarcity of resources that such problems imply. 
The fundamental premise of performance measurement implies that the primary use of 
performance information is to improve the performance of public sector organisations in terms 
of efficiency and effectiveness. Measuring performance is also intended to serve various other 
purposes. Some authors provide lists of potential uses of performance information, and Van 
Dooren et al. (2010) offer perhaps the longest list of those potential uses, containing 44 items. Other 
authors propose the classification of uses into different categories. Speklé and Verbeeten (2014), 
for example, distinguish between: operational use (operational planning and process 
monitoring), incentive-orientated use (target setting, incentives and rewards), and exploratory 
use (priority setting, double loop learning and policy development).  
To sum up, performance measurement systems consist of design, implementation and use 
phases and each phase contains various elements, as summarised in Table 2.2 below.  
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Phase Activity 
Design 1. Identifying target of measurement (what to measure) 
2. Developing measurement framework  
3. Formulating measurement techniques (how to measure) 
4. Developing techniques to account for uncontrollable factors 
Implementation 1. Piloting a new measurement system 
2. Training the users  
3. Collecting performance data 
4. Analysing performance data 
5. Reporting performance data   
Use Using performance measures as intended17 
1. Improving performance 
2. Serving accountability purpose 
3. Evaluating performance 
4. Comparing performers 
5. Setting performance targets  
6. Planning and control 
7. Learning process 
8. Other uses  
Table 2.2 Measurement Systems Phases and Elements 
Source: Developed by author 
 
2.4    Factors Influencing Design, Implementation and Use 
2.4.1    Overview 
The previous section discusses the distinction between the design, implementation and use of 
performance measurement systems. Some factors may play roles in determining the 
effectiveness of each phase which eventually influence the effectiveness of performance 
measurement systems. Table 2.3 provides an overview of studies that have examined the 
influences of various factors in the design and use of performance measurement systems.  
                                                 
17 Different from the items for design and implementation, the items in use do not have an implied order.   
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Author(s) Topic Empirical 
focus 
Research 
method 
Factors examined in the study Key findings Stream of 
literature 
Cavaluzzo and 
Ittner (2004) 
Factors influencing 
design and use of 
performance 
measurement  
US Federal 
Government  
Survey Technical Factors: 
- Limitations of information systems/data 
problems 
- Metric difficulties 
Organisational Factors: 
- Top management commitment 
- Decision-making authority 
- Training 
- Legislative mandate  
Design and use are influenced by 
technical and organisational factors. 
Some of the technical and 
organisational factors interact to 
influence the measurement system, 
often in a complex manner. 
Accounting 
De Lancer 
Julnes and 
Hozler (2001) 
Factors influencing 
design and use of 
performance 
measurement 
US State and 
Local 
governments  
Survey Rational/Technocratic Factors: 
- Resources 
- Information 
- Goal orientation (i.e. a consensus on 
programme goals) 
- External requirement 
Political/Cultural Factors: 
- Internal requirement 
- Internal interest groups (managers and line 
staff) 
- External interest groups (elected officials and 
citizens) 
- Risk taking 
- Attitudes 
Design is influenced more by rational 
factors, whereas use is influenced by 
political and cultural factors. 
Public 
administration 
Van Dooren 
(2005) 
Factors influencing 
design and use of 
performance 
measurement 
Ministry of 
the Flemish 
Community in 
Belgium 
Survey Measurability 
Political Interests (i.e. support from elected officials) 
Size 
Discretion 
Means  
Goal orientation (i.e. the linkage between goals and 
performance measurement) 
Organisations with more observable 
outputs measure more than the ones 
with more intangibles outputs. Then, 
bigger organisation also measure more 
than smaller one.  
Public 
management  
Berman and 
Wang (2005) 
Factors influencing 
design and 
implementation of 
performance 
measurement  
US counties 
with 
populations 
over 50,000 
Survey  Technical/Infrastructure Capacity: 
- Ability to relate outputs to operations 
- Ability to collect data in a timely manner 
- Presence of staff capable of analysing 
performance data 
- Presence of adequate information technology   
Political/Stakeholder Capacity: 
- Support from department heads 
- Support from elected officials  
The success of performance 
measurement is greatly affected by 
counties’ underlying organisational 
capacity (i.e. adequate stakeholder 
support and technical abilities) 
Public 
administration 
Yang and Hsieh 
(2007) 
Factors influencing 
design and managerial 
All 
government 
Survey Political environment (i.e. political support) The implementation of performance 
measurement is inseparable from the 
-  
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effectiveness of 
performance 
management 
units and 12  
district 
governments 
in Taiwan 
External stakeholder participation (i.e. involvement 
of elected officials and citizens) 
Organisational support (i.e. support from both top 
management and the subsystems of the 
organisation) 
Training 
evolution of politics and democratic 
governance, which suggests that the 
integration of political science 
constructs such as political support and 
organisational theory constructs such as 
organisational support provide a better 
explanation for the public management 
phenomenon.  
Abernethy and 
Lillis (2001) 
Interdependencies 
between service 
innovation, structural 
autonomy, and PMS 
design 
149 teaching 
hospitals in 
Australia 
Survey Strategic choices 
Organisational structure 
Performance measurement system 
 
A fit among strategy, structure and the 
performance measurement system is 
likely to bring better organisational 
performance in in terms of efficiency 
and effectiveness. 
Accounting 
Verbateen 
(2008) 
Performance 
management practices 
in public sector 
organisations impact 
on performance  
Public sector 
organizations 
in the 
Netherlands 
Survey  Clear and measurable goals 
Incentives 
The definition of clear and measurable 
goals is positively associated with 
quantity and quality of performance. 
The use of incentives is positively 
associated with quantity of performance 
but not quality.  
Accounting 
Speklé and 
Verbeeten 
(2014) 
Use of PMSs in the 
public sector  
Organisational 
units within 
the Dutch 
public sector 
Survey  Contractibility, which encompasses: 
- Clarity of goals 
- Ability to select undistorted performance 
metrics 
- Degree to which managers know and control 
the transformation process 
The effectiveness of the introduction of 
performance measurement systems in 
public sector organisations depends on 
contractibility and how the system is 
being used by managers. 
Accounting 
Moynihan and 
Pandey (2010) 
Factors influencing 
use of performance 
information 
The US local 
governments 
with 
populations 
over 50,000 
Survey Individual beliefs: 
- Public service motivation 
Job attributes: 
- Reward expectation 
- Generalist leader 
- Task-specific experience 
Organisational Factors: 
- Information availability 
- Development culture 
- Flexibility 
- Budged staff takes adversarial role 
External Factors: 
- Citizen participation 
- Professional Influence 
Public service motivation, leadership 
role, information availability, 
organizational culture, and 
administrative flexibility all affect 
performance information use. 
 
Public 
administration 
Table 2.3 Overview of Studies Examining Factors Influencing Design and Use 
Source: Developed by author  
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From Table 2.3, I can make some observations. First, the existing studies have covered various 
factors that influence design and use but not yet implementation, or at least, factors influencing 
implementation phase have not been made explicit. Berman and Wang (2000) find that having 
staff capable of analysing performance data distinguishes between high and low use of 
performance measurement in the US counties. This finding implies that the capacity of human 
resources influences implementation.18 The focus on design and use phases is understandable 
due to the unclear definition and lack of agreement among authors in terms of what is to be 
included as the implementation phase discussed earlier. Therefore, making it clear what 
specific factors influence implementation will fill in the gap in the literature and respond to the 
call of Van Helden et al. (2012) who have also pointed out this problem.  
Second, different studies have examined different sets of factors, with limited consistency in 
the way in which they conceptualise and classify those factors. For example, Cavaluzzo and 
Ittner (2004) made a distinction between ‘technical’ and ‘organisational’ factors, while De 
Lancer Julnes and Hozler (2001) differentiate between ‘rational/technocratic’ and 
‘political/cultural’ factors. The construct ‘metric difficulties’ in Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) 
associates with ‘measurability’ in Van Dooren (2005) and corresponds to ‘contractibility’ in 
Speklé and Verbeeten (2014). Essentially, the three studies talk about the ability to define 
measures. Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) for example, refer metric difficulties to: 
1) difficulties in determining meaningful measures 
2) results occur too far into the future to be measured 
3) difficulties in distinguishing between results produced by the programme and results 
caused by other factors 
                                                 
18 The implementation phase includes data analysis (see Section 2.3.2) 
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4) difficulties in determining how to use performance information to improve the 
programme or to set new or revise existing performance goals 
Cavaluzzo and Ittner relate the difficulties mentioned above to some features common to many 
Federal programmes, including: 
a. Complex interaction of activities and objectives from different tiers of government (i.e. 
Federal, state and local government) 
b. Outcomes of complex systems which are largely beyond government control (e.g. 
programmes related to ecosystems) 
c. Attribution of performance to a particular function  
d. Difficulties in measuring many government goals (e.g. social welfare) 
Van Dooren (2005) relates measurability to “the characteristics of outputs and outcomes of the 
organisation” (p. 372). As he state, by their nature, some outputs and effects are easier to 
measure. For example, more tangible outputs can be measured in a more precise way than non-
tangibles. Van Dooren (2005) bases his measurability hypothesis on the work of authors such 
as Hackman and Oldman (1980) who define different types of task,19 and Wilson (1989) who 
defines a typology of organisations based on observability of their outputs.20 The argument is 
that performance measurement will be easier for organisations with more observable outputs 
(e.g. those dealing with housing) than the opposite (e.g. embassies and cultural institutions).   
Furthermore, the construct ‘contractibility’ in Speklé and Verbeeten (2014, p 134) refers to the 
degree to which an accumulation of three conditions can be met simultaneously: 
1) “Organisational goals can be specified unambiguously in advance” 
                                                 
19 Tasks with high routine and low ambiguity, tasks with average routine and ambiguity, and tasks with high 
routine and low ambiguity. 
20 Production, procedural, craft, and copying organisations. 
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2) “The organisation is able to select undistorted performance measures (i.e. metrics that 
provide incentives that are adequately aligned with the organisations’ ultimate 
objective”  
3) “Organisational actors know and control the production function that transforms efforts 
into results, and are able to predict the likely outcomes of alternative courses of action” 
Garbage collection is as an example of a high contractibility activity, while activities such as 
child protection services, foreign affairs and community development are examples of low 
contractibility. Contractibility is low when “actors are unable fully to specify the attributes of 
satisfactory performance, or when manager’s systemic influence on the ultimate outcome is 
restricted or unknown”. 
Third, the use of similar terms may refer to different conceptions or vice versa. For example, 
‘organisational factors’ in Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) consists of very different elements to 
the ‘organisational factors’ of Moynihan and Pandey (2010). ‘Information availability’ is 
categorised as an organisational factor by Moynihan and Pandey, whereas Cavaluzzo and Ittner 
classify it as a technical factor. Berman and Wang’s (2000) construct ‘technical/infrastructure 
capacity’ encompasses elements of both technical and organisational factors in Cavaluzzo and 
Ittner (2004).21 In another example, ‘goal orientation’ in De Lancer Julnes and Hozler (2001) 
means a consensus on programme goals, while Van Dooren (2005) defines it as the linkage 
between goals and performance measurement.  
Furthermore, De Lancer Julnes and Hozler (2001) term support from internal organisation (i.e. 
managers and line staff) ‘internal interest groups’, while Yang and Hsieh (2007) call this 
                                                 
21 Berman and Wang (2000) operationalise technical capacity as: 1) being able to collect data in a timely way, 2) 
having adequate information technology, 3) having staff capable of analysing performance data, and 4) being able 
to relate outputs to programmes operations. Points 1, 2 and 4 are categorised as technical factors in Cavaluzzo and 
Ittner (2004) while point 3 can be associated with ‘training’ (organisational factor) in Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004). 
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‘organisational support.’ Support from elected officials is termed ‘political interests’ by Van 
Dooren (2005), ‘external interest groups’ by De Lancer Julnes and Hozler (2001) and 
‘stakeholder/political capacity’ by Berman and Wang (2000), 22  This limited consistency 
implies a lack of communication among different streams of literature on public sector 
performance measurement research, an issue which has also been highlighted by Van Helden 
et al. (2012). For example, Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004), who represent accounting literature, 
do not cite De Lancer Julnes and Hozler (2001), who represent public administration literature. 
Moreover, Van Dooren (2005), who represents public management literature also does not cite 
Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004). Given the multidisciplinary nature of public sector performance 
measurement research, establishing communication among different streams of literature will 
benefit performance measurement research and help to reduce the confusion for those who are 
interested in researching this field.  
2.4.2    Approaches to Studying Design, Implementation and Use 
Contingency-based Approaches 
The studies presented in Table 2.3 can be categorised as contingency-based studies, which 
represent the predominant type of research on public sector performance management and 
measurement (Van Helden and Reichard, 2013). The contingency-based approach in public 
sector performance measurement systems research means that research seeks for a fit between 
performance measurement systems and contexts. This type of research is drawn from 
contingency theory, which was developed within organisational theory in the 1960s (Chenhall, 
2003; Otley, 1980).  
                                                 
22  The ‘external interest groups’ of De Lancer Julnes and Hozler (2001) also cover support from citizens. 
Meanwhile, Berman and Wang’s (2000) ‘stakeholder/political capacity’ also includes citizen participation and 
top management commitment (i.e. support from department heads). 
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The contingency-based approach is also applied in accounting research, particularly in the field 
of management accounting. According to Otley (1980, p. 416), the popularity of contingency 
approaches to the design of accounting information systems in the 1970s was contributed to by 
both “empirically necessity and the availability of a ready-made theory [contingency 
formulations within organisational theory]”. These can be explained as follows. First, a 
universal framework could not satisfactorily resolve conflicting results of management 
accounting research and therefore a contingency theory of management accounting emerged 
as “a necessary means of interpreting the results of empirical research… to explain apparently 
contradictory findings” (p. 414). 
Three general contingent variables (technology, organisational structure and environment) 
have been prominent in the theoretical development of contingency theories of management 
accounting. These factors seem to explain the different accounting systems found from one 
situation to another. Thus, in the 1970s, management accounting research was characterised by 
the move from a universalistic approach to a contingent approach. Second, the popularity of 
the contingency approach in management accounting research relates to the prior development 
of the contingency theory of organisations (the major reason). As Otley describes, “During the 
1960’s organisation theory underwent a major upheaval which led to the construction of a 
through-ongoing contingency theory”. By the early 1970s, contingency theory had been 
strongly established as the dominant approach in organisation theory (cf. Otley, 1980, p.416).  
A more recent review of the application of contingency frameworks in management accounting 
research (see Chenhall, 2003) indicates that research has tended to focus on contemporary 
aspects of the environment, technologies and structural arrangements. The studies draw on the 
original organisational theory to develop arguments that help explain how contemporary 
settings influence the effectiveness of management control systems. The relevance of 
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additional contextual variables to the design of management control system (i.e. the role of 
strategy) has also been considered.    
Overall, Chenhall’s review indicates that the existing literature (i.e. contingency-based studies) 
have examined six common contextual variables: 1) external environment, 2) technology 
(traditional and contemporary), 3) organisational structure, 4) size, 5) strategy, and 6) national 
culture. As at the foundation of contingency-based research, the external environment is a 
powerful contextual variable and will continue to be a central element of context in 
contingency-based research. One important development in research in this field relates to 
incorporating the national culture factor, which represents “an extension of contingency-based 
research from its organisational foundations into more sociological concerns”23 (Chenhall, 
2003, p. 154). 
The main argument of contingency-based studies is that there is no one universal design for a 
management accounting system; instead it is contingent or depends on the contextual factors 
in which organisations operate (Chenhall, 2003; Otley, 1980). A good fit will bring enhanced 
performance, whereas a poor fit will cause diminished performance (Otley, 1980; Chenhall, 
2003). Thus, in the context of public sector performance measurement systems research, a good 
fit between the design of performance measurements systems and their context is expected to 
improve organisational performance or vice versa (Van Helden and Reirchard, 2013). 
Abernethy and Lilis (2001), for example, show how the fit between strategic choices, 
organisational structures and performance measurement systems helped to improve 
performance in Australian teaching hospitals.  
                                                 
23 The inclusion of national culture influence is based on the proposition that different countries possess particular 
cultural characteristics. Development of companies’ multinational operations was a reason for the culture element 
to become important in the design of management control systems (Chenhall, 2003). 
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As the term contingency means that something is true only under specific conditions, actually 
there is no such thing as a ‘contingency theory.’ Instead, a variety of theories may be used to 
explain and predict the conditions under which particular accounting tools (e.g. performance 
measurement systems) will be found or will be associated with improved performance. As 
mentioned earlier, contingency-based research has its foundations in organisational theory, 
which considers contextual variables only at the organisational level. A criticism of 
contingency-based research relates to its reliance on traditional, functionalist theories; it has 
not applied more interpretive and critical views (cf. Chenhall, 2003, pp. 157-159).  
Chenhall (2003) recognises that some researchers have provided an interpretive and critical 
focus in management accounting research through using alternative approaches derived from 
sociology. Alternative approaches imply a rejection of the assumptions upon which 
functionalist contingency research is based. An advantage of the alternatives approaches is that 
research can show the potential conflict between individuals and groups and how accounting 
tools may be implicated in these struggles. From these perspectives, accounting tools do not 
necessarily lead to enhanced effectiveness; groups within the organisation or within society at 
large may use accounting tools for political and power purposes and are not associated with 
the welfare of the organisation. 
An important issue regarding the appropriateness of combining ‘alternative’ theories of 
management control systems with traditional, functionalist models is highlighted in Chenhall’s 
review. Although alternative approaches have different theoretical and philosophical bases, he 
recognises that contingency-based ideas have been used to develop convergence between these 
approaches by some researchers. Scott (1987) argues that many of the insights concerning the 
role of institutions within society on the adoption of management control systems can be 
combined readily into contingency frameworks. Chenhall (2003) argues that contingency-
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based approaches can be used to examine how power is implicated in the adoption and use of 
management control systems to effect resource distribution or induce change: “A contingency-
based approach attempts to map variables and demonstrate potential relationships between 
these variables, which may include power and politics, and indicate potential links with 
outcomes” (p. 160).  
Chenhall’s review offers some important conclusions. First, the study of management control 
systems using contingency-based approaches departs from the assumption that managers act 
with an intent to “adapt their organisations to changes in contingencies in order to attain fit and 
enhanced performance”. Second, using original organisational theorists to study issues of 
contemporary relevance still offers many opportunities, but other approaches based in 
economics and psychology can readily be included within contingency-based frameworks. 
Third, the traditional contingency-based model can be elaborated by incorporating non-
functionalist approaches and insights drawn from ‘alternative’ theories to studying 
management control systems. Finally, contingency-based research can provide “an ordered 
way to integrate thinking about the sociological processes affecting management control 
systems in action, perhaps combining these insights with conventional elements of 
contingency-based models” (cf. Chenhall, 2003, p. 161). 
Using a similar argument to Chenhall’s (2003), Van Helden and Reichard (2013) state that the 
academic rigour of contingency-based research in public sector performance management and 
measurement systems depends on the theory used to interpret the findings. They discuss three 
main theories relevant to studying public sector performance management and measurement: 
1) variants of economic theories (e.g. agency theory or transaction cost theory); 2) variants of 
organisation theories; and 3) variants of institutional theories. These theories will be discussed 
further below (the discussion will be based on Van Helden and Reichard, 2013, pp. 16-17).  
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When research focuses on explaining the selection of particular performance indicators, 
economic theory will be useful. The use of this kind of theory is usually prescriptive (e.g. 
assessing the contribution of performance indicators to improving decision-making and 
control, comparing such improvement with the costs of developing, measuring and reporting 
these indicators). When research is concerned with the effectiveness of incentives for 
managers, such as bonus systems, the use of agency theory will be appropriate. A relevant issue 
to explore, for example, relates to the influence of a pay-for-performance system which is based 
on performance indicators of organisational performance (i.e. the extent to which a pay-for-
performance system contributes to an enhanced organisational performance).   
A broad range of different approaches and explanations can be offered by organisational 
theory. Research can be focused, for instance, on understanding and interpreting the reactions 
of organisational units or actors to the implementation of a public sector performance 
measurement system or explaining impact of performance information on organisational 
performance. Then, closely related to organisational theories, the concept of neo-
institutionalism or institutional sociology can explain, for example, the reason why bureaucrats 
choose a ‘fashionable’ performance measurement system design (isomorphism) or the reason 
why politicians do not use performance information. In general, institutional theories are 
helpful to explain the design and use of performance information through understanding 
institutional forces, including politicians’ and managers’ ways of thinking.  
Van Helden and Reichard (2013) also mention the importance of behavioural theories to 
explain how certain attitudes and perceptions of decision-makers, such as politicians and 
managers, contribute to particular types of performance measurement use. From Table 2.3, 
Speklé and Verbeeten (2014) and Verbeteen (2008) are examples of contingency-based studies 
applying behavioural and economic theories. Another important point to be noted is that Van 
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Helden and Reichard’s (2013) review suggests the increasing trend for studies undertaking 
institutional perspectives in public sector performance management and measurement research.  
Institutional Approaches 
Modell (2009) provides an excellent review of the evolution of institutional research on public 
sector performance management and measurement. The review shows the different focus of 
research using institutional approaches compared to those applying contingency-based 
approaches. Institutional-based research focuses on adaptation processes in public sector 
performance management and measurement systems, whereas contingency-based studies 
assume stability in the fit between context and performance management and measurement 
systems.  
The institutional perspective therefore helps to broaden the view of performance management 
and measurement as merely “a technical or instrumental issue of devising systems for 
measuring and influencing achievement of organisational objectives to emphasize the social 
and political aspects associated with such practices”. The importance of institutional aspects of 
performance management and measurement is often connected to the multiple stakeholders of 
the public sector and the need to provide information for these different stakeholders 
(sometimes with conflicting interests as discussed earlier in Section 2.2). While it is necessary 
to maintain legitimacy, public sector organisations are also subject to regulatory and 
institutional pressures to adopt various performance management and measurement practices. 
The increasing attention on institutional aspects of performance management and measurement 
began in the mid-1990s (cf. Modell, 2009, pp. 277-278). 
The progress in institutional research on public sector performance measurement observed by 
Modell (2009) relates to the extensions of Neo-Institutional Sociology (NIS) with various 
supporting theories. The most popular research strategy to achieve this extension is through 
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juxtaposing institutional theories with predictions derived from the functionalist-centred 
assumptions of rational choice, such as economic theories and contingency theory. Cavaluzzo 
and Ittner (2004) and Van Helden and Tillema (2005) are two examples of this kind of study. 
Modell (2009) argues that the strengths of studies adopting this strategy relate to the explicit 
assessment of the validity of the rival or complementary explanations (of the adoption and/or 
use of performance management and measurement), instead of simply assuming this is 
invariably dominated by legitimacy-seeking behaviour.  
As there are many branches of institutional theory, Scott (1987) reminds us that researchers 
need to specify which kind of institutional theory they are using when adopting institutional 
theories. Authors such as Bouckaert and Halligan (2008, pp. 61-62) and Pollit (2001) suggest 
that the thesis of institutional isomorphism formulated by DiMaggio and Powel (1983) can be 
a useful theory to explain different driving forces for the development of performance 
measurement systems. DiMaggio and Powel (1983) differentiate institutional isomorphism into 
three strands: coercive isomorphism, mimetic processes and normative isomorphism.  
Coercive isomorphism presents itself when organisations receive formal and informal 
pressures from other organisations in which “they are dependent and by cultural expectations 
in the society within which organisations function” (p. 150). State and professional bodies are 
two sources of coercive influence in the current environment, and a common example of 
coercive isomorphism is when organisational change takes place as a direct response to a 
government mandate. Mimetic processes take place when organisations copy the practices of 
other organisations as a standard response to uncertainty; for example, a) organisational 
technologies are poorly understood, b) goals are ambiguous and c) the environment creates 
symbolic uncertainty (cf. DiMaggio and Powel, 1983). 
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Finally, normative pressures are associated with professionalisation. Two important sources of 
isomorphism are: a) education and legitimation in a cognitive base produced by university 
specialists; b) the growth and elaboration of professional networks that span organisations and 
across which new models diffuse rapidly. Universities and professional training institutions are 
important centres for the development of organisational norms among professional managers 
and their staff. The three types of institutional isomorphism are analytical, which means that 
their influences on a certain phenomenon under observation can work together at the same time 
(cf. DiMaggio and Powel, 1983). 
Saliterer and Korac (2013) argue that performance measurement is a complex phenomenon 
which is difficult to explain and understand using a single theory. The use of multiple theories 
will provide a more comprehensive explanation of this complex phenomenon. They use a 
contingency framework to study performance information use by politicians and managers in 
small and medium sized local governments in Austria. Their argument is consistent with 
Chenhall’s (2003) conclusion to bring insights from sociology theories and also Modell’s 
(2009) conclusion on the necessity to bridge institutional and rational choice explanations 
mentioned earlier. Bringing insights from both the institutional and rational approaches is also 
supported by Scott (1987, p. 509), who states, “Institutional arguments need not be formulated 
in opposition to rational or efficiency arguments but are better seen as complementing and 
contextualising them”. 
2.4.3    Factors Influencing Design, Implementation and Use: Further Discussions 
Applying a contingency-based approach and also taking insights from institutional theory (i.e. 
DiMaggio and Powel, 1983), this study classifies factors that might influence the design, 
implementation and use of performance measurement into three broad categories: technical, 
organisational and institutional factors. Technical factors are factors that relate to metrics and 
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data (Berman and Wang, 2000; Cavaluzzo and Ittner 2004; Speklé and Verbeeten, 2014; Van 
Dooren, 2005). Organisational factors refer to the core organisational elements such as 
resources needed to support performance measurement initiatives, organisational support, and 
decision-making authority (Cavaluzzo and Ittner 2004; De Lancer Julnes and Hozler, 2001; 
Van Dooren, 2005; Yang and Hsieh, 2007). Institutional factors comprise cultural and political 
elements of the context where the performance measurement system is being applied (Scott, 
1987; Modell, 2009).  
Design Factors  
Technical Factors 
The existing literature suggest that the ability to define measures influences measure 
development (Cavaluzzo and Ittner, 2004; Van Dooren, 2005). The findings of Cavaluzzo and 
Ittner (2004) show that measure development is negatively associated with metric difficulties. 
More clearly, difficulty in selecting and defining meaningful measures significantly hampers 
measure development. Van Dooren (2005) finds that measure development is higher in 
organisations with more routine-based services than the opposite. Jones and Pendlebury (2010, 
see ch.2, pp. 27-29) note six measurement challenges when measurement systems rely on non-
financial measures: 1) measurement of costs, 2) reliability of output measures, 3) causal 
relationships between inputs and outputs, 4) narrowness of output measures, 5) 
comprehensiveness versus concision, and 6) controllability of performance. It is plausible to 
elaborate these challenges to the metric difficulties of Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) and other 
related studies.  
First, performance measurement requires the measurement of costs of providing services on a 
full accrual basis. The challenge is how to distinguish “the cases where full costs are required… 
and those where full costs are not relevant” (Jones and Pendlebury, 2010, p.27). As they say, 
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in this sense, the public sector shares the same challenge as the private sector. The typical 
challenge for government is the large proportion of costs which cannot naturally be traced to 
outputs and outcomes. As a result, significant amounts of arbitrary allocated costs are 
unavoidable, which means that the accuracy of data reported is questionable.  
Measures that capture costs of services provided (e.g. efficiency measures) are important 
measures for organisations (see the discussion about the importance of efficiency measures in 
Section 2.2). Jones and Pendlebury (2010, ch. 2) argue that from an accounting perspective, 
performance measurement is meaningless when it does not take into account the costs of 
services provided. The difficulties of developing efficiency measures are connected to the 
capacity of an organisation’s costs accounting system (Montesinos and Brusca, 2011; Ammons 
and Rivenbark, 2008). This point will be explored further later in the discussion about ICT 
capacity/data availability in this sub-section. As the difficulties in developing efficiency 
measures connect to the capacity of cost accounting systems, which is part of an organisation’s 
ICT system, the challenge of measuring cost can be associated with the limitations of 
information systems/data problems discussed in Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004).24    
Second, “reliability of output measures” refers to the fact that non-financial databases are not 
auditable in the same way as financial databases. With financial databases, bank statements 
provide a control mechanism for money coming in and out of the system and allow an 
independent check of financial records during the audit process. However, no comparable 
control mechanism is used for non-financial databases (cf. Jones and Pendlebury, 2010, p. 27). 
The same argument has been put forward in earlier studies (see Pendlebury et al., 1994). With 
                                                 
24 Limitation of information system/data problems in Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) is defined as problems providing 
necessary, relevant, reliable and valid performance data in a timely and cost-effective manner. 
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no control mechanism available, outputs measures can be easily distorted (Schick, 2001), 
which means that their reliability is questionable. 
Commenting on the spread use of composite measures, Hood (2007, p. 100) says that relatively 
little is still known about the validity and reliability of complex composite performance 
measurement systems. Quantification is prone to errors. Talbot (2010, pp. 40-41) provides a 
similar argument: four types of error are presented in Table 2.4 below. 
Type of error Description 
Simple mistakes Clerical errors, such as inadvertent double-counting or 
omissions at the source of data collection. 
Sampling error The indicator, time-period or sub-unit taken is not 
representative or the overall population. 
Categorisation errors Perplexity about how to fit cases into categories may result in 
faulty assignment of those cases. 
Gaming or cheating Deliberate massaging or outright fabrication of numbers 
collected with the intention of improving the position of an 
individual or organisation. 
Table 2.4 Classification of Measurement Errors 
Source: Hood (2007, p.100) 
The reliability of output measures may not have an effect on design, but it will affect the use 
phase of performance measurement systems; unreliable measures may discourage policy-
makers from using measures to inform decision-making (this will be discussed further in 
Section 2.4.3). The reliability of output measures also corresponds to the limitation of 
information system/data problems of Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004).   
Third, “causal relationships between inputs and outputs” means establishing causal 
relationships between inputs, outputs, and outcomes reliably (Jones and Pendlebury, 2010, p. 
27) and manifests the ‘essential’ problem of measuring performance in the public sector (Jones 
and Pendlebury, 2000, p. 226). Causality issues or attribution problems are discussed in 
Berman and Wang (2000), Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) and recent literature (see Speklé and 
Verbeeten, 2014). The first point of technical capacity conceptualisation in Berman and Wang 
(2000) is the ability to relate outputs to operations (see Table 2.4). Point (3) of Cavaluzzo and 
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Ittner’s (2004) definition of metric difficulties is on difficulties in distinguishing between 
results produced by programmes and results caused by other factors (see p. 20). Finally, point 
(3) of Speklé and Verbeeten (2014) states: “organisational actors know and control the 
production function that transforms efforts into results, and are able to predict the likely 
outcomes of alternative outcomes” (see p. 22). All of these definitions refer to causality.  
It is not easy to make a direct connection between outputs and operations, as the nature of 
outputs and outcomes in the public sector means that they are very often a joint production of 
different units/organisations (Greiner, 1996; Jackson, 2011; Smith, 1995b); producing the 
desired output may even extend to involving private sector organisations. When an output falls 
into the category of cross-cutting departments, the attribution of performance is difficult. 
Authors such as Keenan (2000), Schick (1973), and Jones and Pendlebury (2000, ch. 4) note 
the cross-cutting departmental problem as one of reasons for the failure of the earlier 
performance measurement initiative, PPBS in the US in the 1970s. 
The causality problem has also been widely recognised in other studies (see Bouckaert and 
Halligan, 2008, p.15; Greiner, 1996, p. 25; HM Treasury, 1988, p. 20; Jones, 1994, pp. 46-48; 
Jones and Pendlebury, 2000, p. 226; Wholey and Hatry, 1992, p. 608). As demonstrated in 
Figure 2.3, performance measurement needs to recognise changing environments and look for 
a base case as comparison, as certain factors influence the process of converting inputs into 
outputs and outcomes.  
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Figure 2.3 An Evaluation Framework 
Source: HM Treasury (1988, p. 20) 
Establishing causal relationships thus addresses the question, “Would this all have happened 
anyway?” (Jones, 1994, p. 47). Greiner (1996) and Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) analogise 
the process of converting inputs into outputs and outcomes in the public sector as a black box, 
meaning that we lack understanding of the process which converts inputs into outcomes. The 
process in the public sector is different from the manufacturing production process, where we 
can easily establish the link from X units of inputs into Y unit of outputs. This lack of a theory 
to explain the relationship between inputs, outputs and outcomes in public sector organisations 
usually causes the outputs and outcomes to be determined by service professionals and 
politicians. This, in turn, fundamentally affects inputs (the primary concern of accounting) 
(Jones and Pendlebury, 2010, ch. 2). 
Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) find that public managers in the US experience difficulties in 
associating their activities with future results and distinguishing between results produced by 
the programme and results produced from other factors. A study in Australia suggests a similar 
finding. Here, public managers consider outcomes measures to be important information. 
Nevertheless, they seem reluctant to develop them, because the outcome could be influenced 
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by other factors outside their control (Lee, 2008). Thus these findings provide empirical 
evidence of how causality issues affect design.  
Fourth, “narrowness of output measures” is the term used by Jones and Pendlebury (2010, p. 
28) to express the difficulty in comparing measures across different services, even within a 
single service.25 The key point is that different services that governments might provide are not 
comparable with each other. Even within a single service, comparison is difficult to make. Take 
education services as an example: comparisons cannot be made between numbers of students 
at secondary schools and primary schools. Although at the same school, the experiences of 
teachers and students in one year will be not the same as those in the previous year. Thus, when 
measuring performance includes all kind of services that governments might provide, 
“performance measurement primarily using non-financial output measures is necessarily 
diffuse”(p.28). Measurement will be easier when the focus of measurement is made more 
specific. However, when measures focus on “complex, multiservice governments or on 
complex single service within a government, measures will have to be very many. These will 
not be comparable and will not be capable of being understood in the context of a complex 
service or government as a whole” (Jones and Pendlebury, 2010, p. 28).    
An empirical example of problems with measure comparability is given in Ammons and 
Rivenbark (2008), who study a performance measurement project involving 15 cities in North 
Carolina, USA. As they describe, in responding to the complexities of measuring efficiency, 
many local authorities choose to use full-time equivalent (FTE) per thousand population (cost 
per capita) for both overall services provided by local authorities and services provided by a 
specific department. Using FTEs, local authorities contracting out one or more main functions, 
                                                 
25 This challenge relate to the discussion about disadvantages of efficiency measures discussed in Section 2.2 
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however, show better performance than local authorities which choose to run the functions 
themselves.  
Costs per capita of services provided by local authorities are obtained from total local budget 
divided by number of population. These costs are then compared between different 
jurisdictions. However, this kind of comparison ignores the differences in terms of the quality 
and ranges of services provided by different jurisdictions. Parks and fire services for instance, 
are costly functions, and in some cases (as noted by Ammons and Rivenbark, 2008), local 
governments are not responsible for these, as they are handled instead by the county 
government. In terms of total costs per capita, therefore, this type of local government will 
appears more efficient than other local governments which are responsible for both functions.  
This problem can be addressed through “per capita cost comparisons on a function-by-function 
basis” (Ammons and Rivenbark, 2008, p. 310). However, cost accounting systems differ 
between cities, causing low comparability of the costs reported. Ammons and Rivenbark’s 
(2008) finding confirms Jones and Pendlebury’s (2000) argument that efficiency measures can 
only be used to compare like goods and services (see Section 2.2).  Efficiency measures in the 
form of unit costs merely “raise the red flag”. Further investigation is needed to find out why 
there are two results when comparing the performance of two jurisdictions (Jones and 
Pendlebury, 2000, pp. 219-220). For this reason, Ammons and Rivenbark (2008) say that FTEs 
are seen as an “extremely crude measure” of efficiency (p. 310).  
The broader the context of where performance measurement systems will be applied, the more 
problematic will be the comparability of measures. Similarly, the more diverse the context of 
where performance measurement systems will be applied, the more difficult it will be to design 
comparable measures. Therefore, the larger the scope of measurement, the less comparable the 
measures will be (cf. Jones and Pendlebury, 2010, p.28).  This argument is supported by Radin 
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(2000): “reform [performance measurement] can be best handled in the context of specific 
programme areas” (p.134). I will use the term ‘comparability of measures’ instead of 
‘narrowness of output measures’ because the meaning of the former seems to be clearer. The 
point about comparability of measures discussed by Jones and Pendlebury corresponds to the 
construct measurability of Van Dooren (2005), which implies the ability to define measures 
based on different characteristics of the outputs of different organisations mentioned earlier.  
Fifth, “comprehensiveness versus concision in reporting measures” reflects the degree of detail 
(i.e. whether measures are comprehensive or concise measures) and the level of expertise 
needed to understand measures (i.e. whether measures can only be understood by specialists or 
can be understood by non-specialists). Designers need to balance the tendency to develop very 
many measures, in order to ensure that all performance aspects of government are sufficiently 
captured, and the demand for simple and easily understandable measures. Indeed, “concise, 
partial performance measures can produce serious misunderstanding of comprehensive 
performance of a government” (p.28). At the same time, service recipients, politicians and the 
population at large are not experts (cf. Jones and Pendlebury, 2010, p. 28). For example, a 
performance measure which states that the cost of providing primary education is £X per 
10,000 populations can be understood only by an expert. The non-specialist will hardly 
understand the implications of this measure.  
Finally, “controllability of performance” relates to the previous discussion about the different 
environments in which public sector organisations operate (see discussion in Section 2.3.1). 
According to Jones and Pendlebury (2010), under a rational control system, “performance 
measurement only relates to those matters that the government can control’ (p. 28); that is, 
what is included in “the planning, execution and monitoring cycle of the government” (p. 28) 
but not anything beyond that. More precisely, the ability of an organisation to control 
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performance is limited to what is contained in the annual budget and the audited financial 
statements, beyond which public managers should not be held accountable. An earlier study 
notes, “it is pointless, and indeed unjust, to hold someone accountable for something that (s)he 
cannot control” (Jackson, 1988, p. 12).  
Point (2) of Cavaluzzo and Ittner’s (2004) definition of metric difficulties – results occur in the 
future to be measured – and points (a) and (b) of the federal government programme features 
(see discussion in point 2.4.1) imply the concern of their studies about the controllability of 
performance. Speklé and Verbeeten (2014) also express concern about this issue and state, “in 
the public sector organisations, means-end relations are often ill understood, and managers may 
be unable to predict the likely outcomes of alternative courses of action” (p. 6). It is also 
important to understand that performance is not only determined by the individual manager’s 
efforts and action choices. Decisions taken elsewhere in the organisation, the cooperation of 
external parties, and uncertain, uncontrollable events, may affect performance. In these 
situations, as Speklé and Verbeeten (2014) state, “performance measures become noisy and do 
not adequately reflect managerial achievements” (p. 6). Controllability of performance will 
influence design, as procedures need to be developed to account for the uncontrollable factors. 
The more uncontrollable factors, the more procedure adjustments need to be developed, which 
implies that the design phase will be more difficult. The more diverse the environment, the 
more difficult it is expected to be to develop procedures to adjust performance standards. 
As mentioned earlier, point (4) of Cavaluzzo and Ittner’s (2004) definition of metric difficulties 
is about unclear prescription on how to use measures (see discussion in point 2.4.1). Their study 
finds that difficulty in determining how to use measures can hamper measure development. 
Deciding how measures should be used is not straightforward. For example, performance 
measurement system development may be intended for the purpose of allocating resources. 
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Difficulties arise related to the inability of performance measures to inform under which 
circumstances resources should be increased or decreased. Greiner (1996) expresses this 
difficulty: “If performance declines, should resources be increased to overcome the problem or 
decreased to put them to better use?” (p. 27).  
Moynihan and Andrews (2010) point out that performance measurement just indicates that 
something happened, but does not tell people what decisions to make. For example, if a school 
in a particular area is performing poorly, should the government close it and shift the budget to 
a school in another area which is performing better? The answer is not straightforward; further 
analysis is needed to find out why that particular school is not performing well. It may need 
more teachers or better facilities, which implies that resources should be increased. From this 
perspective, if we go back to the question, why should the public sector exist? the answer is 
because the private sector cannot provide such resources. More clearly, “the impossibility of 
fully measuring the output of public services” is one basic reason for why the provision of 
public services cannot be left entirely to the competitive markets and why some sort of public 
sector regulation is required (Smith, 2006, p. 75). Furthermore, the immediate sanction as 
applied in the private sector – moving the investment from the less profitable company to the 
more profitable one – is hardly applicable in the public sector. Assuming a local government’s 
performance is poor, its citizens do not necessarily move to another jurisdiction with a better 
performance. Factors such as family, economic status, culture and religion can affect such a 
decision.  
From the discussion above, measurement challenges in this study refer to:  
1) Difficulties in developing measures that capture the costs of services provided 
2) Difficulties in ensuring the reliability of measures  
3) Difficulties in establishing causal relationships between inputs and outputs   
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4) Difficulties in ensuring comparability of measures 
5) Difficulties in balancing comprehensiveness versus concision in reporting measures 
6) Difficulties in addressing controllability of performance  
7) Difficulties in determining how to use measures   
In terms of ICT capacity/data availability, the findings of Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) show 
that limitations of information systems/data problems do not prevent measures from being 
developed, but do affect use. Other studies, however, show different results. Montesinos and 
Brusca (2011), for example, find that the difficulties in formulating efficiency measures in 
Spanish local government are due to the absence of a cost accounting system. Ammons and 
Rivenbark (2008) discover a similar problem and highlight that accurate measurement of 
outputs and inputs is needed to measure efficiency. However, in many governments, cost 
accounting systems tend to fail to capture total costs.26 As a result, even if unit costs are 
calculated, actual costs are understated and therefore mask inefficiency. Berman and Wang 
(2000) also find that cost accounting systems have affected the capacity of counties in the 
United States to design performance measurement systems. As accounting systems in general 
or cost accounting more specifically are part of larger ICT systems owned by organisations, 
ICT capacity can affect design.   
Based on the discussion in the previous paragraph, it implies that accrual system should have 
been in place when introducing performance measurement initiatives. This argument does not 
necessary mean that accrual accounting system is a ‘condition’ for performance measurement. 
The argument is just aimed to emphasise that the absence of accrual accounting could prevent 
development of important measures for organisations such as efficiency measures as the studies 
                                                 
26 For example, overheads or other indirect costs may be overlooked or some costs, such as annualised capital 
expenses, may be ignored.  
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of Ammons and Rivenbark (2008) and Montesinos and Brusca (2011) discovered and 
discussed earlier. This argument is also supported by Van Dooren et al. (2010, see p. 84): 
 …good performance management needs effective performance measures. 
Performance measures, or indicators, have to be calculated on the basis of 
comprehensive and consistent financial and operational data. Accruals 
accounting is therefore an essential component of better performance 
management.  
The view of Van Dooren et al. (2010) reflected from the quote above is consistent with the 
argument of Jones and Pendlebury, (2010) mentioned in the previous discussion regarding of 
the meaning of performance measurement, from accounting perspective, depends on whether 
the system take into account measurement of cost of services provided by the government (see 
discussion on p. 14).  
Organisational Factors 
Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) find that measure development is positively associated with the 
commitment of senior management. This finding is supported by other studies (Berman and 
Wang, 2000; De Lancer Julnes and Hozler, 2001; Dull, 2009; Yang and Hsieh, 2007). This is 
important because senior management can direct resources needed to support performance 
measurement initiatives. The importance of resources to support performance measurement 
initiatives is examined by De Lancer Julnes and Hozler (2001) and Van Dooren (2005). Van 
Dooren (2005) specifies that the resources needed to support performance measurement 
initiatives include financial resources, human resources and ICT infrastructures. Van Dooren 
(2005) is supported by McNab and Melese (2003), who state that introducing performance 
measurement systems requires a huge investment in ICT and human capital.  
Human resources are needed in terms of both quantity and quality. De Lancer Julnes and Hozler 
(2001) find that measure development is higher when organisations have staff devoted to 
handling performance measurement tasks. Staff and managers dealing with performance 
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measurement tasks need trainings (Cavaluzzo and Ittner, 2004; De Lancer Julnes and Hozler, 
2001; Yang and Hsieh, 2007). The findings of Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) show that the more 
training received by public managers; the better the measure development is. De Lancer Julnes 
and Hozler (2001) also find that availability of ‘information’ is positively correlated with 
design.27 According to Yang and Hsieh (2007), most government executives are familiar with 
traditional input-based process indicators but less familiar with output and outcome measures. 
That is why training is important. 
Support for a performance measurement system is important not only from senior management 
but also from middle managers and staff (De Lancer Julnes and Hozler, 2001; Poister and 
Streib, 1999; Yang and Hsieh, 2007). The reactions of the internal elements of organisations to 
change and innovation (e.g. the introduction of performance measurement systems) depends 
on their perceptions of how change and innovation will affect their job, status and personal 
ambitions (De Lancer Julnes and Hozler, 2001). Thus, performance measurement systems will 
be more effective when line managers and employees buy into the system and measures 
(Poister and Streib, 1999) and support by line managers and employees is more likely to occur 
when they are involved in the process of developing the measures, as Poister and Streib (1999) 
add. This study will use the term ‘internal stakeholders support’ to refer to senior management 
commitment and support from middle managers and staff.28  In terms of decision-making 
authority, Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) find that public managers will engage in performance 
measurement initiatives when they have the authority to use the performance information 
(Cavaluzzo and Ittner, 2004). 
                                                 
27 They define ‘information’ as technical knowledge about performance measurement that can be acquired through 
training or access information about performance measurement. 
28 The term covers the ‘top management commitment’ of Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) study and the ‘internal 
interest groups’ of De Lancer Julnes and Hozler (2001).    
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 Next, the influence of size on design has been examined in studies such as Poister and Streib 
(1999) and Van Dooren (2005). The findings of both studies show that size correlates with 
design; larger organisations are more likely to develop measurement systems than small 
organisations29. Poister and Streib (1999), for instance, find that performance measures are 
more prevalent in larger jurisdictions: 30% of cities with populations below 50,000 reported 
the development of performance measurement compared to 50% for cities with populations 
100,000-249,999, and over 75% of those cities with 250,000 populations. Van Dooren (2005) 
also concludes that large organisations tend to measure more. Finally, Berman and Wang 
(2000) find evidence for the influence of where performance measurement efforts are located 
on their design. They argue that technical and political capacities are higher when performance 
measurement efforts are led by a central-budget or finance office (p. 414).  
Institutional Factors 
The development of performance measurement systems may be driven by motivation from 
internal organisations or by external pressures (Poister and Streib, 1999). The external 
pressures can be associated with the thesis of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powel, 
1983). As discussed earlier, the forms of institutional pressures can be coercive isomorphism, 
mimetic processes or normative isomorphism. The findings of Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) 
suggest that, in many cases, performance measurement systems have been developed merely 
to meet regulatory requirements (i.e. coercive isomorphism). When the development of 
performance measurement systems is driven by regulatory requirements, the initiative may be 
taken by the legislative (parliament) or executive (government). Performance measurement 
systems in England have been more executive-based; legislative-based performance 
measurement systems are found, for instance, in Japan, France and the United States (Hood, 
                                                 
29 The proxy used for size can be a population (e.g. Poister and Streib, 1999), or the number of Full Time 
Employees (FTE) (e.g. Verbeeten, 2008). 
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2007). Thus, regulatory requirement will be the first element of institutional factors to influence 
design.  
Existing studies indicate the importance of support from elected officials to the development 
of performance measurement systems (e.g. Berman and Wang, 2000; De Lancer and Julnes 
and Hozler, 2001; Van Dooren, 2005; Yang and Hsieh, 2007). Support from elected officials 
has been expressed under different terms in the existing literature, such as ‘political interest’ 
(i.e. Van Dooren, 2005), ‘external interest groups’ (i.e. De Lancer Julnes and Hozler, 2001) 
and ‘political capacity’ (i.e. Berman and Wang, 2000). The importance of support from elected 
officials is often associated with the availability of resources to support the initiative (Berman 
and Wang, 2000; De Lancer Julnes and Hozler, 2001; Yang and Hsieh, 2007) or to legitimate 
the initiative and new performance expectations (Berman and Wang, 2000).  
I categorise support from elected officials and citizens participation as an element of 
institutional factors, as their support is likely to be influenced by the political conditions of the 
institutional contexts in which the performance measurement system is being developed. This 
argument is based on Radin’s (2000) statement that the GRPA “Does not fit easily into the 
institutional structures, junctions, and political realities of the American system” (p. 111). 
Therefore, I will term support from both elected officials and citizens as ‘external stakeholders 
support.’30 
Smith et al. (2008) remind us that when composite indicators are not carefully designed, “they 
may be misleading and could lead to serious failings if used for policy-making or planning” (p. 
8). Aiming to offer comprehensive performance assessment, composite indicators ideally 
include all important aspects of performance, even if they are difficult to measure. However, 
                                                 
30 The use of the terms ‘internal stakeholders support and ‘external stakeholders support’ allow flexibility in 
referring which group of stakeholders that should be consider as ‘internal’ and ‘external.’ This flexibility is 
important for the purpose of this study which will be discussed further in the next chapter.    
 58 
 
data is sometimes not available and sources can be questionable. Developing adequate proxy 
indicators therefore requires considerable ingenuity. The choice of weights, for example, is 
fundamental to devising composite indicators. However, different stakeholders attach different 
degrees of importance to different aspects of performance, as discussed in Section 2.2. As a 
result, “the specification of a single set of weights is fundamentally a political action” (p. 9). 
This can be termed the ‘political considerations’ factor.   
Implementation Factors  
Technical Factors 
As defined earlier, the phase of ‘implementation’ deals with collecting, processing and 
reporting performance data (see sub-section 2.3.2). Therefore, implementation will first depend 
on the capacity of ICT to provide the necessary data. According to Smith (2006), higher ICT 
capacity will allow the faster collection, analysis and reportage of performance data, and ICT 
has the potential to significantly reduce the costs of collecting and processing performance 
data. Hood (2007, p. 100) notes that advancements in computer technology allow the use of 
composite measures, which implies the role of ICT in processing data and producing composite 
measures from many different measures. One critique noted by Berman and Wang (2000) 
relates to the early performance measurement initiatives such as PPBS and zero-based 
budgeting or ZBB in the 1960s and 1970s: they were technically over-reaching, using 
inadequate data collection capabilities. For example, outcome measures often require citizen 
and client surveys, but “many jurisdictions do not have the capacity to gather these data in 
scientifically valid ways: contracting for such information may be costly and untimely” (p. 
410). Difficulties in processing and distributing the data in a timely manner were also found in 
Poister and Streib (1999).  
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Organisational factors 
Implementation also requires the availability of resources. New ICT infrastructures may have 
to be installed (McNab and Melese, 2003), and staff need to be trained on how to collect and 
analyse data (Berman and Wang, 2000; Sanger, 2008). As mentioned earlier, Berman and 
Wang find that having staff capable of analysing performance data is the factor that most 
differentiates high capacity countries from low capacity counties. Having training implies that 
financial resources should be available to finance it. Newcomer (1997) reminds us that staff 
devoted to performance measurement initiatives need to be paid – treating the process of data 
collection used to enable performance measurement merely as additional and uncompensated 
work will not get the job done. Based on these arguments, it is clear that the availability of 
resources is crucial to support implementation and therefore Sanger (2008) argues that 
insufficient budget can impede implementation and on-going improvement.  
Institutional Factors  
The influence of institutional factors in the implementation phase has not really been made 
clear yet. Another critique on the failure of PPBS and ZBB in the 1960s and 1970s noted by 
Berman and Wang (2000) seems to suggest the influence of institutional factors on 
implementation. Berman and Wang (2000) argue that political officials view the reforms (i.e. 
PPBS and ZBB) as a threat to their power: another reason for the failure of PPBS and ZBB, 
besides the inadequate data collection capabilities mentioned earlier. This can be seen as the 
influence of political support for performance measurement initiatives during the 
implementation phase.  
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 Use Factors  
Technical Factors 
Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) find that data problems tend to deter government officials from 
using the resulting system for performance evaluation. For example, performance measurement 
systems may be designed to serve accountability purposes (see sub-ection 2.3.3). However, 
this objective may not be achieved because of data problems. Performance measurement 
systems may also be intended for budgeting purposes. According to Leithe (1997), the 
integration of performance information into the planning and budgeting process in the city of 
Sunnyvale, California was made possible because the cost of every unit of service 31  was 
calculated using a full-cost accounting system. Leithe (1997) demonstrates how the capacity 
of ICT influences use in relation to measurement of costs.  
The link between use and the ability of ICT to provide the required data is also reflected by 
Schick (2001):  
Performance budgeting failed half a century ago for many reasons, but one 
of the most prominent facts was the inadequacy of government cost-
accounting and allocation systems. The lack of data on particular costs of 
particular services made it exceedingly difficult to link resources and 
results. Government agencies were given bundles of money with little 
awareness as to how the volume or quality of services would vary if more 
or less funding were provided. (p. 56)  
This describes the failure of performance measurement effort as being due to lack of capacity 
in the government’s costs accounting system. That is why, from an accounting perspective, an 
accrual accounting system thus needs to be put in place before a performance measurement 
system is developed. 
                                                 
31 These include police and fire, water, sewerage, solid waste disposal, utilities, parks, libraries and public works. 
 61 
 
In relation to metrics, Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) find that metrics difficulties appear to be 
significant impediment to the initial development of a performance measurement system, but 
have little influence on use once these problems are solved. Van Dooren (2005), however, finds 
that measurability is the key factor influencing use: organisations that have more routine-based 
services have higher use. Dull (2009) also finds measurement challenges to be negatively 
associated with use.32 More specific definition of measurement challenges used in this study 
allows for some predictions to be made in terms of the effects of measurement challenges on 
use: 
- Incomparable measures are likely to discourage public managers from using them 
for benchmarking.   
- When designers fail to include procedures to account for uncontrollable factors, 
measures may be not used (i.e. controllability of performance) 
- Too few or too many indicators may be not used (comprehensiveness verse. 
concision in reporting measures). Too few indicators could also possibly mean a 
lack of priorities. Thus the indicators may reflect the external circumstances of an 
organisation instead of the talents or efforts of its managers. More clearly, too few 
indicators can be interpreted as the measured performance being not truly 
attributable to the organisation (Boyne, 2010). On the other hand, too detailed 
measures may cause managers to be overloaded with information.  
Organisational Factors 
The level of training received by public managers is positively associated with use (Cavaluzzo 
and Ittner, 2004). Their findings imply that availability of resources influence use. This 
                                                 
32 Measurement challenges in this study refer to technical obstacles to developing and using performance measures 
in terms of their validity, reliability, timely and usefulness (Dull, 2009, see p. 263). 
 62 
 
argument is supported by Sanger (2008), who states that investment is needed to train staff on 
how to use performance information. In terms of the influence of senior management 
commitment, decision-making authority, and training, Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) find 
positive correlations with higher level uses of performance information, but not lower level 
uses. Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004, p. 263) point out the complex and non-linear interactive 
effects of decision-making authority, measurement system development and management 
commitment on the use of performance information for higher level decision-making. Finally, 
where performance measurement initiatives are located also seems to influence use. Melkers 
and Willoughby (2005) recognise that use is likely to be higher when the location is in the 
budget office, because the budget office understands the use of performance measurement in 
spending decisions and is in a strong position to decide when and where to use such 
information.  
Institutional Factors 
Traditional cultural norms operating in public sector organisations can form a fundamental and 
challenging obstacle. For example, public managers are not accustomed to managing their 
operations based on performance measurement (using quantitative information) (Greiner, 
1996; Sanger, 2008). This can explain why measures are not used to manage or to budget. 
Therefore, an effective introduction of performance measurement requires a cultural change 
(De Lancer Julnes and Hozler, 2001; Sanger, 2008). Studying performance measurement 
applied in four countries (Great Britain, France, Sweden and Germany), Kuhlmann (2010) 
concludes that when countries have a strong culture of transparency and the approach to 
performance measurement is voluntary, they show an optimum use of local performance 
measurement. In contrast, in countries where performance measurement systems are 
compulsory and highly standardised, the procedures are costly and do not have the anticipated 
learning outcome. 
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Moynihan and Andrews (2010) state that the US Congress rejected revisions on programmes 
and funding allocations made based on PART,33  which implies the influence of political 
considerations on use. Moynihan and Andrews (2010) support De Lancer Julners and Hozler 
(2001) who suggest that the use of performance measures is influenced more by political and 
cultural considerations than by rational/technocratic factors. Berman and Wang (2000) also 
find that elected officials’ support differentiates between high and low use of performance 
measurement system.  
The factors influencing design, implementation and use discussed above can be summarised in 
Table 2.5 below 
 
Factors Phases influenced 
Design Implementation Use 
Technical Factors    
ICT capacity/data availability x x x 
Measurement challenges    
 Measurement of cost   x 
 Reliability of measures   x 
 Causal relationships between inputs and outputs x  x 
 Comparability of measures   x 
 Comprehensiveness versus concision in reporting x  x 
 Controllability of performance x  x 
 Unclear prescription on how to use measures x  x 
Organisational Factors    
Internal stakeholders support x x  
Resources x x x 
Decision-making authority x   
Size x   
Where performance measurement initiatives are located  x x x 
Institutional Factors    
Regulatory requirements x   
External stakeholders support x   
Cultures   x 
Table 2.5 Factors Influencing Design, Implementation and Use (Expected) 
Source: Developed by author  
  
                                                 
33 Program Assessment Rating Tool (the US performance measurement initiative introduced in 2002). 
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2.4.4    Evidence of Use/Non-use 
As indicated in the introduction chapter, designing and implementing a performance 
measurement system involves huge costs and therefore the research on use or non-use of 
information produced from performance measurement systems become very important. 
Bouckaert and Halligan (2008, p. 27) describe the costs of performance measurement systems 
as “unconditional, tangible and immediate” and their benefits as “conditional, intangible and 
scheduled for the future”. The costs are unconditional because processes such as data 
collection, data analysis and data compilation need staff and the staff have to be paid. Tangible 
costs are measurable, and immediate costs are those incurred during the design and 
implementation of the measurement system. The benefits of performance measurement 
systems are conditional because they depend on whether performance measures inform, among 
other matters, decision-making and resource allocation. Intangible benefits can be identified 
by asking, “How do you value knowledge on improvement, better decisions, [and] better 
accountability?” Finally, the benefits of performance measurement systems go through 
learning cycles, and learning cycles take time. That is why the benefits of performance 
measurement are unlikely to be seen immediately after the system is implemented.  
 Gueorguieva et al. (2009) have carried out extensive exercises to establish the connection 
between the performance measures of PART and its budget. The study analyses seven 
programmes and concludes that there is no connection between the measures and the budget. 
This finding confirms Moynihan and Andrews (2010) (see discussion in Section 2.4.3). Some 
authors such as Ammons and Rivenbark (2008) , Hatry (2002) and Poister and Streib (1999) 
find that the actual use of indicators tends to be lower than the activity need to produce the 
indicators. In other words, the production of indicators is not necessarily followed by the use 
of those indicators to inform decision-making.  
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Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) suggest that the development of a performance measurement 
system is driven more by the need to meet regulatory requirements, rather than a wish to 
improve performance or increase accountability, which confirms institutional theory. McNab 
and Melese (2003, p. 91) refer to the GPRA, indicating that it does not reduce costs or improve 
performance.  
2.4.5    Dysfunctional Effects 
Measuring performance is not a neutral activity, but one which affects behaviours (Bouckaert 
and Halligan, 2008). A recent study (Abu Hasan et al., 2013) also suggests that “the auditees 
come across as intelligent actors in the assessment process, not merely as passive recipients of 
an externally imposed structure” (p. 319). Jones and Pendlebury (2010, p. 28) argue that 
unintended consequences of performance measurement are a logical consequence of the 
difficulty in establishing causal relationships between inputs, outputs and outcomes, no matter 
how sophisticated the analysis of performance conducted. Thus, unintended consequences are 
assumed to be a ‘norm’ in measuring performance.  
Substantive evidence of dysfunctional effects has been documented in the literature: Propper 
and Wilson (2003) demonstrate evidence from the health and education sectors, Bevan and 
Hood (2006) from the health sector, Wiggins and Tymms (2002) compare dysfunctional effects 
between English and Scottish primary schools, and Barnow (1992) discusses the effect of 
performance standards on state and local programmes in the United States. Heckman et al. 
(1997) assess the impact of performance measurement standards in the Job Training 
Partnership Act (JTPA) case, also in the United States. McLean et al. (2007) present evidence 
from local authorities in England. For example, the output indicator for leisure services is 
measured through “the extent to which an authority succeeds in promoting its leisure facilities 
to the public”. A specific measure is “the number of swims per square foot of pool area” (p. 
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114). Firstly, the local authority has closed some pools, leaving one to serve people who are 
keen to swim. Then, pool slots have been allocated to members of swimming clubs “at the 
expense of swimming lessons or general sessions for the public”.  
To summarise, there has been a lack of evidence regarding the use of information produced by 
performance measurement systems as a means to improve performance. At the same time, 
many studies have documented substantive evidence of the dysfunctional effects of 
performance measurement systems. These seem to prove Broadbent’s (2003) statement: “we 
may be chasing the crock of gold at the end of the rainbow” (p. 7) when assuming that 
performance measurement will improve performance. Jones and Pendlebury (2010, p. 27) 
suggest that this condition continuously invites ways of introducing monetary measures of 
outputs and outcomes to improve performance measurement. Creating artificial markets (or 
internal markets for services provided by government) is one solution. Jones and Pendlebury 
(2010, p. 27) argue that these would provide a mechanism for service providers to produce 
conventional profit measures as if the service providers were treated the same as providers in 
the private sector who earn profits.  Further exploration of this topic is, however, beyond the 
scope of this study. 
2.5    Conclusion 
The discussions in this chapter helped me to arrive at conceptual frameworks which can be 
used to analyse data at a later stage of this study (see Figure 2.4 and 2.5). Figure 2.4 presents 
the integration between the division of performance measurement phases and factors 
influencing performance measurement systems. 
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Figure 2.4 PMSs Showing Main Phases and Contingency Factors 
Source: Developed by author  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Factors Influencing Performance Measurement Systems 
Source: Developed by author 
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Figure 2.5 show a simpler presentation of Figure 2.4, with the link made to the effectiveness 
of performance measurement systems. These frameworks will be developed further in the next 
chapter, particularly the elements of institutional factors.  
The discussion in this chapter has also bridged the different streams of literature, allowing the 
links between different studies to be better understood. The discussion has also showed how 
insights from institutional perspectives can be integrated into a contingency-based framework 
in studying performance measurement systems.    
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CHAPTER  3                                                                                                        
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN DEVELOPING 
ECONOMIES 
3.1    Introduction 
The discussion in the previous chapter has resulted in a conceptual framework that can be 
useful to analyse my data at the later stage of this study. As the framework was developed 
entirely based on the literature focusing on performance measurement in the context of 
developed economies, further development of the framework is needed to reflect the 
institutional context of the developing economies. The terms ‘developing economies’ and 
‘developed economies’ as used in the previous chapter refer to the World Bank’s classification 
of its member countries. Based on gross national income (GNI) as of 1 July 2012, member 
countries are classified into three broad categories, namely high, middle and low income 
economies. Low income economies refers to countries with a GNI level of $1,035 or less. 
Middle income economies are differentiated into lower middle income (GNI $1,036 to $4,085) 
and upper middle income (GNI $4,086 to $12,615). Finally, countries with a GNI level of 
$12,616 or more are classified as high income. The World Bank (2013) also refers to the first 
three groups (low income, lower middle income and upper middle income) as developing 
economies.34 
                                                 
34 The World Bank (2014) explains that the interchangeable use of the term country with economy has no 
implication for ‘political independence’ but merely refers to ‘any territory for which authorities report separate 
social or economic statistics’. Then, the term developing used to denote ‘low and middle income countries’ does 
not reflect similar levels of development experienced by all economies in the group. It also does not mean that 
other economies have achieved a preferred or final stage of development. 
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This chapter aims to identify specific characteristics of the public sector in the developing 
economies and to further develop the conceptual framework that was developed in the previous 
chapter. The discussion in this chapter indicates some important findings. First, the design, 
implementation and use of performance measurement systems is likely to face higher 
challenges in this context compared to in the developed economies, due to the effects of 
contextual factors. Second, the role of international donor agencies (e.g. the World Bank) is 
very important in relation to how the idea of performance measurement was disseminated in 
this context. Therefore, the driving forces for adoption of performance measurement systems 
in this context can be associated with institutional isomorphism mechanisms (DiMaggio and 
Powel, 1983). Good governance and neoliberalism are two concepts which, it can be argued, 
are associated with the interests of international donor agencies involved in performance 
measurement in developing economies.       
The chapter starts by discussing the current state of performance measurement in the context 
of developing economies. This section includes a discussion related to supply and demand for 
performance measurement in the context of developing economies and an elaboration of the 
conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2 with the contextual factors of the developing 
economies. The next section explores the history of how the developing economies have 
embraced performance measurement, with the objective of understanding the position of 
international donor agencies in this. The discussion then moves on to the development 
paradigms adopted by the international donor agencies. This section covers two important 
concepts in the development discourse: neoliberalism and good governance, which will help in 
the understanding of the interests of international donor agencies attached to performance 
measurement in developing economies. Finally, the last section offers a conclusion.  
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3.2    Performance measurement in Developing Economies 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, research on performance measurement in the context 
of developing economies is still underdeveloped. Mimba et al. (2007) were the first to identify 
what factors influence performance measurement in this context. Using the supply and demand 
approach, it shows the imbalance between increasing demand for performance measurement 
and the limited supply of information (see Figure 3.1).  
                                   
Figure 3.1 Demand for and Supply of Performance Information in Developing Economies 
Source: Simplified by the author from Mimba et al. (2007) 
 
As Figure 3.1 shows, the increasing demand for performance information in developing 
economies is associated with public sector reforms: decentralisation, anti-corruption, directs 
election and marketisation. At the same time, the limited supply of performance information is 
associated with four specific characteristics of the public sector in developing economies: low 
institutional capacity, low stakeholders involvement, high corruption and high informality. The 
elements of framework will be discussed further below (see points 3.2.2 and 3.2.3).      
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Mimba et al. (2007) define demand for performance information as the actual/desired use of 
performance information, following (Mayston, 1985) and Ospina et al. (2004). Meanwhile, 
supply of performance information is defined in Mimba et al. as ‘the production of performance 
information by a public sector organisation’ (2007, p.193). This comprises several activities: 
(1) the selection of those areas of performance which are to be measured, (2) the developing of 
performance measures, (3) the collection and analysis of data, and (4) the reporting of  
performance information. Definition of ‘performance information supply’ in Mimba et al. 
(2007) covers the meaning of ‘design’ and ‘implementation’ phases of performance 
measurement (see definition of ‘design’ and ‘implementation’ in Table 2.3). 
As also shown in Figure 3.1 above and mentioned in the introductory chapter, Mimba et al. 
(2007) connect ‘public sector reforms’ to supports and pressures from external stakeholders 
(i.e. international donor agencies). Furthermore, pressure from international donor agencies is 
associated with the objective to achieve ‘good governance’. The relationship between the three 
is explained by Mimba et al. (2007) as follows. Developing economies face pressure from 
international donor agencies to take on some reforms considered important for the creation of 
the conditions necessary for good governance. Good governance itself is assumed to be one of 
essential conditions needed to achieve the good performance of the public sector in developing 
economies. Developing economies perceive themselves to be under pressure to reform because 
good governance is very often made a condition by international donors to access its funding.  
3.2.1    Public sector reforms and performance measurement  
As suggested by Mimba et al., (2007), reform to the public sector can in turn stimulate 
increasing public demand for performance information. For instance, after decentralisation the 
national government may require local government to achieve good performance. Furthermore, 
elected leaders also need to demonstrate their ability to the local electorates. Local government 
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therefore needs performance measurement to facilitate communication of results to the national 
government (vertical accountability) and to the electorate (horizontal accountability). The 
involvement of a ‘direct election’ system to the position of district heads/mayors in their supply 
and demand framework implies that Mimba et al. (2007) refer to two different definitions of 
‘decentralisation’ (political and managerial decentralisations).  
Political decentralisation is the devolution of power to ‘a locally elected body with some degree 
of autonomy and some local own revenue sources’ (Devas and Delay, 2006, p. 677). 
Meanwhile managerial decentralisation is associated with the concept of new public 
management (NPM) reforms (see Hood, 1991; 1995; Hope and Chikulo, 2000; Lister and 
Betley, 1999). In terms of political decentralisation, devolution of power to the locally elected 
body suggests the addition of a new line of accountability (Smith, 1990). This is expected to 
influence performance measurement, as different stakeholders require different type of 
information.   
Furthermore, the concept of anti-corruption refers to the fight against corruption which is 
prevalent in many developing economies. This  has been top of the international donor agency 
agenda since open discussion about corruption began in 199635 (Greenless, 2006). Kenny 
(2009) differentiates between petty corruption (e.g. ‘speed payments’ and other small bribes to 
obtain everyday services) and grand corruption (e.g. payments to secure government contracts 
or major licenses, change regulations or influence the shape of laws). Mimba et al. (2007) state 
that their study focuses on the influence of petty corruption. Performance measurement is 
assumed to contribute to the effort to combat corruption because performance measurement is 
associated with an increase in transparency. With better transparency, corrupt behaviour among 
                                                 
35 The period prior to 1996 was known as the ‘prohibition era’ when the use of word ‘corruption’ was prohibited 
in all of the World Bank’s formal documents; it was also considered taboo (and highly politically sensitive) for 
borrowing countries to talk about it (Greenless, 2006).  
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public officials is expected to gradually decline. Finally, the introduction of a performance-
based contract in a developing economy requires availability of performance information in 
order to select the best provider. That is why Mimba et al. (2007) include marketisation as the 
fourth reform to influence performance measurement. 
3.2.2    Characteristics of the public sector in developing economies 
The study of Mimba et al., (2007) also identified four characteristics of the public sector in 
developing economies which are considered to hinder performance measurement. The four 
characteristic identified include low institutional capacity, low level of stakeholders’ 
involvement, high corruption and high informality. Each characteristic is discussed below.  
Institutional capacity 
Mimba et al. (2007) define institutional capacity as the ability of governmental organisations 
to decide and achieve their goals. This definition follows World Bank (2004b) and Howitt 
(1977). Mimba et al. (2007) suggest the common features of a governmental organisation with 
low institutional capacity are as follows: (i) weak regulatory practices, (ii) weak public 
accountability, (iii) inefficiency in administration, (iv) limited human resources, (v) lack of 
facilities, and (vi) lack of financial resources. Their study also notes a number of implications 
of the given features:  
1. Delivery of public goods and services involves lengthy bureaucratic procedures and is 
not transparent (see also Henderson, 2001); 
2. Provision of public goods and services in terms of quantity and quality is insufficient 
(see also Haque, 2003), and  
3. Stakeholders have very little information regarding the attainment of objectives of 
public sector organisations.  
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Mimba et al. (2007) thus focus on the impact of weak institutional capacity on the behaviour 
of public officials and their incentive to deliver performance information. They suggest that 
public sector organisations tend to be reluctant to share performance information because of 
anxiety about any internal failures becoming public knowledge, an argument supported by Bell 
(1996).   
For the purpose of the current study, it is also useful to look at the definition of institutional 
capacity from earlier literature (see Honadle, 1981) which describes it as: 
The ability to perform administrative practices “well” by reliance on modern, 
efficient techniques is usually what is meant by “good” administration. 
Organizations not exhibiting “good” administrative techniques are said to 
lack “capacity.” Examples of such administrative practices are internal 
resource allocation (e.g. budgeting, accounting), information management 
(e.g. record keeping) …’. (p.578) 
As this quote suggests, an organisation with weak institutional capacity is likely to have an 
underdeveloped budgeting and accounting system. From the discussion in Chapter 2, it has 
been understood that an accounting system is part of a soft infrastructure which supports 
performance measurement. Another point to be highlighted from Honadle (1981) is that an 
organisation’s ‘capacity to attract resources is not necessary the same as its capacity to absorb 
the resources’ (p. 577). Honadle (1981) says that capacity to absorb resources and capacity to 
attract resources have been distinguished because ‘not every organization with the ability to 
secure resources has the ability to ‘spend’ them’(p.577).  
Stakeholder support and involvement  
Stakeholder involvement as discussed by Mimba et al. (2007) refers to the active participation 
of all stakeholders in the process of decision-making. Stakeholders here include public 
officials, non-governmental organisations, and international donor agencies. Mimba et al. 
(2007) suggest that international donors tend to gain influential or powerful positions in 
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developing economies because of the resources they own in terms of financial and human 
resources. They thus become active stakeholders in demanding performance information.  
Corruption and informal practices 
Mimba et al. (2007) refers to ‘petty corruption’ such as bribery in provision of the normal 
public services, which is consistent with how Mimba et al. (2007) define informality:  
the mechanism through which individuals or groups influence 
organisational decisions and activities without having a formal authority 
to exert that influence, and/or without aligning the content of their 
influence with the goals and policies that are laid down in official 
documents (p.198). 
This definition of informality follows the work of Abernethy and Vagnoni (2004) and Meyer 
and Rowan (1977). Using this definition, Mimba et al. then focus on the impact of informality 
on the inconsistency between the ‘formal goals, policies and authority structure of an 
organisation, which are laid down in official documents, and its actual day-to-day decisions 
and activities’ (p.198). ‘Day-to-day activities’ can be understood as activities performed by 
public officials in delivering public services as part of their defined and expected work 
responsibilities, for example in issuing licences. Mimba et al. (2007) suggest that the informal 
ways are preferred in getting things done, although extra payments should be given.  
Schick (1998) discusses informal practice specifically in connection with budgets, suggesting 
that many developing economies tend to have two types of budget: the one presented to the 
parliament and the real budget that ‘determine[s] which bills are paid and how much is actually 
spent’ (p.128). Schick (1998) acknowledges that in one sense informality has a positive side, 
in that ‘it cuts through red tape, unresponsive, bureaucratic and bad policies’ (p.128). However, 
informality also opens the door for corruption and inefficiency; Schick (1998) refers to this as 
‘the mixed blessing of informality.’ Off-budget expenditures affect the reliability of 
expenditures reported in the formal documents, and as performance measurement may require 
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information from budget and expenditures records, then if the reliability of the records is 
compromised by informal practices, there will necessarily be an impact of off-budget 
expenditure practices on performance measurement.   
To summarise, Mimba et al. (2007) have contributed to the development of performance 
measurement literature in developing economies by providing us with understanding of two 
things: (1) what forces are assumed to be drivers for increasing actual or desired use of 
performance information in developing economies, and (2) the special characteristics of the 
public sector in this context which hinder production of performance information. Mimba et 
al. also imply that performance measurement in developing economies has a connection with 
the development discourse. This will be the point of departure for discussion in section 3.3.   
3.2.3    Factors Influencing Design, Implementation and Use: Further development   
Table 2.5 summarised factors that are expected to influence the design, implementation and 
use of performance measurement systems. The elements included in this table will be 
elaborated with specific characteristics of the public sector in developing economies and the 
reforms discussed in the previous sub-sections, in order to reflect the influence of the contextual 
factors of the developing economies in the conceptual framework built.   
Design Factors 
Technical Factors 
As Mimba et al. (2007) identify and discuss, the public sector in developing economies is 
characterised by low institutional capacity. This characteristic will implicate many elements 
included in Table 2.5. First, lack of facilities (Feature 5 of low institutional capacity, see point 
3.2.2) corresponds to ‘ICT capacity/data availability’. The limited capacity of ITC to provide 
valid, reliable, and complete data in a timely and cost-effective manner is still a problem even 
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in the context of developed economies, as discussed in the previous chapter. In the developing 
economies, the problem is expected to be much more severe. In other words, the availability 
of data will be more difficult in this context compared to in the developed economies. Further 
investigation is required on how ICT capacity/data availability has affected the design of 
performance measurement systems in the context of developing economies.   
‘Lack of facilities’ combined with the other two features, ‘weak public accountability’ and 
‘inefficiency in administration’, will connect to metric difficulties, particularly measurement 
of cost and reliability of measures.36 The connections can be explained as follows. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, performance measurement requires the measurement of costs of services on a full 
of accrual basis, while the accounting systems of the developing economies tend to still be 
under-developed. Earlier literature (see Dean, 1988) indicates that government accounting 
records of developing economies tend to be inaccurate and unreliable. Therefore, according to 
Tillema et al. (2010), “this can be one of the circumstances that will hinder the design and use 
of performance measurement systems, which build on more basic financial management 
systems” (p. 204).  
Tillema et al. (2010) note that in the developed economies, the necessary basic systems (e.g. 
accounting systems) have been developed and therefore, they can start of using performance 
information to achieve performance improvements. In developing economies such as 
Indonesia, the introduction of accrual accounting systems at local government level is now 
underway. The implementation however is impeded by many obstacles, particularly in terms 
of human resources capacity at the local level (McLeod and Harun, 2014) which suggests that 
                                                 
36 Measurement of cost and reliability of measures are the first and second elements of measurement challenges 
defined in Chapter 2 respectively.  
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full implementation still has a long way to go. This discussion suggests the necessity of adding 
a new element to the technical factors: ‘supporting systems for performance measurement.’37   
‘Inefficiency in administration’ implies, for example, under-developed database management 
systems. With database management systems still under-developed and accounting records 
inaccurate and unreliable (Dean, 1988), we can expect low reliability of data reported for 
performance measurement. Next, disparities among regions in developing economies are 
expected to be higher compared to those in developed economies which implies that there will 
be higher challenge to develop comparable measures (i.e. developing procedures to account for 
uncontrollable factors will be more difficult).  For the remaining elements of measurement 
challenges, I expect that similar challenges to those discussed in Chapter 2 will also be faced 
by the developing economies.  
Organisational Factors 
The first element of organisational factors discussed in Chapter 2 is ‘internal stakeholder 
support’. This factor is likely to be influenced by one of the reforms discussed earlier – direct 
election systems for the heads of local governments. A direct election system is part of a local 
democratic system (will be added as a new element of institutional factors). In the context of 
local government under direct election systems, internal stakeholders are civil servants working 
in local government with the highest position the general secretary of the local government. 
Although the heads of local governments (i.e. mayors/district heads) can still be considered as 
internal stakeholders, they hold a political position (i.e. elected leaders), which is a different 
position to career bureaucrats. However, a position such as the general secretary of a local 
                                                 
37 The discussion about accounting systems (i.e. cost accounting systems) was a part of ICT capacity. 
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government can be seen as a managerial position. External stakeholders include for example 
the local parliament, local electorate and central government.38  
In the Indonesian context, an empirical study shows that the elected leaders are perceived to be 
the most powerful stakeholders by managers of local agencies. In responding to the conflict of 
interest among the elected leaders, local parliaments and central government, local agency 
managers will prioritise performance information which will be of interest to the elected leaders 
over the type of information that will be of interest to other stakeholders (e.g. local parliaments 
and central government). This behaviour will affect the design of local government 
performance measurement systems, as the selection of performance indicators or measures is 
aimed to serve the interests of the most powerful stakeholders (cf. Mimba et al., 2013).  
Mimba et al. (2013) tested a conceptual framework developed by a previous study (Tillema et 
al., 2010) which classifies stakeholders into three different groups and defines the performance 
interest of each group. The first group is, purchasers who are interested in quantity and quality 
of services and costs of services. The second group is funding bodies, which will be interested 
in budget disciplines, budget allocation and financial governance structures  and the third 
statutory boards, which are interested in political governance and structure. Applying this 
framework to the Indonesian local government context, Mimba et al. (2013) refer to the elected 
leaders as ‘purchasers’, central government as ‘funding bodies’ and local parliament as the 
‘statutory board’. 
Tillema et al. (2010) is adapted from Brignall and Modell (2000). Tillema et al. (2010) conclude 
that when one group of stakeholders dominates, performance information will be integrated 
throughout the organisational hierarchy and functional use of performance information is likely 
                                                 
38 In Table 2.5, external stakeholders is classified as institutional factors. It is necessary to mention external 
stakeholders here because it connects to the discussions in the following paragraphs.  
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to happen. On the other hand, when more than one group of stakeholders are dominant, there 
will be a proactive decoupling of performance information throughout the organisational 
hierarchy and a partly symbolic use of performance measurement (see Figure 3.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 The Influence of Stakeholders’ Interests on the use of Performance Information 
Source: Tillema et al. (2010, p. 211) 
As can be seen from Figure 3.2 above, reforms taking place in most of developing economies 
discussed earlier (i.e. decentralisation, marketisation and anti-corruption programmes) cause  
more stakeholders to gain substantial influence (i.e. more than one group of stakeholders are 
dominant). Exploring the design and use of performance measurement system in this situation 
is the venue for further research highlighted in Tillema et al. (2010) and Mimba et al. (2013). 
The next features of low institutional capacity, ‘limited human resources’ – the fourth feature 
– and ‘lack of financial resources’ – the sixth feature – correspond to similar elements of the 
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organisational factors summarised in Table 2.5. Therefore, design is likely to be more difficult 
in the developing economies but how limited capacity of human resources and insufficient 
financial resources affect the design need further investigation. Next, the effects of other 
organisational factors on design (i.e. decision-making authority, size and where performance 
measurement initiatives are located) are expected to work in similar ways as those discussed 
in Chapter 2.   
Local government type is likely to be associated with ICT capacity/data availability. This 
argument is based on Mimba et al. (2013), who find that urban local governments tend to be 
more developed and have a higher human resources capacity and better facilities than rural 
local governments. With these characteristics, design and use of performance measurement 
systems seemed to be better in urban local governments than in rural ones.  
Institutional Factors 
An empirical study finds evidence for the influences of factors such as ‘metric difficulties’, 
‘technical knowledge’, ‘management commitment’ and ‘legislative requirements’ on the 
development of performance measurement systems in Indonesian local government but 
legislative requirement has the strongest effect, which suggests the presence of coercive 
isomorphism (cf. Akbar et al., 2012). The discussion of reforms and performance measurement 
in Section 3.2.1 indicates another form of coercive pressure in the context of developing 
economies: pressure from international donor agencies such as the World Bank (Mimba et al., 
2007; Tillema et al., 2010). Both studies are supported by authors such as Pollit (2001) which 
states, “The World Bank or IMF or EU Commission insist on certain types of institutional 
reform as conditions for receiving assistance” (p. 937). Then, Bouckaert and Halligan (2008), 
who state that the government chose performance measurement and management because of 
isomorphic behaviour such as coercive and normative isomorphism by “pressure and 
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propaganda of supra- and international organisations (the European Union or OEDC towards 
Central and Eastern European countries, or by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank 
towards developing countries)” (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008, p. 61-62). 
So far, I have elaborated the discussion about two specific characteristics of the public sector 
in the developing economies, namely low institutional capacity and low involvement of 
stakeholders, with the framework of the performance measurement systems discussed in 
Chapter 2. Another two characteristics (high level of corruption and high level of informality) 
have not yet been elaborated. These two characteristics will be added as new elements of 
institutional factors. The influences of both corruption and informality may be rather difficult 
to directly observe. Instead, their influence is likely to be manifested in other factors (i.e. 
technical and organisational factors). In other words, their influence will intensify or affect 
other factors such as availability of data, measurement challenges, and internal support. For 
example, as indicated earlier, corrupt officials might be reluctant to engage in performance 
measurement initiatives (Mimba et al., 2007; Tillema et al., 2010). Other forms of influence by 
both corruption and informal practices need further investigation.    
Implementation Factors 
The most significant issue for the implementation phase will be ICT capacity/data availability. 
Similar to the previous discussion, this relates to the characteristic of low institutional capacity. 
With an under-developed ICT system, the data collection and data analysis are likely to rely on 
manual systems. Moreover, lack of financial resources may cause insufficient training for staff 
and managers dealing with performance reporting. Given their limited capacity, lower level 
staff dealing with data collection, for example, may have difficulties in understanding and 
interpreting measures, which can lead to them collecting and reporting inappropriate data.  
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Hence, limited capacity of ICT will correspond to size. The larger the size of the local 
government, for example, the more difficult the implementation will be (more data needs to be 
collected and processed while ICT capacity is limited). As regards local government type, 
implementation in rural areas will be more difficult than in urban ones, because urban areas 
tend to be more advanced than rural ones, as found by Mimba et al. (2013) and discussed 
earlier. However, this may correspond to internal stakeholder support. The complex 
interactions among these factors need further investigation.  
In the developing economies, regulatory requirements not only provide the reasons for adopting 
new management techniques such as accrual accounting systems or performance measurement 
systems (which represent the process of coercive isomorphism) can also impede 
implementation. This argument is based on the finding of a recent study on public sector 
accounting reform at the local government level in Indonesia (see McLeod and Harun, 2014). 
One of the findings of their study indicates that uncoordinated and conflicting regulations 
issued by different ministries such as by Ministry of Finance (MoF) and Ministry of Home 
Affairs (MoHA) is one of the main reasons that hinder local governments’ capacity in adopting 
an accrual accounting system. Other factors are expected to work on implementation in a 
similar way to those discussed earlier in the point about design.    
Use Factors 
As Schick (1998) states and discusses (see point 3.2.2), one form of informal practices in the 
developing economies is that they tend to operate using two versions of budgets: the one that 
is presented to the parliament and the real budget that they use for day-to-day operations. This 
indicates the culture of reliance on informal information to inform decisions, instead of 
information written in formal documents. Based on this, I expect that informal practices will 
affect the use of information produced from performance measurement systems. Finding 
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empirical evidence for how informal practices can affect use will fill in the gap in the literature, 
as the existing studies (e.g. Mimba et al., 2013) have not yet captured empirical evidence for 
the influence of informal practices.  
Corruption is expected to affect use, as “corrupt officials and civil servants tend to make 
decisions mainly based on assessment of their personal gains, rather than on an assessment of 
the influence on organizational performance” (Tillema et al., 2010, p. 204). This means that 
the influence of corruption (institutional factor) works through internal stakeholder support for 
performance measurement (organisational factor). The low involvement of stakeholders in the 
context of developing economies in the past seems to explain the small incentive to use 
performance information in this context (Tillema et al., 2010). They predict that the 
increasingly active involvement of stakeholders, such as international donor agencies, will 
influence use.  
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   Factors Phases influenced 
Design Implementation Use 
Technical Factors    
ICT capacity/data availability x x x 
Supporting systems for performance measurement  x   
Metric difficulties:    
 Measurement of cost   x 
 Reliability of output measures   x 
 Causal relationships between inputs and outputs x   
 Comparability of output measures x  x 
 Comprehensiveness vs. concision in reporting x  x 
 Controllability of performance x  x 
 Unclear prescription on how to use measures x   
Organisational Factors    
Internal stakeholder support  x x  
Financial resources x x  
Human resources x x  
Decision-making authority x   
Size x   
Location of performance measurement systems   x x x 
Type of local government x x  
Institutional Factors    
Regulatory requirements x   
External stakeholder support    
Local democratic system (i.e. direct elections)  x x x 
Cultures    
Corruption  x x 
Informal practices  x x 
Table 3.1Expected Factors Influencing Design, Implementation and Use in the Developing Economies 
Source: Developed by author 
To summarise, the framework of the performance measurement systems cycle developed in 
Chapter 2 has been elaborated with contextual factors found in the developing economies. The 
influences of some factors will be implicated by contextual factors of the developing economies 
such as ICT capacity/data availability and internal stakeholder support for performance 
measurement, but the influence of other factors is expected to remain similar to that discussed 
in Chapter 2, such as the influence of decision-making authority and location of performance 
measurement initiatives. Some new elements have been added into the framework, such as 
supporting systems for performance measurement, type of local government, pressure from 
international donor agencies, corruption, and informal practices (hence the significant 
expansion found in institutional factors). For technical and organisational factors, the 
discussion primarily demonstrates how institutional factors can intensify or reduce the effects 
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of the factors on design, implementation and use. The discussion indicates that interactions 
among different factors is likely to be much more complex in this context compared to in the 
developed economies.  
3.3    Role of international donor agencies  
No academic study systematically documents the history of how international donor agencies 
have been involved in promoting performance measurement in the context of developing 
economies. There has therefore been no study similar to Williams (2004), addressing 
performance measurement in the context of developing economies. One way to trace the 
history of performance measurement in developing economies is by reviewing donor 
documents (particularly World Bank Reports) and consultant reports.  
Thorough reviews of the work of the Operation Evaluation Department (OED) of the World 
Bank show that the World Bank has been the key actor in bringing the concept of performance 
measurement into the context of developing economies. The OED is an independent evaluation 
arm of the World Bank, lately known as the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). The 
Department was created on July 1, 1973, with a formal mandate to mainstream performance 
measurement under the Bank’s own operation and to accelerate performance measurement 
development in borrowing countries. This formal mandate was received in 1986, since when 
the OED continues to be recognised as a strong proponent for performance measurement 
development in developing economies (World Bank, 1998). As the World Bank is an 
international donor agency with a formal mandate to mainstream and accelerate performance 
measurement in borrowing countries, it seems logical to follow the Bank’s own classification 
of its member countries in this study as mentioned in the introduction chapter earlier.   
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The efforts to introduce and accelerate this can be divided into three distinct periods: (i) the 
emergence of demand for performance measurement in the 1980s, (ii) the renewed interest in 
performance measurement in the 1990s, and (iii) the transformation of performance 
measurement in the 2000s. Each period is discussed below. To avoid confusion, it is important 
to note that the World Bank Reports do not use consistent terms to refer to performance 
measurement. Commonly-used terms include ‘evaluation’, monitoring and evaluation’ (M&E) 
and ‘results-based development’ to refer to the concept of ‘performance measurement’ (see for 
instance (World Bank, 1994, p. ix - x). The inconsistency of terms used has been acknowledged 
by the World Bank (World Bank, 1998, p. x): 
There are many types of evaluation tools, which can be used in a variety of 
ways. These tools are related – in that they deal with the concept of 
performance – but they can lead to confusion, exacerbated by the different 
terminology employed by evaluation practitioners. Regardless of the terms 
used: ongoing monitoring and performance information; project and program 
evaluation – ex ante, ongoing/formative and ex post/ summative; 
performance (or value-for-money) audits; financial auditing, they all address 
performance measurement. This broad spectrum of performance 
measurement activities is also known by other generic labels, such as 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E). 
 
The broad spectrum definition of performance measurement adopted by the World Bank (1998) 
is consistent with Propper and Wilson’s (2003) thesis which suggest that performance measures 
‘come in a variety of forms.’ For instance, measures may come from an in-depth evaluation of 
an organisation’s performance. Measures may also be derived from administrative data and 
comprise the collection and publication of summary performance measures. Between the two 
forms, measures can be based on the collection of detailed data specifically for the purpose of 
performance management.  
As mentioned earlier, performance measurement does not refer to a particular technique; 
Williams’s (2004) historical analysis of performance measurement also supports a broad 
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spectrum definition of performance measurement. This study will rely on the World Bank’s 
publications/documents to understand how developing economies embraced performance 
measurement. Accordingly, this study will also adopt a broad spectrum definition of 
performance measurement.  
3.3.1    The rise in interest in performance measurement in the 1980s 
A consultant report notes that international donor agencies, for example UNDP and USAID, 
started to introduce performance measurement in developing economies in the 1960s (see 
Schaumburg-Müller, 1996). Next, the World Bank began experimenting with performance 
measurement in 1980s, after the creation of the OED mentioned above.  
Early engagement of developing economies with performance measurement 
The concept of performance measurement (linking inputs and outputs) was first introduced to 
developing economies in relation to the completion reports of projects funded by the World 
Bank. According to Willoughby (2003), prior to 1975, operating departments within the Bank 
increasingly asked borrowing countries to prepare their own project completion reports. 
However, due to the lack of capacity of many of these countries, these reports frequently did 
not meet the expected standard. From October 1975 onwards a tendency therefore arose in the 
OED to systematise project completion report processes, putting heavy emphasis on the self-
evaluative aspect of the report. The OED then started to assist the development of self-
evaluation capacity within the governments of interested member countries. Weiner (2003) 
argues that the project completion report is thus the foundation of the Bank’s evaluation system 
and the reason for the spread of performance measurement ideas to borrowing countries.    
Weiner (2003) also suggests that the capacity of the OED itself was insufficient to produce 
project completion reports. As a result, some reports were high quality but others were not 
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produced at all. Some reports submitted to the Board were inadequate, containing information 
similar to the supervision documents, in other words, the report merely informed donors of the 
implementation history of the project. At times, reports contained serious deficiencies, risking 
the longer-term vision of the OED. The implication was that Operation Evaluation was unable 
to bring the deficient completion reports up to the Board’s standard.  
Building up of performance measurement capacity 
This inadequate capacity of the OED to systemise project completion reports was made worse 
by the fact that by the mid-1980s the effectiveness of development aid was being increasingly 
questioned (Rovani, 2003, p. 31), implying that the need for performance measurement in the 
Bank had enormously increased. This led to the Bank having, by 1986, a significant resource 
problem. The serious cumulative backlog of project completion reports coupled with the level 
of deterioration in reporting indicated that the World Bank’s performance measurement system 
as a whole was about to collapse. 
In 1986 therefore, the Bank started to persuade the governments of borrowing countries to 
become involved in a performance measurement capacity development programme. According 
to Rovani (2003), Brazil was the first country assisted by the Bank to build its performance 
measurement capacity (this was in relation to an environmental impact project). The World 
Bank realised that helping borrowing countries to develop their own performance measurement 
capacity was just as important as promoting performance measurement within the Bank itself. 
Performance measurement capacity development at this time, however, was focused merely on 
governments showing the commitment to provide the necessary resources. Performance 
measurement initiatives during the 1980s can be thus considered as the first period of 
performance measurement development in a developing economy context. 
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3.3.2    The Renewed interest in performance measurement in the 1990s 
During the 1990s there was a strong re-emphasis on performance measurement. This renewed 
interest can be argued to have had a close connection to the end of the Cold War. There was an 
important change in donor countries’ policies regarding foreign aid, one which directly affected 
the availability of development aid managed and distributed by bilateral donor agencies such 
as USAID, or international donor agencies such as the World Bank. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, Doornbos (2001) suggests that it was no longer 
necessary to gain support from developing economies for western democratic ideas. The 
immediate impact of this policy change was a scarcity of development resources experienced 
by all donor agencies and the risk of deep cuts in funding as acknowledged by the OED (World 
Bank, 1994). The scarcity of development resources forced donor agencies to focus their 
concern more on the effectiveness of development programmes and to look for resilient and 
cost-effective performance measurement systems to assist in management oversight and policy 
evaluation (World Bank, 1994, p. ix). Similar argument is provided in Schaumburg-Müller 
(1996).  
Thus, by the 1990s, the international donor countries themselves also faced increasing demand 
from their own citizens for greater accountability in terms of foreign aid expenditure. Tax 
payers finance development aid programmes, and stakeholders in donor countries started to 
question what results had been achieved from the millions of dollars of their tax money which 
had been allocated as development aid for developing economies. In this period, the term 
‘results based development’ emerged. The effect of the scarcity of development resources and 
greater demand for accountability over development aid programmes became a strong pressure 
for donor agencies to focus on results, improve effectiveness of development aid programmes 
and improve their accountability to donors (Mackay, 2006).  
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The connection between the pressure faced by international donor agencies and the need for 
performance measurement is indicated in Mackay’s (2007) statement:  
And international donors are being pressed to demonstrate the results of 
the large volumes of aid spending for which they are responsible; they in 
turn are working to persuade and support developing countries to 
strengthen their own M&E [performance measurement] systems (p.1).  
The focus on results brought about another implication to development aid. Leahy (1993) 
argues that donor-funded projects should also have tangible results for donor countries. In other 
words, donors should question what would be the direct benefits for donor countries of any 
development aid. This notion seemed to affect the areas that donors were interested in funding. 
In the United States, for instance, the three areas proposed to be financed through foreign aid 
by American citizens are presented in Table 3.2 below. 
Areas Meaning 
Global environment  Development aid should contribute to creating of a healthy global 
environment that is defined as a condition where natural resources 
used wisely and there is balance in the world’s population with the 
ability of the Earth to sustain it 
Democracy Development aid should improve democracy which refers to the 
existence of pluralistic systems with open and responsive 
government and people participation 
Economy  Development aid should open the door to market US products, 
economic justice and participation for the peoples in less developed 
economies.   
Table 3.2 US Development Aid Proposal 
Source: Leahy (1993) 
The three areas were considered to directly affect the quality of life or wellbeing of American 
people (Leahy, 1993).  
The global environment for instance should be an area of interest to be funded through 
development aid, as developed and developing economies live on the same earth as Leahy 
(1993, p.40) points out: 
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The destruction of the Earth’s remaining forests, most of which are located 
on other continents where exploding populations are destroying the 
natural resource base, threatens to dramatically change our own climate.  
The implication of the shift in the areas that should be funded through development aid 
programmes was that donor agencies were now operating under new priorities. As the World 
Bank (1994) states ‘programs and projects are now measured against multiple goals, including 
sound economic governance, private sector development, and the promotion of participatory, 
equitable, and environmentally sustainable development.’ Economic governance, 
participatory, environmentally sustainable development are clearly linked to three broad areas 
suggested by Leahy (1993) discussed earlier. This is evidence that donor agencies such as the 
World Bank will respond to changes in donor countries’ policy.  
In relation to environmental issues mentioned earlier, the academic literature, however, 
suggests that the causes are linked to energy and consumer consumption in the USA and UK 
and I agree with this view. The findings of Soytas et al. (2007), for example, suggest that “in 
the long run the main (statistical) cause of CO2 emissions in the US is energy consumption” 
(p. 487). Therefore, the relevant factor to be considered for emission reduction policies is 
actually energy consumption, as reducing energy consumption will decrease carbon 
emissions.39 A study in the UK (see Lorenzoni et al., 2007) also indicates that climate change 
is linked fundamentally to energy consumption: more specifically, changes in the energy supply 
mix contributed to increased main greenhouse gases.40 Therefore, a radical change in values, 
behaviour and institutions towards a paradigm of lower consumption is needed in the UK, as 
they suggest.  
                                                 
39 Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are examples of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) that are considered to be 
the main causes of global warming, an important current example of an environmental issue (Soytas et al., 2007). 
40 ‘Energy supply mix’ refers to “increasing the use of gas compared to oil and coal (known as the ‘dash for gas’) 
since the late 1980s” (Lorenzoni et al., 2007, p. 445). 
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Importance to donors of performance measurement in developing economies  
Performance measurement systems owned by borrowing countries (i.e. developing economies) 
can support the World Bank’s performance measurement system.  The stronger the 
performance measurement capacity of borrowing countries therefore, the easier and cheaper 
the performance measurement task for the Bank itself, as it can rely more on data produced 
from performance measurement systems owned by borrowing countries (World Bank, 2002; 
2004a). The same argument is provided by Mackay (2003):  
…stronger M&E capacity in borrower countries can facilitate Bank M&E, 
but for countries themselves it is also a key element in sound governance. 
It provides access to reliable country data systems and to the work of the 
country’s own evaluators. Strong M&E capacity, developed over the 
medium to long run, will make it possible for donors to rely on recipients 
to self-evaluate aid projects, subject to appropriate quality assurance, and 
it can also increase country ownership of evaluation results, increasing the 
probability that these results will be used. (p.113) 
 
The main reasons for renewed donor interest in introducing performance measurement in 
developing economies in 1990s are summarised in Figure 3.3 below.  
                     
Figure 3.3 Renewed Interest in Performance Measurement in 1990s 
Source: Developed by author 
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Performance measurement capacity development  
Although international donor agencies recognised the importance of performance 
measurement, many performance measurement initiatives proved ineffective. In 1994, the 
World Bank formed a task force to investigate the reasons for the lack of success of past 
initiatives. The 1994 Task Force identified three main reasons for the ineffectiveness: (i) weak 
internal demand, (ii) performance measurement being a stand-alone activity, and (iii) weak 
ownership and political will on the part of borrowing countries. Weak internal demand was the 
most challenging aspect of performance measurement initiatives needing to be addressed. It 
can be argued that the borrowing countries perceived the initiatives (which related to project 
completion reports, see discussion in point 3.3.1) as merely serving the interest of international 
donor agencies. This argument is supported by Khan (1998).  
Furthermore, being attached to projects funded by international donor agencies, the earlier 
performance measurement initiatives were a stand-alone activity. In other words, performance 
measurement in this period aimed solely to assess the performance of a project funded by 
donors. Project-based performance measurement was derived from the perception among the 
development community at that time that physical investment was the primary engine of 
development (Picciotto, 2002, p. 4). What mattered at that time was thus how many projects 
were completed. As the initiatives were connected to the projects funded by the international 
donor agencies, there were overlapping performance measurement requirements of multiple 
donors. For every individual project, there was a specific performance measurement 
requirement. Schaumburg-Müller (1996) notes that a serious problem thus arose when a project 
was funded by multi-donors. The need to satisfy multiple performance measurement 
requirements resulted in high transaction costs for borrowing countries.  
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The 1994 Task Force recommended several strategies to overcome these problems; these are 
discussed in World Bank (2002) and World Bank (2004a)41 and resulted in a significant change 
in approach being taken by the World Bank to introduce performance measurement into the 
borrowing countries. The Bank’s overall strategy designed to improve the effectiveness of 
performance measurement initiatives is evaluation capacity development (ECD). ECD 
encompasses the effort and action needed to be taken by donors in order to ensure a 
performance measurement system is put in place and used in developing economies World 
Bank (2004a).  
Figure 3.4 shows how ECD is conceptualised by the World Bank; each strategy is explained 
further below.  
 
Figure 3.4 Evaluation Capacity Development of the World Bank 
                                                 
41 I made an attempt to access the original 1994 Task Force report. However, my contact at World Bank stated 
that this is considered as historic document by the Bank and public access to it is therefore restricted. 
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Source: Developed by author, based on the World Bank (2002 and 2004a) 
 
Creating internal demand for performance measurement  
This first strategy was aimed at overcoming the weak internal demand for performance 
measurement in developing economies. According to Mackay, efforts to build performance 
measurement system will fail unless there is a real demand for it, or the demand can be 
intentionally created. Internal demand could be created by ensuring powerful incentives are in 
place to implement and use performance measurement (Mackay, 2007). The earlier work of 
World Bank (1998) suggests that internal demand could be created through sensitising key 
stakeholders to the need for and benefits from performance measurement, and then introducing 
suitable techniques and approaches by which to carry it out. Schaumburg-Müller (1996) 
mentions seminars and conferences as important examples of the demand generating activities.   
Placing performance measurement in the wider context of public sector reforms 
The second strategy – introducing performance measurement initiatives in a wider context of 
public sector management reforms supported by the World Bank – aims to address the second 
problem of ineffective performance measurement initiatives. As mentioned above, past 
initiatives for performance measurement tended to work as a stand-alone activity. Using this 
second strategy, the demand for performance measurement would not be so obvious. For 
example, in the reform to fight corruption as mentioned earlier, the logical connection between 
the reform and performance measurement could be easily established: performance 
measurement would contribute to the creation of transparency; with greater transparency, 
corruption it is hoped would gradually reduce. Knowing this might trigger the internal demand 
of stakeholders in developing economies. Introducing performance measurement in the context 
of public sector reforms might thus receive better acceptance from stakeholders in developing 
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economies where international donor agencies tend to provide support. Larbi (2006) suggests 
that a number of developing economies have introduced performance measurement as part of 
the public sector reforms taking place in their countries, presenting evidence that the second 
ECD strategy seems to work in practice. Picciotto (1998) states that ECD is not only about 
transferring skills pertaining to performance measurement, but also means fitting performance 
measurement structures, systems and processes to the new public reform strategies.  
Placing public sector reforms in wider contexts of good governance 
The third element of ECD is the enactment of public sector reforms within a broader concept, 
that is, one of good governance. This strategy aims to tackle that aspect of ineffectiveness of 
performance measurement initiatives which relates to the weak ownership and political will of 
stakeholders in developing economies. The significance of good governance is explored further 
in section 3.4 below.  
To summarise, the past ineffectiveness of many performance measurement initiatives brought 
about the formulation of strategies to make such initiatives effective, conceptualised as ECD. 
ECD strategies are consistent with the findings of Mimba et al. (2007), implying that World 
Bank was successful at putting the ECD concept into practice. Although this chapter has mainly 
referred to the ECD of the World Bank, this is not the only international donor agency which 
has ECD. Other international donor agencies also have a similar concept. The Development 
Assistant Committee for instance, is an OECD department which has a mandate to build 
effective performance measurement systems in developing economies (Schaumburg-Müller 
(1996). Khan (1998) suggests that the UNDP also has a similar programme. ECD implies the 
intention of international donors to be the key actors for performance measurement in 
developing economies. 
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3.3.3    The transformation of performance measurement in the 2000s 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
Entering the new millennium in the 2000s, an agreement was achieved between developed and 
developing economies on targets that should be achieved by 2015. These are known as the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)42. The MDGs have been agreed as a framework for 
measuring development progress covering eight areas (see Table 3.3). There are 18 targets and 
48 performance indicators.  
Goals Description 
1 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
2 Achieve universal primary education 
3 Promote gender equality and empower women 
4 Reduce child mortality 
5 Improve maternal health 
6 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases 
7 Ensure environmental sustainability 
8 Develop a global partnership for development 
Table 3.3 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
Source: UNDP (2006) 
 
OECD and World Bank (2006) state that the MDGs provide ‘specific, measurable targets that 
are gradually being adapted at the country level as the basis for country outcomes and then 
monitored over time to help gauge progress.’ Moreover, Mackay (2006) suggests that the 
emphasis on achievement of MDGs targets requires a similar focus from both international 
donors and recipient countries. A further consequence of this according to Mackay (2006) is 
the requirement for an analysis of the country’s performance measurement system, particularly 
‘the adequacy of available performance indicators’ (p.11). OECD and World Bank (2006) and 
                                                 
42 MDGs emerged from the world conferences organised by the United Nations in the 2000s and were endorsed 
by all 189 United Nations states. 
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Mackay (2006) imply that MDGs are likely to influence the development and system design 
of national performance measurement systems in developing economies.  
The first area in the Leahy (1993) proposal in terms of those to be funded through development 
aid is captured in the MDGs. This was ‘global environment (see Table 3.2), and equates to 
MDG 7 (environmental sustainability). Leahy’s (1993) statement quoted on page 76 of this 
thesis explains donor interest on MDGs in terms of the seventh goal. Environmental 
degradation, regardless of where it occurs, could eventually affect all countries to a greater or 
lesser extent. It is thus also in the interests of donors to protect the environment in developing 
economies. The BBC (2014) for instance, suggested that the changing weather patterns in 
South East Asia could be the cause of the extreme weather which hit much of the United 
Kingdom early of 2014. This could also relate to the problem in deforestation. The largest 
tropical rain forests exist mostly in developing economies such as Brazil and Indonesia. 
Developed economies could thus be assumed to have an interest in ensuring environmental 
sustainability in developing economies.  
The weakness of PMSs in most developing economies prompted the World Bank in particular 
and international donor agencies in general to put more effort into supporting and strengthening 
these systems through World Bank loans, grants and technical assistance. In other words, as 
donors re-emphasised:  
Tracking of progress towards the Millennium Development Goals also 
calls for ECD, as does the growing realization that the quality of M&E for 
Bank financed programs and projects is inextricably linked with the 
capacities and systems of borrower countries. (World Bank, 2002, p.v) 
Bangladesh for instance has requested help from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to 
develop its PMS aimed at assessing the degree of its achievement of the MDGs (see Asian 
Development Bank, 2006). This is evidence that the existence of MDGs have motivated 
developing economies to establish a national PMS. Specifically in terms of the health sector, 
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Kruk and Freedman (2008) recognise that the use of performance indicators in developing 
economies has assumed greater importance since the introduction of the MDGs.  
Global partnership development  
In 2002, the new development approach was introduced aimed at accelerating the achievement 
of MDGs43. This was known as the global partnership. The global partnership required ‘a 
reconfiguration of the development agenda; a reform of aid practices; and a transformation 
of performance management, measurement, and evaluation systems’ (Picciotto, 2002, p. 
3, my emphasis). An example of reform in aid practice is the provision of aid in the form of 
block funding – broad budget support – in order to increase ownership of development 
programmes. More specifically, Picciotto (2002) refers to the transformation of performance 
measurement in terms of three main points. Firstly, performance measurement ‘should go 
beyond the measurement of inputs (number of projects, volume of commitments, 
disbursements, and the like) in order to capture programme results,’ (p. 10) i.e., outputs, 
outcomes, and impacts. This was because the effectiveness of development aid in the new 
approach would be measured in terms of its outcomes.  
Secondly, performance measurement should focus on the country program instead of an 
individual project. The aim was to reduce various performance measurement requirements of 
multiple donors. This led to the emphasis on harmonisation of development aid programmes 
and eventually stimulated demand for one single comprehensive PMS in a recipient country, 
as a potential means to reduce high transaction costs. In addition, the pool funding approach 
agreed in the Monterrey conference of 2002 stipulated the requirement of performance 
information of the recipient country and greater reliance on the recipient country’s PMS. 
                                                 
43 The approach was introduced in the conference organised by the United Nations in Monterrey Mexico in March 
2002.    
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Thirdly, performance measurement should allow for tracking the progress of the MDGs 
achievement (see Picciotto, 2002, p.10).  
To summarise, the two global initiatives seem to work in two directions. Firstly, the global 
initiative causes international donor agencies to put pressure on recipient countries to 
implement performance measurement in order to meet the global target. Secondly, the global 
agreement stimulates recipient countries to develop their national PMSs in order to accelerate 
achievement of the global target (i.e. MDGs) (see Figure 3.5 below).   
               
Figure 3.5 Mechanism of Recent Global Initiatives Influencing Performance Measurement in the 
Developing Economies Context 
Source: Developed by author, based on World Bank reports 
As developing economies constitute some of the recipient countries of the international donor 
agency funding or are borrowing countries of the World Bank, we can assume that the 
performance measurement idea was introduced by the international donor agencies.  
Discussion in this section has shown that performance measurement in developing economies 
has a close connection to the development discourse. We can argue that this is one of the most 
distinctive features of performance measurement in developing economies compared to 
performance measurement in developed economies. We have also presented a considerable 
comprehensive discussion about the roles played by donors in the development of performance 
measurement in developing economies. From the concept of ECD formulated by the World 
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Bank, it is clear that donors have a role at every stage of performance measurement, starting 
from creating internal demand for performance measurement in a developing economy, making 
sure performance measurement is implemented and ensuring performance measurement is 
utilized. The three different periods of performance measurement efforts done by donors in 
accelerating performance measurement in developing economies can be summarised and 
presented in Figure 3.6 below.  
 
Figure 3.6 Three Periods of Performance Measurement Efforts by International Donor Agencies in 
Developing Economies 
Source: Developed by author, based on World Bank reports 
This section has described the long-standing efforts by international donor agencies to carry 
out performance measurement in order to accelerate performance measurement in developing 
economies. It clearly shows the important role of the World Bank in this regard. The interest 
of international donor agencies in performance measurement in developing economies can be 
connected to some points; for example, to help donor agencies with their own performance 
measurement system, to help with the harmonisation of development aid from different donors, 
and also to reduce the burden of developing economies themselves in serving the needs for 
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performance measurement from different donors. The next section seeks to understand the 
interest of international donors in performance measurement in developing economies from the 
perspective of neoliberal agenda.   
3.4    Development paradigms of the international donor agencies 
This section discusses development paradigms adopted by the international donor agencies, 
specifically the World Bank. A grasp of the World Bank’s development paradigm will help to 
understand its interest in performance measurement in the context of developing economies. 
Two concepts are discussed in this section: neoliberalism and good governance. Assessing the 
connection between the two concepts may provide an opportunity to look at performance 
measurement in developing economies from a different perspective.  
3.4.1    Neoliberalism  
Harvey (2007) defines the concept of neoliberalism as a ‘theory of political economy’. 
Neoliberalism is also defined as ‘political economy paradigm’ (Merino et al., 2010) or an 
‘economic order(s)’ (Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010). Finally, for Morales et al. (2013) 
neoliberalism is an ‘economic, political and social project.’ All authors agree that neoliberalism 
is characterised by a number of core principles such as privatisation (strong private property 
rights), free trade, free market, and minimum role of state in the economy (the role of 
government is limited just to provide a guarantee for markets to function properly but there 
should be no intervention in the economy).   
The concept of neoliberalism originated in the 1930s and can be associated with the work of 
Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek (Birch and Mykhnenko, 
2010). It gained momentum in the early 1980s, especially when President Reagan in the United 
States and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom promoted the idea. It 
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quickly spread to the context of the developing economy introduced by the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (well-known as firm supporters of neoliberalism) through 
what were known as structural adjustment programmes.  
Structural adjustment programmes promoted a policy reform package which later became 
known as the ‘Washington Consensus’. The term was invented by Williamson in 1989 (see 
Williamson, 1990). The reform package contained ten policies, covering fiscal discipline (there 
should be no public budget deficit), public expenditure priorities (subsides should be ended, 
redirect public expenditures on basic health, education and infrastructure), tax reform (tax 
cuts), financial liberalisation, exchange rate (adopt free-floating rates), trade liberalisation 
(adopt unified low tariff), liberalisation of inflows of foreign direct investment, privatisation of 
state enterprises, deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit) and  secure property rights.  
The World Bank used the so-called ‘Asian miracle’ as the cornerstone for promotion of the 
Washington Consensus (Baer et al., 1999; Jayasuriya and Rosser, 2001; Kiely, 1998). This was 
the term used to express the amazing growth of the East Asia economy in the 1980s while other 
developing economies such as Latin America, Africa and the Indian sub-continent were trapped 
in ‘debt crisis’ (Kiely, 1998). The Asian miracle was given as an example of how the 
Washington Consensus could be applied successfully in practice by international donor 
agencies. There was a broad agreement among international donors that if the Washington 
Consensus worked in East Asia, it should work for other developing economies (Baer et al., 
1999; Jayasuriya and Rosser, 2001; Kiely, 1998). Based on this argument, the Washington 
Consensus was applied extensively in Latin America and African countries in the 1980s.  
Critics of the Washington Consensus however, argue that the East Asian economy did not work 
according to its own principles (see Kiely, 1998), a view which clearly undermined the 
Consensus. More specifically, the high degree of market intervention did happen in the East 
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Asia economy. Responding to this, the World Bank acknowledged that market intervention did 
occur in the East Asian economy, but argued that the interventions were market friendly (see 
The World Bank, 1993, p.5). When the financial crisis struck Asian countries in 1997/98, the 
Washington Consensus came into question (Jayasuriya and Rosser, 2001; Sheppard and 
Leitner, 2010). Then, the president of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz proposed a post-
Washington Consensus which would take a more holistic view of development.  
According to Van Waeyenberge et al. (2011), two views of the post-Washington Consensus 
exist. One view assumes it to be a genuine departure from the concept of neoliberalism; the 
other sees it as a rhetorical instrument which sustains neoliberalism. Van Waeyenberge et al. 
(2011) themselves take a moderate view and perceive the post-Washington Consensus as 
‘another phase of neoliberalism, rather than a break with it’ (p.7). This is consistent with (Van 
Waeyenberge, 2010) which concludes: 
The imperatives characteristics of the Washington consensus remain 
entrenched in World Bank aid practices, even if in a less visible manner. 
This subtle change may serve to contain the contradiction resulting from 
the conjunction of its discursive shifts, as though the post-Washington 
Consensus, and persistent of a set of neoliberal economic and financial 
imperatives at the heart of its practices (p.106). 
In respect of the global financial crisis of 2007/08, Birch and Mykhnenko (2010) and Sheppard 
and Leitner (2010) conclude that perhaps it is still too early to gain a full understanding of its 
implications for the neoliberalism concept as part of the mainstream of the economic order.  
3.4.2    Good governance  
World Bank (1992) defines good governance as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in 
the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development’ (p.1). This 
definition is understood as a ‘narrow’ or ‘technological’ definition of governance because it 
only captures the ‘economic’ dimension of ‘governance’ (Doornbos, 2001; Welsh and Wood, 
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2007). More clearly, as Welsh and Woods (2007) explain, the World Bank (and also IMF) 
deliberately strives to avoid any political connotations44 of the concept of good governance. 
For these institutions, good government is seen as a much narrower concept that focuses on 
creating certain conditions45 under which ‘free market’ principle can work.46  
A good governance approach in development means that international donor agencies will 
provide funding only for a government which shows the capacity to ‘govern well’. This implies 
having qualities such as (1) a strong tradition of accountable government, (2) an effective 
bureaucracy, (3) stable and assured property rights, and (4) sound rule of law. These are all 
usually characteristics of institutions found in Western democratic countries. There is a great 
temptation among the development community to transplant these kinds of institutions to other 
countries, based on the belief that if ‘they have served rich and stable countries well – so, too, 
they could serve others’ (cf. Welsh and Woods, 2007, p.xii).   
Critics of the good governance approach to development however, argue that it has become a 
framework which aims to create a ‘westernised’ world, one that is regulated by a universal 
standard or value system derived from the western capitalist model of development. Schmitz 
(1995) is an early example of this kind of work. Schmitz’s (1995) argument is supported by 
others from the literature (see for examples Demmers et al., 2004; Doornbos, 2001; Kiely, 
1998; Taylor, 2004). Recent literature shows that Schmitz (1995) is still relevant. Lazarus 
(2013) for example, says ‘good governance and democracy promotion agendas are two 
interlinked elements of the hegemonic project of neo-liberal globalization’ (p.262, my 
emphasis). There are two ways to understand these critics: firstly, through understanding of 
                                                 
44 Good governance can mean democracy that is to do with elections, political parties, parliaments or democratic 
accountability (Welsh and Woods, 2007, see p. xi). 
45 The conditions here refer to for example ‘the rule of law’, ‘the protection of property rights’, ‘competent 
bureaucracies’, ‘effective restraint of corruption’ (Welsh and Woods, 2007, p. xii). 
46 As discussed earlier, the ‘free market’ is one of core principles of neoliberalism (see Section 3.4.1). 
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how the good governance concept has been conceptualised by international donors and 
secondly, through understanding of how the concept emerged in the first place. The details of 
these are discussed further below. 
By looking at the way ‘good governance’ is conceptualised, we can see the link with the 
principles of neoliberalism discussed earlier. Functioning of free markets is one of the core 
principles or characteristics of a neoliberal state. Welsh and Woods’ (2007) interpretation of 
the World Bank’s (1992) definition of ‘good governance’ suggests the alignment of the 
definition with the concept of neoliberalism. In addition, Welsh and Woods (2007) recognise 
that elements of the governance indicators used by the World Bank are actually vital elements 
for promoting and supporting markets, investment and economic growth. Sheppard and Leitner 
(2010, p.187), state that, ‘…, the turn to governance has been implemented in the form of 
international indices of good governance designed to reinforce market efficiency,’ which 
affirms Welsh and Woods (2007).  
Another way of looking at the link between the two concepts is by assessing how and when the 
concept of ‘good governance’ emerged. First, as discussed earlier, East Asia has been given as 
an example of how the Washington Consensus can work and therefore other developing 
economies should follow the same principles (see discussion in point 3.4.1). However, in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, structural adjustment programmes applied extensively in Latin 
American and African countries showed poor results.  As Sheppard and Leitner (2010) note, 
cross countries which adopted structural adjustment programmes, “unemployment and 
impoverishment catalysed widespread localised protests in the late 1980s and early 1990s” (p. 
186).  
In responding to this in its report of 1989, the World Bank brought up the issue of ‘governance’, 
arguing that institutional change was needed for reforms to be effective. This implies that the 
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World Bank blamed the poor results of structural adjustment programmes in Africa on a ‘crisis 
of governance’ across the entire continent, rather than the policies prescribed by the reform 
package itself (see World Bank, 1989). In response, a number of authors comment that the 
issue of ‘governance’ raised by the World Bank to explain the poor results of structural 
adjustment programmes was an attempt to protect the neoliberal agenda (see Lazarus, 2013; 
Taylor, 2004; Demmers et al., 2004). Taylor (2004) for example, wrote:  
Instead of questioning their own prescription, the IFIs [International 
Financial Institutions] instead sought to advance ‘good governance’ as a 
necessary precondition for neoliberal reforms to finally work. This in 
itself reflected the conviction amongst the institutions that neoliberalism 
was the only way forward, and that what was wrong, or had been going 
wrong, was not the ingredients of the adjustment programmes, but rather 
their implementation and wider institutional setting in the borrowing 
states (p.130).  
In 1997/98, a huge financial crisis hit the Asian countries. At this time, the Washington 
Consensus came into question, as Jayasuriya and Rosser (2001, p. 382) express: 
… the Asian economic crisis has also led to a serious ideological crisis in 
the West. Before the collapse there was a broad agreement among Western 
orthodox economies that developing countries should pursue a set of 
economic policies, often referred to as the ‘Washington Consensus. 
The orthodox economists tried to provide alternative explanations but were unable to achieve 
an agreement and the explanations tended to undermined the Washington Consensus 
(Jayasuriya and Rosser, 2001). They also note that while not being able to agree on the roots 
of the crisis in East Asia (whether the crisis resulted from too much state intervention or too 
little), orthodox economists have been able to agree that political and extra economic factors 
contributed to the crisis. The World Bank (1998, p. 16) offers a similar argument: 
East Asia’s crisis is best seen as a story of rapid growth built on 
incomplete foundations, which was left exposed to winds of the 
international capital markets.  Now that the financial earthquake has 
occurred, it will have to rebuild its success on new foundations in its trade 
competitiveness, in the financial sector, and in the governance and 
financing of its corporate sectors.  
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The statement above implies that, for the World Bank,  the cause of the crisis, if not directly 
linked, at least can be associated with poor governance (cf. Jayasuriya and Rosser, 2001). 
Thus, in the views of the orthodox economists and the World Bank, “the crisis was as much as 
a result of institutional and ‘political’ failure of East Asian governments to fully implement the 
tenets of Washington Consensus” (cf. Jayasuriya and Rosser, 2001, p. 387). Hence, the World 
Bank (1998) implies that from their point of view, the Asian economic crisis demonstrated 
market failure worsened by an institutional inability to provide economic order. This implies 
that the World Bank is likely to place greater emphasis on extra-economic factors that are seen 
as essential to the stable functioning of the market system. A further implication is that, “the 
new policy thinking in multilateral agencies will endeavour to articulate a set of political 
underpinnings to support the market reforms championed by the Washington Consensus” (cf. 
Jayasuriya and Rosser, 2001, p. 387).  
From the discussion above, it is clear that concept of ‘governance’ gained its momentum in the 
context of the East Asia economic crisis; the Washington Consensus was replaced by the Post-
Washington Consensus with ‘governance’ as one of its key elements: “developing good 
governance is the most vital piece of the new policy jigsaw” in the Post-Washington Consensus 
(Jayasuriya and Rosser, 2001, p. 388). According to them, the difference between the 
Washington Consensus and the Post-Washington Consensus is that the Washington Consensus 
is about shrinking the state while the new consensus places a great store on getting the right 
institutional mix for functioning markets. Jayasuriya and Rosser (2001) seem to be consistent 
with Van Waeyenberge et al. (2011) who consider the move from the Washington Consensus 
to the Post-Washington Consensus to be just a shift to another form of neoliberalism, not a 
complete departure from it (as mentioned in the previous discussion (see Section 3.4.1). 
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From the above explanations, it is clear that the concept of governance began to emerge in the 
late 1980s or early 1990s in connection with the poor results of structural adjustment 
programmes applied in Latin American and African countries. Then, in the late 1990s the 
concept became more important due to the Asian economic crisis in 1997/9 (Jayasuriya and 
Rosser, 2001). The popularity of the concept in the late 1990s also can be associated with 
another event that will be discussed below.  This explains the increasing popularity of the 
governance concept in the late 1990s.  
The second event which encouraged the concept of good governance to gain momentum, along 
with the emphasis on market-oriented policies, was the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s 
(Doornbos, 2001; Hout, 2007). Doornbos (2001) says that ‘good governance’ (which emerged 
as a conditionality attached to a funding decision) was fundamentally different from the type 
of conditionalities which existed during the Cold War era. During the Cold War, the 
relationship between donors and their clients was built up on the basis of ‘political’ agreement:  
Political support for the West, or for the then so-called Eastern bloc, in the 
UN, in the field and in other fora, had been a key condition for material 
and other upkeep of the regimes concerned. (Doornbos, 2001, p.97) 
Post-Cold War, however, the notion of new conditionalities was aimed at establishing 
…a grip on recipient developing countries’ handling of policy processes, and on the 
basic manner in which government and its constituent political processes – multi-
partyism or other – would be structured. National sovereignty and non-interference in 
internal affairs, for long held in high esteem in international politics, were met with 
increasing impatience. In World Bank circles at the time, there was an acute awareness 
that one was about to step into ‘sensitive’ matters… (Doornbos, 2001, p.97-98) 
When the financial crisis struck East Asia in 1997/98, the ‘good governance’ concept gained 
currency as a contemporary development discourse. Jayasuriya and Rosser (2001) state that the 
crisis had a huge impact on the economy of the region: many Asian companies went bankrupt, 
interest rates were uncontrollable, and unemployment and inflation increased dramatically. Not 
only did the crisis impact on the economy but it also brought about the collapse of several 
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governments in the region (including Indonesia). Jayasuriya and Rosser (2001) argue that the 
Asian economic crisis led to a ‘serious ideological crisis in the West’:   
Before the collapse there was broad agreement among the orthodox 
economists that developing economies should pursue a set of economic 
policies prescribed in the ‘Washington Consensus’… (p.382) 
After the crisis, however, the Washington Consensus was called into question, as Jayasuriya 
and Rosser (2001) point out.  The crisis resulted in greater attention being afforded by the 
development community to the concept of good governance.  
By the turn of the new century, virtually all major bilateral and multilateral aid agencies had 
moved away from focusing purely on ‘economic development’ to a new emphasis on the 
promotion of ‘good governance’ (Welsh and Woods, 2007). However, the shift from 
Washington Consensus to post-Washington Consensus is a new phase of neoliberalism, as 
discussed earlier. The implication is that at the time the World Bank was shifting its 
development paradigm from the Washington Consensus to a good governance approach, 
neoliberalism was actually still the mainstream of the economic order (Van Waeyenberge et 
al., 2011). 
3.4.3    Performance measurement, good governance and the notion of neoliberalism  
As discussed above, the ECD concept shows a clear link between performance measurement, 
public sector reform and good governance (see 3.3.2). According to the concept, for the 
initiative to be effective performance measurement should be introduced into a broader context 
of good governance. Mimba et al. (2007) indicates that the ECD concept was put into practice 
by the international donor agencies; at the same time, the discussion above (3.4.2) shows there 
to be a link between good governance and neoliberalism. In essence, good governance 
complements or secures the neoliberal idea, and it is thus plausible to connect the interests of 
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international donors in performance measurement in developing economies to the notion of 
neoliberalism. Mackay (1998, p.3) for example, presents an indication of this link:   
The potential for evaluation [performance measurement] can be 
understood from recognition that economic governance and a sound 
public sector reform are central to national economic competitiveness – 
markets reward countries able to manage and screen public expenditures, 
and evaluation offers a tool to help do that.  
Key words to be noted from Mackay’s (1998) statements are ‘economic governance’, ‘a sound 
public sector reform’, and ‘economic competitiveness.’ Mackay (1998) has linked public sector 
reforms to the economic competitiveness of a country. ‘Economic governance’ implies similar 
definition of good governance provided by the World Bank (1992) discussed earlier (see the 
first paragraph of point 3.4.2). ‘Sound public sector reforms’ can be interpreted as those 
supporting market efficiency, as Welsh and Woods (2007) argue and as discussed earlier. 
Mackay’s (1998) statement thus confirms Welsh and Woods’s (2007) argument that elements 
of governance introduced by the World Bank are vital to promote and support markets, 
investments and economic growth. This argument is supported by the statement of the Director 
General of the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department: ‘the development consensus 
favors growth-oriented, market-friendly development’ (Picciotto, 2002, p. 9) 
3.5    Conclusion 
I have developed further the conceptual framework established in Chapter 2 by elaborating the 
elements of the framework and the contextual factors of the public sector in the developing 
economies. The discussions in this chapter indicate that factors influencing the design, 
implementation and use of performance measurement systems in the context of developing 
economies are much more complex compared to those in the context of developed economies. 
The complexity stems from a) the on-going reforms, b) specific characteristics of the public 
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sector in this context, and c) the involvement of external stakeholders (i.e., international donor 
agencies).   
In terms of its history, performance measurement in developing economies has its root in the 
context of development. This is very different from performance measurement in developed 
economies which from its introduction was driven by the motivation to transplant efficiency 
techniques to improve the performance of the public sector. In developing economies, 
performance measurement was introduced by international donor agencies in relation to 
development aid. Performance measurement in developing economies can thus be examined in 
the context of development discourse. By tracing the evolution of donor efforts in 
mainstreaming performance measurement in developing economies, it is plausible to relate it 
to the notion of neoliberalism (the development paradigm adopted by the World Bank), even 
after the World Bank shifted this paradigm to embrace the concept of good governance. This 
assumption is based on the argument that the good governance concept can be seen as 
complementing rather than replacing neoliberalism. In terms of the challenges facing 
performance measurement in developing economies, the specific characteristics of the public 
sector in this context exert an influence on the contingency factors defined in Chapter 2. An 
exploration of these characteristics and to what extent they have a role to play will provide a 
contribution to the performance measurement literature in developing economies. 
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CHAPTER  4                                                                                     
METHODOLOGY 
4.1    Introduction 
As discussed in chapter 2, the concept of ‘performance’ is complex and multidimensional; 
measuring performance involves complex processes and elements. Performance measurement 
systems are influenced by the environments or institutional contexts within which they are 
being implemented. Accordingly, Van Helden and Reichard (2013) asserts research on 
performance measurement needs to be more explicit in assessing the influence of institutional 
context. As understanding context is an integral part of understanding performance 
measurement systems. It is thus important to select the most appropriate research methodology 
to capture the influence of the context in which the new performance measurement system is 
being applied in Indonesia.   
This chapter introduces the methodology used in this research. This study adopts qualitative 
research to understand the Indonesian new measurement system, as the most appropriate to 
capture the complexity surrounding the Indonesian new measurement system and the richness 
of context in which it is being practiced. More specifically, I use case study research to address 
the research questions posed by this study. The case study method allows in-depth investigation 
of the Indonesian new measurement system using a range of data collection methods. Case 
study research, however, has less developed procedures than other research methods. Therefore 
a complex iterative process is common in conducting case study research, (Scapens, 1990), as 
I also experienced in this study.   
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This chapter starts with discussion of the philosophical perspective of research in the social 
sciences. This first section covers the differences between positivistic and interpretive 
approaches, the research approach of the current research and research questions. The next 
section focuses on the research design. This discusses the use of case study, the role of theories, 
the steps of the case study, data collection methods and data analysis. The discussion then 
moves on to criteria for research evaluation consisting of procedural reliability, contextual 
validity and transferability of findings and finally presents the conclusions.  
4.2    Philosophical Perspective  
The distinction in social sciences can be made between the parallel streams of positivistic and 
interpretive research. Both types of research are fundamentally different in terms of their 
ontological, epistemological and methodological positions. The ontological position relates to 
the researcher’s view of ‘the very nature and essence of things in the social world’ (Mason, 
2002, p. 14) or ‘the assumptions which the researcher holds regarding the nature of the 
phenomenon’s reality’ (Ryan et al., 2002, p. 35). The ontological perspective determines the 
appropriate epistemological perspective to be used (Chua, 1986; Mason, 2002; Ryan et al., 
2002). Epistemology is ‘the philosophy of knowledge or of how we come to know’ (Trochim, 
2006). In other words, the epistemological perspective is concerned with what is to be included 
as evidence of a study (Mason, 2002, p. 14). It defines the model of explanation (i.e. whether 
the research is to take a positivistic or interpretive approach).   
4.2.1    Positivistic Approach 
Researchers adopting a positivistic approach assume that the researcher and the studied 
phenomenon are independent of each other (Robson, 2002; Weber, 2004). Departing from this 
ontological assumption, positivists believe that an objective reality exists beyond the human 
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mind which reflect their epistemological position (Weber, 2004).  Moreover, positivists assume 
that the objects being researched have qualities that exist independent of the researcher. 
Therefore, researchers taking a positivistic approach believe that ‘a statement made by a 
researcher is true when it has a one-to-one- mapping to the reality that exists beyond the human 
mind’ (Weber, 2004, p, vii).  This belief relates to the view that science is the way to understand 
the world (Trochim, 2006) which implies that discovering knowledge uses observation and 
deductive reasoning (Robson, 2002). More specifically, dependent and independent variables 
are predefined and the reality is therefore described through the measurement of both variables 
(Myers, 1997). Positivistic researchers therefore seek out large amounts of empirical data 
which can be analysed statistically to look for pattern or trend.   
4.2.2    Interpretive Approach 
An interpretive research considers that the phenomenon in the world and the researcher who 
studies the phenomenon are interrelated (Rowlands, 2005; Weber, 2004). Interpretivists 
recognise that ‘the knowledge they build reflects their particular goals, culture, experience, 
history…’ (Weber, 2004, p.vi). Different researchers thus could have a different understanding 
of same phenomenon or the same phenomenon could present different meanings to the same 
researcher at different moments (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). That is why the researchers 
themselves in effect become measurement instruments as ‘the researchers interpret (measure) 
the phenomena they observe’ (Weber, 2004, p. vii). When inconsistency is found between the 
researcher’s pre-understanding and their lived experience of the phenomenon, interpretivists 
refine their interpretation iteratively until it matches with their lived experience.  
An interpretive study does not define dependent and independent variables (Rowlands, 2005); 
the study is not aimed to test a theory and to predict phenomenon but to understand a social 
phenomenon, which is socially constructed in specific circumstances (Hopper and Powell, 
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1985; Scapens, 1990). In other words, an interpretive research aims to understand the social 
contexts of phenomenon and to know how these contexts influence and are influenced by the 
phenomenon (Walsham, 1995). Interpretivists use inductive reasoning that helps to gain deeper 
understanding of structure of a phenomenon through language, consciousness and shared 
meaning (Klein and Myers, 1999; Rowlands, 2005).  
4.2.3    Research Approach of the Study 
The previous point discussed philosophical perspectives in doing research in social science.   
The objective of discussing the perspectives is mainly to locate (to understand) the stand point 
of the current research because I shifted the research perspective at one point during the course 
of the research (see Figure 4.1). Initially, the design of this study was informed by Propper and 
Wilson (2003) and Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004). These two papers were tied to Mimba et al. 
(2007) in order to capture the influence of the specific context of developing economies. The 
research questions formulated require the use of mixed method approach, combining 
positivistic and interpretive approaches. More specifically, I planned to use large scale survey 
questionnaire and case study at several selected districts/municipalities. The preliminary 
findings of this study, however, indicated that mixed method approach was likely to be not 
effective. The change in circumstances encountered in the field was discussed with my 
supervisor and he agreed that the research design should be modified.  
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Figure 4.1 Research Approach 
Source: Author 
The decision to shift the research approach from mixed method to an interpretive approach was 
consistent with Scapens’s (1990; 2004) and Ryan et al.’s (2002) argument: interpretive research 
helps researchers to understand management accounting practices in context: to capture the 
richness of the context where a management accounting technique is being practiced. Some 
early studies such as Burrell and Morgan (1979), Jönsson and Macintosh (1997) and Tomkins 
and Groves (1983) have debated the appropriateness of the positivist and interpretive 
approaches in management accounting research. According to Scapens (1990), positive 
management accounting research is primarily based on neoclassical economic theory, which 
was developed to predict general patterns of economic behaviour and which has been used to 
provide a basis for management decision models. Management accounting research drawn 
from positivism relies on quantitative measurements and statistical methods (Berry and Otley, 
2004; Scapens, 1990).  
Chua (1986) and Scapens (1990), however, argue that the positivistic research approach using 
neoclassical economics is limited when it comes to explaining the process through which 
accounting systems evolve in particular organisations. As some management accounting 
researchers believe (see for examples Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Chua, 1986; Scapens, 
1990), management accounting practices are better understood through interpretive research. 
According to Scapens (1990), management accounting practices are socially constructed; thus 
Positivistic Approach  Interpretive Approach  
Initial design: 
mixed method  
Final design: 
case study 
research 
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they may change as a result of the interaction of social agents. Therefore, looking for a universal 
law and generalisation in order to arrive at a logical theory is likely to be ineffective. For this 
reason, the interpretive approach is increasingly adopted in management accounting research. 
As discussed, the interpretive approach allows researchers to discover and capture the 
meanings of social behaviours, which are developed by humans from what they encounter in 
everyday life.  
The current study examines a social phenomenon which in nature is a complex system. More 
specifically, it aims to understand the new performance measurement system applied in 
Indonesia since 2008 with its different elements and how the different elements fit together. 
The new measurement deals with Indonesia’s decentralisation policy which means that the 
measurement system will be a concern of stakeholders at different tiers of government (i.e. 
national, regional and local government). Moreover, the decentralisation policy also covers the 
entire government’s functions, except for five areas where control is retained by central 
government (foreign policy, defence and security, fiscal and monetary policy, judiciary, and 
religious affairs). The new measurement system thus deals with government services ranging 
from education, health, public works, and the environment to tourism and library services (in 
total 26 obligatory and 8 optional functions). Taking an interpretive approach enables a better 
understanding of this complex measurement system within the specificity of the Indonesian 
context.  
4.2.4    Research Questions 
The change in the research approach required research questions to be re-formulated. The 
refined research question posed for the purposes of this study are: 
1) Why was this new performance measurement system established in Indonesia and 
how?  
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2) What system design does the new performance measurement system in Indonesia 
follow? Why was it designed in the way it is and how effectively has the system 
been designed?  
3) How effectively has the new performance measurement system been implemented?   
4) Is there any evidence of use of the information produced from this new 
performance measurement system? If there is any evidence, how has the 
information been used?  If there is no evidence, why has the information not been 
used? 
5) Which factors influence the design, implementation and use of the new 
performance measurement system in Indonesia? How do the complex interactions 
between technical, organisational and institutional factors work to influence this 
design, implementation and use?  
The first research question (RQ1) was derived from both functionalist and non-functionalist 
perspectives in viewing performance measurement systems. Rational or functional 
perspectives assume that the adoption of performance measurement systems is driven by the 
motivation to achieve improved performance in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. On the 
other hand, from the perspectives of institutionalists, the adoption of performance measurement 
systems is not necessarily linked to efficiency and effectiveness It can serve other purposes 
such as political reasons or gaining legitimacy as discussed in point 2.4.2 
The new performance measurement system being applied in Indonesia (i.e. EKPPD) may have 
been developed because of the objective to help local government in Indonesia to improve the 
quantity and quality of public service delivery for local people (i.e. improve performance in 
terms of efficiency and effectiveness). The development of the system might also have political 
reasons behind it that need to be investigated (institutional perspective).  Referring to the 
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discussion in chapter 3, in particular to the work of Mimba et al. (2007) and the arguments of 
Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) and Pollit (2001), it is very likely that the development of this 
new measurement system has also been influenced by international donor agencies, but which 
donor organisations played roles and how they did it remains unclear. Thus, addressing this 
first research question will clarify whether the development of the new performance 
measurement systems applied in Indonesia contain both rational and institutional explanations 
or only one, and will clarify the role of international donor agencies in the case of this new 
measurement system.  
The second research question (RQ2) was inspired by Williams (2004), who discusses the 
evolution of performance measurement systems in the context of developed economies (i.e. the 
US) prior to and after the 1930s. There has been no kind of study like this in the context of 
developing economies; generally speaking, research on public sector performance 
measurement in the context of developing economies is still under-developed (Mimba et al., 
2007) and specifically for the Indonesian context, there is still scarce literature on performance 
measurement (Akbar et al., 2012). Therefore, there is still little knowledge in terms of what 
type of performance measurement systems are operating in this context. Addressing the first 
part of RQ2 will help to fill in the gap in the literature.  
The second part of the research question was inspired by the discussion in the literature review 
chapter about the steps of the design phase. It was mentioned that the second step is about 
‘developing a conceptual framework’ as a foundation for measures to be developed. The 
measurement framework usually links to the strategic objectives and in most countries, this is 
defined by the constitution (Buschor, 2013). Addressing the second part of RQ2 will inform 
on the measurement framework underlying the EKPPD system. Answering this second part of 
RQ2 may lead to an understanding of the stakeholders involved in this system and how their 
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conflicts of interest have influenced the system design such as selection of measures or other 
aspects of the system. 
The last part of RQ2 asks about the appropriateness of measurement techniques adopted in the 
EKPPD system with the specificity of the Indonesian context. It asks whether this has 
problems, and if so, what they are and how they are connected to the implementation process. 
The underlying theoretical framework for this third question is that the distinct nature of the 
public sector in general brings challenges for measuring performance in the public sector, as 
discussed in chapter 2. The public sector in developing economies also has some specific 
characteristics (see chapter 3). Advanced techniques of performance measurement systems will 
not be suitable. Addressing this final part of RQ2 will help to assess the interdependency 
between design, implementation and use.   
The third research question deals with the status of the ongoing implementation of the 
Indonesian new measurement system. It asks whether it faces problems, and if so, what these 
are and how they have hampered the implementation process. The underlying theoretical 
framework for this third question is that the distinct nature of the public sector in general brings 
challenges for measuring performance in the public sector, as discussed in Chapter 2. The 
public sector in developing economies also has some specific characteristics (see chapter 3). 
These are expected to magnify the challenges of performance measurement in the context of a 
developing economy.  
The fourth research question was drawn from both functional and institutional approaches in 
researching public sector performance measurement systems. The answer to this question will 
depend on the answer to RQ1. If the development of the system was merely driven by non-
functional explanations, then we can expect symbolic use. However, if there was an element 
of rational consideration, then we can investigate whether the information has been used as 
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intended or not. If the system has not been used, what were the reasons? From a functionalist 
perspective, information is not used because lack of validity and reliability. 
Finally, the last research question (RQ5) was formulated based on the conceptual framework 
developed in chapters 2 and 3 which define contingency factors into three broad categories: 
technical, organisational and institutional factors. Table 3.1 summarises the factors in each 
category that have been elaborated with the contextual factors of the public sector in the 
developing economies. Thus, RQ5 aims to investigate which factors that are applied to the case 
of the new Indonesian measurement system under study. Are all of the factors applicable? 
Perhaps other factors will emerge from the specificity of the Indonesian context.  
The second part of the RQ5 was inspired by the argument of Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) who 
state that contingency factors will have complex, non-linear interactive effects on performance 
measurement systems. The complexity is likely to be higher in the case of this new performance 
measurement because of characteristics such as high level of corruption and informal practices, 
as identified by Mimba et al. (2007). In the discussion of Section 3.2.3, I develop some 
predictions on how different factors can intermingle with each other. For example, the 
influence of corruption will work through internal stakeholders’ support/commitment for 
performance measurement initiatives. However, how complex the interaction could be still 
needs further investigation. Addressing the second half of the RQ5 is expected to improve our 
understanding on this issue and may raise some interesting new findings that have not yet been 
discussed in the existing literature.      
To summarise, addressing these five questions will provide a deep understanding of the new 
measurement system as it is applied in Indonesia. In a broader context, an understanding of the 
Indonesian performance management system will inevitably help to generate new knowledge 
on the implementation of performance measurement systems in developing economies.  
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4.3    Research Design  
Research design reflects the way research is carried out. Put simply, it addresses how to plan a 
research project (Flick, 2006; 2009). A comprehensive definition is provided by Ragin (1994): 
‘research design is a plan for collecting and analysing evidence that will make it possible for 
the investigator to answer whatever questions he or she has posed.’ The research design 
‘touches almost all aspects of the research, from the minute details of data collection to the 
selection of the techniques of data analysis.’ Research design thus needs to reflect (1) how data 
collection is to be set up and analysed, and (2) how empirical “material” (situations, cases etc.) 
should be selected. Research questions can thus be addressed satisfactorily using the available 
means, taking into consideration the constraints of time and resources (cf. Ragin, 1994, p. 191). 
As discussed earlier, the research design was modified from mixed method approach to case 
study research.  
A specific definition of case study research itself is provided in Yin (2014), pp.16-17:  
 A case study is an empirical enquiry which 
1. investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within 
its real-world context, especially when  
2. the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly 
evident. 
 
 A case study enquiry 
 copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many 
more variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
 relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulation fashion, and as another result 
 benefits from the prior development of theoretical prepositions to guide data 
collection and analysis. 
 
Essentially, the first part of this definition represents the scope of a case study and the second 
part implies its features.  
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The new design of the research also caused the change in the definition of the ‘case’ under 
studied. In the initial design of this study, a ‘case’ was a district or a municipality whereas in 
the new design, the ‘case’ is ‘the performance measurement system.’ To be clear, the case 
presented in this research is on the performance measurement system applied in Indonesia. I 
look at the operation of the system, various elements within the system and how those elements 
fit together. The new design of this study was consistent with Van Helden et al.’s (2008) 
findings which show the distinctive pattern of research into performance measurement and 
common research methods used. The finding of the study shows that researchers from an 
accounting background tend to study performance measurement using the case study method 
(in contrast to, say, those from a public administration discipline, who often use survey 
research). Table 4.1 shows the link between the refined research questions, data sources and 
methods and justification for each data collection method identified.  
  
 127 
 
Research questions Data sources and methods Justification 
RQ1. Why was the new measurement 
system established in 
Indonesia and how? 
 
 Actors involved in the 
development process of the new 
measurement system : 
interviews 
Also possibly: 
 Relevant reports and 
publications related to the 
development of the new 
measurement system: 
documentary analysis 
Interviews with actors involved in the development 
stage of the new measurement system provide 
information about why the Government of Indonesia 
was interested in developing the new measurement 
system and the process or steps undertaken from the 
beginning to the drafting of the regulation on the 
new measurement system. 
 
Documentary analysis (of relevant reports and 
publications) provides information that might be not 
revealed through interviews with actors involved in 
the development.  Also helps to clarify details such 
as dates or chronology of events involved in the 
process of development. 
RQ2. What system design does the 
new performance 
measurement system in 
Indonesia follow? Why was it 
designed in the way it is and 
how effectively has the 
system been designed?  
 
All related regulations and 
manuals of the new measurement 
system: documentary analysis 
Analysing relevant regulations and manuals of the 
new measurement system will provide information 
concerning system design of the new measurement 
system (such as what aspects to measure and how to 
measure). 
RQ3. How effectively has the new 
measurement system been 
implemented in Indonesia?  
 
 Actors involved in the new 
measurement system  
implementation process: 
interviews and survey 
Also possibly: 
 Relevant reports, and 
publications: documentary 
analysis  
 
 Field visit: direct observation  
 
 Interviews with actors involved in the 
implementation process of the new measurement 
system provide information related to: 
- status of the current implementation 
- problems encountered from first year of 
implementation until now 
- any solutions which might have been found 
- evidence of any dysfunctional effects 
emerging since implementation 
 Survey of actors involved in the new measurement 
system implementation process might also provide 
same information as listed above 
 Documentary analysis of relevant reports may also 
indicate all issues mentioned in the previous two 
points 
 Direct observation will help understand the 
context/environment in which the new measurement 
system is being practiced  
RQ4. Is there any evidence of use of 
the information produced 
from this new performance 
measurement system? If there 
is any evidence, how has the 
information been used?  If 
there is no evidence, why has 
the information not been 
used? 
Users of information produced 
from the new measurement 
system: interviews 
Interviews with users of information produced by the 
new measurement system will reveal how this 
information has been used. If information has not been 
used, what are the reasons for this? 
RQ5. Which factors influence the 
design, implementation and 
use of the new performance 
measurement system in 
Indonesia? How do the 
complex interactions between 
technical, organisational and 
institutional factors work to 
influence this design, 
implementation and use?  
a. Actors involved in the new 
measurement system  
implementation process: 
interviews and survey 
Also possibly: 
 Relevant reports, and 
publications: documentary 
analysis  
 Field visit: direct observation  
Addressing the first four questions will help to address 
the fifth research question. 
 
Table 4.1 Linking Research Questions and Possible Data Collection Methods 
Source: Developed by author, adapted from Mason (2002) and Scapens (2004) 
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4.3.1    The Use of Case Study  
Case study research can address a number of different objectives: to obtain a description of the 
phenomenon being studied, theory testing, and theory building through modification or 
extension of the existing theories (see Scapens, 1990; Berry and Otley, 2004). In accounting 
research (especially in management accounting), case studies offer ‘the possibility of 
understanding the nature of management accounting in practice; both in terms of the 
techniques, procedures, systems, etc. which are used and the way in which they are used’ 
(Scapens, 1990, p. 264). This type of case study falls into the category of interpretive case study 
research (Ryan et al., 2002; Scapens, 2004), a method which is derived from the interpretive 
research approach.  
As already mentioned, the objectives of this study are to understand the new measurement 
system in Indonesia, the different elements involved in it, and how these elements fit together. 
Moreover, from the discussion in chapters 2 and 3 it has been understood that context 
influences performance measurement significantly. The challenge of measuring performance 
in the public sector relates to the fact that here its nature differs from that of the private sector 
(from where the idea of performance measurement was transplanted). Moving from developed 
economies to developing economies also brings different (and probably higher) challenges for 
performance measurement because of the specific characteristics of the latter context. 
Understanding context is thus crucial to the study of performance measurement, and again, 
here the use of an interpretive case study is appropriate. Overall, the objectives of this study 
and its nature are thus consistent with the characteristics of interpretive research, again making 
the adoption of interpretive case study appropriate.  
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4.3.2    The Role of Theories 
Ryan et al. (2002) and Scapens (2004) underline that the use of the case study method in 
interpretive research should be for explanatory purposes. Explanatory case studies are those 
which attempt to explain the reasons for observed accounting practices. Even an exploratory 
case study will include some elements of explanation. More specifically, the nature of the 
interpretive case study is described as follows: 
Theory is used in order to understand and explain the specific, rather than 
to produce generalisations. The theory is useful if it enables the researcher 
to provide convincing explanations of the observed practices. If available 
theories do not provide such explanations, it will be necessary to modify 
existing theory or to develop new theory, which can then be used in other 
case studies. The objective of the research is to generate theories which 
provide good explanations of the case (Ryan et al., 2002, p.144).  
Moreover, Ryan et al. (2002) explain that in interpretive case study the researcher comes to the 
field with existing knowledge and theories47. There is thus two-way interaction between theory 
and observation; theories are used to explain empirical observations which in turn modify 
theory. The theories which support the findings are maintained and the ones which do not are 
changed. This implies a ‘logic of replication and extension, rather than sampling logic’ (Ryan 
et al., 2002, p. 149).  
I went into the field with a conceptual framework which categorised factors that might 
influence the design, implementation and use into three classifications: technical, 
organisational and institutional factors. Investigation at the national level indicated that the 
preliminary findings supported the framework. Many technical and organisational issues 
hampered the implementation process, such as unavailability of data, low reliability of data 
used by local government to fill in KPIs, low capacity in terms of human resources to handle 
                                                 
47 This can be in form of a conceptual framework. If a specific conceptual framework has not been developed at 
this stage, at least there should be a framework at a general level.  
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the implementation, and unavailability of financial resources to support the implementation. 
These findings clearly support the rational arguments. 
Moving towards the investigations at the regional and the local levels, the rational explanations 
were still useful to understand implementation barriers such as how the system design did not 
fit with the specificity of the Indonesian context. For example, the design of the system was 
considerably much more advanced compared to the capacity of local government to report 
performance according to this new system. Then, the selected indicators were considerably 
problematic for stakeholders at local government level (e.g. the use of minimum service 
standard for some local government was not really relevant for them, but for others the 
standards were too high).  
The findings related to the implementation problems faced by the regional government tended 
to support the rational or functional arguments: the design of performance measurement 
systems should fit with the context where the system is being implemented. The investigation 
at local level also showed evidence that supported institutional arguments such as the effects 
of corruption, informal practices and the local democratic system of direct election.  
In relation to the driving forces that finally led to the development of the new measurement 
system, the findings of the study seemed to be better explained through the thesis of 
institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powel, 1983). There was evidence for a strong 
involvement of international donor agencies such as the World Bank, Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) and Asian Development Bank (ADB). The findings also 
suggested the presence of a complex conflict of interest among different stakeholders (e.g. 
between MoHA and sector ministries), between the national government and local elected 
leaders, and between internal stakeholders and international development agencies, the World 
Bank in particular. Institutional theory, however, could not explain the interest of international 
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donor agencies in supporting the development of the new performance measurement in 
Indonesia. Therefore, I borrowed insights from theory in other fields (e.g. political economic 
theory).  
To summarise, some findings can be explained through rational arguments but other findings 
will be better understood using institutional theory (New Institutional Sociology), in particular 
DiMaggio and Powel (1983). As indicated earlier, the conceptual framework developed, since 
the beginning has drawn insights from both rational and institutional approaches in researching 
public sector performance measurement systems.  The weakness of my literature review, 
however, was that I did not include a discussion about institutional theory. Therefore, I had to 
bring the discussion of institutional theory into the literature review. The conceptual framework 
was maintained but the complex conflict of interest among different stakeholders will be 
analysed using the work of Tillema et al. (2010).  
4.3.3    The steps of the case study  
In conducting this case study, I followed the main steps suggested by Scapens (1990; 2004)48. 
However, due to circumstances encountered during the course of the study, the process could 
not follow the exact sequence recommended by Scapens (1990) which acknowledges that the 
iterative process is very common during case study research: ‘in the course of a case study, the 
researcher may have to iterate through these steps many times, possibly in different orders and 
with different interactions between individual steps’ (p. 273).  
Important preparations for case study research include a) reviewing the relevant literature, and 
b) gaining access to the case. Reviewing the relevant literature is essential as no one can 
approach a case with a complete lack of knowledge about it (Scapens, 2004). To begin the 
                                                 
48 The main steps include: (1) preparation (2) collecting evidence (3) assessing evidence and (4) identifying and 
explaining patterns (see Scapens, 1990, pp. 274-276; 2004, 265-275).  
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process, the permission letter to conduct research was obtained from a directorate under the 
Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) known as Kesbangpollinmas (Nation Unity, 
Society and Politic). I received this letter on 7 December 2011, before interviews with key 
informants in national government took place. Applying for permission to conduct this research 
required the submission of several documents: a formal letter from the university, a research 
proposal and a recommendation letter from the authority where the researcher resides in 
Indonesia). The same procedure was followed to obtain permission to collect data at regional 
and local government levels. For regional government, the permission letter was obtained from 
governors and for local government from district heads/mayors. To make this easier, a 
permission letter was first obtained from national government and a recommendation letter 
issued by Directorate of Regional Autonomy at the MoHA. The fieldwork was divided into 
three broad stages (see Figure 4.2).  
               
Figure 4.2 Stages of Fieldwork 
Source: Developed by author, based on the fieldwork 
 
4.3.4    Data collection methods 
Sources of evidence used in this study are semi-structured interviews, direct observations, 
documents and questionnaires. Further discussion of these is provided below.    
  
1. Investigation at national government 
2. Investigation at regional government 
3. Investigation at local government 
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Semi-structured interviews  
Interview is one of the most important sources of case study information (Yin, 2009). There 
are different types of interviews; the type used in this study was semi-structured49. Mason 
(2002, p. 62) notes some characteristics of a semi structured interview, including ‘interactional 
exchange of dialogue’ and that ‘the relevant contexts are brought into focus so that situated 
knowledge can be produced.’ Generating data from a semi-structured interview is aimed at 
obtaining a depth and roundedness of understanding of the case under study. This justification 
is consistent with one of Mason’s (2002) nine recommendations for conducting a semi-
structured interview. 
The approach to establish interviews can be explained as follows. First of all, as the research 
focused on the design, implementation and use of the EKPPD as the new performance 
measurement system under study, I planned to interview actors involved in the design, 
implementation and use. An actor might be involved only in one phase such as design or 
implementation, but some actors could be involved in both. There would be a possibility for 
certain positions to be involved in both implementation and use. In general, the plan was to 
interview: 
(1) Actors involved in the design stage or with knowledge about the design process  
(2) Actors involved in the implementation phase 
(3) Actors involved in the use phase  
For the first group, I expected to interview key actors involved in the design phase such as the 
chair of the design team. However, at this stage, I did not know who the chair was. There was 
also no knowledge about who was involved in the design phase apart from one person (an 
                                                 
49 Also termed as a qualitative interview in Mason (2002).  
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expert who helped with the design). Contact with this expert was obtained through my 
supervisor. I expected that this first contact would lead me to other key actors that I should 
include in the interview. I hoped to interview at least five or six actors who were directly 
involved in the design phase.   
The second group of actors was easier to identify than the first group, because they are defined 
clearly in the regulations and manuals of the EKPPD. A letter circulated by the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, for instance, clearly mention ministries and government bodies that should be 
involved as the national team (i.e. six ministries and four government bodies, chaired by the 
Minister of Home Affairs), who should be included in the regional team (i.e.  minimum element 
from governors’ offices, development and financial supervisory bodies and regional 
inspectorates, chaired by the governor) and local teams (i.e. elements within local government, 
chaired by the local government general secretary). Thus, I made a list of positions to be 
interviewed in relation to the implementation phase according to the positions mentioned in 
the relevant regulations and manuals mentioned earlier.  
As Indonesia is a huge archipelagic country50 consisting of 33 provinces and around 500 local 
governments, it was not feasible for the PhD research to cover the whole country. Broadly, 
Indonesia is divided into three main parts: west, middle and east. The west part includes 
Sumatra, Java and Bali, the middle part covers Borneo, and the east part includes Celebes, the 
Moluccas Islands, and Papua, as can be seen from the map below.  
 
                                                 
50 Extending 5,120 kilometres from east to west and 1,760 kilometres from north to south. It encompasses 13,667 
islands, only 6,000 of which are inhabited. Five main islands are Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Irian 
Jaya, two major archipelagos (Nusa Tenggara and the Maluku Islands), and sixty smaller archipelagos. Indonesia's 
total land area is 1,919,317 square kilometres. (http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/28.htm)  
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Figure 4.3 Indonesian Map 
Source: University Texas Library (2014) 
I intended to include three provinces representing these three main parts of the country 
mentioned earlier, one province from each of the west, middle and east parts. Then, within each 
province, I planned to pick up two local governments (giving six in total). To capture the 
influence of local government type, one of each pair should be a municipality (urban area) and 
the other a district (rural area). To allow comparison between the two different types of local 
government, the choice of districts and municipality should be comparable in terms of size. 
The easiest proxy of size in this case was the number of sub-districts in each municipality and 
district. The justification was that the higher the number of sub-districts, the heavier the 
workload of performance reporting, as more data would be processed.51   
I intended to conduct 5-6 interviews with actors involved in the EKPPD implementation at 
regional level (there would be 15-18 interviews for three provinces). At the local government 
                                                 
51 The organisational structure of local government will be considerably similar, in that each local government 
must have a finance office, local planning and development body and other units directly in charge of delivering 
public services such as education, health, public works, etc. However, the number of sub-districts that a district 
or municipality has will indicate its scale, as it is related to its geographical area and population.  
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level, I also hoped to get 5-6 interviews (30-36 interviews for six local governments). Finally, 
for use stage, I only expected to interview local policy makers (i.e. the head of 
districts/mayors). I assumed that it would be difficult to interview stakeholders involved in use 
stage at the national level as they should be at very high level positions such as ministries that 
I did not have access to them. The expected scale and scope of the interviews are summarised 
in table below: 
Investigation level Expected Interviews 
National level     5-6 
Interviews 
Regional and Local Levels    
(1) Province representing West part  5-6 Interviews  
- Regional Team of the selected Province     
- Local Team of the selected municipality  5-6  Interviews   
- Local Team of selected district  5-6 Interviews   
(2) Province representing Middle part  5-6  Interviews  
- Regional Team of the selected Province     
- Local Team of selected municipality 5-6 Interviews   
- Local Team of selected district 5-6 Interviews   
(3) Province representing East part  5-6  Interviews  
- Regional Team of the selected Province     
- Local Team of selected municipality 5-6 Interviews   
- Local Team of selected district 5-6 Interviews   
Expected interviews at local level 30-36 Interviews   
Expected interviews at regional level  15-18 Interviews  
Expected interviews at the national level   5-6 
Interviews 
Expected interviews in total 50-60 Interviews 
 Table 4.2 Expected Scope of Interviews 
Source: Developed by author 
As presented in Table 4.2, the expected scope of interviews was between 50-60 interviews that 
would be undertaken at three different levels: national, regional and local government, 
involving three provinces and six local governments.  
Interviews with key informants at the national level were established through the help of two 
contact persons. My first contact person,52 who also became my first informant, was involved 
in the design process and recommended other names that I should include in the interviews in 
                                                 
52 As indicated earlier, contact with the first informant was obtained through my supervisor. 
 137 
 
order to get information about the design, and provided their contact details. Two further 
interviews took place based on the first informant’s recommendations.53 My second contact 
was a high level official at MoHA but he was not directly involved in the EKPPD design or 
implementation.54  This second contact introduced me to one key official involved in the 
ongoing EKPPD implementation, one potential user of the information produced from the new 
performance measurement system and another who had relevant knowledge about the 
measurement system.  
The initial analysis of the interviews showed that implementation problems to some extent have 
a connection to the inconsistency between two connecting regulations: regulation on how local 
government performance should be evaluated and regulation on how local governments should 
report their performance as part of the accountability mechanism to the national government. 
Based on this information, I decided to interview the key actor in designing the regulation on 
reporting. An attempt was made to arrange an interview with the Minister of Home Affairs and 
another high official at MoHA but it was not successful due to the very busy period (the end 
of fiscal year). Thus, the overall process of interview establishment is described below: 
  
                                                 
53 The third person recommended by the first informant did not respond to the email I sent him. 
54 I got access to him through my personal network. 
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Figure 4.4 Process of Establishing Interviews 
Source: Developed by author 
As can be seen from Figure 4.4 above, four potential interviews could not take place because 
of the conflict of schedules as indicated earlier. Meanwhile, one potential informant delegated 
the interview to his subordinate on the day of the interview, also because of a conflict schedule. 
The approach used to establish interviews at the regional and local government levels varied 
depending on the circumstances. In province A, I started the interviews at the selected 
municipality while I was still waiting for the responses for the letters I sent to the selected 
district and the regional government of the province. My contact at the selected municipality 
in this province helped to arrange interviews with a senior official directly in charge of 
implementing the EKPPD in this municipality and a key staff member who was very 
knowledgeable about reporting performance for the purpose of the EKPPD. The key official in 
charge of the EKPPD introduced another official and included her in the interview. As I did 
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not hear from the selected district and regional government in Province A, I decided to move 
on to the next province (Province B).  
The decision to conduct interviews in province B was based on the recommendation of two 
key informants in the national government. According to them, Province B was among the 
good implementers of the EKPPD system. I received a quick response from the regional 
government of this province because I managed to find a contact person at the governor’s 
office.55 The contact person introduced me to several officials directly involved in the EKPPD 
implementation at the regional level. One of the key informants then introduced me to the key 
appointment holder at the selected municipality in this province. An interview with a senior 
official at the municipality was also arranged by the contact person in this province, but I 
obtained the third interview through the formal procedure (I came to his office, introduced him 
to the research I did and what information I needed from him. As I had a permission letter from 
the mayor to conduct research in the municipality, he responded well and the interview took 
place). I did not manage to obtain access to the selected district in Province B, therefore, I 
moved on to the next province (Province C).              
In Province C, I started interviews at the local level. I used various approaches to establish 
interviews in order to obtain as many interviews as possible (that included relevant stakeholders 
in connection to the EKPPD implementation). In general, after obtaining permission letters to 
conduct research in the respective districts/municipalities, I went to the department in charge 
of EKPPD implementation at the district/municipality secretariat and explained to the head of 
department or the lower division that directly handled the performance reporting for EKPPD 
purposes. The majority of officials I met agreed for the interviews to take place immediately.  
                                                 
55 This contact person was obtained through my IFP network. 
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From the interview with the majority of officials, I could determine who I should interview 
next, as the interview with the key informant would provide insights into how processes of 
reporting performance for the purpose of the EKPPD were carried out in their 
districts/municipalities. For example, I might have to interview staff in charge of supplying 
data at the working unit level.56 If the data collection and processing were handled by a team, 
I asked the key informant for the details of other team members who I should interview.  
To gather information on whether KPIs of the EKPPD influence policy-making processes in 
the districts/municipalities, I tried to interview senior officials in the positions likely to use 
them, such as officials in planning and development bodies or involved in setting local budgets. 
I approached these officials by showing the permission letter I have from the mayor/district 
head to conduct research, except in one district, where all of the interviews were arranged by 
the district head himself, and in another municipality where I knew most of the officials 
personally.57  
Near to the end of the fieldwork, I had not managed to get any interview with local policy-
makers (i.e. district heads/mayors). Interviews with two district heads and one mayor were 
made possible with the help of Province C's governor. The governor contacted them and 
arranged the interviews for me. Access to the governor was obtained through my personal 
network. Meanwhile, I obtained contact with key appointment holder in the regional 
government via a key informant in one of municipalities studied in this province. An interview 
with a regional evaluator from the regional development and supervisory body was obtained 
through another personal contact. This evaluator also introduced me to another evaluator.   
                                                 
56 Elements of local government in Indonesia are termed as ‘working units’ as an English translation of Satuan 
Kerja Perangkat Daerah (SKPD) 
57 I worked for this municipality prior to studying for my PhD. 
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The phone interview with the key appointment holder in Province D was possible through the 
help of my contact in that province, too. Finally, a phone interview with a key appointment 
holder in province E was obtained through one of the respondents to the survey questionnaire, 
who gave his phone number for further clarification. In short, interviews were established 
through various approaches. The details of the interviews that took place are summarised in in 
Table 4.3 below. 
Investigation level Actual Interviews 
National level   7 Interviews 
Regional and Local Levels    
(1) Province A (West part – Java Island)  -  
- Municipality x 4 Interviews    
(2) Province B (East part - Celebes)  5 Interviews   
- Municipality y 3 Interviews    
(3) Province C (West part – Sumatra Island)  4 Interviews   
- Municipality 1 12 Interviews    
- Municipality 2 7 Interviews   
- Municipality 3 4 Interviews   
- Municipality 4 3 Interviews   
- District 1 4 Interviews    
- District 2 8 Interviews   
- District 3 7 Interviews   
(4) Province D (West part – Sumatra Island) (phone 
interview) 
 1 Interview  
(5) Province E (Middle part – Borneo Island) (phone 
interview) 
 1 Interview  
    
Actual interviews at local level 42 interviews    
Actual interviews at regional level  11 Interviews   
Actual interviews at the national level   7 Interviews  
Actual interviews in total 60 interviews  
Table 4.3 Details of Actual Interviews  
Source: Developed by author 
As can be seen from Table 4.3 above, there were some changes from the plan shown in Table 
4.2. First, in terms of number of provinces involved, five provinces were involved instead of 
three, although the two extras were phone interviews and there was only one interview in each 
province. Second, comparison between the three main parts of the country: west, middle and 
east could not be made because two provinces that I observed were in fact from the west. The 
province from the east was as planned. A field visit could not be done to the province 
representing the middle part of the country because of difficulty in getting access at the 
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beginning and also cost constraint. In addition, only in Province C did I manage to include both 
types of local government: urban and rural. In the first two provinces, I only got one local 
government, which was urban (municipality). In province C, however, I obtained seven local 
governments instead of two as planned. In terms of number of interviews, overall I still 
obtained 60 interviews in total as planned.  
Thus, the semi-structured interviews were conducted for a range of stakeholders involved in 
the Indonesian new measurement system, at national, regional and local government levels. All 
interviews were carried out face-to-face, except for two which were conducted by telephone as 
mentioned earlier. The interview was thematic and topic-centred. The interview schedule is 
provided in Appendix II.  
Key informants available at national government level were quite limited. Government 
officials are very often rotated to different posts, and it was thus difficult to find key 
appointment holders who had been involved in all of the phases of the new Indonesian 
measurement system. Some had retired by the time of data collection. Nevertheless, the 
interviews included (i) key appointment holders involved during the design process, on-going 
implementation or both, and (ii) key appointment holders with a connection either to the 
establishment of the system or to the current implementation and use of the system. These 
interviews provided information on the new Indonesian measurement system from the 
perspective of the national government as the owner and implementer of the system. More 
specifically, the information covers (1) why and how the system was established, (2)  the status 
of the on-going implementation process of the system, and (3) the use and usefulness of the 
system.  
Key informants at the regional government level were the key appointment holders in charge 
of technical evaluation and reporting performance. At local government level the interviews 
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involved a wider range of stakeholders: the district heads/mayors as the local policy-makers, 
key appointment holders for the Indonesian new measurement system (such as the general 
secretary, the heads of government departments and regional autonomy sub-departments), and 
other officials involved in the reporting process (such as the head of finance office, the head of 
budget division, the head of local planning and development body). For the purpose of 
comparison with the previous performance measurement system which continues to be applied 
in Indonesian local government (LAKIP), interviews were also conducted with the key 
appointment holders in charge of this performance report. Interviews were also carried out with 
key appointment holders at the policy implementer level, for example in the health and 
education agencies. A summary of the information gathered during interviews with key 
informants at different levels of government is presented in Table 4.4 below.  
Each interview lasted for one to two hours; with the permission of the informants most were 
digitally recorded. Interviews mainly took place in the key informants’ office. To ensure a high 
quality recording, an additional microphone was used. I also used the interview guide 
containing topics to be covered during the interview. The interview guide referred to the case 
study protocol. The interviews process, however, were very challenging. Although the 
interview guide was prepared, the need for numerous quick judgments required the ability to 
make on-the-spot decisions regarding content and sequence of questions as the interview 
progressed. As Mason (2002) says ‘these have to be done quickly, effectively and coherently 
and in ways which are consistent with the research questions’ (p.67). A semi-structured 
interview is thus said to require a great deal of intellectual preparation.  
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Interview sites Information obtained 
National 
government  
a. Reasons and processes undertaken during the design stage of the new 
performance measurement system 
b. Implementation process 
c. Implementation problems encountered by the national evaluation team  
d. The reason for non-use of the information produced from the 
evaluation  
Regional 
government  
a. Process and procedures of evaluation undertaken by the regional 
evaluation team 
b. Problems of regional evaluation  
c. Process and procedures of reporting undertaken at regional government  
d. Problems of reporting faced by regional government  
 
Local 
government  
a. Process and procedures of reporting undertaken at local government  
b. Problems faced by local government in reporting performance  
c. Performance information use at local government  
d. Responses of local government on the reporting requirement  
 
 
Table 4.4 Summary of Information Obtained from Semi-Structured Interviews 
Source: Developed by author, based on fieldwork 
 Observation 
Observation was also used to generate data in this study because the nature of this enquiry 
requires ‘depth, complexity, roundedness and multidimensionality in data, rather than surface 
analysis of broad patterns’ (Mason, 2002). A distinction can be made between direct 
observation and participant observation (Yin, 2009). This study used direct observation which 
is consistent with the role of researcher as a visitor58. Direct observation ranges in form from 
formal to casual data collection activities (Yin, 2009). Attending a meeting is an example of 
formal observation and can be included in the case study protocol. Direct observation (which 
is less formal) could be undertaken throughout a field visit, for instance while collecting other 
evidence, such as interviews.  
                                                 
58 Ryan et al. (2002) distinguish five different roles implemented by researchers in doing case study research. 
They include: outsider, visitor, facilitator, participant and actor. According to Ryan et al. (2002, p. 152), visitor is 
possibly the most common perception of the case researcher; as a visitor, ‘the researcher is not directly involved 
in the issues being researched, but even the act of talking about these issues could have an impact upon those are 
the subject of the research.’  
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This study includes both formal and informal observations. Informal observation took place at 
national government level, during the follow-up interview with a key informant from the 
Financial Development Supervisory Body. The purpose of the interview was to clarify the 
mechanism of evaluation, especially how scores for key performance indicators (KPIs) are 
assigned. However, while explaining the mechanism according to the evaluation manual, the 
key informant was called away a meeting. He instructed two staff members, members of the 
national evaluation team, to cover the interview session. One of the evaluators showed us the 
evaluation template and demonstrated how it produces the final performance index on the 
computer.  
Another example of informal observation occurred during the interview with key informants 
in Province B, more specifically at the regional inspectorate where the regional evaluation team 
was based. After interviewing the head of the inspectorate there was a chance to have an 
informal discussion with the members of the regional evaluation team and to see how they 
input KPIs using the evaluation template. A group of evaluators were discussing the many data 
problems they encounter when inputting the data, one of whom was seen to provide a 
consultation to a key appointment holder from a municipality. The key appointment holder 
from the municipality did not understand what data she was being asked to supply for a 
particular indicator. It was lunchtime and a couple of evaluators were thus free to talk about 
the problems they faced, and how exhausting and confusing they found the evaluation process. 
This informal observation provided invaluable insights into some of the problems with the 
Indonesian new measurement system, along with evidence of the lack of ICT support which is 
needed to implement a performance measurement system.    
An example of informal observation at local government level occurred during the visit to 
municipality 6. An interview was scheduled with the general secretary of the municipality on 
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21 February 2012. However, he had to lead a meeting to discuss the progress of four main 
reports due at the same time (a financial report, an accountability report for the local parliament, 
a performance report for Ministry of Apparatus and Bureaucratic Reform and performance 
report for MoHA). I was able to observe the meeting; the interview was to take place at the end 
of the meeting. Many useful insights were gained throughout the meeting which suggested a 
number of problems encountered by the municipality in their efforts to meet different reporting 
requirements with limited resources.  
Informal observations were undertaken on another three occasions, firstly during a visit to a 
guesthouse owned by municipality 1 at province C where the local team stayed for about two 
months, secondly during a visit to a local team of municipality 2 within the same province who 
worked in a hotel hired for a week to finalise the performance report and thirdly, during the 
visit to the finance office of municipality 4 for the purpose of interviewing one of key 
informant. Before the interview took place, an official from the finance office and I had lunch.  
During the lunch, the official started to tell anecdotes of irregularities taking place in the every-
day practices of local government. These included: policymakers deliberately making budget 
allocation for public work agency, (a working unit dealing with many big physical projects 
such as roads, bridges and other infrastructures), higher than it should be for the purpose of 
covering any off-budget expenditures throughout the fiscal year. Thus, it has been taken for 
granted that the public works agency is used as a source of finance for anything that cannot be 
included in the formal local government budget document. Another example mentioned by the 
official was related to the practice of bribing members of the local parliament; so that they 
could speed up the processes involved with approving the budget proposal.  
Two examples of formal observations undertaken during this research include attending a 
budget discussion meeting between executives and local parliament members in municipality 
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4 (2 December 2011)59, and a one-day workshop arranged by the regional evaluation team in 
C province (27 February 2012). The first was aimed at understanding the local government 
budget process, and was included in the case study protocol at the beginning, before going to 
the field. The plan to attend the one-day workshop, however, was made during the field visit 
to municipality 5, where the key informant informed us about workshop and helped to contact 
the key appointment holder in charge to arrange our attendance.  
The case study protocol was updated to include the observation of the workshop, which was 
held in the capital city of Province C and attended by representatives from almost all local 
governments in Province C. This observation provided me with a deep understanding of the 
problems encountered by key appointment holders at the local government level when 
reporting performance according to the new measurement system. Many of the questions from 
workshop participants indicated how difficult the system is to work in practice and the 
confusion they face in understanding it. During the interview with the key appointment holder 
at the governor’s office the next day, I was shown the 2012 performance report of the province 
C which was being prepared.  
The key appointment holder at the governor office of Province C showed me how he had to 
just copy and paste the same narrative for each programme because of the difficult timetable 
set in the new measurement system. The difficult timetable has adversely affected the quality 
of the performance report. Besides the difficult timetable, he also believed that the narrative 
part of the report would be not read during the evaluation process. He assumed that evaluators 
would be concerned only with indicators attached to the end of the report. The formal 
                                                 
59 This observation took place immediately after I reached the field, when I was unaware that a permission letter 
from MoHA needed to be obtained before conducting this research. 
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observation at local government level included attending meetings to discuss the progress of 
the reporting performance under the requirement of the new measurement system.  
During the fieldwork in Province C (which included four municipalities and three districts), 
the journey to each research sites was part of the observation. I used municipality 4 (which is 
my hometown) as my base, from where the nearest research site was about two hours journey 
by car (municipality 5 and district 1) and the farthest one five to six hours journey (district 3). 
Each research site was visited three to six times. By taking different routes in every visit, I used 
the opportunity to observe the social and geographical conditions of the districts/municipalities 
being studied. This was possible because I used a private car and the driver was knowledgeable 
about all the areas visited. One municipality might be very small and could be circled in one 
day (such as municipality 3); another research site occupied a huge area, making it impossible 
to visit all sub-districts in one day. Observation during the research journey helped to 
understand the difficulties faced by the districts/municipalities included in this study in 
collecting the data required for the new measurement system.       
Documents  
The primary use of documents in case study research is ‘to corroborate and augment evidence 
from other sources’ (Yin, 2009, p. 103). In the current study, their most significant use was in 
clarifying the role of international donor agencies and their interest in the new Indonesian 
measurement system, as information gathered from interviews was insufficient to provide a 
convincing argument. Another example of the use of documents was in identifying 
stakeholders who according to the regulations are mandated to be involved in the 
implementation process of the new measurement system. Then, looking at what type of 
feedback was given by the national and regional evaluation teams (the feedback is provided in 
the evaluation report issued by the national and regional evaluation teams) helped to explain 
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why the feedback was not used by the local government. Moreover, during the investigation at 
the local government level, the local strategic plan, mid-term plan and budget documents were 
assessed in order to establish a connection with the measurement aspects of the new 
measurement system. If a link is proven between the two, it implies that the new measurement 
system is used to inform local policy-making processes; if not, it means the new measurement 
system is not used yet by local policymakers.   
Some documents existed prior to the study, such as the regulations on the new measurement 
system, and newspaper articles related to its early implementation. According to Yin (2009), 
an internet search for relevant documentation prior to field visits can provide invaluable 
information. For the purposes of this research, the internet sources collected prior to data 
collection included a PowerPoint presentation for workshops on the new measurement system 
arranged by MoHA in different locations. This helped to obtain initial information regarding 
the features and measurement techniques adopted in the new measurement system. Most 
documents, however, were collected during the fieldwork process. Relevant documents were 
collected at all levels of government. At national government level for instance, these include 
the system manuals (of particular importance was the manual of evaluations which are not 
made publicly accessible), evaluation reports, the list of districts/municipalities and provinces 
according to its position or rank in the last five evaluations (2008-2013). At regional 
government level, an example of the regional evaluation report (Province C), the governor’s 
decision letter related to the formation of the regional team (Province B), local government 
performance reports following the new measurement system for five years (2007-2012), local 
strategic planning, local mid-term plan and local budget, and performance report prepared 
according to the Accountability and Performance Report of Governmental Institutions. Besides 
the existing documents, others (such as the case study database) were generated during the 
research process, as Mason (2002) recommended.  
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Questionnaires 
To collect further data in the most efficient way, I used questionnaires which I sent to 31 
districts/municipalities. The nine districts/municipalities which participated in the field visits 
were excluded. The questionnaire was designed based on understanding gained from the field 
visits. The purpose of this survey was not to conduct sophisticated statistical analysis but to 
support my qualitative data. In other words, the survey was used as a data collection method 
for the purpose of method triangulation: collecting more data for my interpretive study. The 
key appointment holders in the 31 districts/municipalities which participated in the survey 
questionnaires were first contacted over the phone to ask whether they agreed to participate in 
the study or not. To those who did agree, I sent the questionnaires by post/email/direct courier, 
depended on the circumstances in each district/municipality.   
The questionnaires focused on technical problems encountered in reporting performance for 
the purpose of the EKPPD, as the target respondents of the questionnaires were key 
appointment holders directly in charge of reporting performance for the purpose of the EKPPD 
in terms of technical aspects. The reason to do this was that the studies conducted in nine 
districts/municipalities showed that this position is likely the one that will have knowledge 
about the EKPPD in most of local government in Indonesia. If I targeted respondents in higher 
level positions, it was likely that these higher positions would not be involved and have 
knowledge about the EKPPD in every local government. Therefore, it was better to focused on 
a level where I was sure that the key appointment holder in every local government could 
answer, even though the responses would be limited to technical information (implementation) 
not use.   
The questionnaire was divided into four sections. Section A focused on DATA PROBLEMS. 
The question asked was “To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements?” Nine 
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items of statements were included in this section (Questions 1-9) relating to opinion about the 
difficulties in reporting KPIs for the EKPPD. Respondents were asked to tick the answer 
applicable to them in a 5-point Likert scale running through “strongly agree”, “agree”, 
“neutral”, “disagree”, and “strongly disagree”. Section B aimed to seek respondents’ opinions 
regarding KPIs and the format of the EKPPD. Five items were asked in this section (Questions 
10-14). Section C included three questions (Questions 15-17) seeking respondents’  
perceptions of the degree of importance of different reports that local governments are 
obligated by the elected leaders to provide. Respondents were asked to put four types of report 
(financial report, accountability report to parliament, LAKIP, and LPPD) in order according to 
the degree of importance of the reports for the elected leaders.  
Question 16 asked about the extent to which the respondent agreed or disagreed that the 
EKPPD system did not get enough attention from stakeholders because there were no financial 
consequences. Then, Question 17 related to the achievement of the mission and visions of the 
elected leader in comparison with the achievement of a high EKPPD index. Finally Section D 
provided an opportunity for respondents to write any comments/suggestions about the EKPPD. 
A contact page was provided, in case respondents were willing to be contacted for further 
clarification. This contact page was separated immediately from the returned questionnaire 
before analysis took place to ensure anonymity of the questionnaire.  
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Province  Location District 
Participated 
Municipality 
Participated  
Total local government 
Participated Island Represent  
I* Sumatra West 2 1 3 
II** Sumatra West 2 1 3 
III Sumatra  West 1 1 2 
IV* Java West 2 - 2 
V Java West 4 1 5 
VI Bali West - 1 1 
VII Borneo Middle 3 1 4 
VIII** Borneo Middle 4 1 5 
IX* Celebes East 3 2 5 
X North Moluccas East 2 2 4 
Total 23 11 34  
Note: * These provinces participated in the previous stage of the study: I also conducted field visits to local 
governments in this province but the local governments that participated in this survey were different 
from those included in the observation.  
          ** These provinces participated in the previous stage of the study: I conducted phone interviews with key 
informants at regional government level; none of the local governments within these provinces 
participated in the previous stage of the study. 
Table 4.5 Included in the Survey 
Source: Developed by author 
Thus, despite the concentration of interviews in one province (Province C), the data was 
supplemented with surveys at local government level, involving ten provinces. Although these 
ten provinces also include provinces which participated in the previous stage of the study, none 
of the local governments where I had conducted face-to-face interviews were included in this 
survey. Moreover, the survey covered the three main parts of the country: west, middle and 
east. Thus, I collected a considerably rich data which can ensure that the concentration of face-
to-face interviews in one province did not distort my data. Fifteen-minute follow-up interviews 
by phone were arranged for two survey respondents. In total, 35 questionnaires were prepared 
at the beginning, but 4 questionnaires could not be distributed: 2 in North Moluccas and 2 in 
Papua provinces because of transportation difficulties However, from the 31 questionnaires 
that were finally distributed, I received 100% response.   
There were some difficulties for me in covering the whole country in this study. First, 
availability of access depended on availability of contact. The request to conduct a case study 
at a local government or a province tended to not get a response when I only went through a 
formal process. As an individual researcher (i.e. merely a PhD student), I have not got many 
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networks; thus I had very limited contacts who could help to open access in a few provinces 
and local governments. Thus, the selection of case site sometimes could not follow the ideal 
criteria previously set. As described earlier, I wanted to pick two local governments in each 
province so that I could treat local government and provinces as an embedded case study and 
then conduct a case comparison for the embedded cases. However, this objective could not be 
achieved because the number of local governments studied in each province was not the same. 
In two provinces, I only obtained one municipality as a case, whereas in the third province, I 
managed to get seven cases (4 municipalities and 3 districts). Meanwhile, in the other two 
provinces, I did not get any cases at the local level.  
There was also a problem of getting access to the whole range of stakeholders in the selected 
provinces, districts and municipalities. At certain sites (i.e. municipality/districts/provinces) I 
managed to get interviews with the whole range of stakeholders, whereas in others, I just got a 
few interviews with the key informant. Thus, the coverage of interviews was not comparable 
from one place to another, at the local government or province level. I could not make case 
comparisons between Provinces B and C, for example, because the interviews obtained in 
Province B were much wider than in Province C (at the regional government level). Case 
comparison at local level within Province A and B could not be done because there was only 
one local government in each province. Thus, if I treated ‘province’ or ‘district’ or 
‘municipality’ as the case, the data from different cases were not comparable. That was why 
re-defined the cases from ‘province’ or ‘district’ or ‘municipality’ to ‘system’ was the solution 
for the problem.  
The case study is categorised as an ‘intensive’ form of research. Piles of data and documents 
need to be processed. Therefore, an individual researcher will not be able to manage too many 
cases.  Finally, face-to-face interviews require travelling to the case site. The challenge to cover 
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the whole country when conducting research in the Indonesian context relates to the size of the 
country, which is huge (33 provinces and over 500 local governments). To visit all of these 
provinces and local government is not feasible under the time and cost constraints for the PhD 
project. Accessibility to some regions was also difficult in terms of transportation. Some places 
can only could be reached by air or sea transportation, which also not regularly available. For 
regions relying air transportation (i.e. Papua), the travel costs would be extremely high.  
4.3.5    Data analysis 
Flick (2014) states ‘data analysis is the central step in qualitative research. Whatever the data 
are, it is their analysis that, in a decisive way, forms the outcomes of the research’ (p.3). 
Maxwell and Miller (2008) and Maxwell (2011), Maxwell and Chmiel (2014, p. 22) distinguish 
two major strategies to analyse qualitative data namely ‘categorizing’ and ‘connecting’ strategy 
(see Figure 4.3). These two strategies, in principle, are based on ‘similarity relations’ and 
‘contiguity relations.’ When analysing qualitative data using similarity relations, researchers 
use similarities and differences to define categories and to group and compared the data by 
category. Contiguity-based relations, however, involve ‘juxtaposition in time and space, the 
influence of one thing on another, or relations among parts of a text.’ In other words, in building 
contiguity relations, researchers look for ‘actual connections between things, rather than 
similarities and differences.’ Thus, ‘contiguity relationships are identified among data in an 
actual context.’ (cf. Maxwell and Chmiel, 2014, p. 22).   
As illustrated in Figure 4.5 below, according to Maxwell and Chmiel, 2014), coding and 
thematic analysis are two examples of techniques of categorising strategies. Coding refers to 
the activity of labelling the data segments and grouping them into category. The data segments 
then are examined and compared, both within category and between categories. Hence, the 
categories generated through coding are linked into larger patterns; according to Maxwell and 
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Chmiel (2014) this step implies establishing connection relationships (contiguity-based 
relations). However, Maxwell and Chmiel (2014) highlight that the connections made are only 
between the categories themselves, instead of between segments of actual data. The 
connections made imply   aggregate account of contiguity relationships and not being able to 
reconstruct the specific contextual connections that were lost during the original categorising 
process. This strategy also means imposing uniformity on the actual diversity of relationships 
in the data, disguising the complexity of such relationships in an attempt to emphasise the most 
predominant connections.  
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Analytical Strategies in Qualitative Research 
Source: Maxwell and Chmiel (2014) 
Thematic analysis is defined by Ayres (2008) as ‘a data reduction and analysis strategy by 
which qualitative data are segmented, categorized, summarized, and reconstructed in a way 
that captures the important concepts within the data set’ (p. 867). According to Ayres (2008) 
thematic analysis embraces both categorising and connecting strategies. It involves 
categorising strategy because researchers identify similarities in terms of themes. Thematic 
analysis also includes connecting strategy because:  
Throughout the analysis, the investigator considers the relevance of each 
theme to the research question and to the data set as a whole, thus keeping 
the developing analysis integrated. At the same time, as identification of 
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themes progresses, the investigator also considers the relationship among 
categories (Ayres, 2008, p. 868).  
Ayres (2008) argues that through simultaneous processes of identifying themes and assessing 
the relationship among categories, researchers maintain the connection of data that have been 
decontextualized through coding to their sources. For Maxwell and Chmiel (2014), thematic 
analysis is still considered a categorising strategy:   
The term ‘theme’ refers to a kind of coding strategy, it is often one with a 
broader or more abstract scope than those involved in the initial coding of 
data…, a theme often has an internal connected structure: a relationship 
between two concepts or actions, a proposition or belief, a narrative or 
argument, or other more complex sets of relations. However, its 
identification and establishment as a theme-showing that it is more than 
idiosyncratic occurrence – is inherently a categorizing process (p. 26).   
Maxwell and Chmiel commented on Ayres’s argument about how thematic analysis retains 
connection of the data into their context: ‘the relationship among thematic categories are 
generic relationships, not ones between actual data, and thus substitute a single understanding 
for the original variation in relationships that existed in the data.’ The relationships among 
thematic categories are still generic because categorising techniques means decontextualisation 
of data and most of works on qualitative methods ‘say little about how one might analyse 
contextual relationship.’ However, when researchers employ case study research, categorising 
strategies retain the connection between data and context as the ‘data are interpreted within the 
unique context of each case in order to provide an account of a particular instance, setting, 
person or event’ (cf. Maxwell and Chmiel, 2014, p. 26). 
I used the thematic analysis to analyse the interviews data in this study. The main themes were 
informed by the literature and research questions; they are: drivers, design, implementation 
and use and were divided into several sub-themes. Sub-themes also came from the literature; 
except one theme (expectations) emerged from the findings. Items within the sub-themes were 
partly informed by the literature, and partly emerged from the findings. I transcribed the 
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interviews data myself and analysed them manually. I did not use a software package to analyse 
qualitative data such as computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). 
According to Scapens (2004) this type of software is effective to analyse structured-interview 
questions whereas my interview questions were semi-structured. Analysing data manually 
increased my familiarity with the data which is very important in conducting an interpretive 
research. The procedures of thematic analysis used were adapted from Matthews and Ross 
(2010) (see Table 4.6).  
Step Explanation 
1 Take the descriptive data (with codes) from each participant 
2 Read and re-read the descriptive data (with codes) for each research participant to 
become familiar with the text 
3 Take a piece of descriptive data (with codes), read through it, and annotate it with 
concepts in the margin 
4 Divide the whole text into concepts 
5 Dispose of duplicate concepts 
6 Define each concept by writing a brief sentence including all text which falls within this 
theme 
7 List all refined concepts on a new piece of paper 
8 Arrange concepts in logical order 
9 Read through the whole transcript again and add thoughts and ideas 
10 Return to the text and summarise each piece of information under the relevant concepts 
including, highlights full explanatory and illustrative quotations, page and line number, 
names or other characteristics, and asterisk repeated points 
11 Continue until the whole text is summarised 
12 Organise summarised points 
13 Add ideas, thoughts and theories  
14 Rearrange the concepts and sub-concepts and summarise for each interview  
15 Create analytical matrix to compare and contrast results for similarities, differences and 
inconsistencies within and across all interviews  
16 Identify any further queries and/ or tentative research questions 
 
Table 4.6 Step by Step of Thematic Analysis 
Source: Adapted from Matthews and Ross (2010, p. 372-385) 
For documentary data, I explored relationships and meanings within a text and in relation to 
other texts. I paid attention to the form and content of document, examined function of 
documents, and assessed the relationship of a particular document to another. These three 
analytical strategies are also discussed in  (Coffey, 2014). Finally, for survey questionnaire 
data, I analysed them using descriptive statistic (i.e. frequency and percentage) and then I 
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produced bar charts for each question. I tabulated how many respondents provided the answers 
“strongly agree”, “agree”, “neutral”, “disagree”, and “strongly disagree”.  
Scapens (1990) suggests that the use of diagram can be very useful to develop explanations 
from the case. Other authors (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Miles et al., 2014) also recommend 
the use of diagrams or figures to display qualitative data. The use of tables or matrices is also 
common as a technique for data display (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Miles et al. 2014).  
The process of data analysis began during the data collection. Analysis of interviews with key 
national government informants, for example, was completed before proceeding to the next 
stage of the study, and findings from this first investigation were used to refine the case study 
protocol. Starting the data analysis simultaneously with data collection is also recommended 
in Miles et al. (2014). According to Miles et al. (2014), early analysis helps researchers to think 
of the existing data and to generate strategies of collecting new, often richer data.  
By the end of October 2012 the initial report of case study findings had been presented to the 
supervisor. Indications were that my analysis of the role played by international donor agencies 
in the Indonesian new measurement system was still very weak. This was because of 
insufficient data obtained from the semi-structured interviews with key informants at the 
national government level. At that point, I had not corroborated the interview data by using 
documentary analysis of donor documents, such as the World Bank reports. I then went back 
to the first step of case study research defined by (Scapens, 1990): the literature review. 
Another three months was spent reviewing substantive numbers of World Bank reports and 
other documents related to the role played by international donors in relation to performance 
measurement in developing economies. I revised the literature review to include discussion of 
the history of performance measurement in developing economies (see section 3.3). Section 
 159 
 
3.3 eventually helps to explain the role of international donor agencies behind the Indonesian 
new measurement system establishment.  
I presented the second version of the case study report to the supervisor at the end of October 
2013. However, there was still a hole in the literature review. Findings related to the reasons 
the Indonesian new measurement system was established showed a connection to the neo-
liberal agenda of international donor agencies. However, I had not covered the concept of 
neoliberalism in the literature review. I therefore went back to reviewing the literature. The 
final, revised literature review chapters include a section about neoliberalism and good 
governance concepts in a development context. This section shows how performance 
measurement in developing economies can be seen in the notion of neo-liberalism, and helps 
to understand the interest of international donor agencies behind the establishment of the 
Indonesian new measurement system.  
I gained a very important lesson from this experience, namely, that in conducting an 
interpretive case study, the data should not merely be read literally but in an interpretive manner 
(Mason, 2002). Thus Jönsson and Lukka (2006) assert that a theoretical contribution will not 
be obtained by interpretive research if the researcher relies on knowledge gained merely from 
the informant’s point of view, without including his/her own interpretation of the data. The 
second lesson is that case study research is indeed very difficult, comprising a complex iterative 
process. In other words, the research process was far from a smooth process, as outlined in 
Scapens (1990; 2004) and mentioned earlier.   
The iteration process also happened in defining the phases of performance measurement 
adopted in this study. As mentioned earlier, the design of this study was initially informed by 
three papers: Propper and Wilson (2003), Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) and Mimba et al. (2007).  
During the data collection stage I also included insights from Van Dooren (2005) and Van 
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Dooren et al. (2010) to operationalise the phase of implementation. At the data analysis stage, 
I discovered a paper written by Bourne et al. (2000) which divides performance measurement 
systems into three phases: design, implementation and use. Bourne et al. (2000) led to the first 
revision of phases division and a definition of each phase. Then, at the later stage of the study, 
a new paper published by Van Helden et al. (2012) offered a comprehensive performance 
management life cycle framework. Van Helden et al. (2012) was helpful for the second revision 
of the performance measurement phases framework built in this study. Before the second 
revision, I used one direction arrows to connect different phases; I changed these into two 
directions arrows in the second revision. The two directions arrows indicate that immediate 
corrections can take place at any phase of a performance measurement system, as Van Helden 
et al. (2012) suggested.  In addition, I also adopted the term ‘institutional factors,’ as used in 
Van Helden et al. (2012) to replace the previous term used in this study (environmental factors). 
The research process is summarised in Table 4.7 below. 
No Activity Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
1 Literature review                           
2 
Documentary 
analysis                            
3 
Development of 
research 
instruments                         
4 Fieldwork                          
5 Data analysis                           
6 Initial findings                         
7 First draft                         
8 Writing-up                                 
Table 4.7 Research Process 
Source: Developed by author 
 
4.4    Criteria for Research evaluation 
Reliability and validity are two important tests of evidence in quantitative research (see Ryan 
et al. 2002, p. 155). Reliability indicates ‘the extent to which evidence is independent of the 
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person using it, and thus implies an independent, impersonal investigator’. The concept of 
validity reflects ‘the extent to which the data is in some sense a ‘true’ reflection of the real 
world’. In other words, validity implies ‘an objective reliability.’ In conducting case study 
research, however, Scapens (2004, p.268) argues that ‘such notions of reliability and validity 
are unlikely to be appropriate.’ This is because the researcher’s interpretation and ‘his/her 
relation to the subject matter are essential elements of any case study.’ Scapens (2004, p.270) 
therefore suggests that when doing case study research, concepts of reliability, internal validity 
and external validity should be replaced by ‘procedural reliability’; ‘contextual validity’ and 
‘transferability of findings.’  
4.4.1    Procedural reliability 
According to Scapens (2004), procedural reliability means: 
The research should have a good design that addresses clearly specified 
research questions; there should be a comprehensive research plan; all 
evidence should be recorded in coherent and comprehensive field notes; 
and the case analysis should be fully documented. (Scapens, 2004, pp. 
268-270)  
Procedural reliability in this study was ensured through building the case study protocol and 
the case study database. I developed my case study protocol into five sections, following the 
structure recommended by (Yin, 2009; 2010). According to Yin (2010, p. 84), a complete case 
study protocol should include: 
1. The procedures for contacting key informants and fieldwork arrangements; 
2. Explicit language and reminders for implementing and enforcing the rules for 
protecting human subjects; 
3. A detail line of questions, or a mental agenda to be addressed throughout the  
data collection, including suggestions about the relevant sources of data 
4. A preliminary outline for the final case study report.   
In relation to point c in the quote from Yin (2010) above, the questions included in the case 
study protocol are not ‘the questions to be posed to case study informants...’ (p. 86). The 
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protocol’s questions are designed for the researcher, posing a query for which the researcher is 
to gather evidence.’ In other words, the protocol’s questions are not the questions to be asked 
to the case study informants. Each question may be accompanied by additional information 
such as (i) a brief list of hypothesised source of evidence for answering the question and (ii) 
clues about identifying the relevant sources. The list can direct researcher to specific informants 
to be interviewed, specific documents to be assessed, or specific field observations to be made 
(cf. Yin, 2010, p. 86).  In essence, these questions remind the researcher of the information 
which needs to be collected and why. In other words, ‘the main purpose of the protocol’s 
questions is to keep the researcher on track as data collection proceeds’ (Yin, 2009, p. 86).  The 
case study protocol of this study can be found in the Appendix I, and is similar to the research 
plan mentioned in Scapens (2004).  
My case study database consists of field notes, case study documents, tabular materials and 
narrative, a structure which follows in Yin’s (2009) recommendation. My own field notes 
formed the most important component of the case study database, and consist of the results of 
my interviews, observations and documentary analysis. Different forms of notes are acceptable: 
handwritten, typed, on audiotape, or word-processing or other electronic files (Yin, 2009). My 
notes were mainly hand-written, a form which I found convenient, as I spent a lot of time 
journeying during the fieldwork. Field visits to local government offices, for example, often 
took the whole day, and I made use of the travel time, as well as time spent waiting for the 
interviews (if more than one interview took place on the same day) to write up notes by hand 
(conditions in the field made it impossible to type up notes using a laptop). Case study 
documents refer to relevant documents collected during the course of the study. These mounted 
up, and were stored in portable document format (PDF). Tabular material is the survey data.  
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Finally, certain types of narrative were produced only upon completion of all data collection. 
These include the narrative of each district/municipality/province which participated in the 
study (contained in the part of the database but not in the final case study report). Another form 
of narrative was composed from open-ended answers to the questions in the case study 
protocol. This is also not included in the final report of the case study; the final report was 
however was influenced by this narrative. According to Yin (2009), ‘the main purpose of the 
open-ended answer is to document the connection between specific pieces of evidence and 
various issues in the case study, generously using footnotes and citations.’ Yin again says: ‘the 
entire set of answers can be considered as part of the case study database.’ The essential 
characteristic of good answers is that they succeed in connecting ‘the pertinent issues – through 
adequate citations – to specific evidence’ (cf. Yin, 2009, p. 122). 
Reliability of information in a case study is also increased through maintaining a chain of 
evidence (see Figure 4.6). A similar principle to the audit of financial statements, where 
auditors should be able to trace the evidence used to prepare the report, applies to the case study 
research. More clearly, the readers of the case study or other researchers should be able to trace 
back any evidence from ‘initial research questions to ultimate case study conclusions’ or vice 
versa (cf. Yin, 2009, p. 122). 
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Figure 4.6 Maintaining a Chain of Evidence 
Source: Yin (2009, p. 123) 
 
4.4.2    Contextual validity 
There are two forms of validity: contextual validity and transferability of findings. Contextual 
validity indicates ‘the credibility of the case study evidence and the resulting conclusions 
drawn’ (Scapens, 2004, p. 269) and was achieved through collecting evidence from different 
sources. For example, results from the interviews were compared with those obtained through 
documentary analysis (i.e. data triangulation). The same topic was asked of key informants at 
different levels of investigation. For example, key informants at the national government level 
raised an issue about data, and I investigated further what problems were faced by local 
government. The results obtained from study at local government level on a particular issue 
were compared to those obtained from study at the regional government level. I analysed the 
consistency or inconsistency of results from the three different levels of investigations for the 
same issue. Specific to investigation at the local government level, I also ensured internal 
validity through method triangulation. For the same issues (especially for those related to data 
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problems and KPIs), the results obtained from the nine districts/municipalities participating in 
the field visits were compared to results of the survey of 31 districts/municipalities. For 
investigation at regional government level, triangulation was achieved through comparing field 
visits to two provinces and phone interviews with key appointment holders from another two 
provinces (see Figure 4.7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Convergence of Evidence 
Source: Adapted from Yin (2009) 
 
4.4.3    Transferability  
Transferability refers to external validity which concerns whether the findings of the study can 
be applied to other similar settings. Scapens (2004) explains the process of theoretical 
generalisation in interpretive case study as follows. When theories provide convincing 
explanations about the case, the theories can be maintained and used in other case studies. 
However, theories that do not explain the case need to be modified and rejected. An individual 
case studies aims ‘to explain particular circumstances’ but a research programme aims ‘to 
generate theories that are capable of explaining all observations made.’ This argument is 
consistent with Scapens’s statement ‘case studies seek to apply theories in new contexts, the 
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theory is likely to be refined and/ or modified, and through this process the theory is 
generalised. Such a process could be described as theoretical generalisation’ (cf. Scapens, 
2004, p. 269).   
Some findings of this study are transferable to other developing economies. First rational and 
institutional explanations for the drivers of performance measurement initiatives in this context 
is transferable to other developing economies. The content of the internal motif for example, 
might be different but whether the initiative could be driven by the internal motif, it is also 
possible to happen in other developing economies. In terms of normative isomorphism exerted 
by the international donor agencies such as the World Bank, it is likely most of developing 
economies experience this. Next, the findings related to design, implementation and use of 
performance measurement system will be influenced by technical, organisational and 
institutional factors will be transferable to other developing economies. However, the dynamic 
might be different because institutional factors might be differ from one developing economies 
to another.  
Furthermore, other findings are also transferable such as the need to first build 1) technical and 
organisational capacity, and 2) performance culture, before embarking on the design and 
implementation of performance measurement systems. Building core performance 
measurement capacity and performance culture takes time and developing economies should 
therefore not rush to embrace performance measurement initiatives. Without the presence of 
both (core capacity for performance measurement and performance culture), designing and 
implementing performance measurement is likely to be waste of precious resources. Instead 
the process requires substantive resources, absence of core capacity tends to result in the 
performance measurement system not being used effectively, with any information not being 
used to inform policy making processes. In terms of what type of public sector reforms drive 
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performance measurement initiatives, this may depend on the institutional context of each 
particular developing economy. However, one thing is likely to be the same: the dominant 
influence and roles played by international donor agencies (the World Bank in particular). 
More specifically, the World Bank’s ECD concept would apply, to attempt to persuade and 
ensure developing economies embrace performance measurement initiatives.  
4.5    Conclusion  
I found that the whole process of this case study research showed agreement with the argument 
of Yin (1984) and Scapens (2004; 1990). Case study research involves a complex iterative 
process. Yin (1984) for example says ‘case study is remarkably hard, even though case studies 
have traditionally been considered to be ‘soft’ research. Paradoxically, the ‘softer’ a research 
technique, the harder it is to do’ (p.26). Qualitative research in general requires good writing 
skills. Case study research in particular involves a lot of writing and re-writing. In the early 
stages of case study research, writing involves the research proposal, literature review and case 
study protocol. Then, field notes are written during data collection, and during data analysis a 
case study database needs to be written. Presenting the case study often involves several 
attempts at writing and re-writing. Moreover, carrying out qualitative research in general 
requires creativity; for example, creativity in presenting data in the most interesting way. Also 
among the challenges in presenting the results of the case study is to write in such a way that 
shows the readers that the researcher was genuinely there (at the case site). In my first attempt 
to write the case report, I was unable to show this. This however is part of the learning process.  
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CHAPTER  5                                                                                                       
CONTEXT 
5.1    Introduction 
As indicated in the introduction of this thesis, the new Indonesian measurement initiative is 
connected to the decentralisation policy implemented since 2001. An understanding of the 
Indonesian decentralisation policy is therefore integral to understanding the new measurement 
initiative. Decentralisation was one of major policies undertaken in Indonesia as a part of 
political reform following the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. As mentioned in chapter 3, 3.4, 
this crisis brought about the collapse of the Soeharto authoritarian regime in Indonesia. Up to 
the end of the 1990s, Indonesia was the world’s most centralised country (Alm et al., 2001; 
Hofman and Kaiser, 2004). On 1 January 2001 however, Indonesia embarked upon ‘big bang’ 
decentralisation (Hofman and Kaiser, 2004), when two items of legislation on decentralisation 
(Law 22/1999 and Law 25/1999) came into force. If successful, Alm et al. (2001) suggest that 
this policy could turn Indonesia into one of world’s most decentralised countries.  
This chapter presents the characteristics of the decentralisation policy applied in Indonesia. It 
attempts to show that the ‘big bang’ approach rendered Indonesia largely unprepared for 
decentralisation. The objective of the policy was not clearly articulated and the decision was 
mainly influenced by political considerations. As a result, unprecedented power was devolved 
to local government instead of regional government. The lack of preparation for 
decentralisation was also reflected in a number of weaknesses contained in the 1999 laws on 
decentralisation. A combination of these flaws and the inadequate capacity of local 
governments compared to the scale of the power devolved to them resulted in a number of 
negative implications which became apparent soon after the implementation of 
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decentralisation. The 2001 decentralisation thus went in a different direction to that expected 
by international donor agencies, and from 2004 the government leaders formulated the revision 
of decentralisation policy.  
This chapter begins with discussion about why Indonesia opted for the ‘big bang’ approach to 
decentralisation in 2001. This section also examines the fundamental changes to Indonesia’s 
governance caused by the 1999 decentralisation legislation. The discussion then moves on to 
some major consequences of the 2001 decentralisation, followed by an examination of the 
redefinition of decentralisation in 2004 and finally, conclusions.  
5.2    Decentralisation in 2001 
5.2.1    The ‘big bang’ approach  
There are two ways to implement decentralisation: the ‘big bang’ and the gradualist 
approaches. According to Shah and Thompson (2004), two defining characteristics of the big 
bang approach are 1) that it is holistic or comprehensive, and 2) the lighting speed of 
implementation. The first refers to ensuring that ‘all pieces of the puzzle fit together’; the 
lighting speed of implementation means ‘the best use of this window of opportunity’ (p.20). In 
the context of Indonesia’s decentralisation, it took only around one and half years from the 
time the legislation on decentralisation was drafted to actual implementation. In 2001, 
decentralisation was both political and fiscal. Substantive authority was devolved to sub-
national governments, leaving only five areas under control of national government: foreign 
policy, defence and security, fiscal and monetary policies, judiciary and religion. Indonesian 
decentralisation is thus classified as having been implemented by the big bang approach, as 
termed by Hofman and Kaiser (2004).  
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Two conditions explain why Indonesia opted for the big bang approach to decentralisation in 
2001. Firstly, it was aimed at preventing a repeat of previous experiences, which had failed to 
fully implement decentralisation policies. Law 22/1999 as the legal basis for the 2001 
decentralisation was not in fact the first law on decentralisation issued in Indonesia. Legislation 
had been passed prior to 1999 (for example, under laws 1/1957 and 5/1974). The initiative in 
1957 came to a complete halt due to outbreaks of regional unrest in Sumatera, West Java and 
Sulawesi (the 1957 law was abolished in 1959). Further decentralisation law was passed in 
1974 but not implemented until nearly 20 years later (the implementing regulations were issued 
only in 1992 and even then it was only partially implemented). Next, an experiment in 1996 to 
give autonomy rights to 26 districts/municipalities was also unsuccessful, as the government 
did not hand over the resources and facilities necessary to support the tasks. Thus, the long 
history of unsuccessful decentralisation initiatives in Indonesia was the first justification for 
the big bang approach in the 1999 initiative. In other words, it aimed to ensure that Law 
22/1999 was really put into effect. This first reason has been discussed in the literature (see for 
examples Hofman and Kaiser, 2004; Silver, 2003).  
The second reason for the big bang approach relates to the circumstances surrounding 1998, 
which were extraordinary. As mentioned earlier, the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis brought 
about the collapse of several regimes in Asian countries, included the authoritarian regime in 
Indonesia. Massive and bloody student protests in May 1998 calling for democracy forced 
Suharto to step down after 32 years in power. An even stronger demand, namely, for 
independence, from some regions with long-standing armed conflicts (such as Aceh and East 
Timor) and resource-rich regions added to the crisis. President Habibie who assumed power 
after the resignation of Suharto faced hard decision between maintaining the integrity of the 
country and responding to demands from its various regions. Granting autonomy to the regions 
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was seen as the best option at that time. This second reason is highlighted by (Hofman and 
Kaiser, 2004).  
The very limited time allowed for preparation resulted in the Indonesia decentralisation being 
inadequately planned (Alm et al., 2001; Guess, 2005; Hofman and Kaiser, 2004). For example, 
its objectives were not clear. At the same time, ‘the first step in most successful decentralisation 
is to establish of an official general framework within which the broad goals of the reforms are 
articulated and agreed upon’ (Alm et al. 2001, p.87). Alm et al. (2001) question whether the 
government of Indonesia was clear itself about what it wanted to achieve through 
decentralisation, and whether there was enough support from parliament and society as a whole 
for objectives. The first step in Indonesia decentralisation was thus carried out inadequately 
(Alm et al., 2001; Guess, 2005). Similarly, Hofman and Kaiser (2004) describe that ‘the 
drafting of law remained largely bureaucratic, with little feedback from the politicians and even 
less consultations with the regions’ (p.18).  
In the course of a year, over two million (or two-thirds) of central government employees were 
transferred to the regions60 . Public spending managed by local government jumped from 
around 17 per cent before decentralisation to 30 per cent afterwards (Hofman and Kaiser, 
2004). At the same time, local government was largely unprepared for its new tasks and 
responsibilities (Alm et al., 2001; Guess, 2005; Basri, 2009). Basri (2009) gives an example of 
how stakeholders in some districts/municipalities were unable to utilise the significant increase 
of transfers received from the national government, presenting evidence that transfers were 
parked at the Central Bank of Indonesia or other commercial banks, rather than being used to 
stimulate development of the regional economy. The consideration of local policymakers was 
merely to gain interest from the money deposited, reflecting not only a narrow vision but also 
                                                 
60 The term ‘regions’ refer to both provinces and districts/municipalities. 
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a lack of capacity to create real economic activities. This relates to Honadle’s (1981) argument 
that the capacity to attract resources is not necessary the same as the capacity to absorb them 
(see discussion about institutional capacity, 3.2.3).    
5.2.2    Fundamental changes to Indonesia’s governance 
National and sub-national government relation 
Silver (2003) refers to Law 22/1999 as ‘radical’ decentralisation legislation because it ‘framed 
the imminent radical transformation of central and local government relations in Indonesia’ 
(p.426). More specifically, Silver (2003) suggests that ‘the impact of the decentralization 
legislation was a “new paradigm” in Indonesia’s governance’ (p.427). Silver (2003) is 
supported by other literature, such as Alm et al. (2001) and (Hofman and Kaiser, 2004). Silver 
(2003) suggests that the fundamental change to Indonesia’s local governance structure was 
beyond even what the international donor agencies were advocating:   
… [the legislations related to decentralisation], advanced Indonesia’s 
local government reform process so rapidly that some of the international 
donors and government leaders responded, in aftermath of the 1999 laws, 
not so much with applause or even self-congratulations but with worried 
calls for retrenchment and even recentralisation. (Silver, 2003, p. 423)  
There were several points in Law 22/1999 which eventually brought about the fundamental 
changes to Indonesia’s governance structure. Firstly, substantive power was devolved to local, 
instead of to regional government. The authority of local government covers public service 
delivery such as public works, public health, education and culture, agriculture, transportation, 
trade and industry, investment, environment, land administration and cooperative and labour 
affairs (Article 11 of Law 22/1999). At the same time however, the authority of regional 
government was not clearly defined in the law. From an economic point of view however, 
provincial (that is, regional) government is in a better position than local government in terms 
of its capacity to shoulder such a scale of new authority and the responsibility of 
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decentralisation (Basri, 2009). If ensuring efficiency and effectiveness of public service 
delivery was the most important criteria in making the decision to decentralise, government 
should thus have devolved power to the provinces. However, for political reasons autonomy 
was finally granted to local government. This point will be discussed further later.  
Secondly, local government was granted full autonomy while regional government was given 
partial autonomy. The distinction between the two is discussed in Rasyid (2004). Full 
autonomy means that local government obtains the discretion to create and implement local 
policies as long as they are consistent with national law and do not go against the public 
interests. Meanwhile, limited autonomy means that regional government is limited to ‘what is 
promulgated in the law and can only make and implement policies in domestic affairs within 
that limit’ (p.66). Simultaneously, the principle of deconcentration is applied to cover a wider 
area of central government operation at regional level. The status of governor as representative 
of national government at regional level, besides his/her position as the head of province, 
relates to this deconcentration principle. Unlike the governor, the district head/mayor (the head 
of district/municipality is purely head of his/her own localities61 (cf. Rasyid, 2004).  
Thirdly, Law 22/1999 cut out the hierarchical relationship between local and provincial 
government. Article (2), versus 4, Law 22/1999 states: ‘regions [provinces, districts and 
municipalities] are independent and have no hierarchical relationship between one and 
another.’ This represented a very fundamental change in terms of the relationship between the 
national and sub-national governments62 before and after the 2001 decentralisation. Before 
decentralisation, provincial government and local government were tiers under the national 
                                                 
61 Under the previous law (Law 5/1974) districts heads/mayors were also awarded status as representatives of 
national government. 
62 The term ‘sub-national government’ refers to both regional (provincial) and local (district) government. 
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government. However, afterwards, under Law 22/1999, provinces and districts/municipalities 
became equivalent, and have a coordination relationship (see Figure 5.1).  
 
                               
Figure 5.1 National-subnational Government Relationship Before and After Decentralisation 
Source: Developed by author 
The significant point highlighted here is that Law 22/1999 removed the traditional oversight 
role of regional government over local affairs. Silver (2003) notes that the only link remaining 
between local and national government was the requirement that all decisions made by local 
policymakers were to be reported to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA).  
The way in which Law No. 22/1999 caused a major re-organisation of the public service 
delivery mechanism in Indonesia is discussed in Alm et al. (2001) and Basri (2009). They 
describe that prior to the 2001 decentralisation, national government and its ministries had 
deconcentrated departments (kantor wilayah or kanwil) at the provincial level. Sometimes, the 
kanwil also had a branch at the local level called a kantor department (or kandep). The province 
had its own regional planning and development body and various autonomous ‘decentralised’ 
departments under its own control. The latter dealt with their own revenues and public service 
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delivery: education and culture, health, public works, traffic management, agriculture, 
livestock, fisheries, forestry, plantations, industry, social welfare, labour and tourism. At the 
same time, delivery of these public services was also managed by central government through 
the deconcentrated kanwil.  
Like provinces, districts/municipalities had an autonomous ‘decentralised’ department 
responsible for their own revenues, and departments in charge of services such as health and 
public works. The size and location of each local government determined the range of those 
departments. Law 22/1999, however, shifted the responsibility over all deconcentrated central 
government ministry offices at the province and the district/municipality levels to the 
respective provincial government. Figure 5.2 illustrates the organisation of public service 
delivery in Indonesia prior to the 2001 decentralisation; organisation after the 2001 
decentralisation is presented in Figure 5.3 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Organisation of Public Service Delivery (Before Decentralisation) 
Source: developed by author 
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Figure 5.3 Organisation of Public Service Delivery (After Decentralisation) 
Source: developed by author, informed by law 22/1999 
With very limited areas under its direct control, national government had lost most of its power; 
at the same time, local government gained substantive authority (Basri, 2009; Rasyid, 2004). 
Although the use of the term federalism is uncommon (politically sensitive) in Indonesia, in 
reality, according to Basri (2009), Indonesia has entered an era of federalism63. The atmosphere 
of federalism became stronger with the two provinces Papua and Aceh being given special 
Regional Autonomy Laws (in 2001 for Papua and Aceh) which are different from Law 
22/1999. In Aceh, the specificity of regional autonomy is even applied to the most basic area 
such as the application of Syaria Law (Islamic Law). These two provinces may trigger other 
provinces to demand the same right since every province has its own uniqueness64.  
                                                 
63 In simple terms, according to Basri (2009) a country adopts federalism when most responsibilities have come 
under local government and only a very small portion of responsibilities and functions remain in the hand of the 
national government. However, the use of the term ‘federalism’ is ‘taboo’ in Indonesia and other terms (such as 
‘wide regional autonomy’) are used in preference.In essence however, this means federalism.  
64 Jogyakarta is the next province likely to demand special regional autonomy, given its historical background and 
current designation as a special region.  
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Political consideration of devolving power to local government  
The fact that Law 22/1999 granted a huge amount of power and responsibility to local 
government rather than provincial government indicated the existence of a strong political 
consideration. This is described in Hofman and Kaiser (2004) which suggest that devolving 
power to local rather than regional government was the strategy of President Habibie to ensure 
military support for decentralisation policy. Since gaining independence from the Dutch in 
1945, regional government had been the centre of regional unrest. In the 1950s for instance, 
outbreaks occurred in Sumatera, West Java and Sulawesi. Then, at the time Law No. 22/1999 
was drafted, Aceh and Papua were in conflict with national government, demanding 
independence. All these regions are provinces (regional government). Given this history, it 
would be hard to gain support from the military for decentralisation, if power was to be 
devolved to regional government. In other words, the military would support decentralisation 
policy if national government could ensure that regional unrest would not ensue.  
For this reason, as stated by Hofman and Kaiser (2004), President Habibie established a plan 
to remove provinces totally from the Indonesian structure of governance, and then devolve 
power to local government. By doing so, the chance for regional unrest would be reduced. The 
rationale was that local government is much smaller in terms of its size in comparison to 
regional government, and its capacity is more limited. With such characteristics, even if the 
scale of power to be devolved to them was huge, they would not become sufficiently 
empowered to demand independence from Jakarta. If however such a scale of power toward 
devolved to the provinces, the opposite might occur. Moreover, controlling 
districts/municipalities would thus be easier than controlling the powerful provinces. Thus, this 
political reasoning was given more weight than economic considerations, and decentralisation 
to local government level ensued. This explanation is consistent with Devas and Delay (2006) 
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who suggest that decentralisation in Indonesia was driven more by a response to potential or 
actual regional conflict and the fear of the secession of resource-rich regions:  
Yet this [decentralisation] has not been driven so much by democratic 
demands from the local level as the combination of local elite interests and 
fear within the central government of secession by the resource-rich 
regions (p. 678).   
Despite Habibie’s intention to eliminate provinces entirely from the governance structure of 
Indonesia, by chance provinces survived. According to Hofman and Kaiser (2004), by the time 
the two laws of decentralisation (Law 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999) were at first-draft stage, 
new election laws were also completed, in December 1999. The new election laws detailed 
how the provincial parliament and governor were to be elected. These new laws imply that the 
plan to remove provinces from the governance structure of Indonesia could not be carried out. 
This is reflected from statement by Hofman and Kaiser (2004), that ‘since one could not have 
a parliament and head of region without a government, it was decided to put the provinces back 
in, albeit with a limited role’ (p.18).  Thus, the completion of the new elections law was the 
circumstance that eventually saved provinces.  
Local governance   
The new nature of the relationship between the national and local government brought about 
by the 2001 decentralisation had a number of consequences. Rasyid (2004) suggests that  under 
Law 22/1999, local government became more independent in 
1. electing the district heads/mayors; 
2. promoting local interests;  
3. developing local institutions; 
4. initiating local policies; 
5. managing financial resources; and  
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6. mobilizing support of its own communities.  
In terms of electing district head/mayors, they were elected by members of the local parliament 
(rather than being appointed by national government); they were thus no longer responsible to 
the governor as head of the province. This situation was applied until replacement of the 1999 
law with the new law on decentralisation in 2004 that will be discussed later in the section 5.4. 
Moreover, Basri (2009) adds that If there is any problem with a local ordinance, the local people 
could bring a case to court and the court has the right to terminate it. Thus, the autonomy for 
local government given by the 1999 law, was characterised by the absent of the national 
government interference (Basri, 2009).  
Law 22/1999 also granted extremely strong power to local parliaments. This power came from 
(i) the right to choose the mayor/district head (elected by local parliament members), (ii) the 
right to impeach the mayor/district head by rejecting the accountability report written about 
them, and (iii) the right to approve or not the local budget proposal. These three main sources 
of power were been utilised by local parliaments to engage with the money politics for the 
benefit of an individual or their party (Hofman and Kaiser, 2004; Basri, 2009). For example, 
the mayor/district head often had to bribe members of the local parliament to obtain approval 
for the local budget proposal. The mayor/district head tended to satisfy the requirements of the 
local parliament because of the fear of their accountability report being rejected. In practice, 
this means that the mayor/district head placed the individual or group interests of local 
parliament members above the interests of the people they are supposed to represent. 
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Intergovernmental fiscal system  
In terms of finance, there was inconsistency between the law on decentralisation (Law 22/1999) 
and the law on fiscal balance between central government and local government (Law 
25/1999). Law 22/1999 granted very wide authority to local government. At the same time, 
Law 25/1999 gave no authority to local government to manage taxes; these remained under the 
authority of national government. This contradiction has been criticised in the literature (Basri, 
2009; Miller, 2013). Law 25/1999 only benefited regions with rich natural resources, and 
ignored the rest. There was thus a huge gap between decentralisation (in term of responsibility) 
and semi-decentralisation (in terms of finance). Alm et al. (2001) and Basri (2009) suggest that 
in unified Indonesia, the fiscal system was the most centralised in the world causing its regions 
to be highly financially dependent on national government.  
The four main sources of local government income under decentralisation are (i) original local 
income, (ii) transfers, (iii) loans, and (iv) other legal revenue. Original local incomes come 
from local government efforts (including local taxes, charges, and dividends received from 
companies owned by local government) and other sources that are legal according to 
regulations. Basri (2009) points out that the ability of local government to earn original local 
income was, on average, low. The evidence shown in Basri (2009) suggests that until 2002, 
local government earned only an average of 12.5 per cent of local income compared to total 
revenue. The second source of revenue – that is, transfers from national government – can be 
divided into three components: revenue sharing, general allocation fund, specific allocation 
fund. Revenue sharing usually comes from taxes on land and buildings and natural resources. 
For most of districts/municipalities, transfer constitutes the largest proportion of local 
government revenue. 
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5.3    Some consequences of the 2001 decentralisation 
5.3.1    Accountability and the emergence of small kings 
As discussed earlier, Law 22/1999 indicated there was to be no hierarchical relationship 
between local and provincial government. It also has been mentioned earlier that the role of 
provinces remained unclear under Law 22/1999. Moreover, as Silver (2003) states that the 
1999 law also failed ‘to specify exactly what role of the central government would exercise  in 
reviewing local decisions, although the assumption among local officials was that they now 
possessed unlimited discretion …’ (p.426). District heads/mayors should indeed be 
accountable to local parliaments. However, the considerably low capacity of local parliament 
members in comparison to local government bureaucrats, as also underlined by (Rasyid, 2004), 
limits their ability to exercise control over local government. The strong temptation for local 
parliaments to use money politics (as discussed earlier), also led many to compromise their role 
as a legislative body. Given that district heads/mayors had a huge authority (and at the same 
time there was no control over them) many acted as raja kecil (‘small kings’) who were neither 
accountable to national government or to their local electorates (Hofman and Kaiser, 2004; 
Basri, 2009). The three conditions explaining this phenomenon are illustrated in Figure 5.4 
below. 
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Figure 5.4 Three Conditions of Early Decentralisation Creating the ‘Small King’ Phenomenon 
Source: Developed by author 
5.3.2    Intense interest in setting-up new local governments 
After decentralisation, regions also show intense interest in the setting up of new 
districts/municipalities. This can be done in one of two ways: either by splitting up an already-
existing district/municipality into two or by establishing a completely new one (Fitriani et al., 
2005). Table 5.1 shows the number of new districts/municipalities established in between 1998 
and 2004. 
Period Number of districts/municipality established 
1998-2001 44 
2002 12 
2003 22 
2004 40 
Total  118 
Table 5.1 Establishment of New Districts/Municipalities (1998-2004) 
Source: Informed by Firtiani et al.(2005) 
National government: 
very little control 
over local 
governments
Regional 
government: no 
control over local 
government
Mayors/districts 
heads: not 
accountable to 
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Many ‘small kings’ 
(raja kecil) created at 
local level 
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As Table 5.1 shows, there were 118 new districts/municipalities in total just after four years of 
decentralisation. Apart from these, Fitriani et al. (2005) also note that parliament had approved 
17 more proposals to create new districts/municipalities during 2004.  
Fitriani et al. (2005) suggest a number of reasons for the high demand in setting up 
districts/municipalities. These include ‘a rich mix of local grievances, ranging from neglect to 
geographical isolation, leadership ambitions and claims over natural resources revenues’ 
(p.64). One incentive for local elites to mobilise local citizens to demand new 
districts/municipalities was the opportunity this presented to those elites to occupy top 
positions. A new district/municipality needs a mayor or district head, bureaucrats, and members 
of parliament (a new municipality needs its own parliament). These provide new ‘job 
opportunities’ for local elites. Moreover, a new district/municipality is provided with funding 
by the government for three years and the amount is substantive, covering costs needed to 
provide essential facilities and equipment for a new local government, such as offices, local 
parliament, the mayor’s residence and vehicles. In some cases also, the establishment of a new 
district/municipality was triggered by ethnic or religious conflict. More specifically, where two 
religions were being practiced in one district/municipality, local citizens tended to demand 
splitting the district along religious lines. Similarly, in some cases where there were two ethnic 
groups in one district, some citizens from the same ethnic group demanded separation.   
The extremely high interest in setting-up new districts and municipalities at regional level 
(which occurred particularly in regions outside Java) reached such a level that national 
government was concerned that this might in the long term pose a threat to the unity of the 
country. According to Fitriani et al. (2005), ‘some regions experienced multiple divisions over 
a period of several years’ (Fitriani et al., 2005, p. 63). As an example, Figure 5.5 demonstrates 
the process of splitting up the district of Riau Islands into five new districts over the course of 
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five years (1999-2004). In 1999, the district was divided into three new districts: Natuna 
district, Karimun district and Batam municipality. Then, in 2001 it was divided again to create 
Tanjung Pinang district, and the last division of Riau Islands was in 2004, with the 
establishment of Lingga district (see Figure 5.5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Proliferation of Riau Islands District (1999-2004) 
Source: Informed by Fitriani et al. (2005) 
Basri (2009) suggests that there were indications that some regions were benefiting from 
decentralisation by adapting development programmes to local conditions. However, other 
regions experienced the deterioration of public services after decentralisation in terms of the 
quality and quantity. Many new regions appeared not to develop but rather to become a new 
burden for national government. In general, the economic growth of new regions tended to be 
lower than that of the region which existed before it.  
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5.3.3    High costs of regional economy 
The phenomenon of the rise of small kings, compounded by the weakness of Law 25/1999, led 
local government to seek for possible ways to raise local income. Discussion in point 5.2.2 has 
highlighted the issue of inconsistency of concept decentralisation in Indonesia introduced in 
2001: in one side, local government was granted very wide authority (by the law 22/1999). In 
another side, Law 25/1999 gave no authority (i.e. responsibility to delivery all ranges of public 
services to local people) for local government to manage taxes. Law 25/1999 caused regions 
to be highly financially dependent on the national government. To solve the problem, local 
government tried to search alternatives that could bring incomes for local government; for 
example, through issuing different local ordinance on charges. Unfortunately, sometimes, the 
charges set in the local ordinances could bring negative implications to the investment climate 
in general.  
In fact, the huge number of local ordinances issued soon after decentralisation in 2001 was one 
of the most problematic implications of decentralisation in Indonesia (World Bank, 2003). The 
World Bank (2003) is supported in this by Basri (2009) which notes that local ordinances were 
often issued in a way which was inconsistent with higher regulations, contradictive of each 
other, overlapping, or counterproductive. For example, the issue was often driven purely by 
the desire to boost local income to the greatest extent possible, without consideration for the 
feasibility of its implementation and impact on the regional economy as a whole.   
Many local ordinances enacted since 2000-2005 related to new local taxes and local charges 
designed to increase local government’s own revenue sources (LPEM-FEUI, 2005). Matsui 
(2005) suggests that the local ordinances issued at this early stage of decentralisation were 
heavily criticised as hampering ‘the revitalization of regional economic activities and creating 
high-costs economic structures’ (p. 179). Moreover, Matsui (2005) suggests that between two 
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and ten per cent of company production costs operating at regional level comprised expenses 
for the provision of services to local government bureaucrats.  
Basri (2009) provides other examples of the negative implications of decentralisation to the 
regional economy. For example, in West Sumatera, the provincial government issued a licence 
to Company X (a local company) to carry out coal exploration in a certain location. At the same 
time however, national government had already granted an exploration licence to Company Y 
in the same location. It was later discovered that the owner of Company X was the son of the 
West Sumatera governor. In Riau, local elites mobilised local citizens to take over an oil 
installation owned by Pertamina (a state-owned oil company) and Caltex (an American oil 
company), stating that it was in the interest of local people to do so. What happened in both 
West Sumatera and Riau provinces reflected the weak protection of property rights which is 
inconsistent both with Washington Consensus and with neoliberal principles, as discussed in 
chapter 3 (section 3.4).  
In terms of industry growth, according to Basri (2009), the data shows that this has declined 
since decentralisation. Problematic local ordinances not only discouraged investors from 
opening new business but also encouraged them to close their businesses. The implication is 
that local government did not issue market friendly local regulations. These problematic local 
ordinances had implications for the growth of industry nationally. During the period 1999-
2000, growth was 0.47 per cent; for the period 2000-2001 the number of industries decreased 
3.51 per cent. Thus, growth was negative after decentralisation. According to Rasyid (2004) 
the problematic local ordinances were not entirely the fault of regions, but also a part of the 
failure of the national government to equip decentralisation policy with adequate implementing 
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regulations65. Rasyid (2004) states that the inadequacy of these regulations was due to the 
reluctance of some sector ministries to hand over power to local government (and thus 
intentionally delayed producing the implementing regulations). This implies that devolving 
power to local government was a threat to the interests of sector ministries.  
5.3.4    Local government becomes active economic actor  
As Silver (2003) mentioned, decentralisation took a different direction from that expected by 
the international donor agencies which supported it at the beginning. Matsui (2005) supports 
Silver’s (2003) argument specifically in terms of regional economy, suggesting that after 
decentralisation local government became an active economic actor. Some districts with rich 
natural resources (e.g. Kutai Kartanegara) initiated large-scale projects without involving the 
participation of the private sector. Others have established and operated airline companies; for 
example, the Government of Riau is the main shareholder of Riau Airlines. The tendency of 
local government to become an active economic actor soon after decentralisation implies that 
the manner in which Indonesian local government acted was inconsistent with the fourth core 
principle of neoliberalism, that is, that the role of the state in the economy should be kept to a 
minimum. This principle states that government should limit its function to ensuring how the 
market should function and not become an economic actor itself (see discussion, chapter 4, 
4.1).  
  
                                                 
65According to Ryaas Rasyid (who led the drafting of the decentralisation law), at least 197 presidential decrees 
were needed to support the implementation of decentralisation policy, which should had been passed on by 
November 2000. However, most of these decrees failed to come into existence (Rasyid, 2004). 
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To sum up, there are two broad categories of implication of the 2001 decentralisation:  
(1) the threat of the disintegration of Indonesia as a nation (emergence of ‘small kings’ 
and extremely high interest in setting up new local government or regional 
government, and  
(2) a potential threat to neoliberal economy principles, worrying for international 
donors (as the high costs of economy and local government became an active 
economic actors).  
Basri (2009) notes two further implications: environmental degradation (i.e. deforestation) and 
decentralised corruption.  According to Basri (2009), deforestation in Indonesia before 
decentralisation was around 1.5 million hectares per year; this increased dramatically to 2.25 
million hectares per year afterwards. If this had continued, Indonesia was predicted to lose all 
of its forest within two decades. Environmental degradation in Indonesia is a concern; serious 
deforestation could affect the global climate as Indonesia is home to one-third of the world 
tropical rain forest (UN-REDD, n.d). Hence, in terms of corruption, Basri (2009) suggests that 
financial decentralisation was followed by decentralised corruption which now became centred 
around the local legislative and executive. Decentralised corruption is barrier to an effective 
local budget. The implications of radical decentralisation discussed in this section are 
summarised in Figure 5.6 below.  
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Figure 5.6 Negative Implications of the 2001 Decentralisation 
Source: Developed by author 
 
 
5.4    Redefinition of decentralisation in 2004 
As mentioned above, international donors and government leaders responded the 1999 law 
with ‘worried calls for retrenchment and even recentralisation’ (see quotation from Silver, 
2003, page 174). Some negative consequences of the 2001 decentralisation discussed in the 
previous section affirm these worries, and were associated with serious flaws in the 1999 law. 
In responding to these flaws, the law was replaced in 2004 (by Law 32/2004), and Law 25/1999 
(as companion to Law 22/1999) was replaced by Law 33/2004. One of most important changes 
to Law 32/2004 relates to the introduction of the direct election system for governors and 
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mayors/districts heads. This change was aimed at limiting local parliament power which had 
often been misused. More specifically, under the 2004 legislation, when a mayor or district 
head is directly elected by the local electorate, they can no longer be impeached by the local 
parliament. With this power removed, it is expected that the practice of money politics will 
decrease and mayor/district head can concentrate on their work.  
Law 32/2004 also returned to provincial government its position as national government 
representative at regional level. This change was aimed to allow regional government to re-
exercise its traditional oversight of local affairs. For example, post-2004 the local government 
budget proposal now needed to be reviewed by the governor (who had the power to delete 
items he deems unnecessary) before it could be approved by local parliament. This reduced the 
absolute power of local parliament which they had enjoyed under Law 22/1999. The 
fundamental change provided by Law 32/2004 is in terms of what is devolved to local 
government. Under Law 22/1999, national government devolved power or authority to local 
government. Law 32/2004 however states that the national government delegates authority and 
responsibility to local government. This change, from ‘transfer of power’ to ‘delegation of 
authority and responsibility,’ is fundamental. The latter implies that control is still in the hand 
of national government, which is very different from the concept of decentralisation according 
to Law 22/1999, which implies the opposite. 
In relation to the direct election of mayors, districts heads and governors, Basri (2009) 
comments that although this mechanism had been long expected, the readiness of local elites 
and local people was still limited and that problems surrounding direct elections emerged as a 
result. For example, horizontal conflict emerged after direct election, and could sometimes be 
massive in scale (such as in North Maluku province). Horizontal conflict here refers to conflict 
between local elites which can lead to physical conflict involving their supporters in a large 
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scale. North Maluku has been given as an example because the conflict between the candidates 
participated in the direct election of 2007-2008 caused a large scale horizontal conflict and 
which was known as a tragic conflict that have ever happened since the decentralisation reform 
and direct election system introduced in Indonesia (Abbas, 2011). National government 
anticipated this happening by including a clause in the regulation which stated ‘in case there is 
conflict after direct election, the solution is in the hand of the national government.’  
Direct election reform has also been connected to increased corruption (Faiz, 2011) which  
suggests that the very high costs of election campaigning in Indonesia changes the orientation 
of the mayors and districts heads once in office, from achieving the vision and mission of their 
campaign to finding a way to regain the ‘investment’ they made as quickly as possible, 
frequently by misusing the local budget: 
The government assumes that direct regional elections are prone to 
corruption as elected candidates will take advantage of any opportunity to 
regain any of their money spent during their campaigns. One of their ways 
to get this money back is apparently by misusing the regional budget (Faiz, 
2011). 
5.5    Conclusion 
The 2001 decentralisation policy implemented in Indonesia has some extreme characteristics. 
Firstly, government took what experts call the ‘big bang’ approach instead of one which is 
gradual, the implication being that it happened suddenly, all at once and on a massive scale. 
Secondly, Law 22/1999 granted unprecedented power and authority to local rather than 
regional government, which in the view of an expert, made decentralisation in Indonesian a 
radical one (Silver, 2003).  As a result, Law 22/1999 transformed the organisation of public 
services delivery and intergovernmental relations in Indonesia (Alm et al., 2001). The 2001 
decentralisation provided evidence for Devas and Delay’s (2006) argument that the 
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characteristics of decentralisation implemented in any particular country are influenced by the 
decision to decentralise. As decentralisation in Indonesia was not due to economic reasons, 
efficiency and effectiveness of public service delivery was not the first priority of the 2001 
decentralisation policy. The political side of the process caused decentralisation to be granted 
to local not provincial government (which would have had better capacity to implement 
decentralisation). Given its characteristics, the 2001 decentralisation had some negative 
implications, providing as it did 1) a threat to the unity of the nation, 2) a threat to neoliberal 
policies in Indonesia 3) a threat to the environment, and 4) a barrier to the effectiveness of local 
budgets. As a result of the many problems which emerged, Indonesia decentralisation was re-
conceptualised through a new law (Law 32/2004), the aim of which was to overcome 
weaknesses in the earlier decentralisation law. Finally, the experience of the first wave of 
decentralisation (2001-02) seems to prove the argument of Shah and Thompson (2004) which 
says that for a country with weak capacity such as Indonesia, the more appropriate approach to 
decentralisation is the gradualist approach.  
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CHAPTER  6                                                                                                   
PROCESS OF AND FACTORS INFLUENCING DESIGN OF 
THE EKPPD  
6.1    Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, performance measurement systems can be divided into three main 
phases: design, implementation and use. Some factors exert an influence on all phases, others 
have a dominant influence on a particular phase. The first phase of performance measurement 
systems (design) is critical, as design influences the next two phases: implementation and use. 
There thus needs to be sufficient time, adequate resources and involvement of all stakeholders 
invested in the process. In Chapter 3, I discussed the connection between performance 
measurement in developing economies with the role of international donor agencies and their 
potential interest in the introduction of performance measurement.  
This chapter presents the findings of this study which relate to the first phase of particular a 
performance measurement system, namely the design phase of the EKPPD system. First of all, 
the establishment of the new performance measurement initiative in Indonesia has been mainly 
driven by the intention to change a) the nature of decentralisation in the country 
(recentralisation), and b) the influence of international donor agencies which can be connected 
to two things: to protect neoliberal policies in Indonesia, and the achievement of MDG targets. 
International donor agencies, such as the World Bank, the CIDA, and the ADB have each 
played a significant role in the process establishing the new performance measurement 
initiative in Indonesia. The EKPPD system focuses on the governance and services provided 
by local government in the context of decentralisation. The system design is complex but only 
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partially captures the dimensions of performance (mainly outputs). Some contingency factors 
influenced the design phase that include political considerations, the direct election system, the 
stakeholders’ support and budget, metric difficulties and the drivers. Finally, the findings of 
this study show a persistent conflict of interests among a range of stakeholders (including the 
national government and international donors supporting the process, sectoral ministries and 
MoHA as the ministry leading the establishment of the initiative, and the national government 
and stakeholders at local government level).  
This chapter begins with a discussion of the new performance measurement initiative 
introduced in Indonesia in 2008. The section focuses on exploring the driving forces of the 
initiative; thus the discussion in this section addresses the first research question. The next 
section discusses the system design of the measurement system used to evaluate local 
government performance in Indonesia and thereby addresses the second research question. The 
discussion then moves on to contingency factors that influence the design phase. The 
discussion in this section addresses partly the fifth research question. The last section offers 
some conclusions.  
6.2    The New Performance Measurement Initiative 
6.2.1    Normative and rational arguments of the initiative  
In an interview with one of the key informants involved in drafting the regulation on the new 
performance measurement initiative in Indonesia (INF2/NG), two arguments were given as 
motivating the initiative: a ‘rational argument’ and a ‘normative argument.’ The rational 
argument was connected to the government’s interest in tracking and monitoring the results 
achieved by its decentralisation policy; the normative argument referred to Law 32/2004 on 
decentralisation, Article 6: 
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1) Regions can be merged or abolished when they are incapable of running 
regional autonomy. 
2) Merger or abolition of autonomous regions is carried out after local 
government governance evaluation. 
3) The evaluation as mentioned in versus (2) above should be further 
regulated by the Government Regulation. 
As INF2/NG pointed out, versus (3), Article 6 of Law 32/2004 provides a direct mandate for 
the Government of Indonesia to develop an instrument which can be used for the purpose of 
evaluating local government performance in implementing the decentralisation policy. 
INF2/NG was supported by another key informant (INF6/NG). The interviews with INF1/NG 
and INF3/NG particularly highlighted the normative argument – the requirement of the law 
32/2004. 
The normative argument used to justify the new performance measurement initiative in 
Indonesia, means that the initiative is intended as a technical instrument to merge or abolish 
regions incapable of running the decentralisation policy. In Chapter 5, I mentioned the high 
degree of interest on the part of regions in Indonesia in setting up a new district/municipality 
as one of the negative implications of the decentralisation policy. The dramatic increase in the 
number of new autonomous regions in Indonesia post-decentralisation reached a worrying level 
for the national government in that the number was becoming uncontrollable. From the 
perspective of the national government, the regions therefore needed to be reorganised. 
Through merging or abolishing underperforming regions, the national government expects that 
the number of districts/municipalities and provinces could be brought under control. The 
intended use of performance measurement for merging or abolishing an autonomous region 
seems to be a new finding in the literature. The list of potential uses of performance 
measurement offered by Van Dooren et al. (2010) enumerating no less than 44 items, for 
example, does not include the merger or abolition of an autonomous region in a decentralised 
country.  
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The re-organisation of autonomous regions in the context of wide decentralisation does not 
imply a simple meaning. More specifically, I argue that the new performance measurement 
initiative was intended as technical instrument for recentralisation. The reason for this 
argument relates to the background of why the law 22/1999 was replaced with the law 32/2004 
as discussed in chapter 5. In essence, the law 32/2004 itself was intended to change the nature 
of decentralisation in Indonesia (recentralisation). As the legal basis of the new performance 
measurement initiative, law 32/2004 contains the spirit of recentralisation, and means that the 
initiative also embodies a similar objective (recentralisation) (see illustration below). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 The New Performance Measurement Initiative and Decentralisation 
Source: Developed by author, based on the interviews’ results 
In chapter 5, I discussed the redefinition of the concept of ‘decentralisation’ in Indonesia 
through the new law (Law 32/2004). I mentioned that the law introduced some fundamental 
changes such as 1) limiting local parliament power, 2) reinstating the provincial governments’ 
position as the representative of the national government at regional level, which allows them 
to exercise its traditional oversight of local affairs (e.g. local budget proposals should be 
reviewed by the governor first before being able to be approved by the local parliament, which 
reduces the absolute power of the local parliament), and 3) decentralisation no longer means 
‘transfer of power’ but only ‘delegation of rights and responsibilities’. The last point is 
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fundamental, as it implies that the new law on decentralisation contain a spirit of 
recentralisation.   
This argument was supported by interviews with two key informants who were also apparently 
involved in the draft of Law 32/2004. INF1/NG, for example, stated, “Many people consider 
the Law 32/2004 emasculates decentralisation… that is true”. Hence, another key informant 
stated, “To understand why the government needs to evaluate how well local government 
perform under decentralisation, we need first to understand what has been decentralised 
[according to the law 32/2004]? …the President delegates ‘functions’ to local government...” 
(INF6/NF). The statement from INF1/NG is very clear. The key word in the statement of 
INF6/NG is ‘functions’: delegation of functions is different from ‘transfer of power.’  
The rational argument mentioned by the INF2/NG refers to the principal-agency perspective:   
…when rights and responsibilities have been given to them 
[districts/municipalities], it is rational to question how well rights and 
responsibilities have been exercised.  
The use of principal-agency theory to justify the initiative indicates the government’s intention 
to exert control over local government (to establish an accountability relationship). However, 
the principal-agency perspective is inadequate to explain the accountability relationships 
involved in the context of a government with different tiers (Smith, 1990). Under the 
decentralisation system, the accountability lines of Indonesian local government are displayed 
in Figure 6.2 below. The rational argument put forward by the INF2/NG recognises only one 
line of accountability (that is, between national and local government) and ignores the other 
two accountability lines demonstrated in Figure 6.2. Simplifying those complex accountability 
relationships can be interpreted as part of an effort to achieve re-centralisation.  
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Figure 6.2 Accountability Relationships in the Context of Decentralisation in Indonesia 
Source: Developed by author 
6.2.2    Influence of international donor agencies 
Demand generating activities 
As discussed in chapter 3, the international donor agencies, the World Bank in particular, are 
key actors in promoting performance measurement in the context of developing economies. 
The new performance measurement initiative in Indonesia was also not free from the influence 
of international donor agencies. The interviews with INF2/NG and INF3/NG revealed that the 
new performance measurement initiative went through a long and difficult design process. 
INF2/NG described how efforts to obtain input from as many as stakeholders as possible were 
realised through various means such as seminars, symposia, workshops and even talk shows 
on television and radio. The first three aimed to gather feed-in from experts, academics and 
practitioners; talk shows were aimed at obtaining a response from citizens in general. These 
events were mainly sponsored by CIDA, who also assigned foreign and local experts to help 
the performance measurement design team to complete their tasks. INF2/NG acknowledged 
the involvement of the World Bank in the process of establishing the initiative, but not in 
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completing the process. According to him, the World Bank consultant insisted that the 
measurement framework developed and tested by the World Bank be adopted as the 
measurement system to track the decentralisation policy results in Indonesia.  
INF2/NG also explained that this pressure to adopt the performance measurement system 
developed by the World Bank was considered incompatible with ‘the circumstances at that 
time.’ This referred to the fact that the Indonesian public had severely criticised many of the 
previous government’s policies which appeared to be designed merely to satisfy the request of 
international donor agencies without careful consideration as to whether the policies were 
applicable or feasible for implementation in the Indonesian context. INF2/NG himself 
perceived that the measurement framework should be drawn from the objectives of the 
decentralisation policy. As INF2/NG described, the arrogant behaviour of the World Bank’s 
consultant, who conflicted with him as the chair of the EPPD design team, resulting in a request 
for the consultant to withdraw from the team. This explains the less significant participation of 
the World Bank in the next process compared to the role of, for example, the CIDA and the 
ADB. 
Analysis of World Bank documents, reports and related publications, however, revealed the 
important role played by the World Bank in relation to the early stage of the initiative. In fact, 
it was the World Bank which initiated discussion of the need to measure the results of 
decentralisation. In 2005, the World Bank, in cooperation with the MoHA, organised a two-
day workshop (28-29 August) on the theme of ‘Strengthening Public Services in Decentralizing 
Indonesia: Approaches for Measuring Performance of Local Governments.’ The workshop 
discussed the vital role of local government in Indonesia in the decentralisation era. As most 
substantive power had been devolved to local government, ensuring the functioning of 
government means ensuring that local government exercises its new rights and responsibilities.  
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The key issue raised in the workshop was that Indonesia had no comprehensive performance 
measurement tool to monitor and evaluate how local government was performing its new tasks. 
The workshop concluded that the establishment of a comprehensive performance measurement 
system to measure results of decentralisation in Indonesia was crucial (see Fengler et al., 2005; 
Suparno, 2005a; b), and would be a manifestation of demand-generating activity undertaken 
by the World Bank for performance measurement in Indonesia (see discussion of the ECD 
concept in Chapter 3). The connection between the 2005 workshop and the establishment of 
the new performance measurement initiative (EPPD) is indicated by INF3/NG’s statement: 
The early discussion about the needs to measure local government’s 
performance in implementing decentralisation policy went back to 2005. 
Since then we continued to search for a formula on how local 
government’s performance should be measured… (Interview with 
INF3/NG on the 13rd December 2011)  
The role of the World Bank was thus clearly crucial at the early stage of establishing the EPPD. 
Following the workshop, the World Bank showed serious commitment to developing a 
measurement framework to evaluate the performance of Indonesian local government in the 
context of decentralisation. This framework developed by the World Bank was devised using 
various assessment tools previously developed by different development partners, and was 
called the ‘Local Government Performance Measurement’ (LGPM). Measurement by the 
LGPM consists of four aspects: public financial management, fiscal performance, service 
delivery and investment climate (see Figure 6.3). The framework was tested in three districts: 
Solok, Biak-Numfor and Tangerang (World Bank, 2008). This is the measurement framework 
to which INF2/NG was referring to in the previous discussion.  
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Figure 6.3 World Bank’s LGPM Framework 
Source: World Bank (2008) 
The World Bank’s Interest 
The World Bank’s interest in supporting the establishment of the new performance 
measurement initiative in Indonesia can be inferred from the LGPM framework. As shown in 
Figure 6.3 above, the fourth aspect of LPGM is investment climate. The significance of this is 
immense, with the number of indicators for this category being much higher than those of the 
other three measurement aspects (there are 43 indicators for measuring investment climate, 32 
for measuring public financial management, 25 for measuring fiscal performance, and 33 for 
service delivery). The 43 investment climate indicators seem to be strongly tied to the 
characteristics of neo-liberal principles discussed in Chapter 3. More specifically, the indicators 
are closely connected to the role of government in ensuring that markets function.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, among the unexpected implications of decentralisation policy in 
Indonesia was that local government acted in a way that was inconsistent with neo-liberal 
principles. Local government became an active economic actor and many regulations issued 
by local or regional governments tended to create difficulties for the private sector to grow and 
participate in regional economic development. By becoming an active economic actor, local 
government acted in a manner inconsistent with neoliberal principles (which stipulate that the 
role of government in the economy should be limited to ensuring how markets function, not 
becoming an active economic actor themselves). Also from a neoliberalist perspective (which 
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states that government should be the guardian of the market to ensure it functions well), 
regulations which are unsupportive of the private sector participating in regional economic 
activity are also inconsistent with the role of the government. 
The new performance measurement initiative in Indonesia, however, has a different structure 
from the LGPM framework proposed by the World Bank. Precisely how they differ will be 
described and discussed further in the next sections. As indicated above, according to 
INF2/NG, the reason for the LGPM framework being rejected was that it was imposed by a 
World Bank consultant. Although the framework of the new performance measurement 
initiative has evolved to be different from that of LGPM, I argue that the World Bank’s interest 
in measuring the performance of Indonesian local government still remains one of drivers for 
the initiative. As mentioned earlier, this interest could be related to the Bank wanting to protect 
neo-liberal policies in Indonesia. It was after all the World Bank which initiated the 2005 
workshop in response to the negative implications of the early stage of decentralisation in 
Indonesia; as also mentioned earlier, the 2005 workshop was the beginning of the discussion 
about the need to measure the performance of Indonesian local government.   
Global commitment 
As discussed in Chapter 3, examples of recent global commitment relate, for example, to the 
achievement of MDG targets. With decentralisation, direct public service delivery becomes a 
responsibility of local government. At the same time, the majority of MDG targets relate to 
basic public services. For the Government of Indonesia, which has committed to achieving the 
MDGs by 2015 (UNDP Indonesia, 2010), tracking and monitoring the MDGs is difficult if 
there is no information system to facilitate it. From the international donor agencies’ 
perspective, measuring the results of decentralisation in Indonesia was also seen to be 
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important as most of international donor agencies continue to direct development funding to 
local level as reflected from the quote below: 
Regions are responsible for one-third of all government spending, and half 
of the development budget… The amount of local resources is likely to 
increase further…The share of the main central government transfer 
(DAU) will increase to 26 percent in 2007…On top of this, international 
donor agencies are increasingly channeling their support through local 
governments and provinces. (Fengler et al., 2005) 
As discussed in chapter 3, under the new approach of development, the performance of 
international development agencies themselves is assessed through the effectiveness of 
development programmes.  
In sum, the new performance measurement initiative introduced in Indonesia in 2008 was 
driven by (1) internal motives and (2) the influence of international donor agencies. The 
internal motives refer to normative and rational arguments. Both normative and rational 
arguments imply recentralisation through merging/abolishing regions incapable of 
implementing decentralisation policy (re-arranging local government in Indonesia) and re-
imposing control over local government. The initiative was also influenced by the demand 
generating activities of the international donor agencies, the World Bank in particular. The 
World Bank’s interest in the initiative can be seen through the notion of promoting and 
preserving neoliberalism. More specifically, the World Bank was interested in ensuring that 
decentralisation did not contradict neoliberal principles. Moreover, the influence of the 
international donor agencies also connects to global commitments such as achievement of 
MDG targets. Achievement of MDG targets, however, is also of interest to the Government of 
Indonesia as it is a global commitment to which Indonesia has also committed itself. Discussion 
at this point thus addresses the first research question, related to the drivers of the new 
performance measurement system introduced in Indonesia and the role played by the 
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international donor agencies and their interests. Discussion in this section is summarised in 
Figure 6.4 below.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Drivers of the New Performance Measurement Initiative in Indonesia 
Source: Developed by author, based on findings 
 
6.3    System Design  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the design phase of a performance measurement system deals with 
two main questions (1) what to measure and (2) how to measure.  Figure 6.5 presents the 
detailed structure of the EKPPD system.  
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Figure 6.5 The EKPPD Structure  
Source: Minister of Home Affairs Circulation Letter No. 120.04/2289/OTDA, 27 August 2009
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6.3.1    Measurement targets 
According to the EKPPD system, the performance of Indonesian local government is measured 
at two different levels: those of the policymaker and the policy implementer. Measurement at 
policymaker level is broken down into 13 measurement aspects. Differing slightly from 
measurement at policymaker level, measurement at the level of policy implementer is first 
classified into a) general administration, and b) the minimum service standard. General 
administration consists of 8 measurement aspects; the minimum service standard is further 
differentiated into those aspects operating for i) obligatory and ii) optional functions.   
As described in the EKPPD manual, each measurement aspect is divided into several sub-
aspects (each referred to in the manual as a ‘focus’), and finally each focus is defined according 
to one or more KPIs. In the category of policymaker there are a total of 13 measurement 
aspects, 37 focuses and 43 KPIs. For the policy implementer, the 8 measurement aspects of 
general administration are translated into 17 focuses and 21 KPIs. Meanwhile, the minimum 
service standard comprises obligatory functions (26 functions with 79 KPIs) and optional 
functions (8 functions with 15 KPIs). Overall, there are 158 KPIs in the EKPPD system (a full 
list of KPIs can be found in Appendix IV).  
Firstly, the question of ‘what to measure’ can be connected to the structure of Indonesian local 
government. Each district/municipality in Indonesia has elected leaders (usually two people) 
and an elected representative assembly (the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or local 
parliament). The elected leaders for each district are termed district head and vice district head; 
in the municipality these are mayor and vice mayor. District and municipality are equivalent 
but represent different characteristics of local government in Indonesia. The district 
(kabupaten) represents the rural areas and the municipality (kota) represents the urban areas. 
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Local government then has so-called ‘Satuan Perangkat Kerja Daerah’ (SKPD)66 or working 
units. The number of working units within each district/municipality depends on the needs and 
size of the district/municipality. The district (or municipality) secretariat is responsible for 
assisting the district head (or mayor) in formulating and coordinating the working units, and is 
chaired by the general secretary. This secretariat consists of several departments (e.g. 
departments in charge of governance, law, policy formulation and organisational arrangements, 
and others).  
The elected leaders and the local parliament are categorised as local policymakers, and thus 
become the first measurement target of the EKPPD system. Meanwhile, working units are 
responsible for implementing the policies made by the elected leaders and local parliaments, 
and thus become the second measurement target of the EKPPD system. Thus, the link between 
the EKPPD structure and the local government structure can be illustrated as follows:  
  
                                                 
66 There are different types of SKPD (1) ‘dinas’ or agencies (e.g. education agency and health agency) (2) ‘badan’ 
or bodies (e.g. local planning and development body) (3) ‘kantor’ or offices (e.g. fire fighter office) (4) 
inspectorate (6) hospitals (7) ‘puskesamas’ or health centres and (8) ‘kecamatan’ or sub-districts  
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Figure 6.6 Linking the EKPPD and Local Government Structures 
Source: Developed by author, based on observations 
In terms of obligatory functions, the local government secretariat runs one of these, namely, 
the regional autonomy function. Similarly, sub-districts and the local parliament secretariat 
also operate the regional autonomy function. These three thus fall into the system category of 
policy implementers. As they run the same function, their performance report is presented in 
just one report. To sum up, the answer to the question of ‘what to measure’ can be taken as 
being local government-wide. Measurement covers both policymakers and policy 
implementers. This is different from the previous performance measurement initiative 
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As discussed in chapter 2, Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) differentiate between micro, meso 
and macro levels of performance (they term these distinction as ‘depth’ of performance). In 
relation to the depth of performance, there are two ways of looking at the EKPPD system. From 
the perspective of local government, it deals with performance at the macro level as 
measurement covers local government-wide. This design is different from LAKIP which is 
concerned with performance at the micro level (of a single organisation). From the perspective 
of the national government, however, the EKPPD measures the achievement of a specific 
policy field, namely decentralisation policy. Measuring performance of a specific policy field 
means measuring performance at the meso level.   
Secondly, the structure of the EKPPD system implies that the EKPPD is aimed at measuring 
the performance of Indonesian local government in terms of two things: governance and 
government services. The concern about the governance aspect of local government is reflected 
in the 13 measurement aspects adopted at policymaker level. Local governance is assessed 
through the existence of various regulations on, for example, building licences, spatial 
planning, sex workers, public cleanliness, and public participation. The government is also 
interested in assessing the content of the regulations across regions. For example, the EKPPD 
requires information about ‘the length of processing time to issue a citizenship card’ and ‘the 
costs of obtaining the card’, as stated in the local regulations. The purpose is to compare this 
information across regions, with the best being a benchmark for other regions.  
Local governance is also assessed through the extent to which local government complies with 
the laws and regulations set by national government. These include government regulations on 
a minimum service standard. 67  Under the EKPPD, districts/municipalities are required to 
                                                 
67 Up until now, the government has issued a minimum service standard for 13 sectors. These are housing, internal 
affairs, social care, health, women’s empowerment and child protection, environmental affairs, family planning, 
education, labour, public works, food resilience, culture and tourism, communication and information.  
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supply information to show whether or not they have complied with these regulations, and if 
so, to provide the list of services for which the minimum service standard has been 
implemented. Furthermore, local governance is also measured by the extent to which local 
government synchronises its programmes with the development priorities set by the national 
government, the effectiveness of the decision-making process undertaken by local 
policymakers, the utilisation of local budgets, and innovations in local governance.    
Measurement at the level of local policy implementer deals with the measurement of services 
provided by local government such as education, health, environmental affairs and public 
works. The EKPPD system includes the measurement of the whole range of government 
functions which have been delegated to local government. As Jones and Pendlebury (2010) 
have argued, supported by Radin (2000) (see discussion on point 2.4.3) about narrowness of 
output measures, the more specific the focus, the more useful the measurement. Applying 
measurements to ‘complex, multiservice governments’ (p28) it will be more difficult and will 
not be comparable. From this perspective, the nature of the environment of the EKPPD system 
is characterised as complex and multiservice governments. Therefore, it is interesting to find 
out how the system is implemented. Detailed discussion about the implementation phase is 
provided in the next chapter. 
6.3.2    Measurement techniques 
The first element of measurement technique relates to performance indicators (or measures). 
These reflect how performance is conceptualised in the EKPPD system. The 158 KPIs68 
involved in EKPPD mainly represent output indicators. For example, the two indicators 
relating to civil registration are i) the length of processing time, and ii) the costs of obtaining 
                                                 
68 Based on the latest EKPPD manual issued through the Minister of Home Affairs Circulation Letter No. 
120/313/OTDA, 24th January 2011. The first set of indicators, however, consisted of 178 KPIs.  
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the citizenship card, as stated in the local regulations. The expected outcome is that all local 
residents will be properly registered, indicated by, for example, all residents holding a 
citizenship (ID) card. However, although the local regulation provides information about the 
processing time and the costs of an ID card, it does not show what proportion of residents holds 
an ID card. Having a clear statement in the local regulation regarding the processing time and 
the costs involved may encourage residents to get an ID card but is not a guarantee that every 
resident will eventually have an ID card.  The two indicators thus fall into the category of ‘low 
level outputs’.  
To give another example, the timeliness of report submission (by local to national government) 
has been adopted to indicate the effectiveness of the relationship between the two (the second 
measurement aspect of policymaker). The indicators are very crude as they do not take into 
account any technical problems that might be encountered by the local government, which 
could then prevent them from submitting reports on time (more detailed discussion about this 
point is provided in the next chapter). At the same time, a delay in report submission does not 
necessary reflect an ineffective relationship between local and national governments.  
Measurement at the level of policy implementer, especially for the eight aspects of general 
administration, faces a problem similar to measurement at policymaker level, namely, the 
reliance on a low level of outputs. For example, with regard to the completeness of planning 
documents (availability of planning documents), physical documents can be examined but the 
indicator cannot show whether in practice they are used or consulted by policy implementers. 
This is thus categorised as a low level output. Some types of measure are not under the control 
of policy implementers, such as their budget allocation, which is controlled by local 
policymakers. 
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In terms of the minimum service standard, most indicators are in the form of a ratio, some 
indicators require dichotomous answers such as exist/does not exist, Yes/No, few indicators 
are in the form of per thousand population: the number of youth sports/social centres per 1,000 
population (that is, covering youth and sport functions) and the average availability of staple 
foods per year in kilogrammes per 1,000 population (that is, covering the food resilience 
function). One indicator requires districts/municipalities to list their sport facilities. Other 
indicators are expressed in terms of frequency such as number of exhibitions in a year 
(communication and information function). Table 6.1 summarises type of measures adopted in 
the EKPPD system and number of KPIs within each category. 
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Measurement 
Level 
Type of measure Examples Number 
of KPIs 
Policymakers - Existence of 
regulations/standard operating 
procedures (SOPs), and systems 
Existence of regulation on building permit 10 
- Timeliness of reports submission Timeliness of the ‘LPPD’ report submission 3 
- Ratios  21 
1. Percentage (19) Percentage of local ordinances approved by local 
parliament to the number of ordinances proposed 
 
2. Per ten thousands of 
population (1) 
Number of social police per 10,000 population  
3. x/y (1) Ratio of civil servant compared to total population  
- ‘H’ question  8 
a. How long (1) Processing time of obtaining an ID card  
b. How much (1) The cost of obtaining an ID card  
c. How many (6) Number of Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) owned  
 
- Type of audit opinion on 
financial report 
 1 
Total KPIs  43 
Policy 
Implementer 
   
General 
administrative  
a. Existence of SOPs, systems and 
positions 
The existence of non-management position (e.g. 
teachers at education agency or doctors at health 
agency or auditors at local inspectorate) 
5 
b. Ratios  14 
1. Percentage (13) Percentage of officials meeting requirements of 
their respective grade 
 
2. x/y (1) Ratio of civil servants at a specific working unit 
compared to total civil servants at the respective 
municipality 
 
c. ‘H’ question (how many) Number of public participation facilities and type 
of facilities 
2 
Total KPIs  21 
Minimum 
Service 
Standard 
a. Existence of regulations and 
documents 
Existence of strategic planning document 8 
b. Ratios  76 
1. Percentage (67) Percentage of households having access to clean 
water 
 
2. Per thousands of 
population (5) 
Number of citizens owned birth certificate per 
1,000 population 
 
3. x/y (4) Number of vehicles compared to number of 
passengers 
 
c. ‘H’ questions  9 
a. How much (1) Net export value  
b. How many (6) Number of art and cultural exhibition facilities  
c. How often or frequency 
(2)  
Number of trade exhibition per year  
d. Yes/No Implementation of ID card using Family Unique 
Number  
1 
Total KPIs  94 
Total KPIs of Policymaker and Policy Implementer  158 
Table 6.1 Type of Measures Adopted in the EKPPD System 
Source: Developed by author, based on analysis of KPIs adopted in the EKPPD system 
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Information contained in Table 6.1 above can be summarised as presented in Table below.  
No. Type of measures Number of KPIs 
1. Availability of regulations/standard operating procedures 
(SOPs),  systems, positions and documents 
23 
2. Timeliness of reports submission 3 
3. Ratios 111 
4. ‘H’ questions 9 
5. Type of audit opinion 1 
6. Yes/No 1 
Total KPIs 158 
Table 6.2 Summary of Type of Measures Adopted in the EKPPD System 
Source: developed by author, based on analysis of KPIs of the EKPPD 
Measurement at policy implementer level is function-based not organisational structure-based. 
This is the second difference between the EKPPD and LAKIP systems. LAKIP performance 
indicators represent the performance of a working unit. However, performance indicators in 
the EKPPD system are associated with function performance. The EKPPD is a performance 
measurement system which relies on self-assessment using mainly local government internal 
data, some of which is external data, especially that produced by the Statistics Office.  
The EKPPD has adopted a composite measure or the use of single measure to judge the overall 
performance of a district/municipality. The use of a composite measure seems to follow the 
current trend in performance measurement, as discussed in Chapter 2. The composite index is 
formed by two components: the performance achievement index and the relevant materials 
index. The performance achievement index consists of performance achievement at 
policymaker and policy implementer levels, as described earlier. The relevant materials index 
refers to the extent to which a district/municipality follows the structure and format of reporting 
as defined by the government regulation on reporting (Government Regulation No. 3/2007).69  
                                                 
69 The report is known as ‘Laporan Penyelenggaraan Pemerintah Daerah’ (LPPD). As mentioned earlier, this 
report later on was decided to be the basis for evaluation of local government performance using the EKPPD 
system. 
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More information regarding this reporting regulation is presented in Chapter 7. The weight 
attached to the components involved in the composite index is shown in Figure 6.7 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7 The Weighting Rules of the EKPPD System 
Source: Minister of Home Affairs Circulation Letter No. 120.04/2289/OTDA, 27 August 2009 
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The differences between the latest version of the weighting rules and the previous version 
(based on the MoHA circulation letter no. 120.04/2393/OTDA, 5 November 2008) relate to the 
distribution of weight between performance achievement and the relevant materials index. The 
previous version allocated higher weight to the relevant material index (20%) than the latest 
version (5%). Moreover, in the previous rules the 13 measurement policymaker aspects were 
allocated equal weight (0.077 each), whereas the most recent version one distributes the weight 
unequally among the 13 aspects, as displayed in Figure 6.6. Finally, the 2008 version did not 
specify individual weight for the nine priority functions which come under the obligatory 
functions. 
Each KPI is assigned a score, ranging from 0 (zero) as the lowest and 4 (four) as the maximum 
score. The EKPPD manual explains the scoring rules as follows: firstly, if 
districts/municipalities do not supply the data for a particular KPI, it is automatically assigned 
a score of zero. Thus, if a KPI provides the option of two of answers (for example, ‘Yes/No’ 
or ‘Available/Not available’) the rule is to assign the maximum score of 4 if the answer is 
positive and 1 if the answer is negative. For KPIs where a ‘negative’ answer indicates good 
performance while a ‘positive’ answer means bad performance, these rules are reversed. For 
one specific measure (the ‘Supreme Audit Office’s opinion on the financial reports’), the best 
audit opinion, ‘Unqualified Opinion’, is scored as 4, ‘Qualified Opinion’ as 3, ‘Adverse’ as 2 
and ‘Disclaimer’ as 1. Finally, for KPIs which are expressed as a percentage, there are five 
steps to scoring: 
(1) Combine performance achievement within a province; 
(2) Determine maximum and minimum values; 
(3) Normalise the data; 
(4) Obtain average data, and  
(5) Classify achievements into 4, 3, 2, or 1. 
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If a local government obtains ≥ 1.25 times the average value of data normalisation, it is given 
the maximum score of 4 for that particular KPI. If the score is between the average value of 
data normalisation up to 1.25 times of the normalisation value, then the respective KPI is scored 
as 3. A KPI is scored as 2 when a local government achieves ≥ 0.75 of the average 
normalisation value to the average value of normalisation, and 1 if a local government achieves 
≤ 0.75 of the normalisation value.  
After generating a composite index of each individual district/municipality, the government 
determines its status and ranking. The status is classified into four: very high, high, medium 
and low performers. Table 6.3 shows the range of scores for each performance category.  
Ranges of Score Performance Category 
3.01 – 4.00 Very high 
2.01 – 3.00 High 
1.01 – 2.00 Medium 
0.00 – 1.00 Low 
Table 6.3 Performance Score and Category 
Source: Minister of Home Affairs circulation letter no. 120.04/2289/OTDA, 27 August 2009 
As well as determining the status of every district/municipality and province, the government 
also announces the: 
(1) 10 best performers by districts and municipality; 
(2) 10 worse performers by districts and municipality; 
(3) 3 best performers by province, and 
(4) 3 worse performers by province. 
The nine districts/municipalities observed in this study differ in terms of social, economic and 
cultural aspects. Studies in developed economies show that different circumstances facing a 
specific local authority can significantly influence its performance score based on composite 
measures as applied in the EKPPD system (see discussion in point 2.4.3). This finding is 
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consistent with the previous report (see Taraschewski and Wegener, 2011) which suggest that 
some districts/municipalities request that the measurement should take into account the specific 
characteristics of their regions.  
The fact that the EKPPD is not equipped with procedures to adjust performance according to 
the unique circumstances of the respective regions (and in view of the fact that regions in 
Indonesia are very diverse) could be seen as the EPPKD’s most serious weakness. This 
weakness was acknowledged in interviews with the key informants. INF3/NG for instance 
stated that: 
We realised that the design of the EKPPD indicator does not recognise the 
different characteristics of regions in Indonesia…, especially in terms of 
geography. For regions relying on the water transportation for example, 
we should not ask ‘miles of roads in a good condition,’ we should ask 
instead how many boats in a good condition for example (Interview with 
INF3/NG on 13 December 2011) 
INF3/NG’s statement was supported by INF5/NG: ‘The system was designed as very generic. 
It does not recognises the specificity of regions such as Papua and Aceh that have a different 
kind of autonomy.’  
A similar issue was highlighted by two respondents to the survey questionnaire administered 
with 31 local governments.  
The EKPPD should continue to search for a better formulation so that the 
final results of the evaluation could represent real conditions at regions. 
(ss2.d) 
The key performance indicators should be re-considered and there should 
be a technique adopted to classify districts and municipalities in 
Indonesia; therefore key performance indicators for each local 
government are not necessarily the same. (ws3.m)  
Both comments suggest the need to recognise the uniqueness of regions. 
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In terms of the benchmarking used to judge the performance of a district/municipality, a 
floating average performance value has been adopted, rather than setting explicit performance 
targets for a given year, as explained by INF3/NG. INF3/NG said that the use of a floating 
average target could avoid the possibility of dysfunctional effects, such as the ratchet effect as 
experienced with LAKIP. This chapter does not cover a detailed discussion of performance 
targets as according to Van Helden and Reichard (2013) setting performance targets is one of 
main components of performance management. On the other hand, this study focuses on 
performance measurement. Table 6.4 below summarises the features or characteristics of the 
EKPPD as the new performance measurement system applied in Indonesia. Meanwhile Table 
6.5 presents a comparison between features of the EKPPD system and another performance 
measurement system (LAKIP) applied much earlier than the EKPPD.  
No. Element of System 
Design 
Characteristics 
1. Measurement targets 
(what to measure) 
 The EKPPD measure performance of local government at the level 
of policy makers and policy implementers. 
 In term of ‘depth’ performance of Bouckaert and Halligan (2008), 
the EKPPD deals with performance at the meso level (from a 
government perspective) as it measures the performance of a 
specific policy field, namely decentralisation policy. Then, the 
EKPPD is categorised as a performance measurement system at 
macro level (from a local government perspective) as it concerns 
the performance of local government as a whole (the local 
government-wide). 
 The EKPPD focuses of measurement into two: governance aspect 
and local government’s services. 
 The EKPPD is applied in complex and multiservice governments   
2. Measurement techniques 
(how to measure) 
 Performance is conceptualised primarily in terms of outputs  
 The use of composite measures  
 The EKPPD Index is formed by two major components: 
performance achievement (95%) and consistency of reporting 
format and structure with the regulation requirement (5%) 
 The EKPPD Index  ranges from 0-4 
 The measurement system adopts self-assessment and desk-based 
performance evaluation  
 Performance evaluation can include common sense and field visits 
 No procedures are applied to account for exogenous factors 
Table 6.4 Summary of Characteristics of the EKPPD System Design 
Source: Developed by author, based on findings 
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No. Aspects The EKPPD System  LAKIP System  
1. Approach  Top-down, standardised KPIs 
developed by the national 
government  
Top down approach but indicators 
are developed by local governments 
themselves, derived from the local 
strategic planning. 
2. Depth performance  Macro and meso Micro 
3. Basis  Functions-based performance 
measurement  
Departmental-based performance 
measurement  
4. Focus Governance aspect and services 
provided by local government 
The consistency between strategic 
plan, budget and indicators  
5. Source of data Internal and external Internal  
6. Linkage to planning and 
budget cycle 
No linkage  There will be a linkage (if the system 
is designed properly) 
7. Application of composite 
measure 
Yes No 
8. Application of ranking 
system, reward and 
punishment 
Yes Previously not, but adopted similar 
system since the implementation of 
the EKPPD system. 
9. Eligibility  Applicable only to local 
government 
Applicable to all kind of 
government institutions  
10. Reported to MoHA MoABR 
11. Introduced through Government Regulation No. 6/2008 Presidential Instruction No. 7/1999 
Table 6.5 Comparison the EKPPD and LAKIP Systems 
Source: developed by author, based on findings 
This discussion addresses the second research question of this study related to the system 
design the EKPPD follows; the findings contribute to improving our understanding in terms of 
what type of performance measurement is operating in the context of developing economies.  
6.4    Contingencies 
The EKPPD structure presented in Figure 6.5 is clearly different from the measurement 
framework developed by the World Bank, as shown in Figure 6.3 above. As indicated by one 
of key informants and mentioned earlier, the framework for new performance measurement 
initiative should be developed by referring to the ultimate objectives of decentralisation policy 
itself. This view is consistent with the performance management framework proposed by Van 
Helden and Reichard (2013) and Buschor (2013) which suggests that organisational objectives 
and strategies should inform the design of performance management systems. According to 
Buschor, in most countries the strategy usually refers to ‘legal mission’ (2013, p. 4). Then, 
 221 
 
linking back to the evaluation framework of HM Treasury (1988) presented in Figure 2.4, the 
measurement framework of decentralisation policy in Indonesia according to INF2/NG, should 
be (see Figure 6.8): 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Framework for Measuring Results of Decentralisation Policy 
Source: Based on interview with the chair of the new performance measurement initiative design team on 23rd 
December 2011). 
The objectives of decentralisation in Indonesia however, especially during the radical 
decentralisation period, were not clearly articulated (as discussed in Chapter 5). Nevertheless, 
after the redefinition of Indonesian decentralisation in 2004, Law 32/2004 states that its 
objective is to improve the quality of life or wellbeing of local people through improvement of 
(1) levels of welfare or prosperity, (2) public service delivery, and (3) local competitiveness 
(Law 32, 2004). Therefore, this should be used as the reference of the measurement framework 
which is consistent with Buschor’s (2013) argument mentioned earlier. Besides improving the 
wellbeing of local people, the two key informants (INF2/NG and INF6/NG) also mentioned 
improved democratisation at the local level as the second objective of decentralisation policy 
in Indonesia. Thus, Figure 6.8 can be adjusted to give Figure 6.9 below. 
 
 
  
Figure 6.9 Measuring the Results of Decentralisation Policy in Indonesia 
Source: Developed by author, informed by Law 32 and 33, 2004 and interviews with INF2/MOHA and 
INF6/MOHA 
The structure of the EKPPD system, however, is also not the same with the measurement 
concept illustrated above. Thus, a question emerged regarding whence the framework of the 
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EKPPD was derived. Instead, the measurement framework illustrated in Figure 6.8 shows 
consistency with the second measurement system (EKPOD) (see Figure 6.10).  
Although the EKPOD structure does not include measurement of democratisation (the second 
objective of decentralisation), the first objective (improved quality of life) is much more 
important, as INF2/NG and INF6/NG emphasised. INF6/NG for instance stated: 
Decentralisation was aimed to improve quality of life and democratisation 
at local level. The first objective, however, is more important than the 
second one. There is no guarantee that being a democratic country means 
that we will be able to provide better quality of life for our people. In 
comparison to our neighbours [Malaysia, Singapore and Brunai 
Darussalam], Indonesia is much advanced in terms of democracy but look 
at them, in terms of quality of life, they are much better than us. 
                
Figure 6.10 The EKPOD Structure 
Source: Informed by Government of Regulation No. 6/2008 
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The government regulation on the new performance measurement initiative issued on the 4th 
February 2008 includes the EKPOD indicators in its annex but not the EKPPD indicators. Thus, 
another question is raised in terms of the reason why two separate measurement systems have 
evolved – the EKPPD (an annual measurement system) and the EKPOD (conditional on the 
EKPPD). ‘What is the significance of having the EKPPD system as well as the EKPOD 
system?’ Even one measurement system requires huge investment, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Having two measurement systems simultaneously to measure the same thing (results of 
decentralisation policy) would increase costs, consume more time and complicate procedures.  
6.4.1    Political considerations 
As mentioned earlier, the new performance measurement initiative was driven by the needs for 
a technical instrument to merge/abolish regions performing poorly in terms of implementing 
decentralisation policy. Although mandated by law, the merger/abolishment of an autonomous 
region will be not an easy task as it entails political consequences. This was reflected in a 
statement of INF5/NG: ‘…[the] merger or abolishment of an autonomous region is not an easy 
to deal with. It may trigger a civil war in the region…’ This statement is understandable, given 
the background of decentralisation in Indonesia. As Devas and Delay (2006) stated and as 
mentioned in chapter 5, the driving force behind decentralisation in Indonesia was the will to 
anticipate potential or actual regional conflicts. If regions had to fight to gain autonomy, then 
they definitely will fight too if autonomy is taken back from them.  Therefore, there should be 
sufficient procedures and justifications prior to a decision to merge or abolish low performing 
regions.  
The low performing regions also should be given enough opportunity to plan actions on how 
to improve their performance. At the same time, the national government also should provide 
assistance or capacity building programmes. This explains why merger or abolishment does 
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not takes place immediately after an evaluation. The reason for why the measurement system 
was eventually split into two systems is, however, still not clear yet. According to INF2/NG:  
The initial idea of measuring local government performance in achieving 
the objectives of decentralisation was simple, not complicated. There was 
no such thing of splitting measurement process into annual and 
conditional systems [EKPPD and EKPOD].  
The statement above implies that initially there was only one measurement system, namely 
EKPOD. The rule that the EKPPD should take place before the EKPOD must have come at the 
very latter stage, before the draft of the regulation on the new performance measurement 
initiative was finalised. This interpretation is supported by the explanation provided by INF 
2/NG about his rotation to another position, which took place before the regulation on the new 
performance measurement initiative was finalised. Up to that point, he was certain that there 
was no talk about splitting measurement into annual and conditional. The EKPPD system itself 
was designed after the issuance of a government regulation on the new performance 
measurement initiative. As mentioned previously, the regulation was signed on the 4th February 
2008 and it does not yet contain the indicators for the EKPPD. The development of the EKPPD 
indicators was started on the 19th February 2008 when MoHA first sent a letter to the sector 
ministries requesting them to supply indicators of the EKPPD. Further details about 
development of the EKPPD indicators is provided in point 6.4.3. The influence of the direct 
election system for choosing districts heads/mayors seems to explain why eventually the 
measurement system was split into two (see discussion in the next point).       
6.4.2    Influence of direct election system  
As explained in the interview with INF5/NL, the EKPOD adopts mainly outcome-based 
indicators such as a human development index and as he noted, a ‘human development index 
is not something that we can developed overnight.’ It may take years to improve human 
development index performance, while under the system of direct election, elected leaders have 
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only five years to complete their programmes. There is a problem of performance attribution 
to elected leaders (see illustration below). 
 
                                
                                
                                
                                
 
Figure 6.11 District Head/Mayor’s Term of Office and Performance Reporting 
Source: developed by the author based on interview with INF5/MOHA 
Assuming municipality X performed poorly for three consecutive years (2008-2010), this poor 
performance might be partly associated with performance of Mayor B and partly with 
performance of Mayor A or even with the performance of the previous mayors, prior to when 
Mayor A took the office. If the three consecutive year period ended in 2013, the poor 
performance might represent the weak programmes and leadership of Mayor B. However, the 
influence of the previous mayor’s performance could still not be ignored. This argument is 
supported by Jones and Pendlebury (2010) below: 
The government services provided today are inseparable from those 
provided in the past, given that security, health and education are of the 
most fundamental cultural kind, from the long distant past. These services 
provided by government organizations, again, because each is only 
contributing to the overall well-being of the population, are also 
inseparable from each other, and from the for-profit… (p.19). 
If the three year period ends in 2014, which is the first year of the new Mayor’s (Mayor C) 
term of office, it means that Mayor C will be punished for the poor performance of the previous 
mayors.  
Besides technical considerations, there were also political considerations in this context, as 
INF5/NL explained. Political considerations relate to who should be rewarded for good 
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performance or punished for bad performance, as the EKPPD system applies reward and 
punishment. Thus, consideration as to which elected leader should be rewarded for a good 
performance and which should be punished for bad performance was the reason for why it was 
eventually decided that measurement should use indicators that can be easily attributed to work 
programmes or activities undertaken during the term of office of a specific elected leader.  
Thus, political considerations, the difficulty of attributing performance to specific elected 
leaders, which is connected to the system of directly electing the head of districts/mayors, 
explain why two measurement systems have evolved and why the EKPPD (annual evaluation) 
adopts mainly outputs indicators, and why the EKPOD (conditional evaluation) adopts 
outcomes indicators.  
Thus, the case of the EKPPD demonstrated causality issues which has been discussed in chapter 
2. The case of the EKPPD system provided new evidence related to the difficulty in establishing 
a causal relationship in the context of a direct election system applied to the head of 
districts/mayors. The causality problem eventually caused the approach to measurement to be 
divided into two systems: the first measurement system relies on output indicators whereas the 
other uses mainly outcome indicators70.  
The study of Mimba et al. (2013) suggests that managers of working units see elected leaders 
as the most powerful stakeholders in local government; as a result, they design performance 
indicators to accommodate the elected leaders’ interests. The finding of Mimba et al. (2013) 
points to the influence of elected leaders on the design of performance measures. The findings 
of the current study expand that of Mimba et al. (2013), indicating that in the context of the 
                                                 
70  Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) provides empirical evidence for the difficulties associated with developing 
measures due to the nature of most of government programmes (see discussion in point 2.4.1). 
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EKPPD, despite performance indicators having been designed by the national government, the 
interests of elected leaders still exert an influence.  
The reason why two separate measurement systems have evolved – the EKPPD (an annual 
measurement system) and the EKPOD (conditional on the EKPPD) – is now clear. As 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, the third measurement system (EDOB) is beyond the 
scope of this study; however, it is relevant to provide a brief explanation in terms of how the 
new performance measurement initiative (EPPD) finally includes EDOB. An ADB Report 
released in 2008 reveals how the third measurement system was finally integrated into EPPD.  
The report describes how initially the Directorate General of Regional Autonomy at MoHA 
prepared a separate draft of the regulation to evaluate the newly-established regions (EDOB). 
At the same time, the Division of Capacity Building and Evaluation 71  drafted the EPPD 
regulation. It was considered to be cumbersome as these two regulations each stood on their 
own; thus, during the harmonisation, they were merged. The harmonisation process was 
supported by funding from ADB (ADB TA 4682-INO). ADB also provided funding for the 
first year of EPPD implementation (BPKP, 2011).  This was the reason why the EPPD 
eventually turned into a package of measurement systems consisting of three sub-measurement 
systems (see Figure 6.12).  
                                                 
71 A division under the Directorate of Regional Autonomy, MoHA 
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Figure 6.12 The EPPD and Its Components 
Source: Developed by author, informed by Indonesian Government Regulation NO. 6/2008 
 
6.4.3    Stakeholders’ support and budget 
In terms of indicator development for the EKPPD system, INF3/NG described how the process 
began with the MoHA sending a letter to the sector ministries (letter no. 120/408/SJ on 19 
February 2008) asking them to supply performance indicators for their sector. This step met 
with a lack of response. There were several attempts to establish contact by letter; however, 
only seven sector ministries responded and supplied performance indicators for their sectors 
(education, health, environment, forestry, labour, public works, and housing) (Minister of 
Home Affairs circulation letter no. 120/1875/OTDA, 5 September 2008). INF5/NG confirmed 
the lack of response from other sector ministries in terms of supplying indicators, adding that 
the many meetings set up by MoHA to discuss indicator development were rarely attended by 
other sector ministries. INF5/NG emphasised that the lack of response from other sector 
ministries was the reason for the slow process of indicator development.   
According to INF5/NG, the reluctance of the ministries to attend these meetings related to a 
lack of clarity concerning who was to pay for sector ministry representatives to participate. 
EPPD
EDOB 
(specific 
evaluation)
EKPOD 
(conditional 
evaluation)
EKPPD            
(annual 
evaluation)
 229 
 
Should they be paid by MoHA or their respective ministries? At the same time, as INF5/NG 
explained, this unclear budget allocation sometimes caused other sector ministries to send only 
those staff to attend the meetings who were not in a position to make decisions on behalf of 
their ministries regarding which indicators should be supplied by their sector. Then, INF3/NG 
explained that the very low response from sector ministries had led to the creation of a small 
dedicated team, with the defined task of formulating performance indicators covering all 
sectors.  
After the indicators had been developed, sector ministries were invited to comment. As 
INF3/NG noted, there were many complaints from sector ministry representatives during the 
discussion forum, who argued that the indicators were inadequate to reflect the overall 
performance of local government, particularly for some sectors. The team improved the 
indicators by incorporating suggestions from sector ministries and a set of indicators was 
signed on 5 September 2008. This set of indicators was introduced to representatives from local 
and regional governments through a one-week workshop arranged by MoHA on 15-19 
September 2008. As a result of this workshop, the set of indicators was revised and signed off 
on 9 October 2008. The October 2008 version containing 173 KPIs was the set of indicators 
that was finally disseminated and used to evaluate local government performance for the first 
time (evaluation on performance report of 2007).   
The description above demonstrates lack of stakeholder support (i.e. from sector ministries) on 
the design phase of the EKPPD. The key informant connected the lack of sector ministry 
support to the unclear budget of the EKPPD system. This finding confirms the literature that 
suggests the importance of budget support for designing performance measurement system as 
discussed in chapter 2. Besides the effect of the unclear budget, the lack of stakeholder support 
can be connected to the conflict of interest between the sector ministries and MoHA. As 
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discussed earlier, one of the intended uses of the EKPPD is to exert control over local 
government. If the EKPPD is successful, it will bring local government in Indonesia under the 
control of MoHA. I argue that sector ministries do not want this to happen as they have an 
interest in maintaining their influence over local government. This argument is supported by 
insights from the interviews with INF3/NG, INF6/NG and INF7/NG.  
The conflict of interest between MoABR and MoHA to maintain influence over local 
government, for instance, is reflected in the lack of participation in the process of the EKPPD 
implementation that will be discussed further in the next chapter.  MoABR is one of ministry 
that is mandated by the regulation as one of members of the national evaluation team under the 
EKPPD system. Moreover, under the LAKIP system initiated by MoABR, the indicators are 
supposed to be developed by local government themselves (see characteristics of the LAKIP 
system in Table 6.5). However, as reported by INF2/A/mx, since the implementation of the 
EKPPD system, MoABR has also introduced so-called ‘main performance indicators’ that 
adopt similar idea to those of the KPIs in the EKPPD system. Moreover, the LAKIP system 
also did not originally apply a ranking system, but a ranking system is now also being applied 
to LAKIP. The nuance of the competition between the two ministries was also highlighted in 
the interview with INF3/NG: 
We have included the Ministry of Apparatus and Bureaucratic Reform 
(MoABR) as member of the national evaluation team in the new 
performance measurement initiative. By placing the minister as the vice 
chair of the team, we expected to gain a full support from MoABR. In fact, 
they are just still busy with their own interest. 
INF3/NG implies ‘their own interests’ in the quote above to ‘LAKIP’ system.   
6.4.4    Metric difficulties  
A part from the conflict of interest among the sector ministries and MoHA that caused the 
irresponsiveness to the request to supply the indicators to be adopted for the EKPPD system as 
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requested by MoHA, I believed that the low response rate was also connected to metric 
difficulties. As Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004) have argued, and as discussed in chapter 2, the 
metric difficulties relate to the nature of the government programmes. Sector ministries must 
have experienced difficulties in formulating the appropriate indicators relevant for their sectors. 
This argument is supported by the information provided by INF7/NG who was in charge of 
coordinating the formulation of the indicators for minimum service standards. INF7/NG 
reported that sector ministries struggled to define the indicators. He once led a meeting at the 
regional autonomy watch commission that was attended by representatives of the sector 
ministries and experts from academia. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the indicators 
to be adopted as minimum service standards for each of the sector ministries.  According to 
INF7/NG, sector ministry representatives said that they did not know what indicators to 
develop.  
As mentioned earlier, education and health were among the ministries that responded to 
MoHA’s request to supply performance indicators.  Similarly, only eight sector ministries 
eventually managed to supply indicators relevant for their sector for inclusion in the EKPPD 
system. These eight ministries represented the ones that had developed minimum service 
standards indicators in their sectors by the time the first manual of the EKPPD system was 
signed on 5 September 2008. Furthermore, as described earlier, complaints were raised 
regarding indicators that insufficiently capture the performance of local government for certain 
sectors. According to INF2/NG, who led the small team devoted to formulating indicators for 
the EKPPD covering all sectors, they faced a trade-off requiring a balance to be maintained 
between the need to create many indicators to ensure that overall local government 
performance is captured in the EKPPD system and the capacity of local government to report 
them. That was why the focus was firstly to formulate indicators related to obligatory functions.  
As discussed in point 2.2.2, Jones and Pendlebury (2010) term this challenge as a 
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‘comprehensiveness versus concision in reporting’. The difficulties in formulating indicators 
also explain of why the opportunity to develop indicators for optional functions was given to 
local government.    
6.4.5    Influence of drivers on system design  
Influence of intended use for recentralisation 
The system design of the EKPPD is clearly influenced by its intended uses. The government’s 
intention to re-impose control over local government, for example, manifested itself in the 
definition of measurement targets into policymaker and policy implementer. Ideally, with the 
right to self-management under decentralisation, local policymakers are free to define local 
policies. By evaluating the content of the regulations made by local policymakers, the meaning 
of ‘autonomy’ itself is undermined. Under autonomy rights, assessing the performance of 
policy implementers is ideally the responsibility of the local policymakers. That is why one of 
the intended uses of the EKPPD is a technical instrument for re-exerting control over local 
government. Moreover, the intention to recentralise power is also reflected in the use of a top-
down approach and standardised performance indicators. This approach is inconsistent with 
the nature of the regions in Indonesia, which are very diverse. More clearly, the standardised 
set of performance indicators neglect the diversity and uniqueness, which should be afforded 
equal importance in the context of decentralisation. The adoption of a top-down approach and 
standardised performance indicators are thus evidence of the EKPPD system being an 
instrument for recentralisation.  
As an illustration of regional diversity in Indonesia, Rhodes et al. (2012) state that Indonesia 
has  ethnicities and cultural groups  as diverse as countries in Europe. There are approximately 
300 ethnicities and 250 languages in Indonesia.  
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Influence of the World Bank’s measurement framework  
Although the final design of the new performance measurement initiative in Indonesia does not 
really follow the LGPM framework, its influence on the design of the new measurement 
systems cannot be totally ignored. Some of the proposed LGPM indicators were eventually 
adopted as EKPPD or EKPOD indicators. My analysis of the LGPM indicators shows that that 
52 per cent of the proposed service delivery indicators covered by the LGPM were converted 
into minimum service standards for public service delivery under the EKPPD, either with no 
adjustment or some minor adjustments (17 out of 33 indicators). The influence of the LGPM 
in terms of the investment climate on the EKPPD design is reflected in KPI 43 of policymakers 
(local competitiveness) and KPI 41 of minimum service standard (capital investment).  
The EKPPD measures the number of investments approved in a year, then local governments 
also have to supply investment approval documentation as evidence during the evaluation 
process. This documentation provides information detailing to whom local governments 
granted investment approval and the value of the investment. From this information, the 
government can ensure that there is no overlapping approval issued, as many such cases 
happened in the past. This aims to anticipate the problem of local governments issuing overlaps 
business permits. For example, as commonly happened in the first wave of decentralisation (as 
discussed in chapter 5), local governments issued permits to more than one company to explore 
the same area as very often happened in the mining industry. By measuring this, it is clear that 
the government wanted to create a conducive investment climate in the regions. Then, the 
government can also monitor increases or decreases in the value of the capital investment 
flowing into a particular local government (KPI 41 of minimum service standard). 
Under the EKPOD, investment climate indicators were compressed into five indicators, which 
encompass approximately 35 per cent of investment climate indicators under the LGPM. Some 
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indicators and areas of focus for policymakers and policy implementers (specifically general 
aspects) under the EKPPD seem to have been informed by indicators from public financial 
management and fiscal performance under the LGPM (see Table 6.6). Moreover, the influence 
of the LGPM concept is not limited to the adoption of some its indicators by the EKPPD and 
the EKPOD, but also in terms of its scoring techniques and its application of a composite index.  
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 LGPM EKPPD 
Indica-
tor  
Description of measurement aspect/ 
indicator 
Adopted as  Notes 
1. Public Financial Management   
19 Local legislation on asset 
management exists 
Availability of assets registration and 
number of unused assets  
Reported per policy implementer, included in 
general aspect – local assets management 
23 Journals, ledgers, supporting 
ledgers and balance sheets all exist 
Availability of financial reports 
(balance sheets, notes on financial 
statements) 
Reported per policy implementer, included in 
general aspect – local assets management 
2. Fiscal Performance     
54 Share of local budget for 
infrastructures development   
Capital expenditure to total budget  Reported per policy implementer, included in 
general aspect – local financial management  
55 Share of local budget for 
infrastructure maintenance  
Maintenance expenditure to total 
budget 
Reported per policy implementer, included in 
general aspect – local financial management 
56 Combined budgeted expenditure on 
health and education  
Ratio Combined budgeted expenditure 
on health and education to total 
budget 
Policy maker level, aspect harmony between 
the national and local policies, focus finance 
3. Service Delivery     
60 Net enrolment rates for elementary                               
(children age 7-12 in primary 
school over of children age 7-12 
The 3rd KPI of minimum service 
standard in education 
Adopted as is 
61 Gross enrolment rates for secondary                                 
(children age 13-15 in junior 
secondary school over of children 
age 13-15) 
The 4th KPI of minimum service 
standard in education 
Adapted as net enrolment, instead of gross 
enrolment  
62 Literacy rate for 15 -24 year The 2nd KPI of minimum service 
standard in education 
Adapted by not mentioning the upper limit for 
the age 
63 Junior secondary completion rate 
for 16-18 year old                     (of 
children age 16-18 completing 
junior secondary school 
The 11st KPI of minimum service 
standard in education 
Adopted as is 
72 Childhood immunization coverage  
(proportion of children up to 12 
months old having completed all 
scheduled immunizations) 
17th KPI of minimum service standard 
for health function 
Adapted into villages coverage, instead of 
individual children  
73 Proportion of deliveries assisted by 
a trained professional 
16th KPI of minimum service standard 
for health function 
Adopted as is 
77 Minimum service standard  at the 
district level applied 
11st KPI of policy maker level, 2nd 
aspect of  measurement  
 
78 Share of health spending going to 
primary healthcare  
17th KPI of policy maker level, 3rd 
aspect of measurement  
Developed further  into share of spending for 
basic services, include nine services 
79 General spatial plan exists 3rd KPI of policy maker level, 1st 
measurement aspect 
Merged just into one indicator  
80 Detail spatial plan exists 
81 Green spatial plan exists 
82 Share of roads districts in good 
condition  
27th KPI of minimum service standard 
for public works function 
Adopted as is 
83a Ratio of green area to total 
district/city area 
31st KPI of minimum service standard 
for spatial plan 
Adapted into ratio between open green space 
area to the area allocated for buildings and 
other purposes 
83b Ratio of irrigated rice fields 28th KPI of minimum service standard 
for public works function 
Adapted into ratio of districts irrigations 
(width) in good condition to total width of 
irrigations in the districts 
84 Share of population with access to 
clean water                               
(Based on MDGs definition) 
36th KPI of minimum service standard 
for housing function 
Adapted into share of households with access 
to clean water 
85 Share of population with access to 
proper sanitation                      
(Based on MDGs definition) 
29th KPI of minimum service standard 
for public works function 
Adapted into share of households with access 
to proper sanitation 
4. Investment Climate Local competitiveness measured 
through number of investment 
approvals per year (policymakers)   
The wording of indicators is not the same with 
indicators of investment climate of the LGPM 
but both represent what is expected from the 
presence of good investment climate according 
to the LGPM framework. 
The 41st KPI of minimum service 
standard (capital investment) 
Table 6.6 Mapping Influence of LGPM Framework on the EKPPD System 
Source: Developed by author, based on analysis on the LGPM and EKPPD indicators 
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Influence of global commitment 
Furthermore, the implications of the MDGs for performance measurement in developing 
economies was discussed in Chapter 3. According to the UNDP Indonesia (2010), not all the 
MDG targets have been achieved in Indonesia yet:  
Indonesia has reached a critical period in the achievement of the 2015 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) targets. The country has made 
significant progress in meeting a number of targets in the areas of 
education, gender equity, malnutrition, and poverty reduction. There are 
concerns, however, over lack of progress on maternal health, child 
nutrition, and environment, including access to safe drinking 
water.(UNDP Indonesia, 2010, p. iii)  
The statement above mentioned ‘maternal health, child nutrition, environment and access to 
safe drinking water’ as the areas still lacking progress in terms of achieving the MDGs in 
Indonesia. The EKPPD covers these areas as part of the minimum service standards. This 
implies that some KPIs of the EKPPD were informed by the MDG indicators. Analysis of the 
158 KPIs adopted by EKPPD shows that the EKPPD system accommodates the second MDG 
goal as the minimum service standard for education, the third goal as the minimum service 
standard for women’s empowerment, the fourth, fifth and sixth goals as the minimum service 
standard for health, and the seventh goal as the minimum service standard for environmental 
and public works functions. The eighth goal is not relevant for local government and is thus 
not accommodated in the EKPPD system.  
The discussion in this section puts forward empirical evidence for the argument of Van Helden 
and Reichard (2013), as shown in a statement below: 
Depending not only on the objectives and strategies of an organization but 
also on different contingency factors, the design of a PSPM [public sector 
performance management]-system can have a quite different focus on the 
kind of performance elements to be identified, measured and reported… 
(p. 12). 
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Moreover, this study showed how political considerations significantly influenced the design 
phase of the performance measurement system to be applied in Indonesia. Political 
considerations not only influenced the choice of indicators to be adopted, it even caused the 
split of the measurement into two separate systems. Thus, this study addresses a gap in the 
literature as the investigation of how political considerations influence design phase of 
performance management systems was one of research agendas highlighted in the study of Van 
Helden and Reichard (2013).  
6.5    Conclusions 
Two major reasons explain the establishment of the new performance measurement initiative 
in Indonesia: recentralisation and influence of international donor agencies. Measurement as a 
technical instrument for recentralisation is supported by normative and rational arguments 
designed to justify the establishment of the new performance measurement initiative. Its 
intended use for recentralisation is manifested through the adoption of a top-down approach 
and standardised performance indicators to judge the performance of different regions. The 
influence of international donor agencies can be seen through: a) the notion of neoliberalism 
and b) the global commitments. More clearly, the new performance measurement initiative was 
intended to protect neoliberal policies in Indonesia and to help ensure the achievement of 
MDGs targets in Indonesia.  
The new Indonesian performance initiative indicates the importance of the roles played by the 
international donor agencies. The ECD concept has been applied and carried out by multiple 
international donor agencies including the World Bank, CIDA and ADB. The World Bank 
contributed to the creation of internal demand for performance measurement through initiating 
early discussion about the need to measure the results of decentralisation in 2005. CIDA 
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contributed to imparting performance measurement skills through sponsoring seminars, 
workshops, symposia, conferences and assigning local and foreign expertise during the design 
process of the new Indonesian performance initiative. ADB contributed to fitting the 
performance measurement structure and providing budget support during early 
implementation.  
In terms of design, EKPPD, as the first component of the new measurement system’s package 
to assess local government performance, is a performance measurement system which focuses 
on the governance aspect and services delivered by local government in Indonesia. The 
governance aspect of EKPPD, however, was not only limited to compliance with the values of 
democratic government, as mentioned in the study of Williams (2004), but also with the laws 
and regulations set by the national government. The measuring of governance by EKPPD is 
thus also for the purpose of recentralisation. 
The EKPPD system relies mainly on low level of outputs and does not include measurement 
of the costs to provide the local government services. From an accounting perspective, this is 
its main weakness. It produces a single performance index (a composite measure) for individual 
districts/municipalities and provinces in Indonesia. The composite measure is used to 
determine the status and ranking of individual districts/municipalities and provinces. In relation 
to the composite measure, the most obvious weakness of EKPPD is the absence of procedures 
to account for the unique circumstances of different regions, despite the fact that regions in 
Indonesia are highly diversified in terms of social, economy, geography and culture. Other 
features of EKPPD include the use of a self-assessment approach to obtain the performance 
data of districts/municipalities and provinces.    
In terms of contingencies influencing the design phase, the findings of this study show 
agreement with the literature with regard to metric difficulties, the importance of stakeholder 
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support and a sufficient budget to support the design process.  This study expands the literature 
through showing how political considerations can significantly influence the design of the 
measurement system and how the system of direct election for the district heads and mayors 
could magnify the causality problem. The influence was not limited to the choice of indicators 
to be used (i.e. from outcomes to outputs indicators), even caused the separation measurement 
into two separate systems.  
Finally, the process of establishing the new performance initiative in Indonesia demonstrated 
a persistent conflict of interest among different stakeholders. The first conflict of interest exists 
between the government of Indonesia and international donor agencies in terms of the 
measurement framework to be adopted. The next conflict of interest emerged between MoHA 
and the sector ministries. The reluctance of other sector ministries to supply performance 
measures related to their sector can be assumed to be an expression of their disagreement with 
the notion of MoHA leading the establishment of a comprehensive performance measurement 
system. Another conflict of interest emerged between the national and local governments while 
determining whether the measures to be adopted should be outcome or output measures. 
Designing a performance measurement system needs to accommodate many different interests 
and is not easy. The summary of design phase is presented in Table 6.7 below. 
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Steps Events/Activities Comments 
1. World Bank in cooperation with MoHA organised a 
two-day workshop, Strengthening Public Services 
in Decentralizing Indonesia: Approaches for 
Measuring Performance of Local Governments,28-
29 August 2005 in Bali. 
Early discussion about the necessity of 
measuring the performance of Indonesian local 
government in the context of decentralisation 
2. World Bank formulated a measurement framework 
to be used as a basis for developing key 
performance indicators  
Measurement framework is called ‘local 
government performance measurement’ 
(LGPM) 
3. The process entered a stagnant period Several directors of directorate in charge of the 
initiative changed.  
4. Various activities undertaken such as seminars, 
workshops, symposia and talk shows on radio and 
television, included travelling abroad (i.e. Canada) 
to gather idea for the new performance 
measurement initiatives  
These all activities were sponsored by 
international donor agencies and reflection of 
EDC strategy  
5. Disagreement between the chair of the new 
performance measurement initiative design team 
and World Bank consultant regarding the 
measurement framework to be adopted 
The disagreement ended up with a request from 
the chair of the new performance measurement 
initiative design team for World Bank consultant 
to withdraw from the team 
6. Measurement was split into two separate systems 
(the EKPPD and EKPOD) for technical and 
political considerations 
Political considerations relate to the direct 
election system to choose the district heads and 
mayors (problem to attribute performance) 
7. ADB proposed to integrate another measurement 
system for newly-established regions (EDOB) for 
practical reason  
Practical consideration that turned the new 
measurement initiative into a comprehensive 
measurement package consisting of three sub-
measurement systems.  
8. Government Regulation No. 6/2008 on evaluation 
of local government governance (EPPD) was 
signed on 4 February 2008 
The regulation contained the EKPOD indicators 
but the EKPPD indicators yet. The regulation 
mandated for the first performance evaluation 
using the EKPPD system scheduled to take 
place in October 2008 
9.  MoHA sent a letter to sector ministries to request 
for indicators to be adopted for the EKPPD system. 
The Minister of Home Affairs letter No. 
120/408/SJ, 19 February 2008. There was lack 
of response to this request 
10. MoHA sent a second letter to sector ministries with 
the same request  
Letter no. 102/1597/OTDA on 8 August 2008  
11. Establishment of a small team devoted to 
formulating all key performance indicators 
covering all sectors 
The small team consists of MoHA, Financial 
and Development Supervisory Body and CIDA 
12. First version of a set of indicators was signed off on 
5 September 2008 
However, the real one used in the first 
evaluation was the set of indicators signed on 9 
October 2008 which is the revision of the first 
one.  
Table 6.7 Summary of Design Process 
Source: Developed by author, summarised from findings 
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CHAPTER  7                                                                                          
PROCEDURES, STATUS AND FACTORS INFLUENCING 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EKPPD  
7.1    Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the term ‘implementation’ in this study is operationalized as the 
phase undertaken after design until performance information is ready to be used by 
stakeholders in whatever format is determined in the system design. The three main activities 
undertaken in the ‘implementation’ phase include (1) collecting performance data (2) analysing 
performance data and (3) reporting performance data. When these three activities are 
undertaken at the same level (within the same organisation or within the same department) and 
by the same stakeholder, the process may be less complex than when they are undertaken at 
different levels and by different stakeholders.  
This chapter aims to describe and discuss the implementation of the EKPPD system. First, the 
findings of this study show that the EKPPD implementation requires a complex process as the 
production of measures undertaken at three different levels of government (collecting and 
analysing data to complete KPIs at the local level, analysing the quality of KPIs at the regional 
level and analysing KPIs and assigning scores to KPIs to produce composite measures at the 
national level). Second, implementation has encountered technical, organisational and 
institutional factors. More specifically, at all levels – national, regional and local government 
–capacity has been inadequate to implement the measurement system. A serious lack of 
technical capacity has been encountered more at local government than at regional or national 
levels, because it is local government which deals with collecting data used in the measurement 
 242 
 
process. A more critical problem of inadequate capacity is faced by national government due 
to its failure to gain stakeholder support. This has caused serious problems in terms of the 
financial and human resources needed to support implementation. Inadequate capacity directly 
affects the reliability of performance indicators reported by local government and the reliability 
of the EKPPD index produced by the evaluation process. Finally, there were inconsistencies 
between design and implementation: a) implementation did not follow the system design and 
b) the involvement of subjective judgements whereas the system design adopted ‘objective’ 
principles.  
This chapter begins with a description of the procedures involved in the EKPPD system. Then 
the next section discusses reporting performance indicators by local and regional governments. 
This discussion is followed by evaluating performance indicators at regional and national 
government levels. Discussions of both reporting and evaluating performance under the 
EKPPD system are synthesised in the next section and finally some conclusions are drawn.  
7.2    Procedures Involved in the EKPPD System   
Figure 7.1 outlines the EKPPD process. This starts with local government reporting the 
indicators for the performance evaluation to the governor and MoHA and continues up to the 
announcement of the evaluation results by the national evaluation team.  
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Figure 7.1 Measurement Process in the EKPPD System 
Source: Minister of Home Affairs Circulation Letter of No. 120.04/2290/OTDA, 27th August 2009 
Notes: 
A1 Performance report from districts/municipalities sent to governors 
A2 Governors send performance report of districts/municipalities to regional evaluation teams 
A3 Regional teams clarify the data of districts/municipalities or request additional data (if necessary) 
A4 Regional evaluation teams send evaluation preliminary results to governors 
A5 Governors forward the preliminary evaluation results from regional teams to Ministry of Home Affairs and 
the respective  districts/municipalities 
A6 Ministry of Home Affairs forwards the preliminary evaluation results of evaluation by regional teams to 
technical national team 
A7 Technical team at the national level sends final evaluation results and national ranking of 
districts/municipalities to regional teams 
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A8 Regional teams forward the final evaluation results and national ranking of districts/municipalities  to 
governors 
A9 The governor forwards the results to the mayor or district head 
B1 Performance report of provinces is sent to the Ministry of Home Affairs 
B2 Ministry of Home Affairs sends the performance reports of the provinces to be evaluated by the technical 
team 
B3 Technical team confirms and verifies data of provincial government 
B4 Technical team sends preliminary results of the provinces performance evaluation to the Minister of Home 
Affairs; then, the Ministers of Home Affairs, as the chair of the national evaluation team, forwards these 
results to each province 
C1 Technical team sends evaluation results and national ranking to the national team 
C2 National team sends the final evaluation results to the President 
 
As reflected in the Figure 7.1 above, the evaluation of local government performance using the 
EKPPD system involves a complex process. Thus, it took two years to complete the whole 
process based on experience of the first six rounds of implementation. ‘A’ is used to denote the 
flow of local government performance reports in the evaluation process under the EKPPD 
system. For example, step 1 which is represented by ‘A1’ in Figure 7.1, means the process of 
sending performance reports from local government to the governor by 31st March every year. 
The final step of evaluation which is associated with the local government performance report 
comes when the results of the evaluation of local government reports conducted by the national 
team are sent back to the regional team (A7) and then the regional evaluation team forward the 
result to the governor (A8) and the governor forwards the results to the mayor or district head 
(A9).    
‘B’ represents the flow of the performance report of a province (in its position as an 
autonomous region) in the evaluation process under the EKPPD system. The process starts 
with the provinces sending their performance report to the Minister of Home Affairs (B1), and 
the report is forwarded to the national technical evaluation team. The final process comes when 
the result of the evaluation is forwarded to each province by the Minister of Home Affairs (as 
the chair of the national evaluation team) (B4). Finally, ‘C’ indicates the steps involved in 
presenting the result to the President.  
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Thus, the whole process will take place at three different levels: local, regional and national. 
The process at the ‘local’ level deals with collecting the raw data, completing KPIs, producing 
performance reports and sending the report to the governor (A1). When the process of 
evaluation has taken place, the regional evaluation team can ask the local government to 
confirm or classify or supply more data (A3). At the regional level, there are two action points 
in relation to performance evaluation under the EKPPD system. First, the regional government 
should produce its own performance report because in its position as an autonomous region, it 
is also under an obligation to report performance under the EKPPD system and, as indicated 
earlier, it should submit the report to the Minister of Home Affairs (B1).  
In its position as the representative of the national government at the regional level, the regional 
government should conduct regional evaluation of local government performance reports 
before the national team carries out further evaluation later on. In Figure 7.1, this task is 
associated with steps ‘A3’, ‘A4,’ ‘A5’ and ‘A8’. Finally, at the national level, the team should 
evaluate the regional government performance report (B2) and should also conduct further 
evaluation of the local government performance reports (A6). Hence, the team should provide 
the results of the national evaluation (for the performance of both the local and regional 
governments) to the president (C2), the results of the performance evaluation of the regional 
governments to each province (B4), and the results of the evaluation of local government 
performance reports to the regional evaluation team (A7). Further details of the process 
undertaken at different levels of government will be discussed below.  
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7.3    Reporting Performance Indicators  
7.3.1    Reporting performance indicators by local government  
As illustrated in Figure 7.1, evaluation of Indonesian local government performance using the 
EKPPD system begins with local government submitting its performance report to the 
governor. This ‘Local Government Governance Report’ (or Laporan Penyelenggaran 
Pemerintah Daerah, or LPPD) is the responsibility of a department (known as ‘government 
department’) within the district/municipality secretariat; more specifically, it is the task of the 
regional autonomy division within the government department (see Figure 7.2).  
Government Regulation No. 6/2008, Article 34 (1) requires districts/municipalities to form an 
assessment team chaired by the general secretary in order to implement EKPPD at the local 
level. Furthermore, the MoHA circulation letter No. 120.1875/OTDA, 5 September 2008 states 
that the assessment team should first conduct a self-assessment on the KPIs reported by all 
working units (SKPDs) of local government, before reporting them to the regional evaluation 
team. In fact, our study showed none of districts/municipalities had formed an assessment team 
as stipulated by the regulations. Only two municipalities72 (the municipality x (province A) and 
the municipality 1 (province C) which had formed a team appeared to have come close to 
addressing the concept of forming an assessment team.  
                                                 
72 Out of six municipalities and three districts or nine local governments in total. 
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Figure 7.2 Department in Charge of EKPPD Performance Report 
Source: Based on observations and the EKPPD manual 
According to the practice of the other seven local governments observed, however, the 
collection of data to fulfil the 158 KPIs of the EKPPD was treated as an additional task of a 
team responsible for the LPPD. A more detailed explanation of the LPPD report is given in 
section 7.5 in the discussion about the regulatory framework. The team is usually formed at the 
beginning of the year for a period of two to three months, and contains cross-departmental 
members from within the districts/municipalities, including the mayor or districts head and the 
general secretary. The role of the regional autonomy division is to administer the performance 
reporting activity73.   
 
                                                 
73 ‘Performance reporting activity’ refers to the name of the item in the local budget. 
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Different arrangement of reporting process 
Observation carried out in the three districts and six municipalities indicated that the structure 
of the teams and tasks distribution differed between districts/municipalities.  In municipality 1 
(province C) for example, the reporting team was chaired by the mayor and coordinated by the 
general secretary (see Figure 7.3). The team was divided into three groups: data collectors, 
report writers and report editors. The data collection team comprised around 30 dedicated staff 
selected from various elements in the municipality. The task of writing the report was given to 
middle level officials who were also selected from the working units (SKPDs) with the main 
selection criterion being the ability to write a report. Finally, all heads of the working units in 
the municipality 1 (province C) were involved in the team. According to key informants in the 
municipality, generally speaking the team worked well due to the active involvement of the 
mayor and the general secretary and other stakeholders.  
 
Figure 7.3 Structure of the Reporting Team, Municipality 1 (Province C) 
Source: Based on interview with key informant, municipality 1, province C 
The structure of the reporting team in municipality 2 (province C) was different (see Figure 
7.4).   
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Data collectors               
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Report  writers     
(middle managers)
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Figure 7.4 Structure of the Reporting Team, Municipality 2-Province C 
Source: Based on interview with key informant, municipality2-province C 
Formally, it included the mayor and general secretary. It was divided into non-technical team 
and technical team members. The non-technical team involved heads and middle managers 
from the influential working units such as local planning and development body and finance 
office within the municipality. The technical team consisted of all five staff in the government 
department. However, according to the key informant in this municipality, the team did little 
work – in fact, the mayor and general secretary did not get involved at all. The non-technical 
team also did little; tasks were therefore done solely by the technical team (the five staff 
government department). Similar practice was discovered in other districts/municipalities in 
province C (for example, municipality 3, district 1, and district 3). 
A rather different arrangement was found in district 2 (province C). Here, the formal team 
consisted of district head, general secretary, all the heads of the working units, and middle level 
officials and staff from selected working units. The work was carried out by a small number of 
core team members (which were mainly staff without any managerial position) and coordinated 
by the junior official directly handling the EKPPD reporting. This strategy was devised because 
he predicted that the larger team would not work effectively. The ineffectiveness of the team 
related to the considerably low interest and involvement of key stakeholders. The key 
informant (INF2/C/d2) said that the small team did all the work first and the result was then 
Mayor                                     
(Chair)
Non-technical team Technical team
General Secretary 
(Secretary)
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discussed by the larger team. However, it was not easy to arrange meetings for the larger team, 
because of the lack of interest and low involvement of the stakeholders mentioned earlier.   
Unavailability of Data and Lack of ICT capacity 
To complete the 158 KPIs required at least around 800 items of data. All districts/municipalities 
which participated in this study faced problems such as unavailable, invalid, unreliable, 
incomplete and inconsistent data. Obtaining data on a timely basis was also a struggle for all 
the districts/municipalities studied. For example, district 2 (province C) had difficulty 
completing the ‘ratio of houses having building permit’ KPI (KPI 2 of the policymaker). The 
given formula to calculate this ratio is:  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠
 × 100% 
However, the public works department (as the working unit responsible for housing in this 
district did not have data on either the total houses in the district or the proportion of houses 
which had already obtained building permits. According to INF2/C/d2, public works only has 
a record of the ‘number of building permits issued in a year’.  
He acknowledged that a survey should have been conducted in the first evaluation using the 
EKPPD system to establish a baseline of unavailable data. Data could then be built up for the 
future evaluations.  However, owing to limited time and budget this survey was not conducted. 
Instead, the problem related to housing data was addressed by asking each sub-district head to 
supply data about the number of houses in his/her area. Data about houses in every sub-district 
was then added-up. From the sum of houses, INF2/C/d2 arbitrarily took 75 % of the data as the 
ones which had building permits. The problem however, as he acknowledged, was that he did 
not know whether each sub-district used the same or a different method in arriving at its data. 
Thus, two levels of judgement were involved here. The first subjective judgment was in 
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counting the number of houses as the denominator in the formulae; the decision about the 
percentage of houses with valid building permits was also based on judgement.  
INF2/C/d2 stated that he received information about a municipality which had addressed a 
similar problem by taking the number of residents in the municipality from the civil registration 
office. Then, ‘number of residents in the municipality’ was used to estimate number of houses 
in the municipality by assigning the arbitrary percentage. The problematic data related to this 
particular KPI was confirmed in an interview with the key informant of the national evaluation 
team. According to INF5/NG, during his evaluation he came across a municipality which 
equated ‘number of houses’ in the municipality with ‘number of residents.’ Analysis of KPIs 
adopted in the EKPPD system shows that at least four KPIs would be affected by data relating 
to ‘number of houses’ (see Table 7.1).   
No. Key performance indicator Note 
1. Ratio of houses having building permits Indicator number 2 of policymaker: 
peace and public order aspect 
2. Ratio of households having access to clean 
water 
Indicator number 35 of policy implementer:  
housing function  
3. Ratio of habitable houses Indicator number 37 of policy implementer:  
housing function 
4. Ratio of households having sanitation facility Indicator number 28 of policy implementer:  
public works function  
 
Table 7.1 Examples of Indicators Affected by Data on Housing 
Source: Analysis of EKPPD KPIs 
The results of the survey of 31 local governments supports the information provided by the key 
informant discussed earlier. The majority of respondents (74%) agreed that the fact that certain 
types of data had never been collected prior to the first implementation of the EKPPD, such as 
number of houses, was one of the difficulties with reporting KPIs (see Table 7.2): 
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Type of response Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Total 
N 6 17 3 5 0 31 
% 19% 55% 10% 16% 0% 100% 
Table 7.2 Result of Survey Data (Part A-Q6) 
Source: Analysis of survey data 
As shown in Table 7.2 above, 19% of respondents answered ‘strongly agree’ and 55% selected 
‘agree’ (combination of both = 74%).  
In terms of inconsistent data, the most common example found in all districts/municipalities 
studied was that which was reported by working units with regard to benchmarking data. For 
example, a working unit could be wrong in reporting its budget. The data supplied by working 
units should have been cross-checked against the local budget issued by the finance office. 
Another example mentioned by key informants in all districts/municipalities studied concerned 
‘number of population.’ The data owned by the districts/municipalities tended to be different 
from that issued by the statistics office. Where this was the case, the regional and national 
evaluators preferred the statistic office data. The problem with this however was that it was not 
made available until June every year, whereas the deadline for submitting the performance 
report for the purpose of the EKPPD is 31st March. There was thus a mismatch in terms of 
between the timeliness of report submission and the availability of the required data.  
This finding was supported by the survey data (see Table 7.3 below): 
Type of response Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Total 
N 8 18 1 3 1 31 
% 26% 58% 3% 10% 3% 100% 
Table 7.3 Result of Survey Data (Part A-Q3) 
Source: Analysis of survey data 
As can be seen from Table 7.3 above, over 80% of respondents agreed (when ‘strongly agree’ 
is combined with ‘agree’ responses) that the dependency of certain types of data such as those 
related to Statistic Office data was one of difficulties in reporting the KPIs of the EKPPD.  
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In all districts/municipalities observed, collecting data for the performance evaluation had been 
handled manually: ICT infrastructure was still underdeveloped. Computer facilities were used 
merely to type the report but there was no application for data collection for example, or for 
data analysis. In district 1 (province C), a health centre located in a remote area did not have a 
landline connection or mobile signal. There was thus a problem of communication between 
reporting staff at the health centre and the district reporting team. Any clarification of specific 
data or request for new data took much longer than should have been necessary. In addition, 
the use of email for internal communication was uncommon practice. Districts/municipalities 
under study might use email occasionally for communication externally (e.g. with the 
ministries of Finance or Home Affairs). ICT infrastructure was influenced by the geography of 
the districts/municipalities observed; the more remote or difficult the geographical conditions, 
the higher the costs to establish the ICT infrastructure, which thus tended to be more advanced 
in urban (municipalities) than rural areas (districts).  
Type of response Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Total 
N 7 19 1 4 0 31 
% 23% 61% 3% 13% 0% 100% 
Table 7.4 Result of survey data (Part A-Q9) 
Source: Analysis of survey data 
Part A-Q9 of the survey questionnaire asked respondents’ opinion on the statement: “A lack of 
ICT was one of the difficulties with obtaining data in a timely manner”, and most respondents 
agreed with the statement, as indicated in Table 7.4.  
Support systems in place 
Data for the EKPPD was also difficult to obtain due to the limitations of the support systems 
in place, such as budgeting and accounting systems. For example, the local budget did not 
separate sources of funding for every individual activity. This problem was found in almost all 
districts/municipalities observed, except municipality y (province B). At the same time, local 
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government is required to report a ‘absorption of general allocation fund’ KPI (KPI 33 of the 
policymaker). The ratio is measured through: 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑
 × 100% 
Two pieces of information are needed to calculate this ratio: (i) total general allocation funding 
received in a year, and (ii) residual income coming from the general allocation fund of the 
respected year. The total general allocation funding received in a year minus the residual 
income coming from the component of the general allocation funding equals the general 
allocation fund absorbed.  
The key informant in municipality 1 (province C), however, said that by the end of the fiscal 
year the accounting department would not be able to specify the residual income into detail 
components:  
From the residual income of X billion rupiah, the accounting department 
cannot tell how much of this X rupiah actually comes from the general 
allocation fund, revenue sharing or original local income. Therefore, as 
the one who is responsible to supply data relates to finance, I just used my 
best ability to estimate the figure based on experience working at the 
Finance Office for years. (Interview with INF8/C/m1 on the 10th February 
2012) 
 
Moreover, financial reports were not generated from a double entry system, but from a cash-
based record; the data was then converted into an accrual financial report. This implied that 
local government did not have the data related to the costs of services provided.   
Finally, asset management was the most underdeveloped system found in all the 
districts/municipalities observed. The most common problem was that there were many 
unregistered assets; that is, the physical assets were there but they were not recorded. Informal 
practice was one of reasons for this. Sometimes assets were acquired not through formal 
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procurement activity but were bought using budget allocated to other activities (that is, as part 
of expenditure for other activities). For example, the accounting department in the Finance 
Office purchased a new printing machine using the ‘financial reporting activity’ budget. They 
did this because they could get the facilities they needed faster, instead of going through the 
normal procurement procedure. This practice was made possible through the mark-up of budget 
for other items (such as meals or stationery).  
Function-based versus departmental-based indicators  
As mentioned in Chapter 6, in terms of the eight aspects of general administration, the latest 
technical guideline issued by the MoHA (Minister of Home Affairs Circulation letter No. 
120/313/OTDA, 24th January 2011) specified that the KPIs should be reported according to 
function, not the organisational structure of local government. The Minister of Home Affairs 
Circulation letter No. 120/313/OTDA, 24th January 2011 was issued as a result of local 
government having misunderstood the EKPPD system, reporting KPIs based on local 
government organisation structure instead of functions run by individual working units. The 
nine districts/municipalities studied were not structured according to their one-to-one 
relationship with the functions delegated to them. For example, in the municipality x (province 
A), two functions (Education, and Sport and Youth) were merged into one working unit 
(Education, Sport and Youth Agency). Meanwhile, in municipality 2 (province C) the 
education function was converted into the Education Agency. In other districts/municipalities 
the function of education was integrated with a different function (e.g. Culture); therefore the 
agency is called the Education and Culture Agency. 
The national evaluation team realised that local government did not understand the requirement 
to report the KPIs according to functions, after struggling to evaluate KPI 17 of the 
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policymaker. The KPI requires districts/municipalities to report budget allocated for basic 
services (see Table 7.5).  
Measurement level Policymaker 
Measurement aspect The harmony between the national and local government policy (3rd aspect) 
Measure or KPI number  17th     
Description of measure Finance  
Measure of achievement  The ratio of expenditures for basic public services to total expenditure 
Data that need to be 
completed 
Basic public services expenditures for local budget of 201x 
(1) Education function   IDR………………….. 
(2) Health function    IDR…………………… 
(3) Environmental affairs function  IDR…………………… 
(4) Public works function   IDR…………………… 
(5) Social function    IDR……………………. 
(6) Labour function    IDR…………………….. 
(7) Cooperation function   IDR…………………….. 
(8) Social security (police) function  IDR…………………….. 
(9) Citizens and civil registration function IDR…………………….. 
Total expenditure for basic public services in 200x IDR X 
Total local budget of 200x    IDR Y 
Ratio of public services expenditure to local budget 
IDR  X
IDR Y
 × 100% = Z% 
 
Table 7.5 The 17th Key Performance Indicator (KPI) of the EKPPD at the Policy Makers Level  
Source: Minister of Home Affair Circulation Letter No. 120/313/OTDA, 24 January 2011 
 
The problem emerged that the KPI was rarely reported by districts/municipalities using 
complete data. As described in the interview with INF5/NG, the majority of 
districts/municipalities had empty data at least for one or two rows (functions). Moreover, when 
total expenditure (Figure X) was cross-checked with the budget document of the respected 
district/municipality, the figure was never consistent. More detail description are provided in 
Box 7.1 below.  
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Box 7.1 EKPPD: Functions-based performance measurement system  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After the technical guideline was revised and it was made clear that local government should 
separate the different functions (where working units run more than one functions), 
stakeholders at the local government level experienced a state of great confusion. All key 
informants in the districts/municipalities studied said that this latest requirement was the most 
challenging to fulfil. Interviews with the key informants in five municipalities (the municipality 
x at province A, the municipality y at province B, and the municipalities 1, 3 and 4 at province 
C) were supported by the results of an observation of a workshop arranged by the government 
bureau of province C in early February 2012. In the workshop, delegates representing the 19 
districts/municipalities of province C raised their concerns about this latest requirement. They 
expressed their confusion and worries about the difficulty of reporting KPIs according to 
function, and asked for guidance from the regional and national evaluators (acting as the key 
speakers in the workshop) in terms of how allocation should be made for KPIs related to staff 
Box 7.1 Evidence of Lack of Local Government Understanding of EKPPD System Design  
After looking at the budget structure of each respective district/municipality, the evaluator discovered the 
reason for this inconsistency. District A for example left out data for the social security (police) function 
because the function was integrated with the citizen and civil registration function to become one agency. 
Instead, District A reported the total budget (that is, the total budget of the agency responsible for both 
functions) and entered the figure in row 9 that represented budget for the citizen and civil registration function 
only. Next, municipality B left row 7 (co-operation function) empty and reported the budget for the labour 
function (row 6) to be much higher than it should be. That happened because the labour and cooperation 
functions in municipality B were one agency which was in addition integrated with other functions (which 
were not included in the KPI 17). Another example, district C, reported the budget for the social function as 
more than double what it actually was because it had been merged with the housing function. In other words, 
the budget reported for the social function actually represented the budget of the social and housing agency. 
Variations in how districts/municipalities organised functions caused intense confusion for evaluators during 
the first two evaluations using the EKPPD system.   
Source: Interview with INF5/NG on 26 December 2011 
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and budget. Explanations provided by the speakers however were inconsistent and confused 
the delegates even more. A speaker from the national evaluation team for example stated that: 
We are not concerned so much about methods you use to make an 
allocation. As far as your districts/municipalities provide us with the 
performance report with KPIs, that is enough.   
He added that the staff and budget of the secretariat of working units could be distributed 
equally to different functions. At the same time, the speaker from the regional evaluation team 
suggested that the secretariat’s budget and staff (where working units were running more than 
one function) should be allocated to the dominant function. For example, if a working unit runs 
both education and culture functions simultaneously, the staff and budget of the secretariat 
should be allocated to the education function.  
In fact, different allocation methods had been used in the nine districts/municipalities observed. 
Municipality 2 (province C) for instance did not follow the latest requirement to report KPIs 
based on function because of their limited capacity. As mentioned earlier, the EKPPD 
performance report in this municipality was handled by the regional autonomy division alone. 
The middle level official in charge of the EKPPD implementation had no understanding of the 
system and delegated all the technical work to junior departmental staff. With limited personnel 
to deal with the data, it was beyond their capacity to analyse the programmes of the different 
working units contributing to the achievement of the specific function. As a result, they 
continued to report KPIs referring to the organisational structure of the municipality; some data 
might have thus been under- or over-represented.  
For example, for KPI 17 (shown in Table 7.5 above), budget allocation for the environmental 
function was under-represented, while the budget for public works was over-represented in the 
municipality 2. It was correct that the environmental office carried the primary responsibility 
for the environmental function. Two main duties of the environmental office are (i) 
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environmental governance and environmental impact, and (ii) pollution control and 
environmental management. However, environment maintenance was carried out by public 
works. Moreover, public works also had a department dealing with drainage water resources 
infrastructure and liquid waste management. Programmes of this department also can be 
associated with the achievement of the environmental function. As mentioned earlier, because 
of limited time and resources, programme analysis could not be carried out. Thus, municipality 
2 reported budget allocated for the environmental function referring to the budget of the 
environmental office only. The budget allocated to programmes owned by public works which 
also contributed to the environmental function was not included.  
Another example occurred in municipality 1, where one local agency is called ‘mining, 
industry, trade, cooperation and SMEs and capital investment.’ The key informant at this 
municipality described the allocation method used to deal with indicators related to staff 
management (Aspect 4 of policy implementer) as follows. The agency of mining, industry, 
trade, cooperation and SME and capital investment had 40 staff, including the head of the 
agency. The agency’s secretariat employed 10 staff and each department74 employed six staff. 
First of all, the 10 staff employed by the secretariat were equally distributed to each function. 
This means that each function received two additional staff. With the distribution of staff from 
the secretariat, each function was assumed to be responsible for eight staff. The head and the 
secretary were then added to each function; each function thus also received two more 
additional staff. The staff responsible for running the functions of mining, industry, trade, 
cooperation and SMEs, and capital investment was thus reported as 10 personnel for each 
function instead of six personnel.  
                                                 
74 Each department is equivalent to a specific function. For example, the department of ‘mining’ is equivalent to 
‘mining function’ 
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The implication of allocating staff in this way was that total staff in the agency reported higher 
(50) than the actual (42). The working units with similar characteristics (as shown in Figure 
7.5, municipality 1 at province C) were several, not just one. When the same procedure was 
applied to all of them, the cumulative differences in terms of number of staff became significant 
in comparison to the actual number of staff registered on the staff management body. This 
became a problem during the evaluation. Evaluators assumed the KPI reported by this 
municipality to be invalid and unreliable, as commented on by the key informant (INF5/C/m1).  
Municipality 3 of province C however applied a different allocation method. Here, the key 
informant reported that working units were instructed to report the number of staff according 
to function while maintaining the total number of staff as the same as the actual number. 
INF3/C/m3 acknowledged that she ignored the different approach that might be taken by the 
different working units. Table 7.6 summarises some KPIs that would be directly affected by 
the different methods selected to allocate resources (budget, staff and assets).  
No Indicator Note 
1. Expenditure for basic services  Harmonisation between the national and 
local government policy  (policymaker): 
finance aspect 
2. Number of civil servants to total civil servants in the 
district/municipality 
Staff management (the fourth aspects of 
policy implementer) 
3. Number of officials that have fulfil training requirement  
4. Number of officials that have fulfil grade requirement  
5. Proportion of budget realisation to total local budget Financial management (the sixth aspects of 
policy implementer) 6. Capital expenditure to total local agency/technical 
organisation’s budget  
7. Maintenance expenditure to total goods and services 
expenditures of the local agency/technical organisation 
8. Maintenance expenditure to total expenditure of the local 
agency/technical organisation 
9. Unused assets Asset management (the seventh aspect of 
policy implementer) 
Table 7.6 Examples of Indicators Affected by the Different Allocation Methods 
Source: Analysis of EKPPD KPIs 
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Lacked of training/technical guidelines  
The lack of training and technical guidelines was complained about in all 
districts/municipalities studied. Some key appointment holders received training just once 
within the course of four times of evaluation. As mentioned earlier, the key appointment 
holders of the municipality 2 of province C did not have any understanding of the system at all 
and the tasks were therefore delegated to junior staff. A similar problem was also encountered 
in district 3 of province C. The head of government department was new and acknowledged 
that he understood nothing about the KPIs. The rotation took place within the period of the 
EKPPD reporting process.  
A similar problem occurred in district 1 of province C. Here however, the new head of regional 
autonomy division managed to attend the workshop arranged in February 2012. Some key 
appointment holders from other districts/municipalities had attended training twice or three 
times but said that this was not enough. The fact that none of key informants in the 
districts/municipalities studied were aware whether (i) they could develop their own measures 
for optional functions, (ii) they should carry out self-assessment processes, and (iii) they should 
form the appraisal team at a local level was evidence of insufficient training.  
One example of lack technical guidelines related to the first KPI at the level of policy 
implementer, as described by a key informant from the municipality at province B. This KPI 
aims to measure consistency between national and local level policies. More specifically, it 
refers to the ratio of programmes in each working units which support the national programmes. 
To complete this ratio, local government has to consult the list of national programmes. 
However, up until the deadline to submit the performance report (31st March 2012), the nine 
districts/municipalities reported that the list of national programmes was not available. This 
kind situation confused key appointment holders at local government level in terms of what 
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was to be done with the KPI and what should be referred to. Considerable efforts were made 
to contact the regional and national evaluation teams and ask for the list but they did not receive 
it.  
Another problem highlighted by key informants in all the districts/municipalities studied was 
that the technical guidelines tended to be advised quite late. Sometimes, the new guideline was 
informed when districts/municipalities had already collected the data (such as in municipality 
4 of province C), or even almost finished the performance report (the experience in the 
municipality of province 1). Both municipalities referred to the guideline issued by MoHA on 
the 24th January 2011 (specifying KPIs were to be reported according to function). Moreover, 
the guideline only provided an example of a matrix for working units running two functions.  
This confused key appointment holders at local government level about how to deal with a 
working unit running multiple functions, as expressed by INF5/C/m1. This informant also 
reported that on one occasion, municipality 1 of province C representatives consulted the 
national evaluation team in Jakarta on this problem. The response was however unexpected. 
Instead of offering a solution, the national evaluator questioned them in response, ‘Is there any 
such kind of practice [merging multiple functions at one agency] at the local government?’   
Many of the KPIs have also been perceived by local government stakeholders to be poorly 
defined or ambiguous. This lack of clarity caused difficulties in determining (i) what data 
should be collected, and (ii) what the sources of the data were. Given the limited human 
resource capacity at the local government level (especially of those staff dealing with reporting 
tasks), the ambiguous KPIs and lack of technical guidelines made the situation worse. Some 
KPIs relied on the subjective interpretation of staff in charge of supplying data. For example, 
KPI 29 of the policy implementer (minimum service standard for public works function) is 
called ‘width of the dirty area.’ The key informants in most districts/municipalities involved in 
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this study said that they did not know how to define ‘the dirty area’; the EKPPD manual does 
not provide an operational definition. They also did not know which standard to follow. Some 
indicators considered to be ambiguous are listed in Table 7.7 below. 
No Indicators Note 
1. Width of dirty area KPI 29 (minimum service standard for public works) 
2. Width of green space area KPI 30 (minimum service standard for spatial planning) 
3 Houses using clean water KPI 35 (minimum service standard for housing) 
4. Dirty housing area KPI 36 (minimum service standard for housing) 
5. Habitable houses for living KPI 37 (minimum service standard for housing) 
 
Table 7.7 Examples of Ambiguous KPIs (Local Government Perspective) 
Source: Interviews with key informants in nine districts/municipalities 
The first four KPIs listed in Table 7.7 above represent unclear operational definitions. The last 
KPI however reflects the low capacity of human resources at local government level. Although 
an operational definition of ‘habitable houses for living’ is provided in the Minister of Housing 
Regulation No. 22/2008 on the Minimum Service Standard for Housing, none of the key 
informants from the nine districts/municipalities studied stated that they have referred to this 
definition while collecting data to be reported for KPI 37. Unclear operational definitions of 
KPIs and low capacity of human resources at local government level thus eventually led to 
different interpretations. Municipality 2 of province C for instance relates ‘Houses using clean 
water’ only to those using water supplied by a clean water company. District 2 of province 3 
however includes villagers using hot spring water in determining the ratio. For the KPI related 
to green area, the municipality of province 2 uses data from a satellite image to determine the 
width of green space area in the city; municipality 2 of province C determined it manually by 
including all city gardens, areas along the railways, river banks, rice fields and swamp areas.  
The key informant in municipality 4 of province C reported that the majority of staff in charge 
of supplying EKPPD data in working units did not understand what the minimum service 
standard means. They did not know whether there were several ministry regulations on 
 264 
 
minimum service standard for different sectors75. One KPI requires information about whether 
a minimum service standard has been implemented or not yet. If districts/municipalities have 
implemented the minimum service standard, they are also required to provide a list of functions 
in which the standard for the respective functions has been implemented (see Table 7.8).  
Measurement level Policymaker 
Measurement aspect Harmony and effectiveness of relationship between government and local 
government and among local government themselves in developing regional 
autonomy (2nd  aspect) 
Measure number  11st    
Description of measure Implementation of minimum service standard  
Measure of achievement  Number of functions in which minimum service standard for the respected 
functions has been implemented: 
1) Function… 
2) Function… 
3) Function… 
4) Function… 
5) Function… 
6) Function… 
Supporting evidence (e.g. circulation letter of head of local government)  
 
Table 7.8 Indicator on EKPPD minimum service standard implementation 
Source: Minister of Home Affair Circulation Letter No. 120/313/OTDA, 24 January 2011 
 
INF3/C/m3 also said that the reporting staff of working units at times could not differentiate 
between those KPIs which require budgeted figure and those which need realisation figures. 
INF3/C/m3’s statement was supported by the results from the survey whereby the majority of 
respondents (78%) agreed that the capacity of human resources at the level of working units 
influences the way in which they interpret KPIs (see Table 7.9): 
Type of response Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Total 
N 7 19 1 4 0 31 
% 23% 61% 3% 13% 0% 100% 
Table 7.9 Result of Survey Data (Part A-Q8) 
Source: Analysis of Survey Data 
 
                                                 
75 Up to now, the government has issued a ‘Minimum Services Standard’ for 13 sectors.  
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As can be seen from Table 7.9 above, none of the respondents selected ‘strongly disagree’, 
only 13% disagreed and 3% were neutral.  
Furthermore, the problems discussed earlier are also supported by the survey data for the 
questions in Part B of the questionnaire which asked per respondents’ perceptions on the design 
of selected measures or KPIs (one question), issues related to formats (two questions), reporting 
workload (one question) and lack of technical guidelines (one question). For the five questions, 
none of respondents selected ‘strongly disagree’. After collapsing the responses for the options 
‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’, the results of the survey for the five questions in Part B are 
presented below   
 
Figure 7.5 Results of Survey Data (Part B, Q10-Q14) 
Source: Analysis of Survey Data 
As reflected in Figure 7.5 above, for all questions, majority of respondents agreed that poorly 
designed KPIs, frequent format changes, format changes that were informed late, overlap of 
reporting deadlines and lack of technical guidance caused difficulties in reporting performance 
under the EKPPD system. 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%
Poorly designed KPIs
Frequent format changes
Format changes infomed late
Overlapping reporting deadlines
Lack of technical guidance
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neutral
disagree
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One respondent provided answers to the open-ended question which related to the issue of 
overlapping performance reporting: 
In the future, it will be better if the format for the LAKIP report and EKPPD report 
could be made as one report only (mu.4.m) 
The point that they made was that the reporting burden for local government would be reduced 
if there were fewer overlapping reporting requirements; and this would help them to be able to 
meet their reporting deadline.  
Another comment in the open-ended survey question was connected to the frequent format 
changes and the timing to inform the changes: 
Any change in KPI should be informed as early as possible before we [local 
government] start collecting data… and a clear explanation about the changes should be 
provided. (ss3.d) 
 
Hence, comments related to lack of training were also provided by two respondents: 
There is a need for training on how to fill in KPIs for all working units to reduce mistakes 
made by working units in completing data related to obligatory and optional functions. 
(kt3.d) 
The EKPPD team should give explanation and guidance to make the task of completing 
KPIs easier. (ks1.d)  
 
Thus, it is clear that the results of the survey data on 31 local governments covering ten 
provinces supported the results of the interviews, even though the interviews were concentrated 
in one province (i.e. province C).  
Work system and culture 
One difference which every district/municipality under study observed both prior and post- 
decentralisation is the occurrence of frequent staff rotation, post-decentralisation. The key 
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informants mentioned that rotation could take place twice or even three times a year. The key 
appointment holders in charge for the EKPPD might hold their post for only three to six months 
before being moved to another position. Seven out of nine heads of government department in 
the districts/municipalities studied were new when the field visits took place. In terms of staff, 
only in four districts/municipalities did this study find that the staff who had been dealing with 
the EKPPD since the first evaluation had remained constant. One problem, which was part of 
the work system and culture applied in the districts/municipalities, was the lack of a mechanism 
to hand over tasks and responsibilities when rotation took place. The staff member moving to 
a new place took everything with them, and the replacement staff member could find nothing 
as reference. The key informant at district 2 stated:  
I heard that the previous head of department was invited to attend the 
socialisation of the system. He must have the manuals. But when I moved 
to this position, I did not see any of them. I just learned how to make the 
report from examples of the previous report. (Interview with INF2/C/d2) 
The issue of high frequency of staff rotation and its implication for EKPPD data supply was 
mentioned by the key informants in all the districts/municipalities studied.  
As mentioned earlier, data used to complete the KPIs tended to not come from an established 
database system but rather was collected from scratch, as database management systems of 
working units were still underdeveloped. Some data was based on prediction as the data 
required was not available. In addition, there was no reliable baseline data when the first 
evaluation took place in 2008. In the nine districts/municipalities observed, besides no baseline 
data being established, there was also no effort undertaken to build up the data obtained for the 
first evaluation for the purpose of subsequent evaluations, except in the municipality of 
province A. In other words, the practice of collecting data from scratch happened every year 
(and every year districts/municipality went through the same struggle to collect data). High 
staff rotation was one of explanations for no learning process taking place; in addition, 
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databases had never been established at local government level. Rotation of staff twice or three 
times a year may have meant that key appointment holders had insufficient time to introduce a 
change and no incentive to improve as they knew they would not hold their position for long.   
Two items from the survey data are relevant to support the discussion about ‘work system and 
culture.’ The first item (Part A-Q7) asked the respondents’ opinion regarding the extent that 
they agreed or disagreed with the statement: “High frequency of staff rotation, including staff 
managing data at working units, was one of difficulties in reporting KPIs because data tend to 
be attached to the individual holding the data”. 60% of respondents stated that they agreed with 
the statement. This result demonstrated how work systems and cultures which form part of 
institutional factors can influence technical factors such as availability of data.  
Part B-Q13 (“the timeliness of reporting KPIs of the EKPPD is the same as for other main 
reports that local government should produce: financial reports, accountability report of district 
head/mayor to local parliament, and LAKIP),” besides providing an indication of the heavy 
reporting workload for local governments that must submit many kinds of major reports by 31st 
March, the response to this question can also be connected to the influence of the work system 
and culture. This question was included after discovering the way in which things were done 
at local government settings; reporting activities for different purposes are conducted in the 
form of ‘project teams’. Senior officials and skilled officials tended to be involved in all project 
teams. Given the same deadline to finish all the reports caused them to make them a priority: 
what is seen as more important will get done first. As can be seen from Figure 7.5 presented 
earlier, 81% of respondents agreed that overlapping reporting deadlines caused difficulties for 
them in reporting the KPIs. This point will also be discussed further later (see appreciation to 
the EKPPD system).    
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To conclude, several factors that have been discussed above eventually affected the reliability 
and comparability of the KPIs reported by local government to be evaluated as displayed in 
Figure 7.6. The central problem of reporting KPIs by local government related to the 
availability of data. The availability of reliable, valid, and complete data in a timely manner 
has been affected by several factors that include ICT, budget, support systems in place, training 
and technical guidelines and work system and culture. I used a bidirectional arrow between 
budget and stakeholder support as stakeholder support, particularly the commitment of elected 
leaders, can significantly influence budgetary allocations to support the activity of collecting 
data to complete the KPIs. The motivation of stakeholders involved in the reporting KPIs was 
also influenced by the availability of budgetary funds to support the activity. The difficulties 
in obtaining reliable, valid, and complete data on a timely basis caused key appointment holders 
at local government to rely on estimated data. Data estimation involved subjective judgments.  
The second major challenge in reporting KPIs came from the system design of the EKPPD 
itself. Firstly, timeliness did not match with the availability of data. Secondly, the measurement 
was designed as a functions-based system whereas the data was available according to 
department. As a consequence, it was necessary to split or to merge data related to a specific 
KPI from different departments (working units) to arrive at the data according to functions to 
complete the respective KPI. Due to a lack of common understanding among stakeholders 
which related to a lack of training and technical guidance, key appointment holders of different 
districts/municipalities had used different allocation methods. The use of different allocation 
methods affected the comparability of the KPIs reported by different districts/municipalities. 
The choice of method was influenced by subjective judgments. 
Poorly defined, some of the KPIs also meant that subjective judgments were unavoidable. The 
capacity of key appointment holders, which was connected to training and technical guidelines, 
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affected the way judgments were made. Subjectivity also came from different approaches to 
managing the EKPPD data collection process were applied in the districts/municipalities 
studied. Some teams were effective; some were not. The effectiveness of the local team 
influenced its ability to collect more valid, reliable, and complete data and to conduct better 
analysis before using the data to fulfil the KPIs. The quality of data collected by a single worker 
under pressure (as occurred in the municipality of province B could hardly be compared to the 
quality of data collected by thirty motivated personnel (as in municipality 1 of province C. The 
effectiveness of the local team was influenced by the involvement of the district head/mayor, 
which could not only compel team members to participate actively but could also determine 
the amount of budget allocated to support the data collection process. The budget in turn 
determines (i) the facilities which the team can afford to support the activity, and (ii) the size 
of the team (the bigger the budget, the more personnel can be involved). Facilities available to 
support the data collection process influence the motivation of the personnel involved; the 
effectiveness of the local team was also influenced by the qualifications of personnel involved. 
As the local team changed every year, the personnel involved could also change every year.  
The involvement of subjective judgments in the process of data collection for the EKPPD KPIs 
in the districts/municipalities studied showed inconsistency with the system design. The new 
performance measurement initiative adopts six principles namely specific, objective, 
continuous, measurable, comparable and accountable (Government Regulation No. 6/2008, 
Article 3). Data from interviews, observations, and documents is supported by data from survey 
questionnaires in 31 districts/municipalities.  
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Figure 7.6 Factors Influencing the Reliability of the Performance Indicators 
Source: Developed by author, based on findings 
Availability of 
reliable, valid, and 
complete data in a 
timely manner   
Under-
developed/   
ICT  
Budget support  
Supporting 
systems  
Work system 
and culture 
Trainings/ 
guidelines  
Reliance on 
predicted 
data 
Timeliness of 
reporting  
Measurement 
basis   
Subjectivity 
Reliability 
and 
comparability 
of KPIs 
reported  
System Design  Inevitable Errors  
Different 
allocation 
methods 
Poorly defined 
KPIs   
Stakeholders’ 
support  
Management of 
reporting KPIs  
 272 
 
7.3.2    Reporting performance indicators by regional government  
The redefinition of decentralisation in Indonesia through Law 32/2004 includes clarification of 
the role of each province as (i) an autonomous region, and (ii) a representative of the national 
government at the regional level. Thus, in relation to the EKPPD, provinces play two roles: as 
the target of evaluation and at the same time in charge of conducting evaluation at the regional 
level. A province is made a target of evaluation in relation to its position as an autonomous 
region, whereas responsibility for carrying out regional evaluation relates to the governor’s 
position as representative of the president at the regional level. The process of EKPPD 
implementation in terms of the first role is described and discussed below. Description and 
discussion in the relation to the second role is provided in the next point. 
Key informants at regional government level reported that the biggest challenge for provinces 
when reporting KPIs was timeliness. The deadline for local and provincial governments to 
submit their reports was the same, whereas KPI provinces are dependent on results from the 
KPI districts/municipalities within its jurisdiction. As a key informant of province D pointed 
out, although the provincial government tried hard to encourage districts/municipalities to 
submit their report earlier, the result was far from the expectation. The majority of 
districts/municipalities submitted their reports right on or close to their deadline (31st March) 
or even beyond 31st March. This fact was acknowledged by key informants from the other two 
provinces (provinces B and C).  
The formation of a province and the districts/municipalities included in its jurisdiction is 
carried out according to law. Province B for instance consists of 24 districts/municipalities, 
province C comprises 19 districts/municipalities, and province D has 15 
districts/municipalities. The issue of reporting KPIs is that at provincial level, they represent 
the performance of all districts/municipalities within its jurisdiction. For example, the ‘net 
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enrolment for elementary education of province C’s KPI must reflect the net enrolment for 
elementary education in the 19 districts/municipalities; no district/municipality should be 
excluded. As a consequence, data from all 19 districts/municipalities needed to be received 
before province C could report on its KPIs. Any exclusion of data of any district/municipality 
violates the law.  
In their role as autonomous regions, provinces were placed in an extremely difficult position 
by the system design of the EKPPD. As mentioned above, indicators for a province depended 
on those which were reported by the districts/municipalities within its jurisdiction. However, a 
problem emerged from both local and provincial governments being given the same deadline 
to report their indicators. Having the same deadline as local government submitting its 
performance report means that the regional government will never be able to meet its deadline. 
In province C for example, by 31st March 2012, at least two districts (districts 2 and 3) 
deliberately delayed their report submission. District 2 submitted its report in April 2012 
because the key appointment holder in charge of EKPPD reporting was overloaded with work. 
Meanwhile, district 3 had to delay report submission to April 2012 because of its key 
appointment holder being on maternity leave. Province C thus had to wait for at least two 
districts to submit their report and over-ran its deadline by a month. In province B, some of the 
24 districts/municipalities deliberately delayed submission of its indicators until June 2012, 
giving as the reason (as reported by INF1/B that they were waiting for the audited financial 
data.76 Province B was therefore unable to complete its performance indicators by the deadline.  
                                                 
76 Financial year ended 31st December. Then, the production of performance measurement data for the EKPPD 
would start by January of the following year and finished by 31st March. The performance data reported covered 
the same period as the financial year (January-December).  
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7.4    Evaluating Performance Indicators 
7.4.1    Regional Evaluation 
Regional team and the different approaches 
According to the EKPPD manual (MoHA circulation letter Number 120.04/2290/OTDA, 27th 
August 2009), the governors form the regional evaluation team. This team can involve elements 
such as (i) the government bureau at the governor’s office, (ii) the regional inspectorate, and 
(iii) the regional office of the financial and development supervisory body. Observations in two 
provinces (provinces B and C) showed that the two regional teams had undertaken different 
approaches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.7 Organisational Structure of Regional Evaluation Team in Province B 
Source: Based on interviews and observations at regional evaluation team at Province B in January 2012 
As shown in Figure 7.7, the evaluation team of province B was divided into the secretariat 
(government bureau) and the technical team (regional inspectorate and financial and 
development supervisory body). The secretariat facilitated communication between the 
technical team and local government; the technical team conducted the technical evaluation. 
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The 24 districts/municipalities within province B were grouped in such a way that allowed a 
district/municipality to be evaluated by members of technical team from both elements (the 
regional inspectorate and the financial and development supervisory body) (see Figure 7.8).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.8 Task distribution of the Regional Evaluation Team in Province B 
Source: Interview with INF1/B and INF2/B 
Figure 7.9 shows the approach used by the regional evaluation team of province C. The team 
distributed the evaluation tasks as follows: the 19 districts/municipalities were grouped into 
three: group 1, 2 and 3, consisting of six, six and seven districts/municipalities respectively. 
Each group was then assigned to one element of the evaluation team (see Figure 7.10).  
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Figure 7.9 Organisational structure of C regional evaluation team 
Source: Interview with INF2/C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.10 Tasks distribution of the WS regional evaluation team 
Source: Interview with INF2/C. 
According to the interview with the key informant from province D, in this province the 
regional inspectorate took a more active initiative than the other two elements.   
 Data problems 
As discussed in point 7.3.1, data needed to complete the KPIs of EKPPD was problematic in 
terms of reliability, validity, completeness, and timeliness. This was confirmed in the 
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investigation undertaken at the regional government level. For example, the key informant (a 
member of the regional team in province B) described how districts/municipalities had wrongly 
reported an indicator requiring data in terms of quantity as data in terms of monetary. 
Moreover, data reported was often very confusing as the evaluators could not see the rationale 
governing where the figures came from. For example, when numbers were added up the result 
did not tally with the reported figure. In other words, arithmetical errors were common. During 
investigation at the local government level this research found evidence of this type of error 
(see Table 7.10). 
 
 
 
 
 
Expenditures 
for basic 
public 
services is 
divided with 
total 
expenditure 
 x 100% 
1) Education 211,327,496,204.00  
 
 
 
 
 
0.96% 
2) Health 53,159,856,142.00 
3) Environmental affairs 2,483,357,805.00 
4) Public works 70,078,843,466.00 
5) Social 3,705,256,223.00 
6) Labour - 
7) Cooperation 5,299,124,075.00 
8) Social police 3,000,904,080.00 
9) Civil registration - 
Total expenditure for basic public services 5,377,194,291.00 
Total expenditure in local budget 557,648,215,846.00 
 
Table 7.10 Extract from District 3 (Province C) Performance Report 
Source: LPPD report, district 3, 2011 
Table 7.10 shows an extract from KPI 17 of the policymaker reported by district 3 in province 
C. In fact, this KPI contained a miscalculation error.  Firstly, district 3 had miscalculated the 
total expenditure for basic public services, stating it to be IDR5,377,194,291.00. The correct 
figure should be IDR349,054,837,995.00. This meant that the ratio of expenditures for basic 
public services to total expenditures of the district was calculated to be 0.96%, when it should 
be 63%.  
This 
should 
be 63% 
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Data problems resulted caused double jobs of the regional evaluators. Firstly, they had to 
provide one-to-one mentoring for the key appointment holders at the district/municipality level, 
offering guidance on how to fill in the indicators, what data to use and where to get the data 
from. Then, after the reports were revised and the data completed, evaluation could take place. 
An evaluator of the regional team in province B commented that their work was more like an 
operator’s job (namely, to recalculate most of the data reported by local government before it 
could be inputted into the evaluation template). Moreover, as the key informant on the 
evaluation team in province C (INF3/C) commented, any request to local government for 
additional data or clarification of data obtained a very slow response. Local government 
officials frequently ignored the request, which could cause long delays in completion of the 
evaluation. The informant added that in contrast, the local government attitude to the audit 
process meant that auditors tended to receive respect and attention from the auditee.  
Flawed scoring rules 
As described in Chapter 6, the EKPPD employs a scoring system from zero to four. This 
research found that a problem with the scoring system was the inability of the system to 
differentiate between an indicator with a positive meaning and one with a negative implication. 
In other words, for this particular indicator the system is not able to differentiate between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ performance. This flaw can negatively affect a particular district/municipality 
with a good performance while benefiting others which do not necessary perform better (as 
experienced by municipality 1 at province C). The ratio of ‘environmental cases solved in a 
year’ is one of the indicators used to measure the performance of local governments in the field 
of the environmental affairs with a given formulae:  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑋
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑋
 × 100%   
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For the 2011 evaluation, municipality 1 reported ‘no’ environmental case happened during the 
fiscal year of 2009 (the year for which performance was being evaluated). When a zero case 
was input into the equation above, the result was undefined. The evaluation template 
automatically assigned ‘zero’ score to this KPI and it was treated in the same way as a ‘blank 
indicator.’ The issue about the weakness in the system design was also indicated in a response 
to an open-ended question in the survey questionnaire: 
The key performance indicators should be evaluated, include the formulae used in the 
scoring process, because there are some indicators, when it is completed and then is put 
into the formulae, it reduced the score obtained, which logically should be the opposite. 
(INF5/C/m1) 
Problem with evaluation template   
The evaluation uses a simple template, designed using Microsoft Excel. To control data input, 
the system uses a ‘IF’ function. Taking the example of one of the KPIs for the education sector 
(KPI 13): 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 10
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 9 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
 × 100% 
The logic of the evaluation template was that the maximum value of the ratio = 1 or 100%. If 
the ratio was higher than 1, the evaluation template automatically rejected the data. This means 
that the data cannot be inputted and a score cannot be assigned.  If this happened, the evaluator 
simply assumed that the data reported by local government was invalid.  
The experience of municipality 3 in province C however showed that it was possible for the 
ratio to be higher than 1. The municipality 3 has a policy of free high school education 
(although many neighbouring districts/municipalities still charge a fee). As a result, many 
students from outside the area enrolled in the municipality 3. That is why students enrolling at 
senior high school (Year 10) was much higher than the number who completed junior high 
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school (Year 9) in this municipality. In addition, students who completed their junior high 
school in this municipality had the choice to enrol in senior high school elsewhere. The key 
informant from the municipality 3 said that the evaluator had arrogantly claimed that they had 
reported invalid data and the evaluators forced them to revise the data.  
Scope of regional evaluation 
Ideally, evaluation carried out at the regional level should be a complete evaluation, starting 
from analysing data reported by local government, inputting the data into the evaluation 
template, assigning a score and determining the ranking of each local government regionally. 
However, this was changed because of what happened in province B during the 2010 
evaluation. There, districts X and Y were ranked sixth and ninth respectively within province 
B. However, the result of national evaluation had placed the district X at the lower position 
than district Y. This triggered a protest from district X. According to INF3/B the head of district 
X complained that the national evaluation had undermined the result of the regional evaluation.  
The finding above was supported by evidence from two other sources: documentary analysis 
and survey data. First, an article in Kompas published on 2nd May 2012 reported that the district 
head of West Manggarai protested the results of the EKPPD announced by the national 
government as the result placed his district in a lower ranking than the result of the regional 
evaluation announced by the regional evaluation team. Among the 21 districts and 
municipalities within Nusa Tenggara Timur province, the district of West Manggarai was 
ranked as the 12nd performer with a performance score of 2.146, which was categorised as a 
‘high’ performer. However, the national evaluation team placed it as one of six ‘low’ 
performing local governments for the 2011 evaluation. The district head argued that the 
national evaluation ideally supported the result of the regional evaluation team instead of 
undermining it (cf. Kompas, 2nd May 2012).  Second, in a response to the open-ended question 
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in the questionnaire, one survey participant highlighted the inconsistent results of evaluations 
conducted by the regional and national evaluation team. This led to confusion regarding which 
one the local government should use as a reference (I.R1.D).  
Since then, the determination and announcement of regional ranking was discontinued; only 
national ranking would be announced. The responsibilities of the regional team are limited to 
analysing the data reported by local government, inputting it into the evaluation template and 
sending it to the national evaluation team. Thus, in the last evaluation (2011), the regional 
evaluation team no longer assigned scores or determined regional ranking.   
Influence of subjectivity  
As well as using a desk-evaluation approach, the EKPPD process includes the use of common 
sense and site visits. Districts/municipalities under study report different experiences from year 
to year in relation to site visits conducted by the regional or national evaluation teams. For 
example, for the 2010 evaluation municipality 1 at province C received field visits from both 
evaluation teams. The teams cross-checked all the data, asked to meet directly with the key 
appointment holders from local agencies/technical organisations supplying the data, talked to 
them directly and observed any physical objects reported by the municipality. However, for 
the 2011 evaluation the local team did not perform a thorough evaluation. During the field visit, 
team members met key appointment holders in the government department for two hours but 
rejected an offer to meet with key appointment holders from working units.  
On one occasion, district 2 in province C was evaluated by evaluators from the government 
bureau; another year evaluators were from the development and financial supervisory body. 
The key informant in district 2 (INF2/C/d2) said that evaluation by the government bureau was 
much more flexible. In fact, government bureau evaluators from the governor’s office tended 
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to come from the same background as local government staff77. The experience described by 
this key informant can be linked to the work of Abu Hasan et al (2013) which suggest that 
evaluators (auditors) need to have some empathy with subject being evaluated or auditee.  A 
key informant from the municipality observed in province A (INF3/A/x) stated that no standard 
was applied when regional and national evaluation team made their field visits. INF3/A/x 
reported that the regional team very rigid and strict, the national team was described as more 
flexible. In one year, the evaluation team provided a list of things they wanted to clarify but 
the following year there was no list given.   
As mentioned earlier, the regional evaluation team consists of three different elements. I also 
have described the different approaches undertaken by the different regional teams in 
conducting the evaluation. The problem was that the three elements involved in the regional 
evaluation teams own different levels of skills in relation to evaluation. The first element, the 
government bureau, has a similar characteristic to a government department at local 
government level (the similarity was mentioned earlier). The regional inspectorate is the 
institution which deals with monitoring and internal audit of the provincial government. Not 
all of its staff were accountants; nevertheless, their work relates to assessment and evaluation. 
Finally, the last element, the finance and development supervisory body, is the internal auditor 
of the government, and all the staff are accountants.            
The organisational structure and task distribution in the regional evaluation team of province 
C has two implications. Firstly, there is no party to facilitate communication among different 
elements of evaluators. This caused the evaluation to be not well-coordinated. Each group of 
                                                 
77 Indonesia has an institute devoted to the education of sub-district heads candidates, Institut Pemerintahan 
Dalam Negeri’ (IPDN). Officials to be placed in the government department in charge of the EKPPD at local 
government and regional government level) are usually IPDN graduates. Key appointment holders in charge of 
the EKPPD at the local government level and the key appointment holders in charge of the EKPPD at the regional 
government level therefore tend to come from the same network (i.e. the IPDN alumni).  
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evaluators has to deal directly with the districts/municipalities under its responsibility, for 
example, contacting the mayor/district head to obtain additional evidence or to complete data. 
Secondly, the result of the evaluation could contain a higher bias than that obtained by the 
approach used by the regional evaluation team of province B, as the evaluation skills of the 
three elements of evaluators were not at the same level.  The approach used by regional 
evaluation team in province B seems to be better as any evaluation bias or unfairness was 
reduced by making sure that a district/municipality was assessed by two different elements 
(both elements are familiar with evaluation tasks). This approach undertaken by the regional 
team in province B explained the better implementation of the EKPPD in this province than in 
province C. The different approaches would affect comparability of the evaluation quality 
among the different provinces.  Figure 7.11 summarise factors that influence the reliability of 
regional evaluation results.  
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Figure 7.11 Factors Influencing the Reliability of Regional Evaluation Results 
Source: Developed by author, based on findings 
 
7.4.2    National Evaluation 
Article 6 of Government Regulation No. 6/2008 mandates six ministries and four government 
bodies to be involved in implementing the EPPD; the national evaluation is chaired by the 
Minister of Home Affairs. The organisational structure of the team is presented in Figure 7.12, 
below. Among the ten ministries and government bodies involved, INF5/NG reported that the 
Financial and Development Supervisory Body was actively involved to help MoHA 
conducting the evaluation.   
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According to INF5/NG, implementation of the EKPPD performance evaluation was supported 
only through the routine budget of the MoHA’s evaluation directorate, not by any special 
budget allocation (the Ministry of Finance (MoF) rejected the proposal for this). Evaluators 
from the financial and development supervisory body were supported by internal funds. 
INF5/NG stated that this limited budget meant the government could only facilitate training 
for those provinces/districts/municipalities with the capacity to finance such training. 
Availability of qualified evaluators was said to be limited because evaluator training was also 
considerably limited. INF5/NG commented that most evaluators tended to perform more of an 
‘operator’ job rather than a real evaluation. Furthermore, there was lack of agreement among 
evaluators in terms of how to solve any problems encountered during the evaluation. According 
to INF5/NG, some evaluators preferred to ignore any miscalculation and continue to input data 
into the evaluation template. Moreover, with a limited budget, field visits only could take place 
to some selective districts/municipalities. These were ones nominated to be one of the best 10 
performers, and were limited to a couple of days with only two or three evaluators involved.  
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Figure 7.12 Organisational structure of the EPPD team 
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs Circulation Letter of No. 120.04/2289/OTDA, 27 August 2009 
 
As already mentioned, the evaluation process was carried out manually by the Financial and 
Development Supervisory Body using a Microsoft Excel evaluation template. INF5/NG 
explained that this template often crashed, an indication of the inadequate capacity of Microsoft 
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Excel to support the task. In other words, EKPPD data evaluation requires a more specific 
software package than Microsoft Excel. The inability to support the EKPPD with a suitable 
ITC system relates to the unavailability of budget. Furthermore, as INF3/NG added, the limited 
number of evaluators meant an evaluator could only analyse data for up to a maximum five 
functions out of more than 30 reported on, which, according to INF3/NG, increased the 
evaluation risks. At the same time, data to be evaluated contained many problems, as described 
earlier. The national evaluators experienced a similar situation with the regional evaluator in 
terms of difficulty in getting a response from local government for data clarification or request 
for additional information.  
As displayed in Figure 7.12, ten ministries and government bodies are supposed to be involved 
in EKPPD implementation. In fact, only two elements (MoHA and the financial and 
development supervisory body) were actively involved. As mentioned earlier, MoF rejected 
the allocation of funds for local government evaluation. Similar to the explanation of why 
sector ministries did not support the design phase of the EKPPD discussed in the previous 
chapter, one possible explanation for this could be a conflict of interest between MoF and 
MoHA. The two ministries have been always in a state of competition to gain control and 
influence over local government. Based on Law 32/2004, coordinating districts/municipalities 
and provinces in Indonesia is the responsibility of MoHA, which implies its greater power. The 
new performance measurement initiative (EPPD) was introduced by MoHA. Other ministries 
therefore considered the EPPD (or EKPPD) to be a product of MoHA. Supporting the EPPD 
(or EKPPD) means acknowledging the greater power held by MoHA over local government 
than other ministries.  
In reality, sector ministries still wanted to maintain their control over local government as 
practiced during the centralised era. Alm et al. (2001) has questioned the readiness of sector 
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ministries to give up their control over local government when Indonesia embarked on the ‘big 
bang’ decentralisation in 2001. As discussed in chapter 6, the EKPPD covers all government 
functions which have been delegated to local government. If the EKPPD is successful, it will 
turn MoHA into a very powerful ministry, as all information about the functions implemented 
by local government is included in it. If successful, the EKPPD will have the ability to 
undermine the influence of sector ministries over local government.    
It is also interesting to further analyse why the financial and development supervisory body has 
been actively involved since the beginning and shows a strong and consistent commitment to 
support EKPPD implementation. This body has been in decline since decentralisation. It held 
very important position during the centralised era because the regime did not want the supreme 
audit office to function properly. At the same time, after decentralisation, the government put 
more emphasis on the role of external audit in local government. The local government 
performance evaluation may be seen by the financial and development supervisory body as an 
opportunity to show they still have a role. Moreover, this body has an internal budget which 
can be used for supervision and monitoring purposes. If there is no supervision or monitoring 
activity taking place, the budget cannot be used. Thus, by participating in the EKPPD 
implementation, the financial and development supervisory body can spend its supervision and 
monitoring budget.  
This finding shows how multiple stakeholders with different interests and objectives influence 
capacity to implement the EKPPD. Lack of stakeholder commitment and support has brought 
about two direct consequences: limited availability of evaluators in term of quantity and quality 
and lack of financial source to support the process. What happened during the evaluation 
process at the national level is summarised in Figure 7.13 below: 
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Figure 7.13 Factors influencing reliability of the national evaluation results 
Source: Developed by Author, based on findings 
 
As mentioned earlier, MoHA tended to be late in advising of any changes related to the EKPPD. 
This was also another indication of a lack of readiness on the part of the national government 
to implement the system. For local government, given the very limited time frame, any change 
in format would cause serious consequences, because the adjustment to the new formats when 
data has been collected or the performance report has been written, uses resources and time. 
This can discourage local government from starting the process of data collection and drafting 
the report as early as possible.  
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7.5    Reporting and Evaluating Performance under the EKPPD System 
System design  
From the description and discussion of the implementation process undertaken at different 
levels (local, regional and national government), several issues can be seen to relate to one 
problem: system design. The issues included timeliness, poorly-designed indicators, scoring 
rules, and an unstable evaluation template. Timeliness as a critical issue is reflected in:   
 mismatched availability of external data with timeliness of performance report 
submission; 
 mismatched availability of some internal data with timeliness of performance report 
submission; 
 same deadlines for local and regional government to submit performance report, 
whereas KPIs for regional government depend on data from local government.   
If local government needs to include external data in its performance report for EKPPD 
purposes, it should be ensured that deadlines match with the availability of the external data. 
Similarly, the timeline to submit the report needs to consider the availability of internal data. 
Several indicators would be affected by the availability of external data and 14 indicators would 
be affected by the availability of financial data (see Table 7.11):   
No Key performance indicator Note 
1. Basic public services expenditure KPI 17 (policymaker): harmony of local policy and 
national policy 
2. Expenditure on education and health  KPI 18 (policymaker): harmony of local policy and 
national policy 
3. Absorption of block grant KPI 31 (policymaker): transparency in using transfer 
4. Expenditure allocation financed through 
block grant 
KPI 32 (policymaker): transparency in using transfer 
5. Expenditure allocation from total local 
budget 
KPI 33 (policymaker): transparency in using transfer 
6. Proportion of original local income to total 
local revenues (realisation) 
KPI 34 (policymaker): intensity, effectiveness and 
transparency in collecting original local income 
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7. Proportion of residual income to total 
revenue 
KPI 36 (policymaker): effectiveness of planning, 
execution and accountability of local budget. 
8. Proportion of expenditure realisation to 
budgeted expenditure 
KPI 37 (policymaker): effectiveness of planning, 
execution and accountability of local budget. 
9. Proportion of original local income 
(realisation) to the potency 
KPI 39 (policymaker): local potency management  
10. Increase/decrease in original local income  KPI 40 (policymaker): local potency management 
11. Expenditure allocation to total local budget KPI 13 (policy implementer): financial management  
12. Capital expenditure to total budget local 
agency/technical organisation 
KPI 14 (policy implementer): financial management 
13. Maintenance expenditure to total goods and 
services expenditure 
KPI 15 (policy implementer): financial management 
14. Proportion of maintenance expenditure to 
total expenditure of the technical 
organisation 
KPI 16 (policy implementer): financial management 
 
Table 7.11 Indicators Affected by Availability of Financial Data 
Source: Developed by author, based on analysis 
Regulatory framework 
The problematic of timeliness in terms of there being no time differential between local and 
provincial government deadlines governing the submission of the EKPPD performance report 
relates to the failure to harmonise two different regulations. As mentioned earlier, the 
regulation on the new performance measurement initiative was issued in February 2008 and 
the first evaluation took place in October 2008 (to evaluate local government performance of 
fiscal year ended 31st December 2007). The EKPPD KPIs in this first evaluation were treated 
as supplementary to the LPPD report. As mentioned earlier, the LPPD report itself is regulated 
through Government Regulation No. 3/2007 which came into being a year before the regulation 
on the new performance measurement initiative was signed78. In other words, Government 
Regulation No. 3/2007 governs how local government should report to national government, 
whereas Regulation No. 6/2008 indicates how local government should be evaluated.  
According to INF6/NG who chaired the drafting of the regulation on reporting, the two 
regulations were drafted by two separate directorates at the MoHA (the regulation on reporting 
                                                 
78 Government Regulation No. 3/2007 on LPPD was signed on 4 January 2007; Government Regulation on EPPD 
was signed on 4 February 2008. 
 292 
 
was drafted by the directorate of reporting; the regulation on evaluation was drafted by the 
directorate of evaluation). Both regulations were expected to be harmonised before they were 
implemented. However, the drafting of the local government evaluation regulation took much 
longer to finish and, as a result, harmonisation did not take place whereas the regulation on 
reporting states that both the local and regional governments are obliged to submit the LPPD 
report by 31st March annually. INF6/NG underlined that the LPPD report has its own structure 
and was designed for a model of evaluation, which is different from the concept of the EKPPD.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.14 Unfinished Harmonisation of Regulation on Reporting and Evaluation 
Source: developed by author based on finding 
 
When the design of the EKPPD indicators was completed in 2008 there was confusion in terms 
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year before. To address the confusion, MoHA as secretariat of the EKPPD issued the first 
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guideline required local government to submit the supplement79 by October 2008. For the next 
evaluation, however, the KPIs for the EKPPD should be attached to the report as an annex.  
As the earlier explanation indicates, it is clear that 31st March is the timeline established by the 
regulation on reporting; the regulation on evaluation itself does not mention this deadline. The 
mismatched timeliness thus indicates the failure to harmonise the two regulations. This 
argument is supported by a statement from INF6/NG: 
The reporting mechanism according to government regulation no.3/2007 
does not require the provincial report to be dependent on the local 
government report. That was why the deadline for both to submit the 
report to the MoHA was made the same.  
In contrast, under the EKPPD system, KPIs provinces depend on the KPIs of 
districts/municipalities under its jurisdiction. The EKPPD should follow timeliness set in the 
reporting regulation, as the EKPPD KPIs are presented as an annex to the LPPD report.    
The second explanation relates to lack of clarity during the design phase in terms of how 
performance data should be collected. According to INF2/NG, data from sector ministries 
could be used for this, meaning that MoHA would not need to collect additional performance 
data:    
There is no one who knows better about education than the ministry of 
education: ask them! There is no one knows better about health than the 
ministry of health: ask them! The duty of MoHA should be to coordinate 
other sector ministries (statement of INF2/NG). 
Alternatively, as INF2/NG added, MoHA could conduct a customer satisfaction survey, asking 
local people directly what they think about the performance of their local government. 
                                                 
79 It was referred to as a ‘supplement’ as the LPPD report itself had been submitted by local government by 31st 
March 2008 (apart from in 49 districts and 9 municipalities).  
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However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, INF2/NG adopted another position before the 
draft regulation on the new performance measurement initiative was finalised.  
Lack of understanding of local government practices 
There is evidence that the EKPPD was designed without a full understanding of practices 
applied at local government level. Firstly, the latest technical guideline (which specifically 
stated and provided an example of a matrix on how to report KPIs according to functions) was 
issued only after two evaluations had taken place. It was issued because of the struggle faced 
by the national evaluators in trying to understand why complete data for KPI 17 of the policy-
maker had never been obtained. ‘KPI 17’ means the 17th Key Performance Indicator used as 
one of measures to assess local government performance at the level of policy-makers under 
the EKPPD system. This KPI has been presented in Table 7.5 and discussed earlier. Moreover, 
a cross-check of budget document figures indicated they had never been consistent with each 
other. After that, the national evaluation team realised that districts/municipalities might have 
merged different functions together. It can thus be argued that the EKPPD was designed with 
the assumption that a one-to-one relationship existed between functions delegated to local 
government and the organisational structure of local government, which was not the case in 
practice. Furthermore, the shock response demonstrated by the national evaluator with whom 
the key appointment holders of the municipality 1 in province C had consulted80 provided 
further evidence of the lack understanding of who was involved in EKPPD design with real 
practices existing at local government (the real practices did not always follow what written in 
the regulations).  
  
                                                 
80 The consultation concerned how to deal with a working unit running multiple (more than two) functions, as the 
technical guideline only provided an example of a matrix for a working unit in charge for two functions only.  
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ICT support 
Capacity in terms of ICT at local, regional and national government levels was inadequate to 
support EKPPD implementation. Reliance on a manual system made it hard to expect proper 
implementation, given the massive amount of data to be processed (as mentioned earlier, the 
EKPPD involves 800 pieces of data for each individual district/municipality, and up to 2012 
there were 373 districts and 91 municipalities eligible for EKPPD (Minister of Home Affairs 
Decision No. 120-251, 24th March 2014). Chapter 2 mentions that the proliferation of 
performance measurement in the context of developed economies was possible because of 
advancements in ICT (computer technology). In the case of the EKPPD however the 
Government of Indonesia was tempted to adopt a performance measurement system without 
careful consideration of the feasibility of implementing it in terms of ICT support.  
Budget support 
The finding of this study shows how insufficient budget support significantly affected 
implementation of the EKPPD. During the first year of implementation the government was 
supported by a loan from the ADB. When this came to an end the government relied on the 
routine evaluation budget of the evaluation directorate at the MoHA. However, this was 
limited, and as a result the national evaluation team was unable to provide sufficient training 
for evaluators and key appointment holders at local government. The insufficiency of this 
budget was another reason the evaluation relied on a manual system. At the local government 
level, those districts/municipalities which received adequate budget support showed better 
implementation than others with insufficient support. Budget support for EKPPD varies across 
districts/municipalities and depends on support from elected leaders and the financial capacity 
of the respective districts/municipalities.  
  
 296 
 
Stakeholder involvement  
Stakeholder involvement is more problematic at the national level than at regional and local 
government levels. At the national level, the low support and involvement of stakeholders 
significantly affected the capacity of the national evaluation team to carry out a proper 
evaluation. At the local government level, the finding of the study shows stakeholder 
involvement varied across the nine districts/municipalities observed. Nevertheless, 
districts/municipalities still managed to report KPIs. Even with no support from the elected 
leaders and other local government’ elements, the key appointment holder in the regional 
autonomy division continued to report KPIs, as evidence in municipality in province B shows.  
Human resources 
The low human resource capacity at the local level affected EKPPD implementation in two 
ways. Firstly, staff encountered difficulties in understanding KPIs in terms of the data each 
indicator required. Secondly, local government stakeholders had an insufficient understanding 
of the system design of the EKPPD. For example, they misunderstood the need to report KPIs 
according to the organisational structure of local government rather than the functions run by 
local government. This finding supports Taraschewski and Wegener (2011) which states that 
local government officials do not have a common understanding of the EKPPD system. 
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Inevitable errors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evidence of errors have been found originating from local government during the reporting 
process (for example, those which emerged in district 3 of province C, see Table 7.10) and 
during the evaluation process by the regional team (such as 40 KPIs which were not inputted 
by the into the evaluation template). Box 7.2 above presents the experience of municipality 1 
of province C in relation to human error happened during evaluation process based on the 
EKPPD System. This finding supports the literature which suggests that any attempt to quantify 
is not free from errors (such as Talbot (2010) and Hood (2007), discussed in Chapter 2).  
  
Box 7.2  Inevitable Human Errors in Measuring Performance:                                                           
Evidence from Municipality 1 (Province C) 
For the 2011 evaluation, municipality 1 received an unfair evaluation result because of human error on the part 
of the regional evaluation team. The team’s report stated that municipality 3 did not supply data for 40 KPIs, 
which were thus automatically scored as zero. The effect of this was that municipality 1 got a very low score 
compared to its previous evaluation where it had ranked sixth among the best 10 performers in Indonesia. In 
the 2011 evaluation, the municipality jumped dramatically to 70th position in the national ranking and 11th 
among the 19 districts/municipalities in province C. This was startling news for the mayor, who believed 
performance to be better than the previous year. The local team also considered their report for the 2011 
evaluation to be the best they had written.  
The mayor instructed the local team to send a letter of complaint to the C regional evaluation team and to ask 
for clarification. The report’s statement that 40 KPIs were not fulfilled did not make sense as municipality 3 
had completed all the 158 KPIs. The 40 KPIs logged as ‘blank’ included KPIs for the tourist function, one of 
the municipality’s priority. As INF5/C/m1 commented, ‘This is not possible. Tourism is a priority function for 
us; data about tourism is therefore the first that concerns us.’ The regional evaluation team at province C 
eventually acknowledged that they had missed inputting the data for those 40 KPIs into the evaluation template.  
Source: Interviews with a) key members of team in municipality 1-province C, and b) letter sent in response to 
the evaluation result to the local team, 11th January 2012.  
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Appreciation for EKPPD system 
In general, districts/municipalities did not appreciate the EKPPD system. Here, stakeholders 
instead placed higher value on the financial reports and the accountability report presented to 
the local parliament. This finding is supported by the finding obtained from the survey taken 
among 31 districts/municipalities, in which 58.06 per cent of respondents stated that financial 
reports were the most important priority for stakeholders in their districts/municipalities, and 
only 9.68 per cent indicated that the EKPPD performance report was the first priority (see Table 
7.12).   
 Type of Report 
Priority Financial Report Accountability Report LAKIP Report LPPD Report 
1st 58.06% 16.13% 6.45% 9.68% 
2nd 16.13% 41.94% 9.68% 19.35% 
3rd 16.13% 25.81% 22.58% 25.81% 
4th 0.00% 6.45% 48.39% 35.48% 
 
Table 7.12 Degree of Importance of Different Reports for Stakeholders at Local Government 
Source: Developed by author, analysed from survey data 
The different priority given by stakeholders at local government in relation to four main reports 
that local government should produce, is clearly demonstrated in Figures 7.15. The majority of 
respondents placed the LPPD report which is the basis performance evaluation using the 
EKPPD system as the 4th priority.  
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Figure 7.15 Degree of Importance of Different Reports 
Source: Developed by author, analysed from survey data 
 
Responses on the next question: the extent respondents agree or disagree if ‘performance 
evaluation under the EKPPD system has no financial consequences. This was a reason why the 
KPIs and evaluation results also have no influence on strategic decision making processes at 
the local government.’ Majority of respondents (79%) also agreed with this statement.  This 
point links to the discussion about disconnection between the EKPPD and resource allocation 
that will be discussed in point 8.3.4 
7.6    Conclusions  
The first conclusion obtained from the discussion in this chapter is that inadequate capacity 
exists to implement the EKPPD system at local, regional and national government levels. The 
direct effect of this is the low reliability and comparability of KPIs reported by local 
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government. Furthermore, evaluation conducted on this basis resulted in unreliable 
performance and an incomparable performance index produced from the performance 
evaluation process.  Status and ranking of districts/municipalities were determined based on 
the performance index produced from the EKPPD system; they were therefore unlikely to 
reflect the actual performance of Indonesian local government.  
Capacity to report KPIs at local government level was influenced by three major factors: 
availability of data/ICT, system design, and support of stakeholders. Weakness in system 
design led to the heavy involvement of subjective judgments in deciding which data to use to 
fulfil the KPIs. System design also caused difficulty in terms of the timelines needed to obtain 
data. Underdeveloped ICT systems and infrastructures led to much necessary data being 
unavailable. Availability of data was also affected by the work systems and culture practiced 
at the local government level (e.g. informality and high frequency of staff rotation). Support 
from elected leaders was crucial as it influenced availability of resources needed to implement 
EKPPD, such as personnel and budget. Districts/municipalities with higher organisational 
capacity showed better implementation than others with lower organisational capacity. In terms 
of technical capacity, all districts/municipality faced similar problems.  
Capacity to report at the regional government level was primarily affected by system design, 
and more specifically by timeliness. Meanwhile, the capacity of the regional team to carry out 
the evaluation was affected by three main factors: (i) reliability of the KPIs reported by local 
government, (ii) subjectivity, and (iii) system design. In term of national evaluation, this 
capacity, however, also faced a very serious problem due to a lack of stakeholder support, 
resulting in an inadequate allocation of resources needed to carry out a proper evaluation 
according to the system design. In addition, as part of the inherent weakness of quantification, 
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inevitable errors were found at different stages of implementation (data collection at local 
government, evaluation at regional level, and evaluation at the national level).  
Implementation at local, regional and national government level thus went through a stage of 
confusion. Local government stakeholders remained unclear about how their performance was 
being measured according to the EKPPD system, stakeholders at regional government 
continued to be frustrated with the irrational timeliness for performance report submission, and 
the national evaluation team (MoHA in particular) struggled with inadequate resources.  The 
second conclusion is that the system design of a performance measurement system can be a 
great obstacle at implementation stage, especially when those involved in the design process 
do not have a full understanding about the circumstances or context in which the system will 
be applied. Thirdly, implementation of performance measurement in the context of developing 
economies requires improvement in some basic areas, such as consistency regarding 
regulations and cultural change to align with performance culture.  
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CHAPTER  8                                                                                                                
USE AND DYSFUNCTIONAL EFFECTS OF THE EKPPD                                                                            
8.1    Introduction 
The findings related to the first two phases of the EKPPD, design and implementation, have 
been described and discussed in chapters 6 and 7. The next phase after implementation is use, 
as defined in chapter 2. As the system design affected implementation, as shown in the 
discussion in chapter 7, it might also influence the use of the EKPPD. As described in chapter 
6, the system design of the EKPPD includes some key features: 1) a focus on assessing the 
governance aspect and the services provided by the Indonesian local government, 2) 
introduction through a top-down approach adopting a set of standardised KPIs, 3) performance 
evaluation primarily uses desk-based evaluation but can include common sense and field visits 
to cross-check the performance data. Moreover, in chapter 7, I described and discussed the 
implementation problems encountered by the government at all levels: local, regional and 
national. Problems in implementation may prevent use.  
This chapter therefore aims to present the findings of this study related to the evidence of use 
or non-use of the EKPPD system. The findings show no evidence of the EKPPD results being 
used to inform the policy-making process at the local and national government levels. Thus, 
the real intended use of the EKPPD as a technical instrument to support recentralisation has 
not been achieved yet. Reorganisation of local government in Indonesia has not occurred and 
the attempt to re-impose control over local government appears to not really work. The strong 
influence of the elected leaders in the process of local policy-making suggests that a different 
approach or mechanism might be needed to ensure local policies align with national policies. 
Determining the status and ranking of districts/municipalities with no follow up seem to be 
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disproportionate to the efforts spent by local government to report KPIs and by the regional 
and national evaluation teams to evaluate them. At the same time, a degree of dysfunctional 
behaviour emerged. 
This chapter begins by describing how the results of the EKPPD system should be used by both 
national and local government. It shows a connection between the EKPPD and the second 
measurement system (the EKPOD). The next section focuses on the difficulties in using KPIs 
and performance index of the EKPPD system, covering the regulatory framework, the 
challenges of the performance index, the strong influence of the elected leaders, the 
disconnection of the EKPPD into resources allocation and system design. The discussion then 
moves on to the dysfunctional effects of the EKPPD system and finally the conclusion. 
8.2    The Intended Uses of the EKPPD System 
As discussed in chapter 6, one of driving forces of the new performance measurement initiative 
was recentralisation through a) merging/abolishing regions incapable of achieving the 
objectives of decentralisation policy and b) re-exerting control over local government to ensure 
local policies are aligned with the national policies. Due to technical and political 
considerations, measurement was split into two separate systems: the EKPPD and EKPOD. 
The regulation on the new performance measurement initiative states that those local 
governments whose performance has (according to the annual evaluation) been low for three 
consecutive years will be subjected to the next assessment type, that is, the EKPOD 
(Government Regulation No. 6/2008, article 42 (a)). The worst-case scenario is that poorly 
performing local governments face the risk of being either merged with other regions or 
abolished. Before implementing the EKPOD, however, national government is required to 
provide capacity building programmes for the low performers. Districts/municipalities able to 
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improve their performance can avoid the EKPOD; otherwise, national government will assess 
their capacity to implement decentralisation using the EKPOD. The EKPOD is expected to 
produce recommendations on how poorly performing regions can improve, and they will then 
be given a chance to do so. If they fail to improve their performance, they will be merged with 
other regions or abolished.  
              
Figure 8.1 The Relationship between EKPPD and EKPOD 
Source: Developed by author, on the basis of the EKPPD manual and interviews with INF3/NL 
Figure 8.1 illustrates the relationship between the EKPPD and the EKPOD. As indicated, a 
long and complex process is used to merge and abolish regions which are shown to be incapable 
of implementing decentralisation policy. Two types of measurement should be carried out first.  
According to INF3/NG, the idea during the design phase of the EKPPD was that any low 
performing regions would be required to develop an action plan on how to improve their 
performance. The national evaluation team would assess the plan and determine which actions 
should be undertaken by the regions themselves and which ones that should be carried out by 
sector ministries in the form of capacity building programmes. MoHA, as the evaluation 
secretariat, should send recommendations to the sector ministries; thus, the sector ministries 
can design appropriate capacity building programmes for the respective regions. However, 
according to INF3/NG, at the time this interview took place, the government’s focus was still 
on gathering data from local government. The information thus obtained, however, had not 
EKPPD
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been used for any capacity-building purpose or to contribute to the new design of 
decentralisation in Indonesia. INF3/NG was supported on this point by INF4/NG, INF5/NG 
and INF7/NG. Then, during the investigation at local government level, all key informants also 
acknowledged no impact of the EKPPD on the policies and programmes undertaken in their 
respective districts/municipalities.   
8.3    Difficulties in Using KPIs and Performance Index of the EKPPD 
System  
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 present the results of the performance evaluations from 200781 to 2012 for 
the categories of district and municipality respectively.  
No Performance Category Performance 
Index  
Year of the Performance being Evaluated 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
1. Very high  3.01 – 4.00 3% 0% 0% 6% 6% 12% 
2. High  2.01 – 3.00 38% 69% 79% 78% 81% 51% 
3. Medium  1.01 – 2.00 30% 27% 21% 15% 13% 31% 
4. Low 0.00 – 1.00 15% 4% 0% 2% 0% 6% 
5. Failed to submit 
performance report 
 14% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 8.1 Results of Performance Evaluations Using the EKPPD System: District 
Source: processed from the results of evaluation undertaken for performance, 2007-2012 
 
No Performance Category Performance 
Index  
Year of the Performance being Evaluated 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
1. Very high  3.01 – 4.00 2% 0% 0% 4% 13% 21% 
2. High  2.01 – 3.00 49% 95% 95% 80% 86% 56% 
3. Medium  1.01 – 2.00 27% 5% 5% 16% 1% 22% 
4. Low 0.00 – 1.00 12% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
5. Failed to submit 
performance report 
 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 8.2 Results of the Performance Evaluation Using the EKPPD System: Municipality 
Source: processed from the results of evaluation undertaken for performance, 2007-2012 
                                                 
81 Evaluation of 2007 performance took place in October 2008 and the results came out in 2009. There was thus 
a difference of two years between the year of performance being evaluated and the year the result was announced. 
Similarly, for the 2012 performance, evaluation started in 2013 and the result was announced on 25 April 2014.  
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Tables 8.1 and 8.2 indicate the increasing trend for districts and municipalities to fall into the 
‘high’ performance category and decreasing trend for them to fall into the category of ‘low’ 
performance in the first five evaluations (2007–2011). This can be associated with the fact that 
the local governments knew better how to do the reporting. The evidence for this argument was 
the explanation from one of the key informants (INF3/NG), who stated that the concern of the 
first evaluation was mainly with the format and structure of reporting, not the quality of the 
KPIs reported in terms of their reliability and validity. Districts/municipalities were given a 
high score if they followed the reporting format and structure as required. At this first 
evaluation, among those that submitted the LPPD report, some did not follow the format and 
structure required by Government Regulation No. 3/2007.82 Meanwhile, the weight allocated 
for the format and structure was 20% of the total weight for the final EKPPD index (MoHA 
Circulation letter No. 120.04/2393/OTDA, 5 November 2008), which was quite high, to 
influence the score.  
Using the wrong reporting format and structure was the reason why Yogyakarta was placed at 
the bottom of the league table in the first evaluation (INF/NG). Yogyakarta was given as an 
example was because it used to be well known for many best practices in terms of local 
governance in Indonesia. Once Yogyakarta followed the right format and structure the 
following year, it jumped to being one of the highest performers, as INF3/NG added. 
Yogyakarta was likely to not be the only region experiencing this issue. Improved performance 
scores as a result of local government’s greater familiarity with the intended reporting format 
is not unique to the experience of local government in Indonesia. of McLean et al. (2007) 
revealed this issue in the case of CPA implementation in English local government. In 
                                                 
82 49 districts and 9 municipalities were not evaluated in the first evaluation as they did not submit a LPPD report. 
The ‘LPPD report’ is the name of the report that contains the matrix of KPIs of the EKPPD (as discussed in the 
previous chapter). I also mentioned in the previous chapter that Government Regulation No. 3/2007 is the 
regulation on how local government should report to the national government. 
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investigating auditee perceptions on the external evaluations of the use of resources by local 
authorities in England from 2002 to 2009, Abu Hasan et al. (2013) show that 90% of their 
respondents agreed that the improved score could be associated with the fact that local 
authorities knew where to improve through the indicator provided.  
In the 2012 evaluation, however, both tables show that the results did not follow the trend in 
the first five evaluations. For the district category, for example, there was a  6% increase in 
districts in the ‘very high’ category, a 30% decrease in the ‘high’ category, an 18% increase in 
the ‘medium’ category and finally a 6% increase in the ‘low’ performance category (see Table 
8.1). The case was similar for the municipalities: there was 8% increase in municipalities in 
the ‘very high’ category, a 30% decrease in the ‘high ‘category, a 21% increase in the ‘medium’ 
category, and finally a 1% increase in the ‘low’ performance category (see Table 8.2).  
These changes can be associated with the products of the scoring system. First, there was a 
difference in terms of the number of districts evaluated in the 2012 and 2011 evaluations. In 
2011, 365 districts were evaluated whereas the number increased in the 2012 evaluation to 
become 373 districts. This means that 8 districts were evaluated for the first time in the 2012 
evaluation. This change explained the changes in the proportion of districts in each 
performance category. According to Jacobs and Goddard (2007), who examine whether 
composite indicators are a good way of measuring performance in the public sector, rankings 
are sensitive to the way in which the performance indicators are aggregated. As described in 
the system design, the way in which the final EKPPD index for individual local government 
was produced will be influenced by the total number of local governments being evaluated. 
This relates the data normalisation process discussed in chapter 6.  
Furthermore, Jacobs and Goddard (2007) state, “Small changes in methods used to aggregate 
underlying indicators to construct the composite indicator can have a substantial impact on the 
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results” (p. 106). It is very likely that some changes were made in the evaluation techniques 
such as improving  the formulae used. The reason for this argument is linked to the discussion 
in the previous chapter about the weakness of the evaluation template (see discussion in chapter 
7). The national evaluation team might have corrected the weakness of the evaluation 
techniques, as some local government openly protested about their ranking. 
The changes occurring in the 2012 evaluation can also be connected to the local governments 
‘gaming’ the system. This argument is supported by information received from one of the key 
informants in province B (INF1/B) in a follow-up phone call in May 2012. She said that the 
regional evaluation team in her province were not able to start the evaluation process, as most 
of the local governments had delayed submission of the KPI matrix. Most of the districts and 
municipalities only submitted the LPPD report without attaching the KPI matrix as the basis 
for evaluation under the EKPPD. According to her explanation, the reason why districts and 
municipalities did that was because they wanted to ensure the accuracy of the finance figures 
(to make sure that the figures reported in the KPI matrix were the same as the figures reported 
to the Supreme Audit Office).  
The districts and municipalities wanted to ensure the accuracy of the finance figures because 
this was one of the indicators under the EKPPD system. Ensuring the figures would be 
consistent was achieved by waiting until the audit by the Audit Supreme Office had been 
completed. Therefore, some districts/municipalities in province B intended to delay supplying 
KPIs until June 2012 (by which time it was expected that districts/municipalities would have 
obtained audited financial figures), as INF1/B explained. The reason why they still submitted 
their LPPD report by 31st March without the KPI matrix was because the timeliness of report 
submission was assessed under the EKPPD system (one of the performance indicators to be 
evaluated). By doing this, the local government can secure a score for two KPIs: ‘accuracy of 
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finance figures in the KPIs and the ones reported to the Supreme Audit Office’ and ‘timeliness 
of report submission.’  
It was true that by ‘gaming’ the system in this way, the local governments actually secured 
only two KPIs. However, this could make a big difference in their final index because the 
overall score is very sensitive even to a change in one KPI. This argument is supported by the 
explanation received from another informant in province B during the field visit. According to 
this informant, who had tested what the effect would be if the score for some KPIs changed in 
the final performance index obtained by the local government and their ranking, the change 
could be very significant, even if only one score for one KPI was changed:  “The score is very 
sensitive. If we change the score, even just for one KPI, it can make the ranking of a district or 
municipality jump significantly” (INF3/B). Another piece of evidence to support the 
explanation about the sensitivity of the EKPPD index the when score of an individual KPI 
changes, is reflected in the information provided in Box 7.2 The rank of municipality 3, 
province C decreased dramatically from 10th to 70th in the 2011 evaluation because of a human 
error on the part of the regional evaluator who was in charge of inputting data for municipality 
3 into the evaluation template for 40 KPIs.  
Thus, from the explanation above, the evaluation results presented in Table 8.1 and 8.2 can be 
associated with both factors: the local governments knowing better how to report and a product 
of the scoring system. These findings therefore, support the existing literature that has pointed 
out this issue when aggregating indexes are used (using composite measures). Another message 
that both tables convey is that the results of the first six years of evaluations presented in both 
tables indicate that no district/municipality met the EKPOD criteria; the data presented in 
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 thus explain why no EKPOD has yet taken place. The difficulties in using 
the results from the EKPPD evaluation will be discussed further below.  
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8.3.1    Regulatory Framework 
In the interview with INF3/NG, he mentioned the regulatory framework as one of the reasons 
for which the results of the EKPPD have not been used. More specifically, the Presidential 
Regulation as the necessary implementing regulation for capacity building programmes has not 
been finished yet. He pointed out the long delay in the parliament’s approval of the regulation. 
He explained further that without an implementing regulation, the sector ministries could not 
design any capacity building programmes as designing capacity programmes related to the 
source of the budget to finance the programmes. More clearly, the sector ministries would not 
have a legal basis to make budgetary allocations to support capacity building programmes. 
Thus, this finding shows how the regulatory framework affected the use and usefulness of the 
performance information produced by the performance measurement system. For this reason, 
as INF3/NG acknowledged, designing a measurement system should ensure all related 
regulations is completed at the same time as the issuance of the regulation on performance 
measurement itself.   
Chapter 7 also discussed the implementation of the EKPPD, which has been problematic due 
to the unfinished harmonisation of two different regulations (the regulation on local 
government reporting and the regulation on local government revaluation). Moreover, the need 
for the new system of measurement was also related to the weak regulatory framework.  As 
discussed in chapter 6, the new performance measurement initiative relates to one central 
problem: the negative implications of decentralisation policy. Then if we trace back, the 
negative implications of decentralisation policy were connected to the serious weakness of Law 
22/1999 as the legal basis of the decentralisation policy implemented in 2001. In addition, as 
Rashyid (2004) highlights, sector ministries were also responsible for the necessary 109 
implementing regulations that never been issued (see discussion in chapter 5). This highlights 
a weak regulatory framework as one of characteristics of governance in Indonesia. 
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8.3.2    Challenges of the EKPPD Index 
Reliability of Performance Index 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the struggle of a) local government to report KPIs 
accurately, and b) the regional and national evaluation teams to carry out a proper evaluation.  
The discussion in Chapter 7 concluded that the KPIs reported by districts/municipalities were 
likely to be unreliable, as many factors distorted the data used to complete the KPIs. Similarly, 
the processes of evaluation at the regional and national levels were also affected by many 
factors. Thus, the EKPPD indexes presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 were produced from KPIs 
of questionable reliability, and the evaluation emerged from a process which was improper. 
Therefore, INF3/NG reported that the Minister of Home Affairs openly stated that he had 
lacked confidence in the evaluation result and requested a second opinion from the third party. 
The reliability of the EKPPD index in fact was also affected by corruption and informal 
practices discovered in the districts/municipalities studied. As Faiz (2011) suggested (and as is 
mentioned in Chapter 5), the direct election system that was applied to select mayors/districts 
heads in Indonesia is in fact a very costly process for the candidates. The elected leader 
therefore had an interest in getting their ‘investment’ back through whatever means possible. 
The finding of this study was consistent with that of Faiz (2011). One district head mentioned 
in interview that it was taken for granted that elected leaders received up to 10 per cent of a 
project’s value in the form of ‘project fees’ from contractors (that is, for projects valued at over 
IDR1 billion).  
The working unit (i.e. public works) dealing with many large-scale projects was often used to 
cover any off-budget expenditures. The local budget team anticipated these by allocating a 
higher budget for the agency than was actually needed. One example of ‘off-budget spending’ 
was the provision of ‘extra’ services to the audit team (from the Supreme Audit Office). Local 
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government stakeholders (including elected leaders) avoided irregularities in budget spending 
being exposed and included in the audit report by negotiating the audit findings with the audit 
team. Specifically, the head of finance office would negotiate with the audit team leader to 
decide which findings were to be reported and which to be corrected.  
Another example of off-budget spending was money paid to members of the local parliament 
in order to speed up the approval of the budget proposal. This practice affected the reliability 
of the figures (KPIs) reported by the Finance Office. Meetings between a local parliament and 
local government to discuss budget proposals sometimes took place in a hotel and the money 
needed to pay the bribe was obtained through a mark-up on the hotel fee (the hotel received 
payment up to a maximum of 70 per cent of the total invoice issued; the remaining 30 per cent 
was paid to members of the local parliament involved in the budget committee). These findings 
demonstrate how local government in Indonesia worked with two versions of the budget; this 
study therefore captures evidence of the form of informal practice suggested by Schick (1998) 
and discussed in Chapter 3.     
As indicated in the previous chapter, data problems affected the reliability of the KPIs reported 
by the districts/municipalities studied, and corruption and informal practices aggravated this 
issue. The example given in the previous paragraph likely affected all KPIs related to budget 
allocation, such as ‘capital expenditure to total public works agency expenditure’,  KPI 13). 
The performance of the public works department in relation to KPI 13 would have been 
compromised by part of its capital expenditure budget being used to cover off-budget 
expenditure. Thus, the current study captures evidence of how informality affects performance 
measurement results. More specifically, in the case of the EKPPD, although informality did 
not prevent local government from reporting performance, practices distorted the numbers 
reported. Therefore, the findings of this study expand the work of Mimba et al. (2013) by 
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providing empirical evidence for the influence of informality and the influence of corruption 
from the supply side83 on performance measurement.   
If local government had reported reliable KPIs and the evaluations had been conducted 
accurately, the first six evaluations almost certainly would have results different from those 
presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2. More clearly, if the KPIs reported were reliable and regional, 
and national evaluations were robust, the EKPOD may have taken place. The reliability of the 
EKPPD index thus influences use of the EKPPD system. 
Comparability of Index 
The key informant from the municipality studied at province A (INF1/A/mx) stated that 
different approaches were needed to optimise the development of regions with different 
characteristics and to overcome the different problems which emerged in the different regions. 
He added that problems faced by his municipality were not comparable to those faced by other 
districts/municipalities in Indonesia. That was the main reason why the EKPPD KPIs, along 
with the status and ranking obtained from the evaluation, constituted less relevant information 
for the decision-making process at the local government level. A similar point was also made 
during the interview with a policy maker at district 2 of province C. He explained that the 
quality of education in his district could not be compared with that of other advanced 
districts/municipalities:  
Students in the city may attend a private course after the school day 
finishes, while students in this district go to the fields to help their parents 
or just play around in the river  
According to him, one way to improve the quality of education in his district was to optimise 
the learning process in school, including giving extra meals to the students to improve their 
                                                 
83  Mimba et al. (2013) acknowledge that their study captures the influence of corruption on performance 
measurement from the demand side but not the supply side.  
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nutrition. As a relatively newly established region, district 3 of province C focused on the 
development of essential infrastructure and facilities, such as offices, roads and bridges. The 
district head was also planning to build an airport to support the plantation and fisheries export 
industries. Different characteristics across districts/municipalities thus meant that stakeholders 
at the local level did not see the relevance of the top-down approach of a performance 
measurement system such as the EKPPD. INF1/A/mx for example did not believe that the 
status and ranking achieved by his municipality was a true reflection of its performance.   
As pointed out by INF1/A/mx, regions in Indonesia are very diverse. Moreover, 
districts/municipalities did not start from the same point of departure when decentralisation 
policy was implemented in 2001. At the same time, as mentioned in the discussion about the 
design of the EKPPD system (see Chapter 6), the EKPPD is not equipped with procedures to 
account for the specific circumstances of different regions. The EKPPD index therefore faces 
a major challenge in terms of comparability across regions. Based on the interview with one of 
senior officials at municipality 2 of province C, the municipality 2 for instance found the 
minimum service standard for its education sector less relevant in terms of informing the 
decision-making process because they had achieved a level far beyond the minimum service 
standard. On the other hand, the key appointment holder in charge of reporting data for KPIs 
of EKPPD at education agency of municipality 1 of province C said that for municipality 1, 
the minimum service standard set by the government was difficult to implement for them, the 
standard was too high. 
As mentioned above, district 3 of province C as a newly established region focused on 
infrastructure development; it still therefore had a long way to go to achieve the minimum 
service standard for public services. Measuring performance of different regions using a 
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minimum service standard provides an advantage to developed regions but disadvantages 
under-developed regions:  
(i) Developed regions find KPIs are not useful, as they need a higher standard; 
(ii) For regions in the middle, the KPIs may be still useful; 
(iii) For under-developed regions, higher efforts are required to achieve the minimum 
service standard.  
The education sector in municipality 2 of province C had achieved a very high standard 
compared to other districts/municipalities within province C because of its long history and 
tradition as a centre for education, long before independence. Since the 1920s, the city had 
been a destination for students from neighbouring regions, and even neighbouring countries, 
such as Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam. When the government started to provide free basic 
education in 2005, the municipality 2 started to provide free education at high school level. 
Thus, the high quality of education in this city achieved today cannot be assessed in isolation 
from its long history. This evidence confirms a statement of Jones and Pendlebury (2010, p. 
19) that was quoted in the previous chapter: 
The government services provided today are inseparable from those 
provided in the past and, given that security, health and education are of 
the most fundamental cultural kind, from the long distant past.  
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Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Rank District Province  District Province  District Province District Province 
1 Jombang East Java Sleman Yogyakarta (Java) Tuban East Java Kulon Progo Yogyakarta (Java) 
2 Bojonegoro East Java Wonosobo Central Java Tulungagung East Java Gowa South Sulawesi 
3 Sragen Central Java Boyolali Central Java Jombang East Java Jepara Central Java 
4 Pacitan East Java Karanganyar Central Java Pacitan East Java Pasaman West Sumatera 
5 Boalemo Gorontalo (North Sulawesi) Jombang East Java Purbalingga Central Java Sleman Yogryakarta (Java) 
6 Enrekang South Sulawesi Luwu Utara South Sulawesi Semarang Central Java Purbalingga Central Java 
7 Buleleng Bali Kulon Progo Yogyakarta (Java) Enrekang South Sulawesi Pacitan  East Java 
8 Luwu Utara South Sulawesi  Pacitan  East Java Sleman Yogryakarta (Java) Bangkalan East Java 
9 Karanganyar Central Java Sukoharjo Central Java Jepara Central Java Tuban East Java 
10 Kulon Progo Yogyakarta (Java) Bogor West Java Humbang 
Hasundutan 
North Sumatera Jombang East Java 
 
Table 8.3 Top 10 Performers in the 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 Evaluations: Districts 
Source: Developed by author, processed from ranking published by MoHA for evaluation conducted in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Rank Municipality Province Municipality Region  Municipality Province  Municipality Province  
1 Surakarta Central Java Yogyakarta Yogyakarta (Java) Tangerang West Java Semarang Central Java 
2 Semarang Central Java Magelang Central Java Madiun East Java Madiun East Java 
3 Banjar West Java Tangerang West Java Yogyakarta Yogyakarta (Java) Surakarta Central Java 
4 Yogyakarta Yogyakarta (Java) Semarang Central Java Depok West Java Probolinggo East Java 
5 Cimahi West Java Samarinda East Kalimantan Medan North Sumatera Tangerang West Java 
6 Sawahlunto West Sumatera Bogor West Java Cimahi West Java Mojokerto East Java 
7 Probolinggo East Java Sukabumi West Java Surakarta Central Java Tegal Central Java 
8 Mojokerto East Java Depok West Java Mojokerto East Java Balikpapan East Kalimantan 
9 Sukabumi West Java Makassar South Sulawesi   Tegal Central Java Depok West Java 
10 Bogor West Java Cimahi West Java Sawahlunto West Sumatera Salatiga Central Java 
 
Table 8.4 Top 10 Performers in the 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 Evaluations: Municipality 
Source: Developed by author, processed from ranking published by MoHA for evaluation conducted in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
 
 317 
 
Tables 8.3 and 8.4 present the 10 best performers for the category of district and municipality 
respectively for four evaluations. The shaded cells represent regions outside Java. The data 
above can be summarised as follows: 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Position Java Outside 
Java 
Java Outside 
Java 
Java Outside 
Java 
Java Outside 
Java 
1st rank x  x  x  x  
2nd rank x  x  x   x 
3rd rank x  x  x  x  
4th rank x  x  x   x 
5th rank  x x  x  x  
6th rank  x  x x  x  
7th rank  x x   x x  
8th rank  x x  x  x  
9th rank x  x  x  x  
10th rank x  x  x x x  
 
Table 8.5 Summary of Top 10 Performers in the 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 Evaluations: Districts 
Source: Developed by author, summarised from Table 8.3 
 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Position Java Outside 
Java 
Java Outside 
Java 
Java Outside 
Java 
Java Outside 
Java 
1st rank x  x  x  x  
2nd rank x  x  x  x  
3rd rank x  x  x  x  
4th rank x  x  x  x  
5th rank x   x  x x  
6th rank  x x  x  x  
7th rank x  x  x  x  
8th rank x  x  x   x 
9th rank x   x x  x  
10th rank x  x   x x  
Table 8.6 Summary of Top 10 Performers in the 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 Evaluations: Municipality 
Source: Developed by author, summarised from Table 8.4 
 
As clearly presented in the two tables above, the results of the last four evaluations have 
demonstrated the domination of Javanese regions among the 10 best performers. Moreover, 
none of districts from Kalimantan and Papua and Nusa Tenggara have ever achieved a position 
in the top 10. This data supports the previous argument that the EKPPD benefits developed 
regions and undermines the performance of under-developed regions.  
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To sum up, standardised KPIs do not capture the specific circumstances of different regions, 
which are very diverse in many aspects (geography, economy, social, ethnicity, culture and 
religion). This weakness is acknowledged by the Minister of Home Affairs, who has mentioned 
the need for clustering different regions (Haluan, 2012).  
Reliance on Output Measures 
As discussed in chapter 6, for the technical and political considerations, the EKPPD design 
system mainly adopts output indicators.  However, Jones and Pendlebury (2010, Chapter 2) 
remind us that output indicators are likely to be less relevant to the decision-making process. 
Taking as an example KPI 9, which relates to the assessment of the policymaker, the indicator 
for performance is ‘timeliness of performance report submission to the government according 
to regulation’ (see detail in Table 8.7 below). 
Measurement Level Policymaker 
Measurement aspect Harmony and effectiveness of relationships between government and local 
governments, and among local governments in the corridor of regional autonomy 
development (second aspect) 
Measure number  9th  
Description of measure Timeliness of performance report submission to the Government according to 
regulation 
Measure of achievement  On time/not on time 
Supporting evidence Proof of report submission84  
 
Table 8.7 KPI 9 (Policy-maker) 
Source: Circulation letter of Ministry of Home Affairs Number 120/313/OTDA, 24th January 2011. 
The basic question for this kind of KPI is whether ‘timeliness of report submission’ is a true 
reflection of the harmony and effectiveness of the relationship between local and national 
governments. The discussion in Chapter 7 has demonstrated how ‘timeliness of report 
submission’ is a very serious issue in relation to the EKPPD. In 2012, for example, due to its 
limited capacity, district 3 at province C was unable to submit its performance report by the 
                                                 
84 When local governments submit their performance report, it is usually accompanied by a letter signed by the 
mayor/district head. The date this letter is signed is the basis on which the submission is judged to be on time or 
not.   
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deadline (see discussion in point 7.3.1). Its inability to submit a performance report was thus 
nothing to do with the degree of harmony and effectiveness of its relationship with the national 
government, but purely a problem with institutional capacity. Therefore, KPI 9 can be 
misleading in judging the quality of the relationship between national and local governments.  
The second example is KPI 11 (Table 8.8, below). 
Measurement Level Policymaker 
Measurement aspect Harmony and effectiveness of relationships between government and local 
governments and among local governments in the corridor of regional autonomy 
development (2nd aspect) 
Measure number  11st   
Description of measure Implementation of minimum service standard 
Measure of achievement  Number of functions whereby minimum service standard have been implemented 
Type of data Mentioned number of function (…..functions) and then list the function: 
- Function……………… 
- Function……………… 
- Function……………… 
- Function……………… 
- Function……………… 
- Function……………… 
 
Table 8.8 KPI 11 (Policymaker) 
Source: Circulation letter of Ministry of Home Affairs Number 120/313/OTDA, 24th January 2011 
KPI 11 captures information about whether the minimum service standard for certain functions 
has been implemented or not yet (‘YES’ or ‘NO’). However, the extent to which the minimum 
service standard for the respective functions has been achieved is not captured. That is why 
this type of indicator is categorised as a raw measure or low level of output.  The evidence 
shows different levels of implementation in the different districts/municipalities studied. As 
mentioned above, municipality 2 at province C achieved far more than the minimum service 
standard for the education sector. On the other hand, the implementation of the minimum 
service standard in municipality 1 at province C reached a level of about 80 per cent of the 
minimum service standards. KPI 11, however, cannot distinguish between these levels of 
achievement and both municipalities were assigned the maximum score of 4 for this indicator.    
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The type of KPIs adopted at the policy implementer level face similar problems. For example, 
the effectiveness of policies made by local policymakers is measured through the 
‘completeness of planning documents owned by the policy implementers’ (see Table 8.9).  
Measurement Level Policy Implementer 
Measurement aspect Local development planning (5th Aspect) 
Measure number 9 
Description of measures Completeness of planning documents owned by the policy 
implementers 
Measurement of achievement  Availability of three types of documents: 
1. Strategic planning document 
2. Work plan document 
3. Budget plan document 
 
Table 8.9 KPI 9 (Policy Implementer) 
Source: Circulation letter of Ministry of Home Affairs Number 120/313/OTDA, 24th January 2011 
KPI 9 only captured information about whether the planning documents were complete or not. 
It did not, however, record whether these documents were utilised or not. Key informants in 
several of the districts/municipalities studied acknowledged that in practice the planning 
documents were often not consulted. Thus, for KPI 9, if working units had the three types of 
documents (strategic plan, annual work plan and budget plan) the maximum score of 4 was 
assigned, regardless of whether the plans were followed in practice or not. No difference was 
thus recorded between working units which had complete planning documents and used them 
to guide their work, and those which merely owned the documents and did not use them.  
Controllability of Performance  
Chapter 6 also discussed how the EKPPD was designed as functions-based performance 
measurement system. The serious difficulty with this system is how to attribute performance. 
Contributions to the performance of a specific function might be made by several working units 
(see discussion in point 7.3.1). At the same time, the heads of these working units were 
concerned with the performance of the organisations they led. They were accountable to the 
elected leaders based on a performance contract concluded prior to their appointment. 
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Moreover, a functions-based performance measurement system (such as the EKPPD) differs 
from the LAKIP performance measurement system which was departmental-based. This 
difference explains why the heads of the working units were more familiar with LAKIP than 
the EKPPD (apart from the fact that LAKIP was introduced much earlier than the EKPPD).  
8.3.3    Strong influence of elected leaders  
As mentioned in section 8.2, all key informants acknowledged that the EKPPD results had no 
impact on the policies and programmes undertaken in their respective districts/municipalities. 
According to INF1/A/mx, the central reference point for the stakeholders in the municipality 
observed in province A when making decisions was the vision and mission statement of the 
elected leader: 
For everything that takes place at the local government should refer to the 
local mid-term plan. This plan is a transformation of the vision and 
mission statement of the mayor. The mid-term plan determines 
programme priorities for five years, annual plan and budget allocation. 
Thus, we are not going in any different direction just because the 
government introduces the EKPPD. (Interview with INF1/A/mx on the 4th 
January 2012) 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, in 2005 Indonesia introduced a system of direct election for the 
head of district/mayor. Each elected leader has a vision, missions and programmes that they 
want to accomplish during the five year term of office, which in practice is equal to the local 
mid-term plan. Ideally, the local mid-term plan should be linked to local strategic planning, 
and local long-term planning should refer to the national long-term plan. This is mandated in 
Law 17/2007 on the national long term plan 2005-2025 (see Article 6, which implies that the 
formulation of the vision, missions and programmes of the elected leaders should align with 
national goals). The practice, however, was far from ideal, as commented on by INF8/C/m2 
who was twice involved in formulating the local mid-term plan. 
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Investigation of the three districts and six municipalities indicated that the vision and missions 
were very much dependent on individual leaders. As well as a strong tendency to promote local 
identity, the educational background and previous career of elected leaders were among the 
important factors which shaped their vision and missions. Moreover, political affiliation (which 
party sponsored individuals to participate in the election) influenced the policy direction taken 
by those elected during the course of their leadership. In addition, the general secretary of 
district 3 at province C stated: 
The [elected leaders] who come and go every five years determine 
everything in the way this district operates. All of us here [bureaucrats] 
just have to adjust things accordingly to align with his vision and missions. 
The implication is that this position of strength enabled elected leaders to control stakeholders 
at local level, and that the heads of working units preferred to follow the requirements of the 
elected leader rather than refer to national policy. This argument was supported by the 
explanation of INF5/C/m2. According to him, each head of a working unit in the municipality 
signed a performance contract with the mayor. For example, the target for the education agency 
was to achieve an international standard for the senior high school, enabling students to enrol 
in overseas universities (students graduating from high school in Indonesia cannot usually 
apply directly to overseas universities as the standard is different). 
The reason local government stakeholders tended to follow their elected leaders was that the 
vision and mission statement made by these leaders was a political contract between the leaders 
and the local parliament: 
The local medium-term plan [a manifestation of the vision and missions 
statements of elected leaders] is a political contract between elected 
leaders and local parliament. So we just stick to this plan in whatever we 
do [for five years], and whatever new systems [e.g. EKPPD] are 
introduced, we cannot just change direction (Interview with INF1/A/mx). 
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Every year in the accountability speech to the local parliament, the mayor would be held 
accountable according to the extent his vision and missions had been achieved. This 
accountability report was placed second in importance for local government stakeholders after 
the financial report; a finding supported by results of a survey of 31 districts/municipalities as 
presented in Figure 7.16. As Table 7.9 shows, 41.94 per cent of respondents considered the 
accountability report of the elected leaders to local parliament to be the second priority, while 
only 19.35 per cent of respondents considered the LPPD report (used as the basis for the 
EKPPD) to be the second priority. The majority perceived the LPPD report to be the fourth 
priority for local government stakeholders (35.48%).  
Evidence found in the district 2 at province C supports the statements of INF1/A/mx and a high 
official at district 3, province C. One of key informants at the district 2 of province C stated 
that the previous district head wanted to construct a modern hospital, and as construction was 
incomplete in the final year of his term, he instructed the local budget team to shift resources 
allocated to other purposes to its completion. The local budget team tried to cut the budget from 
different programmes. However, before the budget was approved by the local parliament, the 
amount shifted from the different programmes was still insufficient to ensure the completion 
of the hospital. To address this, the local budget team made a massive cut to the budget 
allocation for the agriculture agency. Accidently, the budget allocation was cut from the core 
programmes of the agency. As a consequence, the agency could not run its main programmes 
for that given year. This is further evidence of the power of the elected leaders in determining 
local budget allocations. This finding thus supports the work of Mimba et al. (2013).   
Van Helden and Reichard (2013) suggests that contingency factors could be distinguished into 
three levels: societal, sectoral and individuals levels. The case of the EKPPD showed empirical 
evidence for the influence of contingency factors at the individual level on performance 
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measurement. As discussed earlier, the education and previous career background of the 
elected leaders shaped the way they defined their visions and missions to be accomplished over 
their five year term of office. Accomplishment of these visions and missions were key to 
programmes undertaken at local government over the course of five years. Therefore, 
information produced by the EKPPD as a performance measurement system had no influence 
on policies and programmes formulated at the local level. This finding also support De Lancer 
Julnes and Hozler’s (2001) argument related to the influence of internal interest on performance 
measurement, as discussed in chapter 2.  
8.3.4    Disconnection of performance measurement system to resources allocation 
According to one of high officials interviewed at MoHA, for the EKPPD results to be useful, 
they needed to be linked to resource allocation. More specifically, the EKPPD was supposed 
to be linked to the transfer from the national government to local government. However, this 
transfer used a formula that was nothing to do with the EKPPD. This informant highlighted the 
coordination with MoF as the ministry managing transfers to local government. The variables 
used by MoF to determine general allocation fund for local government is displayed in Figure 
8.2 below.   
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Figure 8.2 Variables of General Allocation Funds 
Source: Indonesian Ministry of Finance, Directorate of Fiscal Balance Central and Local Government (n.y.) 
The disconnection between resource allocation and the EKPPD also explains why the EKPPD 
has no effect on local policymaking. I believe that if the EKPPD is connected to resource 
allocation (that is, if the EKPPD result determines transfers to local government), the EKPPD 
must get full attention from stakeholders at local government. This argument was supported by 
the explanation of key informants who suggested that elected leaders were more concerned 
with the type of reporting that had financial implications than those that had no financial 
consequences (this point was discussed in the previous chapter). The financial report influenced 
many aspects of local government operation. For example, a delay in submitting the financial 
Fiscal needs Fiscal capacity 
Population index 
General Allocation Fund 
Salary of civil servant Fiscal gap 
Area occupied index 
Construction price index 
Fiscal needs 
Human development index 
Original local income 
Revenue sharing (taxes) 
Revenue sharing (natural 
resources) 
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report to the Supreme Audit Office caused a delay in approval of the report by the local 
parliament (the regulation requires the financial report to be audited before it can be approved 
by the local parliament). The delay in the approval of financial report for fiscal year of 201X 
for example would delay in the process of budget revision for the fiscal year or 201X+1. Delays 
in budget revision brought other implications such as insufficient time to execute programmes 
inserted in the budget revision.  
The issue of the disconnection between resource allocation and the results of the evaluation 
was also commented on by one of the survey respondents: 
The EKPPD was relatively separated from the local government work plan; therefore 
the result received insufficient attention as a basis to plan the future work plan. (ks2.d)   
Another respondent commented: 
There should be reward and punishment… when the result is good, the government 
should give additional budget allocation for local government… but when the 
performance is poor, there should be a punishment too. (y.4.d) 
Another response linked the lack of commitment and attention of other stakeholders in local 
government, commitment of the elected leaders and reward and punishment (r3.m). A similar 
answer was provided by another respondent: 
So far, there is no a clear reward and punishment. As a result, many elected leaders 
have not focused on implementing the EKPPD and therefore, the EKPPD only becomes 
a routine activity. (r.1.d) 
The four responses to the open-ended question in the survey questionnaire above highlight the 
importance of reward and punishment for the EKPPD to receive enough attention from the 
internal stakeholders of local government, including the elected leaders. Thus, the comments 
from the survey data supported the findings from the interviews discussed earlier.  
MoF applied a policy of reward and punishment to encourage each local government to submit 
its financial report on time. For example, there would be a cut in the general allocation of funds 
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to any local government which submitted its financial report after the deadline of 31st March. 
This cut was a certain percentage of the total transfer, which increased gradually with the length 
of the delay. For example, a one-month delay resulted in a two per cent cut, a two month delay 
in a ten per cent cut and a three month delay in a 15 per cent cut. Conversely, there was reward 
of 15 per cent extra for any local government managing to submit its financial report on time. 
With real financial consequences such as these, local governments began to show more concern 
for their financial report.  The EKPPD system, however, does not include financial incentives. 
Good performers received appreciation from the government in form of certificate. On the 
other hand, as discussed earlier, those local governments whose performance has been low for 
three consecutive years under the EKPPD system will have to face another evaluation using 
the indicators of EKPOD.  
At local government level, resource allocation was influenced by the interests of elected leaders 
as discussed earlier. The missing link between the EKPPD and the local budget cycle was also 
acknowledged by INF2/B: thus, ‘We cannot see where to connect the EKPPD to the budget 
process.’ This is consistent with Taraschewski and Wegener (2011), who state: ‘there is no 
systematic link to the planning process to inform the next budget and program plan in order to 
improve upon objectives based on specific indicators’ (p.50). The findings of this study also 
agree with Radin (1998) who argued that the institutionalisation of performance measurement 
into the budget process would create an important link to decision-making and encourage it to 
be taken seriously by the object being measured. 
8.3.5    System design  
The description of how local policies are formulated in the previous section pointed to the 
diversity of local objectives. The different objectives were influenced by the specific 
characteristics of the regions and the elected leaders.  On the other hand, the EKPPD system 
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imposed a set of standardised KPIs. Key informants at local government level highlighted that 
the standardised KPIs for a country as diverse as Indonesia seem to be inappropriate. 
Municipality 3 for example, strongly complained that the tourism function is only measured 
through two KPIs: 
1) Number of tourist visits per year, and  
2) Contribution of the tourism sector to regional gross domestic product 
These two KPIs were assumed to not fully capture municipality 3’s performance in tourism, 
which was the function with the highest priority in this municipality.  
Tourism was weighted very lightly in the EKPPD system because it was classified as an 
optional function. The EKPPD placed heavy weight on obligatory functions such as education 
and health. In this sense, the weighting system (see Figure 6.7) benefited regions with priorities 
which fell into the category of obligatory functions, and punished regions with those in the 
category of optional functions. From a national government perspective, obligatory functions 
were weighted heavily, because with decentralisation, local government was supposed to 
provide local people with at least the minimum level of basic services.85 This perspective was 
reflected in the interview with INF2/NG. Local government, however, had a different 
perspective. Interviews with the four elected leaders indicated that the priority of elected 
leaders in the context of decentralisation was to build a strong foundation for local economies 
through exploring and utilising local potencies.  
8.3.6    Evaluation feedback 
Finally, insight derived from the interview with INF4/NG also explained the non-use of the 
evaluation results at the local level. INF4/NG highlighted the long gap between the year of the 
                                                 
85 Basic services are categorised as obligatory functions. 
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performance being evaluated and the year for completing the evaluation and giving the 
feedback on performance. This gap of two years rendered the feedback less relevant to the 
decision-making process at the local level, such as for budget formulation. INF4/NG was 
supported by a comment from a survey participant: “The results of the evaluation conducted 
by the regional and the national government often arrive late and seem to lack transparency” 
(r.1.d). Analysis of the evaluation reports produced by regional and national evaluation teams 
show that the type of evaluation feedback at both the regional and national levels merely 
recorded the score achieved by local government for each measurement aspect and function. 
The report also described in which area local governments attained a very high, high, medium 
or low score, with no real recommendations provided on how to improve performance.  
8.4    Dysfunctional effects 
The discussion in the previous section focused on the non-use of evaluation results using the 
EKPPD system. During the investigation, however, I found evidence of a number of 
dysfunctional effects.  Firstly, it is possible that some elected leaders paid attention to the 
EKPPD merely to enhance their reputation. This is based on evidence discovered during the 
interview with a senior official at MoHA. The official received a call from municipality Z 
offering to host the celebration of Regional Autonomy Day in April 2012. As mentioned 
earlier, 25th April is when the Indonesian government announces the status and ranking of 
districts/municipalities according to the EKPPD system.  INF4/NG reported that municipality 
Z’s offer was contingent on the municipality being ranked as one of top ten best performers. 
Hosting such an event on a national scale would require substantive costs as it would be 
attended by the vice president, members of various ministries, 33 governors and over 500 
mayors/districts heads across Indonesia.   
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Furthermore, the interview with the INF5/NG revealed evidence that some regions had hired 
the Financial Development Supervisory Body to act as a consultant in preparing their EKPPD 
performance report. The Financial Development Supervisory Body was also the one that would 
evaluate the performance report after it had been prepared, and there was thus a conflict 
between the two roles it played. Regions which lacked the capacity to prepare the report 
themselves (but still wanting to obtain a high score) employed a short cut, namely hiring the 
evaluators to make the report for them.  
Implementation of the EKPPD also created an opportunity for corruption on the part of the 
evaluators. According to INF3/C/m1, on one occasion he asked for an explanation from the 
national evaluation team as to why the ranking of his municipality in the 2011 evaluation 
represented a dramatic decline in comparison with the previous evaluation. In response, the 
national evaluation team asked him, ‘Did you serve the evaluators who came for field visit?’ 
INF3/C/m1replied: 
Yes, we welcomed the evaluators and served them according to our 
normal way of serving our guests. We provided all the data to be clarified. 
We offered whether they wanted to cross check the data to the working 
units that supplied the data. 
According to INF3/C/m1, the national evaluation team responded: ‘Was that all? No other kind 
of service?’  INF3/C/m1said that initially he did not understand the meaning of the latter 
question, but later on he realised it referred to the provision of money.  In this example, EKPPD 
implementation represented an opportunity for irresponsible evaluators to obtain personal 
benefit (corruption).  
The triggering of corruption is perhaps the most different type of dysfunctional effects of 
measuring performance than those discussed in the literature. This difference connects to a 
specific characteristic of the context of developing economies (namely, the prevalence of 
corruption) as identified by Mimba et al. (2007) and as discussed earlier (see Chapter 3). This 
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finding implies that performance measurement introduced in a corrupt system can lead to 
further corruption instead of reducing it. It is also consistent with the study of Harun et al. 
(2012, see p. 273) on the adoption of an accrual accounting system by Indonesian local 
government, which suggests that it has stimulated corruption as local government hired 
consultants to help with preparing the financial report. In order to win the project, the 
consultants had to bribe the local government official in charge.    
8.5    Conclusion 
The findings of this study indicate that there was no evidence of use of the information 
produced from the performance evaluation under the EKPPD system either by the national 
government or local government. After six rounds of evaluation, no further evaluation (i.e. 
EKPOD) has taken place yet, and therefore, no district/municipality has been either merged or 
abolished. The intermediate use to design capacity building programmes to help poorly 
performing local governments to improve their performance has also not been done yet. What 
has taken place has been limited to a) the routine activity of reporting local government 
performance and the evaluation of the performance report, both regionally and nationally, and 
b) the status and ranking of districts/municipalities being announced annually to celebrate 
Regional Autonomy Day. This constitutes a very narrow use compared to the effort expended. 
The powerful influence of elected leaders in directing local policy implies that government 
efforts to align national and local policy through the EKPPD have also not yet been achieved, 
and that national government has not regained control over local government. The findings of 
the study show some forms of dysfunctional effects (i.e. corruption) and ‘gaming’ of the 
system.    
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Five major factors which contribute to EKPPD results not being used are (1) regulation, (2) the 
challenges of the performance index, (3) the elected leaders, (5) the disconnection of the 
performance measures with resources allocation, and (5) the system design. Firstly, sector 
ministries need an implementing regulation in order to design and carry out capacity building 
programmes to help poorly performing regions improve their performance. The completion of 
this implementing regulation has been delayed and has not been finished yet.  Secondly, the 
index produced from the evaluation as a basis for further stages of evaluation (concluding with 
merger and abolishment) has been distorted by numerous factors.  The reliability of the index 
seems to have affected use. Hence, the narrowness of the index is inadequate for capturing the 
overall performance of districts/municipalities which have different characteristics and 
objectives.  
Thirdly, the strong influence of elected leaders has influenced the use of the EKPPD on both 
sides, both national government and local government. More clearly, the strong influence of 
elected leaders means that imposing control over local government does not work; stakeholders 
at local government level have continued working towards the achievement of the visions and 
missions of the elected leaders. Then, a disconnection between the EKPPD results and resource 
allocation works in two ways: there was a missing link between resource allocations from: a) 
the national government to local government and b) from local government to the working 
units. Finally, the influence of system design on the use of the EKPPD result was seen more 
obviously from a local government perspective.  
The final point to be made is in relation to system design and the context of Indonesian local 
government. Given the significant diversity of regions in Indonesia, compounded by the very 
strong influence of district heads/mayors in directing local policies (as a consequence of the 
direct election system), the use of a top-down approach and standardised measures are unlikely 
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to be appropriate. The powerful position of the elected leaders suggests that performance 
measurement which is internally developed may work better in terms of how working units 
will respond to performance measurement.  In addition, performance measurement system rely 
on a large quantity of data such as the EKPPD seems to be not suitable with current condition 
of Indonesia as reflected from a statement of one of key informant:  
Performance measurement relying on the large scale quantitative data is 
not suitable yet for Indonesia. You know how difficult the availability of 
data is. Obtaining data here is like trying to capture ten grasshoppers. 
Therefore, the result was unbelievable (INF6/NG).  
‘Obtaining data is like trying to capture ten grasshoppers’ is an analogy used by INF6/NG to 
describe the difficulty of accessing data.  
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CHAPTER  9                                                                                            
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
9.1    Reopening the Case   
This study aims to improve our understanding of performance measurement systems in the 
context of developing economies. More specifically, this study intends to understand (1) the 
driving forces of the development of performance measurement systems in this context, (2) the 
effectiveness of their design, implementation and use, (3) the factors that have influenced  the 
effectiveness of the performance measurement systems applied in this context in terms of its 
three main phases: design, implementation and use, and (4) how the complex, non-linear 
interactive effects of the different factors influence the design, implementation and use. The 
new performance measurement system being applied in Indonesia which is aimed at assessing 
the performance of local government in the context of re-designing decentralisation policy has 
been used as a case study to address the five research questions posed in this study.  
RQ1. Why was this new performance measurement system established in Indonesia and how? 
This first question aims to achieve the first objective of the study – to understand whether the 
EKPPD has been developed for the purposes of functional use (i.e. to improve performance) 
or to serve other purposes that are nothing to do with improved efficiency and effectiveness of 
public service delivery at the local level, which will be consistent with argument of institutional 
theories. Furthermore, if the system has been developed for non-functional reasons or a 
combination of functional and non-functional arguments, where did the pressures come from? 
Were they merely internal or were international donor agencies involved? If international donor 
agencies were involved, how did they exert their influence? These questions stem from the 
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concept of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powel, 1983). Chapter 6 addresses this 
first research question.     
RQ2. What system design does the new performance measurement system in Indonesia follow? 
Why was it designed in the way it was and how effectively has the system been designed? This 
second research question connects to the second objective of the study. This question was 
informed by the key argument of contingency-based studies: the design of accounting tools 
(e.g. performance measurement systems) should fit with the context (Otley, 1980; Chenhall, 
2003; Van Helden and Reichard, 2013) – a fit between design and context is expected to bring 
improved performance while a poor fit will damage performance. This second question was 
also inspired by the institutional arguments: conflict of interests among different stakeholders 
may affect features of design such as the selection of indicators. Chapter 6 addresses this 
question.  
RQ3. How effectively has the new performance measurement system been implemented?  This 
third research question also links to the second objective of the study. This question was 
inspired by the work of Mimba et al. (2007) who identify specific characteristics of the public 
sector in the context of developing economies that are different from those in the developed 
economies. Chapter 7 provides answers to this question.  
RQ4. Is there any evidence of use of the information produced from this new performance 
measurement system? If there is any evidence, how has the information been used?  If there is 
no evidence, why has the information not been used? This question also aims to achieve the 
second objective of this study. It was also motivated by studies drawn from institutional 
approaches in researching performance measurement systems. Chapter 8 answers this question.  
Finally, RQ5. Which factors influence the design, implementation and use of the new 
performance measurement system in Indonesia? How do the complex interactions between 
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technical, organisational and institutional factors work to influence this design, implementation 
and use? This study was derived from contingencies-based studies. I was influenced primarily 
by the work of authors such as Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004), De Lancer Julnes and Hozler 
(2001) and Van Dooren (2005). The answer to this final question is reflected in the three 
findings chapters: chapters 6, 7 and 8 but further elaboration is needed and will be discussed 
below.    
This chapter starts by presenting the main findings of the study. This section elaborates further 
the findings discussed in chapters 6, 7 and 8. The subsequent sections discuss the academic 
contributions and practical implications of this research, revisit of expectations set the 
beginning of the study, address the limitations of this study, provide conclusion of the study, 
present lessons gained from the PhD process and finally notes potential for future research.   
9.2    Main Findings 
9.2.1    Drivers 
The decentralisation policy implemented in Indonesia in 2001 (under law 22/1999) brought 
about several negative implications. These implications can be classified into (i) the threat for 
the unity of the country in the long term, (ii) inconsistencies of some practices at the local level 
with neoliberal principles, (iii) decentralised corruption, and (iv) environmental degradation. 
The negative implications caused re-definition of decentralisation through law 32/2004. The 
redefinition of decentralisation meant reducing freedom of regions as decentralisation is no 
longer the devolution of authority only but also include a responsibility. The new definition 
implies that the government wanted to re-exert control over local government. The new law 
mandates the development of technical instrument to merge or abolish incapable regions in 
implementing decentralisation policy. Since the legal basis for the development of the new 
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performance measurement initiative contains a spirit of re-centralisation, it implies that the new 
performance measurement initiative was aimed to achieve recentralisation effort. The objective 
of establishing the new performance measurement to support re-centralisation is manifested in 
the measurement aspects adopted in the new measurement system which clearly aims to align 
local and national policies. Indirectly, this implies an intention to create a uniform system of 
local government programmes in Indonesia, as existed during the centralised era.  
The internal demand for measuring performance of Indonesian local government was 
supported by the international donor agencies, the World Bank in particular. The support was 
connected to the World Bank’s interest in protecting its neoliberal agenda in the country. The 
evidence to support this argument arises from two things. First of all, the literature suggests 
that the radical decentralisation implemented in Indonesia from 2001 onwards had some 
negative implications, namely, 1) local government became an active economic actor instead 
of supporting the private sector to participate in regional economic development, 2) local 
government tended to issue regulations which were unconducive for the investment climate to 
grow, and 3) protection of property rights was weakened (in that a desire to take over foreign 
companies operated in the regions). The second item of evidence is that the measurement 
framework built and offered by the World Bank to be adopted as an instrument to measure the 
performance of Indonesian local government in the context of decentralisation showed a strong 
influence of neoliberal principles. This is manifested in one of the measurement aspects 
included in the framework (investment climate).    
Both internal and external interests to establish a new performance measurement initiative were 
also influenced by global commitments, such as the aim to achieve the MDG target by 2015. 
In Indonesia, the implementation of decentralisation brought about a shift in responsibility for 
achieving the MDGs to local government, triggering the need to track and monitor how well 
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local government performed in this regard. The influence of the MDGs on the new 
measurement system is clearly evident in the KPIs adopted, such as those covering the 
education and health sectors. The drivers thus were not mainly connected with the basic 
premise of performance measurement discussed in chapter 2 (namely, improved performance 
in terms of efficiency and effectiveness).  
9.2.2    The role of international donor agencies 
The new measurement system has been considerably influenced by (and has received the 
support of) international donor agencies, from the very beginning of the initiative up to its 
initial implementation. The World Bank played an extremely important role in initiating the 
new system, and also built a measurement framework which was planned for use as a basis 
from which to develop the indicators to assess the performance of Indonesian local 
government. Although the new measurement system finally adopted a different framework, the 
influence of this framework constructed by the World Bank cannot be ignored. Another 
international development agency, CIDA, played a significant role at a later stage of the design 
process, providing foreign and local expertise to design the measurement system and draft the 
regulation on the EPPD, and to arrange seminars and workshops to discuss the system design. 
Finally, the Asian Development Bank provided a loan to cover the draft of the regulation and 
to finance the first year of implementation. This finding is evidence of how the ECD concept 
(discussed in Chapter 3) formulated by the World Bank and other international development 
agencies works in practice. 
Thus, as with many other reforms being undertaken in most developing economies, 
performance measurement can hardly be said to be free from the influence of international 
donor agencies. These agencies, in particular the World Bank, are key actors in the introduction 
of performance measurement in developing economies. Almost all international donor 
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agencies have ECD programmes containing strategies on how to generate internal demand for 
performance measurement in developing economies, how to transfer the skills needed to 
conduct performance measurement, and how to ensure performance measurement is put in 
place and used in developing economies. ECD efforts provide evidence of the high interest of 
international development agencies in transferring the performance measurement idea to the 
context of developing economies. ECD encompasses every phase of a performance 
measurement system (design, implementation and use) and it was applied as part of the EPPD. 
This implication is that the influence of international donor agencies in relation to the new 
Indonesian performance measurement initiative was significant.  
This involvement of international donor agencies means that performance measurement in 
developing economies needs to accommodate a wider range (both internal and external) of 
stakeholders. This implies the need for compromise on a greater number of interests and goals, 
which in turn increases the likelihood of conflict of interests occurring. Discussion about the 
high conflict of interest among multiple stakeholders, that was clearly evident in the case 
studied, will be elaborated further in point 9.2.9.   
9.2.3    Design 
Characteristics of the new performance measurement system 
The EKPPD system proposes the measurement of Indonesian local government performance 
from two aspects: governance and the services provided. On the one hand, in terms of ‘depth’ 
of performance, the EKPPD measures performance at the meso level, as the system deals with 
the achievement of a specific policy field (decentralisation). At the same time, it measures 
performance at the macro level (local government-wide) as it is concerned with the 
performance of local government as a whole. It thus covers the performance of local 
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policymakers and local policy implementers (governance aspect) and the entire range of 
functions implemented by local government (local government services).  
Its design as a local government-wide performance measurement system distinguishes the 
EKPPD from another performance measurement system which continues to be applied to 
Indonesian local government (LAKIP). LAKIP deals with the performance of local 
government organisations (performance at the micro level). Meanwhile, its focus on measuring 
both the governance aspect and local government services means that the EKPPD shares a 
characteristic with the prototype of performance measurement applied in the context of 
developed economies prior the 1930s.  
It is recognised in the literature that performance measurement is a complex process. By 
involving three different levels of government (local, regional and national government) to 
produce a composite measure of local government performance, the EKPPD becomes a very 
complex performance measurement system.  In addition, its long process with the chance of 
errors at every step affects the reliability of the composite measure (the EKPPD Index) 
produced.      
Conceptualisation and measurement of performance  
Although designed as very complex system in terms of procedures, the EKPPD’s 
conceptualisation of performance fails to capture all the important performance elements 
(inputs, outputs and outcomes). The EKPPD relies on indicators of output, includes few 
indicators of outcomes and ignores the cost of services which become measures for inputs. The 
EKPPD system only takes into account budget allocation (e.g. for nine basic services). The 
inability of a performance measurement system to include a measurement of costs is not only 
encountered by developing economies such as Indonesia but also by a number of developed 
economies. However, from an accounting perspective, the conceptualisation and measurement 
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of performance according to the EKPPD is incomplete. In addition, the EKPPD system uses 
measures that only can be understood by specialists. 
Methodological issues in the EKPPD system 
The EKPPD has several methodological issues which affect the reliability and comparability 
of the performance index. First, it requires a large volume of data (approximately 800 pieces 
of data are needed to complete 158 KPIs) while at the same time, the capacity of local 
government to provide the data is low. This has led to a reliance on prediction data and the high 
involvement of subjectivity. Next, the absence of techniques able to isolate the influence of 
exogenous factors is a serious problem in system design. The new Indonesian measurement 
system assumed that districts/municipalities started from the same point of departure when the 
country embarked upon decentralisation in 2001. This is one of the most serious weaknesses 
of the design, as levels of development varied throughout Indonesia when the decentralisation 
policy came into being in January 2001.  
Without the influence of exogenous factors being taken into account, KPIs reported by 
districts/municipality could not be considered comparable. However, the performance index 
produced by the new measurement system is used to rank and to determine the status of districts 
and municipalities throughout Indonesia. A performance measurement system which uses a 
standardised set of KPIs benefits developed regions and punishes underdeveloped regions.  
In terms of timeliness, the design of the new system can be assumed to lack rationality. Local 
and regional governments have the same deadline (31 March) by which to submit their 
performance reports. However, regional government KPIs are based upon those reported by 
local government. Given the difficulties faced by local governments to complete its KPIs, many 
tended to submit their performance report either on or close to the deadline, putting the regional 
government in the position of not having time to extrapolate the information necessary to then 
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complete its KPIs by the same deadline. This issue of timeliness also presents irrationalities to 
local government. The system involves the use of external data, the availability of which did 
not match with the deadline for submission of the performance report. Even some internal data 
(i.e. financial data) was not available in time to process (the audited financial data is likely to 
be available after June every year). Timeliness has thus become a weakness of the system 
design, as ‘timeliness of report submission’ itself is assessed in the EKPPD system (and 
covered by KPI 10).  
Inconsistency thus exists between the principles of measurement and the measurement 
techniques adopted. The regulation governing the EPPD mentions the principle of objectivity. 
However, EKPPD measurement techniques include common sense and field visits, which are 
subjective and vulnerable to misuse. In terms of indicators, many are considerably poorly 
defined, with meanings which tend to be vague and thus not easily understood by local 
government and open to interpretation. In addition, flaws in the scoring rules can provide 
disadvantages for some districts/municipalities but benefits for others. Finally, the system is 
not tied to resource allocation, meaning there is a lack of incentive for local government to 
comply with it; good performers receive only a certificate as reward. On the other hand, local 
government tends to respond immediately to the financial incentive. The system promises a 
serious punishment for those local governments whose performance is low, with the threat of 
losing their autonomy rights through a merger with other regions, or even of abolition.  
The findings of this study show that Indonesia’s capacity to design the new measurement 
system was inadequate, manifested by its reliance on the assistance of international agencies 
in terms of: 
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a) Initiating discussion in 2005 around the need to establish a new performance 
measurement system (the workshop was initiated and organised by the World Bank, 
who also invited foreign experts to present their thoughts in the workshop).  
b) Designing the measurement system and drafting the regulation on the new 
measurement system (workshops and seminars were organised and financed by 
CIDA; local and foreign experts involved were assigned and paid by CIDA).  
c) The harmonisation of the regulation on the new measurement system and the first 
year of implementation (activities were financed by Asian Development Bank 
through loan provision). 
Several obvious weaknesses of system design (for example the poor design of many of the 
KPIs; flawed scoring rules) provide further evidence of the lack of capacity to design such a 
system.  
9.2.4    Implementation 
The implementation phase of EKPPD involved a long and complex process. Different steps of 
implementation were undertaken at different levels (local, regional and national government) 
and took two years to complete from the start of data collection to the announcement of local 
government status and ranking. The steps of implementation are summarised below. 
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No. Steps Activities Involved 
1. Local government 
reports KPIs 
1. Collecting data from all local government organisations and sub-districts 
2. Analysing data supplied by local government organisations and sub-
districts 
3. Reporting KPIs to regional government  
2a. Regional 
government reports 
KPIs 
1. Compiling KPIs reported by all districts/municipalities within its 
jurisdiction  
2. Reporting KPIs to MoHA 
2b. Regional 
evaluation team 
conducts regional 
evaluation 
1. Analysing performance data (KPIs) reported by local government  
2. Confirming any unclear data and requesting local government for any 
unsupplied data 
3. Conducting field visit (if necessary) 
4. Inputting performance data into the evaluation template 
5. Sending inputted performance data to the national evaluation team 
3. National evaluation 
team conducts 
national evaluation 
1. Analysing performance data of both provinces and local government 
2. Confirming any unclear or incomplete data 
3. Inputting performance data (for province) into evaluation template 
4. Assigning score 
5. Determining local government status and ranking 
 
Table 9.1 Summary of Implementation Steps 
Source: Developed by author, based on findings 
 
Until 2012, implementation of the new measurement system engendered great confusion at all 
levels (local, regional and national government). Stakeholders involved in the process of 
implementation lacked understanding on the system design of the new measurement system. 
Several factors have affected capacity to implement the new measurement system:   
At the local government level 
The capacity to implement the EKPPD varies across districts/municipalities. They do however 
have some problems in common, such as underdeveloped ICT systems and infrastructure, 
which caused difficulties in terms of obtaining the data necessary to complete the indicators. 
Availability of data is also affected by the frequent occurrence of informality practices and high 
staff turnover. In terms of the latter, there is a lack of a mechanism to hand over the 
responsibility and documents relating to a job when a member of staff is rotated to another 
position. Unavailability of data tended to result in a high reliance on estimated data, which in 
turn involves high levels of subjectivity as different approaches have been applied to estimate 
it. Some districts/municipalities used a rational approach or an approach with a strong basis, 
others did not. The choice of approach depended on the capacity of key appointment holders 
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in charge of data collection, and this in turn was influenced by the training and availability of 
technical guidelines or a system manual.  The training received and the technical guidelines, 
however were perceived to be insufficient     
The capacity for implementation was also influenced by the degree of support and involvement 
of elected leaders, which in turn significantly influenced the involvement of other stakeholders 
and the amount of budget allocated to support data collection. Budget allocation determined 
how many personnel were involved in the process of data collection, how much they could be 
paid and the type of facilities that could be afforded to support the activity. These factors in 
turn influenced the motivation of personnel to get the job done. Involvement of elected leaders 
varied across the districts/municipalities studied, from those who were actively involved to 
those who had no involvement at all. Implementation has been markedly better when elected 
leaders have been more involved.  
The heavy influence of subjectivity was due to many of the indicators having been poorly 
designed and thus being open to interpretation. The way key appointment holders interpreted 
indicators was also influenced by their capability to do so. In short, inadequate capacity of local 
government to provide the necessary data and report the indicators has significantly affected 
the reliability and comparability of the data used to complete the indicators which were used 
as basis for the performance evaluation by the regional and national evaluation teams. At local 
government level therefore, at almost every stage of the implementation process there was 
potential for error, which was thus magnified.  
At the regional government level 
In its position as an autonomous region, the capacity of a province to report indicators under 
the new measurement system is dependent on the capacity of local government, and as local 
government has shown a lack of capacity to report, regional government is unlikely to be able 
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to report accurately, whatever its degree of capacity. This is addition to the adverse effect on 
regional government of the timeliness aspect of system design which, as explained above, has 
resulted in provinces not being able to report to deadline. Meanwhile, the capacity of regional 
government to evaluate local government performance varies, and has been affected by the 
commitment of governors as the representatives of the president in the regions. In province B 
for example, where the governor was aware of the new measurement system and indicated his 
commitment to supporting it, capacity to implement was better than in province C where the 
governor was unaware of the new system and did not become involved in its implementation. 
As with the involvement of the district head/mayor at local level, here the awareness and 
support of the governor influences the involvement of other stakeholders in the regional 
evaluation team; their involvement in turn influences the organisation of this team, which then 
affects the quality of the process and the result of the evaluation.  
At the national government level 
A very serious deficiency in capacity to implement the system was apparent at the national 
government level, due to the lack of stakeholder support (from ministries and government 
bodies). Of the six ministries and four government bodies supposed to be involved in EKPPD, 
only two elements (MoHA and the Financial and Development Supervisor Body) actively 
were. The direct implication of this was a lack of human resource to be engaged as evaluators. 
In addition, a lack of support from MoF incurred a direct implication in terms of the availability 
of budget to support implementation. With no specific budget allocated for the initiative, the 
new measurement system relied on a manual system which was unsuitable for processing the 
massive volume of data obtained from over 400 districts/municipalities and 33 provinces. In 
addition, lack of budget also affected the quality of evaluators, for whom limited training could 
be provided.  
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The inadequacy of evaluators in terms of quantity caused only limited data reported by local 
government to be verified (a maximum of five out of 34 functions delegated to local 
government). Meanwhile, the inadequacy of evaluators in terms of quality affected the quality 
of the evaluation. In other words, this capacity deficit has seriously affected the results of the 
evaluation in terms of: 
1) Performance index of districts/municipalities and provinces; 
2) Status of districts/municipalities and provinces; 
3) Ranking of districts/municipalities and provinces, and  
4) Type and quality of feedback provided. 
Finally, inevitable errors also contributed to influence the reliability of the performance index.  
9.2.5    Use  
Weaknesses in system design and barriers to implementation have implications for the use of 
the new measurement system. The performance index compiled from measurement activity 
was unreliable, and thus meaningless in terms of mapping capacity building programmes for 
local government in Indonesia. The low reliability and narrowness of the index has also 
prevented the ultimate goal of the system to reorganise local government through the merger 
or abolition of low performing districts/municipalities. Moreover, the high political 
consequences if any such merger or abolition were to take place formed another reason that the 
results of the performance index have been used merely to ‘celebrate’ Indonesia’s annual 
regional autonomy day.  
From a local government perspective, it has been difficult to include KPIs able to inform the 
local policymaking processes because of the strong role of elected leaders in shaping and 
directing local policies. For them, their achievement of their stated vision and mission has been 
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key at local government level. The local mid-term plan (covering a five year period) 
represented the intended transformation of this vision and mission; the work plan of local 
government (a one-year programme) was derived from the local mid-term plan. Then, the 
budget plan was prepared based on the local government work plan. The influence of the 
elected leader’s vision and mission statement in shaping programme priorities undertaken at 
local government level is strong, representing as it does a political contract between the elected 
leader and the local parliament. The elected leader is held accountable to the local parliament 
in terms of the extent to which his/her vision and mission has been achieved. The presence of 
these factors means that little else was able to influence change in the five-year programmes.  
Besides there being no evidence of use of the indicators at either local or national government 
level, this study has also found some distorted behaviours on the part of stakeholders. For 
example, to meet the report submission deadline, local and regional government submitted the 
narrative part of the LPPD report only, without including the KPIs (these were supplied once 
local and regional government had managed to obtain more complete and valid data86). It was 
difficult to ascribe blame to local and regional government for the deadline not having been 
met, as national government did receive the report. However, as the report was missing the KPI 
matrix, the performance evaluation could not start. Another form of distorted behaviour was 
demonstrated by some evaluators, who misused field visits to seek bribes in exchange for the 
allocation of high status and ranking to the districts/municipalities under his/her responsibility. 
Similarly, there was evidence of the municipality offering to host a major event in return for 
being granted high status and ranking. Here, the EKPPD was misused to gain popularity. Some 
regions have also asked a hired consultant from the Financial and Development Supervisory 
Body87 to compile the performance report on their behalf. Three possible reasons for this are 
                                                 
86 For example, after the audited financial data was released by the financial office 
87 The performance evaluation contained a high possibility for bias as the Financial and Development Supervisory 
Body played a double role as consultant and evaluator of the performance report of the same district/municipality.  
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(i) a lack of capacity to report, (ii) the desire to obtain a high score, and (iii) a combination of 
both. 
To sum up, this study demonstrates an inconsistency between the various stages and among 
the different elements involved in the EKPPD. The implementation stage did not fully follow 
the system design, and use did not follow the intentions set by the designers (see Table 9.2). 
Capacity to implement the system is much lower than the level of sophistication of its design. 
The ultimate intended use of the EKPPD, which has the potential of incurring highly political 
consequences, is disproportionate to the incentive provided (that is, there is a disconnection 
between the measurement system and its resource allocation).  
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No. Inconsistency System design Practice Comments 
1. Local self-
assessment 
 Local government should form a 
self-assessment team; the team 
should conduct a similar 
assessment process at local level 
before KPIs of local government 
as a whole are reported to 
regional government 
 The team should be chaired by 
the general secretary 
 The team can determine status 
and ranking of local government 
organisations 
 Local government was not 
aware of this requirement. There 
was no self-assessment team 
formed at local government 
level 
 Activities to collect data for the 
KPIs were treated as an 
additional task of the local team 
assigned to produce the LPPD 
report 
 Collecting KPI data did not have 
its own allocation in the local 
budget; it thus had to share a 
budget allocated for the ‘LPPD 
reporting’ activity 
This reflected low awareness of 
stakeholders and support at local 
government towards the system 
2. KPIs for 
optional 
functions 
Local government can formulate KPIs 
for optional functions 
 Local government was unaware 
of this possibility. 
 Local government has not yet 
developed additional KPIs for 
optional functions 
This was because of lack of training 
3. Regional 
evaluation 
Regional evaluation is supposed to 
conduct a complete evaluation, from 
inputting performance data to 
assigning a score and announcing 
local government ranking regionally  
Scoring and ranking only take place at 
the national evaluation 
This was because results of regional 
evaluation were sometimes 
inconsistent with results of the 
national evaluation, triggering 
protest from districts/municipalities 
whose position was lower according 
to the national evaluation than in 
the regional evaluation 
4. Timeliness  Performance evaluation should 
start by April every year  
 Result is announced within one 
year 
 Performance evaluation only 
could start after June 
 Result is announced within 2 
years 
 
5. Regional 
evaluation team 
Governor forms a regional evaluation 
team consisting of at least three 
elements: government bureau at the 
governor office; regional inspectorate; 
regional Financial and Development 
Supervisory Body 
 Not all governors were aware of 
the system 
 Regional evaluation team varied 
across provinces (some included 
the three elements but others 
only one or two elements)  
Lack of stakeholder support at 
regional level 
 
6. National 
evaluation team 
The national evaluation team consists 
of six ministries and four government 
bodies  
Only two elements are actively 
involved: MoHA as secretariat and 
Financial and Development 
Supervisory Body in charge of 
technical evaluation 
 Reflects a lack of support 
from other ministries and 
government bodies 
 Reflects conflict of interest  
 Active involvement of 
Financial and Development 
Supervisory Body included 
the organisation’s own interest 
(for the sake of its own 
existence which has long been 
questioned, and to utilise the 
internal budget)  
7. Field visit The regulations do not stipulate that 
field visits are conducted only for 
those nominated as top 10 performers 
(local government) and top 3 (for 
provinces)  
Field visits limited to those 
districts/municipalities nominated as 
10 top performers and provinces as in 
the top 3 
This is the effect of lack of financial 
capacity 
8. Ranking  National government should announce 
the 10 best performers and 10 worst 
(local government), and three best 
performers and three worst 
(provinces). 
Government only announced 10 best 
performers (local government) and 3 
best performers (provinces) 
Announcing 10 worst performers 
(local government) and three worst 
ones (provinces) was considered 
likely to trigger protests from local 
and regional government  
Table 9.2 Inconsistencies of design and implementation 
Source: Developed by author, based on findings 
9.2.6    Contingencies 
Table 9.3 presents a synthesis of factors which influence the different stages of performance 
measurement systems in the context of developing economies.  
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   Factors Phases influenced 
Design Implementation Use 
Technical Factors    
ICT capacity/data availability  x  
Supporting systems for performance measurement  x x  
Metric difficulties:    
 Measurement of cost    
 Reliability of output measures   x 
 Causal relationships between inputs and outputs x   
 Comparability of output measures   x 
 Comprehensiveness vs. concision in reporting x   
 Controllability of performance  x x 
 Unclear prescription on how to use measures    
Organisational Factors    
Internal stakeholder support  x x x 
Financial resources x x  
Human resources x x  
Decision-making authority  x x 
Size x   
Location of performance measurement systems    x  
Type of local government x x  
Institutional Factors    
Regulatory requirements x x x 
External stakeholder support x x  
Local democratic system (i.e. direct elections)  x x x 
Cultures  x  
Corruption  x x 
Informal practices  x x 
System design     
a. Functional-based measurement system  x  
b. Timeliness  x x 
c. KPIs  x x 
d. Flawed in scoring rules   x 
e. Incentive scheme (disconnection to resources 
allocation) 
 x x 
f. Absence of procedure to adjust performance   x 
Drivers x x x 
Table 9.3 Summary of Contingencies in Different Phases 
Source: Developed by author, based on empirical result of the study 
 
As expected, the design, implementation and use of the new performance measurement systems 
applied in Indonesia were influenced by factors that can be classified into three broad 
categories: technical, organisational and institutional factors. Most of the findings support the 
conceptual framework, with a slightly different dynamic compared to the prediction for some 
factors and some new findings emerged. The logical link between different factors is shown in 
Figure 9.1 below. 
 352 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1 Factors Influencing Main Phases of Performance Measurement Systems in Developing Economies 
Source: Developed by author, based on findings 
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Drivers  
As can be seen from Figure 9.1, the first element of the framework is the ‘drivers’ of 
performance measurement systems. The driving forces for developing new performance 
measurement systems can be explained through institutional isomorphism. As discussed in 
chapter 2, Di Maggio and Powel (1983) differentiate three mechanisms of isomorphism: 
coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism. 
As indicated in the previous discussion (see chapter 6), the development of the new 
measurement system was to follow up the mandate of Article 6 of the new law on 
decentralisation (Law 32/2004). Adoption of performance measurement systems because of 
regulatory requirements represents a form of ‘coercive’ isomorphism. Then, the previous 
discussion in this section (see also section 6.2.2) indicated the presence of another type of 
isomorphism mechanism that worked in the case of the new performance measurement system 
applied in Indonesia that was related to pressures exerted by the international donor agencies, 
the World Bank in particular, through ‘normative’ isomorphism.  
The reason for considering the pressure exerted by the World Bank in the case of the Indonesian  
measurement system as normative isomorphism relates to the discussion about demand-
generating activities conducted by the World Bank to sensitise internal demand for 
performance measurement in the developing economies, as discussed in chapter 3 (see section 
3.3). The finding of this study showed that some forms of demand-generating activities were 
undertaken by the World Bank to persuade MoHA, as the ministry in charge of coordinating 
local government, to develop a new and comprehensive performance measurement system to 
track the results of the decentralisation policy. The demand-generating activities were 
manifested in the arrangement of a two-day workshop in 2005 in cooperation with MohA, 
bringing in expertise on decentralisation and local government as mentioned earlier (see also 
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discussion in section 6.2.2). Normative isomorphism relates to pressure coming from education 
and training (DiMaggio and Powel, 1983).  
Apart from being mandated by the law, which supports the institutional arguments, the 
adoption of the new performance measurement system in Indonesia still had some rational 
explanations (related to internal motifs). The rational explanations connect to the background 
of the replacement of Law 1999 with the new Law 32/2004 on decentralisation (see discussion 
in chapter 5). The point was that the decentralisation policy brought about some negative 
implications (e.g. the spread of corrupt practices to the local level). The implication of this was 
that the substance of the budget allocation sent to the local level might not be effective to 
improve the quantity and quality of public service delivery to local people. This was one reason 
why there was a mandate in the new law on decentralisation to merge or abolish regions 
incapable of running regional autonomy (i.e. decentralisation) (see the discussion in section 
6.2.1). 
This explanation is consistent with the argument of the principal-agency perspective. It is true 
that the complex accountability relationships in public sector organisations, especially in the 
context of decentralisation, cannot be sufficiently explained using agency theory, as Smith 
(1990) points out, but the theory is still useful in explaining this case. More clearly, in the 
context of Indonesia, it is true that regions (i.e. districts/municipalities) have been given so 
called ‘wide-regional’ autonomy, which in essence has been similar to a federal country, as 
discussed in chapter 5. However, Indonesia is a unity country, which implies that the ultimate 
responsibility for ensuring the welfare of all Indonesian citizens is actually still in the hands of 
the President, as one of the key informants (INF6/NG) underlined during the investigation at 
the national level. Although the district heads or mayors are directly elected by the local 
electorate, there is still a line of accountability between them and the president, as reflected in 
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Figure 6.2. As the president has delegated functions to deliver public services delivery (35 
functions) to local government level, it is rational for the national government (or more 
specifically the president) to take an interest in knowing how well the task and responsibilities 
are being exercised.   
Thus, in terms of internal motifs, there were elements of political reasons (i.e. recentralising 
power) and rational explanations which can be explained through agency theory. Therefore, 
the answer to RQ1 can be explained through both institutional arguments (i.e. New Institutional 
Sociology) and rational explanations (i.e. agency theory). The institutional arguments, 
however, were more dominant, with the presence of another form of isomorphism (i.e. 
normative isomorphism exerted by the international donor agencies). This finding supports 
Modell’s (2009) argument about the need to supplement institutional approaches in researching 
the adoption of performance measurement systems rather than making a direct assumption that 
their adoption is nothing to do with the efficiency and effectiveness arguments but merely 
seeking for legitimacy, for example.     
Design  
Differently from what was expected, ICT capacity/data availability did not influence the 
development of the KPIs of the EKPPD. In other words, there was no consideration about the 
availability of data while developing the KPIs. The discussion in chapter 2 indicates that the 
capacity of ICT, or more specifically the capacity of the cost accounting system to provide 
data, affected the development of efficiency measures (Ammons and Rivernbark, 2008; 
Montesinos and Brusca, 2011). As described in chapter 6, initially, the focus was on searching 
for measures that could capture the outcomes of the decentralisation policy in each sector (e.g. 
education, health, etc.) As mentioned and discussed in the findings chapter, the adoption of 
minimum service standards stemmed from the argument that  with greater autonomy, local 
 356 
 
government should be able to provide all types of basic services to local people, at least at the 
minimum level. As INF 2/NG said “if they [local government] cannot provide services even at 
the minimum level, what is the decentralisation for?” This view reflected consistency with 
economic theory  
Due to the conflict of interest between different stakeholders,88  however, the selection of 
indicators was compromised to accommodate these different interests. For example, in 
considering a factor such as ‘local democratic system’ – which relates to the interests of local 
elected leaders – the choice of indicators was changed from ‘outcome’ measures to ‘output’ 
measures which could be easily linked to the performance of specific elected leaders in a given 
period. A part from the political considerations, the selection of outputs instead of outcomes 
indicators was also connected to the technical issue of causality: how can we reliably establish 
a relationship between inputs used during a specific period of a specific elected leader holding 
office with the outcomes seen in the future (see discussion in section 6.4.2). It was expected 
that the causality issue would influence design (see discussion in section 2.4.3). However, the 
possibility of linking causality to the local democratic system was not predicted, which make 
this finding is interesting and notably a new finding in the literature. The selection of KPIs was 
also influenced by the involvement of the international donor agencies. For example, the 
measurement framework developed by the World Bank, to some extent showed an influence 
on the KPIs adopted for the EKPPD (i.e. LGPM) (see Table 6.6). Further discussion about 
conflict of interests among different stakeholders will be provided in section 9.2.6).  
The next form of measurement challenges that influenced design was the difficulty in balancing 
comprehensiveness and concision in reporting. Its influence was manifested in the decision to 
prioritise the development of KPIs related to obligatory functions at the expense of KPIs related 
                                                 
88 This point will be discussed further in a separate point. 
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to optional functions, leaving the responsibility to develop KPIs for optional functions to local 
government. Given the lack of capacity of human resources at the local level, there was no 
progress in the development of measurement for optional functions.89 This is a new finding in 
the literature. Prioritising the KPIs of obligatory functions contained two different 
considerations: a) the capacity of local government to report KPIs (rational consideration), b) 
the achievement of obligatory functions is an interest of the national government, whereas 
optional functions tend to be an interest of local government because the functions relate to the 
specificity of each region. This issue also relates to the point about conflict of interest discussed 
later. 
As discussed in chapter 2, controllability of performance relates to the developing of 
procedures to adjust performance or to take into account the influence of uncontrollable factors. 
The case under study failed to include procedures to account for uncontrollable factors. This 
point has been mentioned earlier (see point 9.2.3). This finding is not surprising, as 
performance measurement system designers rarely go this far (Barnow and Henrich, 2010).  
Among the eight elements of organisational factors that were expected to influence design, as 
discussed in chapters 2 and 3, only four were applicable to the case of the EKPPD: internal 
stakeholder support, financial resources, human resources, and to some extent decision-making 
authority. As the EKPPD involved a wide range of stakeholders at three different levels of 
government (local, regional and national, as described and discussed in chapter 7), and also 
involved international donor agencies, what is referred to as ‘internal’ stakeholders depends on 
what level is being examined. As the EKPPD was designed by the national government, with 
the support of international donor agencies, in this sense, internal stakeholders means the 
                                                 
89 As indicated in chapter 7, local governments did not even know that they were allowed to develop measures for 
optional functions, and the assessment of local government performance in terms of optional functions still relied 
on a few KPIs developed by the national government for each function.  
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government at all levels, including parliaments and Indonesian citizens, and international donor 
agencies are treated as ‘external’ stakeholders.  
The design process has been negatively affected by lack of support from internal stakeholders 
(i.e. sector ministries) in opposition to the considerably strong support from external 
stakeholders discussed earlier. The design process was very slow because sector ministries did 
not supply KPIs relevant for their sectors, which eventually led to formulation of a small team 
to deal with indicator selection to be applied for all sectors.90 There were some issues here. 
First, the low involvement of sector ministries can be connected to unclear budget allocation 
for supporting performance measurement initiatives. The sector ministries’ concern was about 
who should pay any of their staff involved in the performance measurement initiative led by 
MoHA. Implicitly, sector ministries did want to pay for that, but MoHA should. On the other 
hand, the initiative did not get support from the MoF (manifested in their refusal to make a 
specific budget allocation for the initiative) (see discussion in section 6.4.3). This finding also 
suggested a conflict of interest among different ministries that will be analysed further later.  
The lack of support from sector ministries showed a connection with another factor: decision-
making authority). As a further consequence of the unclear financial resources to support the 
new performance measurement initiative, sector ministries tended to send representatives who 
did not have the capacity to make decisions on behalf of their ministries. This situation resulted 
in the decisions regarding KPIs to be adopted being difficult to make.91 Besides the issue of 
conflict of interest, the low involvement of sector ministries can also be associated with the 
                                                 
90 As mentioned in chapter 6, this small team consisted of only two elements: MoHA and the Development and 
Financial Supervisory body. 
91 As representatives of sector ministries attending meetings did not have the capacity to make decisions on behalf 
of their ministries, the agreement on KPIs to be adopted was very slow. The representatives had to report the 
results of the meeting to their ministry first.   
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technical issue (the difficulties in developing measures). Some ministries struggled themselves 
to define KPIs relevant to their sector. I discussed this issue in section 6.4.4.  
Implementation 
For implementation, the findings show consistency with the conceptual framework. The first 
important factor to influence implementation is ICT capacity/data availability. This finding is 
understandable, as ‘implementation’ deals with collecting, processing and compiling data to 
report the KPIs of the EKPPD. As discussed in chapter 7 (see section 7.3.1), the availability of 
data also relates to several other issues such as ‘cross-cutting departmental issues’ or attribution 
problems. Data to complete certain KPIs needs to be gathered from several different working 
units, for example, or specific data need to be broken down in order to get data which represent 
information about a specific function. The lack of staff devoted to performance reporting tasks 
and lack of technical knowledge increased this problem. Data collection was also difficult 
because support systems were incompatible with the design of the measurement system. For 
example, the budget system did not contain information about the sources of budgets at the 
activity level. When the budget system contained information about sources of budgets at the 
activity level, collecting data for certain KPIs was easier. 
The municipalities studied that had better availability of financial resources (organisational 
factor) showed better implementation. Implementation in municipality 1 (province C), for 
example, seemed better than implementation in municipality 2 (in the same province), although 
they are relatively comparable municipalities in terms of size.92 Hence, with no staff devoted 
to handling reporting performance for the purpose of the new performance measurement 
system, collecting data, compiling them and completing KPIs was very difficult, as experienced 
by municipality y (province B). The condition was different in municipality x (province A), 
                                                 
92 I distinguished size of districts and municipalities involved in the study based on number of sub-districts owned. 
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where the presence of sufficient staff devoted to dealing with the reporting task showed better 
implementation.  
The availability of staff devoted to dealing with reporting tasks in fact very much depended on 
the support of the elected leaders. In municipalities where the elected leaders showed full 
support, there was sufficient allocation of staff and budget (i.e. municipality x (province A) 
and municipality 1 (province C)). It was not only about the allocation of budget and staff to 
directly handle the reporting task but also about attention from the other elements of local 
government, depending on how the elected leaders responded to the EKPPD requirements. 
When there was no support from the elected leader and other elements, reporting tasks relied 
on few staff or junior managers. Thus, the influence of elected leaders was very strong.  
The limited capacity of human resources to understand and interpret measures led them to 
report the wrong data. This eventually affected the validity and reliability of the data used by 
the regional government to report their performance. The lack of financial support also affected 
the availability of data. For example surveys to develop baseline data could not take place and 
led local government to report data based on predictions – which were very subjective. Data 
availability can even be affected by institutional factors such as informal practices. As 
described in chapter 7, it was a common practice to acquire assets outside of formal 
procurement procedures which affected the validity, reliability and completeness of data 
related to assets needed to complete the related KPIs. Put more clearly, asset registers did not 
reflect the real number and value of assets owned by local governments.  
Size influenced implementation, but the influence corresponded to the internal stakeholder 
support. Although local government is quite big in terms of scale, with strong support from 
internal stakeholders, the local governments studied still managed the reporting activity better 
than smaller local governments without support from internal stakeholders. The best was small 
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local governments with full support from internal stakeholders. The worse was a large scale 
but no support from internal stakeholders. Small local governments with no support still 
managed their reporting activity, but large ones with no support struggled to meet the 
requirements. Thus, the reason why the influence of size corresponded to the support of elected 
leaders was because size is connected to the availability of staff devoted to reporting tasks. The 
bigger the size of districts/municipalities, the more difficult it was to collect and process the 
data, because a higher amount of data had to be collected and processed. As mentioned earlier, 
availability of staff also depended on support from the elected leaders.   
The influence of decision-making authority in the implementation phase was also evident. As 
described and discussed in section 7.3.1, when there was involvement of senior officials of 
local government, it was easier to arrange meetings to discuss whether they agreed with the 
data to be used for completing KPIs. However, when the task was handled by junior level 
officials, arranging meetings with high officials was difficult, let alone deciding when they 
could submit the report. Although the report was ready, the report had to be consulted first in 
a meeting among senior officials, including the general secretary and sometimes the elected 
leaders.  
As expected, the characteristics of local government (i.e. district or municipality) influenced 
implementation: implementation tended to be better in the municipalities than in the districts. 
This was because municipalities which represented urban areas tended to have more advanced 
development and infrastructures and higher quality human resources than districts which 
represented the rural type of local government.  
Related to the factor ‘where performance measurement systems are located’, the findings 
supported the prediction with a slightly different dynamic. The existing literature suggests that 
performance measurement systems would be better handled by the finance office which deals 
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with budget task. The key informants in all local governments studied perceived that reporting 
would be better handled by the local planning and development body, as this body tends to 
have human resources that are accustomed to performance reporting tasks. In the context of 
Indonesian local government, the local planning and development body also plays a very 
significant role in the budgeting function. Thus, essentially, the finding was still consistent with 
the prediction. However, this study did not capture evidence as to whether implementation 
really would have been better if the reporting task was handled by the local planning and 
development body, as in all districts/municipalities studied, the reporting tasks were located 
within government departments under the local government secretariat. 
The findings suggested that the presence of clear incentives is very important to determine the 
response of the internal stakeholders. The elected leaders and other internal stakeholders in 
local government will pay attention to this system if there are clear financial consequences for 
being a low or high performer. This finding suggests that local government tended to respond 
to financial incentives. This is because local government in Indonesia tended to be financially 
highly dependent on the national government. For the majority of local governments, the main 
source of revenues was from transfers in the form of general allocation grants, block grants or 
revenue sharing. Local income tended to be a relatively very small portion of the total local 
budget. This finding confirms economic theory, which suggests the importance of designing 
appropriate incentives systems when introducing performance measurement. However, the 
focus here is not incentives for individual managers, but incentives that will benefit 
organisations, in this case the local governments.  
At the national level, the limited capacity of human resources acting as ‘evaluators’ caused an 
inability to notice the inappropriateness of the numbers reported by local governments. The 
limited availability of capable evaluators at the national level was very much related to the lack 
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of budget support for the initiative. Evaluation relied on in-house resources owned by the 
MohA alone and partly on the support of the Development and Financial Supervisory Body. 
Thus, the lack of internal support at the national government level (from other ministries) 
significantly affected the availability of financial support and human resources to support the 
system, which caused a very serious problem: it affected the ability of the national evaluation 
team to conduct a proper evaluation. 
As described in section 7.3.2, the ability to report KPIs was also influenced by institutional 
factors: province performance reports should include all districts/municipalities within their 
jurisdictions, as the formation of a province is defined by law in terms of how many districts 
and municipalities are included in it. Provinces submitting their report but excluding 
districts/municipalities in an attempt to meet their deadline violated the law. This kind of 
difficulty has not yet been discussed in the literature.  The existing literature does point out 
issues of overlapping and conflicting regulations as a barrier for Indonesian local government 
to implement performance measurement systems instead of strengthening their capacity 
(Rhodes et al., 2012). However, there has been no mention of this particular finding of this 
study.  
Another factor that was not included in the framework before which was found as a common 
problem across all local government studies is the work culture related to the attachment of 
data to individual holdings or managing the data instead of it remaining in the administration 
system of organisations (see discussion in point 9.2.4 and 7.3.1). This culture significantly 
affected the availability of data needed for the KPIs.  
Use 
Use has been influenced by several factors: (i) regulatory framework, (ii) technical factors, (iii) 
and incentives. As discussed in chapter 8 (see section 8.3.1) the unfinished regulations on 
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capacity building programmes was a reason mentioned by key informants for why sector 
ministries did not use the results of the evaluations for the purpose of helping low performing 
local governments to improve their performance. This is also a new finding that has not yet 
been discussed in the literature, because there has been no regulatory framework to legitimise 
the programmes; if there is no regulation, sector ministries have no basis to allocate budget for 
the programmes.  
As mentioned earlier, the ultimate purpose of the EKPPD development is as an instrument to 
merge and abolish low performing local governments in running the decentralisation policy. 
However, no single local government has been merged or abolished so far. It can be assumed 
that the information was not used because of the fear of the political consequences of merging 
and abolishing local governments, as one of the key informant at the national government level 
pointed out (INF 5/NG). However, this argument is only valid when a local government has 
received a ‘low’ score for three consecutive years. In fact, no single local government fell into 
this category, as seen in Tables 8.1 and 8.2.  
It can be argued that fear of the high political consequences of action to merge or abolish local 
governments might have triggered the national evaluation team to avoid the possibility for that 
to happen, for example by deliberately making sure that no local governments were eligible for 
the EKPOD. However, this argument requires further investigation to prove it.  
Therefore, one possible explanation for the non-use can be connected to the technical factors 
(i.e. validity and reliability of the EKPPD index). As discussed in chapter 8, performance scores 
achieved by local governments in the last six rounds of evaluations (2007 evaluation to 2012 
evaluation) was influenced by two things: first local governments knowing better how to report 
led them to start ‘gaming’ the system; second, there was an influence from the scoring system, 
thus, the validity and reliability of the index was questionable. The implication is that the 
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problematic validity and reliability of the index meant that the next step of the evaluation (i.e. 
EKPOD) could not take place, therefore no local government could be merged/abolished.  
The argument above is also supported by the discussion in chapter 7 which suggested that the 
entire process of reporting KPIs from the local level, reporting and evaluation at the regional 
level and evaluation at the national level indicated lack of rigour. The index produced clearly 
indicated low reliability and validity. If the processes of the evaluations had been rigorous, the 
evaluation results could have be different from those presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2.   
From the perspective of the local governments, they have a lack of incentives to use the results 
of evaluation because there are no concrete incentives such as financial incentives in the form 
of increased budget allocation when a local government moves from the category ‘high’ to 
‘very high’ or from ‘low’ to ‘medium’ performance, for example. As mentioned earlier, local 
governments tend to respond to financial incentives. On the other hand, the EKPPD has no link 
to the resource allocation. As indicated in the discussion of section 8.3.4, there is an issue about 
the conflict of interest between MoHA and MoF in relation to the disconnection between the 
EKPPD and resource allocation.  
Another form of conflict of interest was also a reason for the non-use of the information at the 
local level. This related to the discussion on the strong influence of elected leaders discussed 
in section 8.3.3. Local budgets are mostly derived from the visions and missions of the elected 
leaders. Achievement of these visions and missions is central for local government programme 
settings. Apart from the conflict of interest which can be understood through the lens of 
institutional perspectives, this issue also contains a rational explanation: some local 
governments did not find the measures or KPIs adopted in the EKPPD system relevant to them 
because of their specific circumstances. An example is the adoption of the minimum service 
standard: for advanced local governments, the measures have no use, as they have passed the 
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stage of achieving the minimum service standard, but for others even the minimum service 
standards were too advanced for them if they were still struggling with the very basic 
infrastructures.  This is consistent with the argument of contingency-based approaches: the 
design should fit with the context.    
9.2.7    Interrelations between Technical, Organisational and Institutional Factors  
As reflected in the discussion above, there were complex interactions among the different 
factors:   
Technical and organisational factors 
Organisational factors (e.g. low quality of human resources) intensified problems of reliability 
and comparability of measures (technical factors-metric difficulties). This was possible as 
evidenced in this study; due to their limited capacity to understand and interpret the guidelines, 
staff at local level can use very different types of data to complete KPIs compared to those 
actually mentioned in the guidelines. For example, they could not differentiate between those 
KPIs which require budgeted figure and those which need realisation figures. Staff reported 
KPIs using data in the form of ‘monetary,’ instead of ‘quantity'. Then, lack of internal 
stakeholder support caused lack of resources to support the initiative. Lack of resources made 
proper implementation difficult, which eventually affected the reliability of the measures (i.e. 
composite measure – the EKPPD index) produced from the measurement system.   
Technical and institutional factors 
Measurement challenges and local democratic system  
The political environment of the Indonesian local government, where the new measurement 
system was being applied, can intensify technical problems such as metric difficulties – more 
specifically causality issues or attribution problems. This was discussed, for example, in section 
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6.4.2. The direct election system as part of the local democratic system applied in Indonesia 
has complicated causality issues or performance attributions. The reason why the issue of 
performance attribution became crucial and sensitive for the elected leaders was because the 
elected leaders can directly use their performance as campaign material for the next round of 
elections, or if they decide to participate in elections at a higher level of government for 
example (i.e. governor position).  
Thus, the performance attribution problem caused the change in the design of the new 
measurement system in terms of the type of indicators to be developed – from outcomes 
indicators as the national government originally wanted to outputs indicators – to compromise 
with the interest of local elected leaders and also to solve the causality issues, in terms of the 
difficulties selecting and defining meaningful measures which finally caused the designers of 
the performance measurement system to opt for indicators that are easy to measure. However, 
the attribution of performance with a specific link to the direct election system is a new finding 
in the literature. This finding support Mimba et al.’s (2013) argument about the powerful 
position of the elected leader under the direct election system and also expands their study.  
Mimba et al. (2013) demonstrate how managers of local agencies within local government 
adapt the development of performance measures to accommodate the interest of the elected 
leaders (i.e. managers define measures which are in the interests of the elected leaders instead 
of the interests of other stakeholders such as the national government or local parliament). In 
this study, despite the measures were developed by the national government, still the interests 
of the elected leaders could influence the types of measures developed. Further expansion was 
achieved by the current study by showing how this direct election link to technical factors  not 
only influences the types of indicator to be adopted but also causes the measurement system to 
be split into two: annual and conditional.  
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Availability of data and Informal practices    
From the existing literature, we understood that unavailability of data can affect design, 
implementation and use. The cultures and common practices applied in the context of 
Indonesian local governments such as high practices of informality, in fact, also contributed to 
the unavailability of data. For example, as discussed in chapter 7, sometimes unregistered 
assets were associated with informal practices (i.e. assets were acquired not through a formal 
procurement process but by using other items of the local budget such as the budget for meals 
and stationery). When every sub-division, division, department, and working unit within a 
district/municipality uses this practice, the accumulation of unregistered assets can be quite 
significant. Moreover, assets have been removed in different ways than through formal 
procedures of asset depletion. When districts/municipalities reported KPIs related to assets for 
the purpose of the EKPPD, the validity of the KPIs was obviously questionable. Informality 
did not stop local governments from reporting KPIs but did distort the numbers reported. High 
practices of informality (e.g. application of two versions of budgets) negatively influenced the 
reliability and validity of data used by local government to report KPIs, which eventually 
caused the reliability and validity of the EKPPD index obtained by each local government to 
be questionable. 
Technical, organisational and institutional factors 
Under decentralisation and the direct election system (i.e. institutional factor), staff rotation 
tended to be high. On the other hand, there was a lack of mechanisms to hand over tasks and 
responsibility between officials rotated (organisational culture). As a consequence, data tended 
to be attached to individuals holding or managing the data instead of remaining in the 
organisational database (i.e. work system and culture). This situation significantly affected the 
availability of data (technical factor) (see discussion in section 7.3). This kind of situation will 
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not be found in organisations with a better organisational culture and database management 
system, such as in the developed economies. In the context of the developing economies, and 
Indonesia specifically, staff rotation was a major issue for the availability of data. This is a new 
finding that has not been discussed in prior studies focusing on the Indonesian context (i.e. 
Akbar et al., 2012 and Mimba et al., 2013).    
9.2.8    Interrelations between Design, Implementation and Use 
As implied in Figure 9.1, the technical, organisational and institutional factors are interrelated. 
Design, implementation and use were interrelated. It was evident that the poorly designed KPIs 
caused problems for the implementation phase (i.e. staff responsible for collecting data and 
reporting KPIs at local level struggled to identify and to decide which or what type of data to 
be used to complete the KPIs). The mismatch of timeliness for submitting the performance 
report caused the unavailability of data required to complete KPIs. The low reliability and 
validity of KPIs reported which were used to form the composite measures of the EKPPD (i.e. 
implementation phase) seemed to be one of reasons why the results of the EKPPD have not 
been used (see the previous discussion about ‘use’). Another obvious example that relates to 
the lack of rationality of timeliness was making the deadline for reporting the performance for 
provinces the same as that for local governments, whereas data for provinces should be 
compiled from local government reports; the deadline was just not feasible.  
Moreover, the inconsistent system design of the measurement system, with the organisational 
structure of districts and municipalities observed, caused great confusion for staff handling the 
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reporting task at the local level.93 The problem worsened with the lack of training94 and low 
capacity of human resources at local level to interpret the limited technical guidelines available. 
Thus, designing of performance measurement systems without a sufficient understanding of 
the environment where the measurement system was to be applied created implementation 
problems. The measurement system was not equipped with procedures to account for 
uncontrollable factors. Thus, the indexes produced were non-comparable.   
Figure 9.1 shows similarity with conceptual framework of performance management proposed 
by Van Helden and Reichard (2013). Thus, this study empirically supports the framework 
developed by Van Helden and Reichard (2013). The difference is their framework assumes that 
the objectives and strategies of a public sector organization are important drivers of a 
performance management system. The drivers of performance measurement system in the 
context of developing economies, however, has been driven more by political reasons and the 
motivations of international donor agencies. Thus, drivers are distinguished into two types: 
internal and external drivers.  
9.2.9    Conflicts of Interest among Different Stakeholders 
Conflicts of interest among different stakeholders is necessarily complex and it is quite difficult 
to reflect it in the performance measurement systems stages framework above. The conflicts of 
interest demonstrated in the case under study included the following.   
First, the conflict of interest between the government and the World Bank as the first 
international donor agency providing strong support for the government of Indonesia to 
                                                 
93  KPIs should be reported according to functions, which was inconsistent with organisational structure of 
districts/municipalities. This created the cross-cutting departmental problem.  
94 Both training provided for staff at local level who were directly in charge of handling reporting performance 
for the purpose of the EKPDD and training for the members of the national team responsible for guiding local 
government on how to report performance according to this new system. 
 371 
 
develop a new and comprehensive performance measurement system to assess the results of 
the decentralisation policy. The World Bank insisted that the measurement framework they 
developed was adopted as the new measurement system, but the internal stakeholders also had 
their own views regarding the conceptual framework of the performance measurement system 
to be developed. As discussed in section 6.4, according to the internal stakeholders, the 
conceptual framework of the new performance measurement system should be derived from 
the objective of the decentralisation policy itself. On the other hand, the measurement 
framework developed by the World Bank, LGPM (see Figure 6.3) was built on four pillars: (i) 
public financial management, (ii) fiscal performance, (iii) service delivery, and (iv) investment 
climate. My analysis was that the indicators adopted in the LGPM seemed to be derived from 
the World Bank governance indicators (see discussion in section 3.4.2). The discussion in 
section 3.4.2 suggested that the concept of ‘good governance’ defined by the World Bank aims 
to support their neoliberal agenda. As mentioned in section 9.1.1 (see also chapter 5), 
decentralisation in Indonesia has brought many negative implications, including local 
government becoming an active economic actor, which is inconsistent with neoliberal 
principles, as discussed in section 3.4.1. These explanations provide an answer for the interests 
of the World Bank behind the support of the development of the new performance 
measurement system in Indonesia: to secure neoliberal policies in Indonesia, and this addresses 
part of RQ1. 
Second, the conflict of interest between MoHA and sector ministries, as explained earlier.  
Sector ministries have an interest in maintaining their own direct power and influence over 
local government. Under the decentralisation system, all local government affairs should 
actually be under the coordination of MoHA, but this implies greater power for MoHA while 
sector ministries lose their power and influence over local government. Supporting the EKPPD 
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means acknowledging the superiority of MoHA over other sector ministries, which the sector 
ministries did not want to do (see discussion in section 6.4.3). 
Finally, there was a conflict of interest between the national and local governments. The 
interest of the national government is to recentralise power, whereas the interest of local 
governments is to maintain their authority. The national government wants to ensure uniformity 
in programme priorities to support the national government agenda, but local governments 
want to pursue their local agendas, which do not necessarily align with the national policies. 
For example, the national government policy is to ensure all citizens get access to the minimum 
service standards, but local governments may have other priorities. The national government 
wants to prioritise the achievement of obligatory functions, but local governments may want 
to direct resources to support programmes that fall under optional functions.95 
The national government is interested in assessing the ‘outcomes’ of the decentralisation 
policy. However, this conflicts with the interest of elected leaders who are interested in 
showing the ‘outputs’ of their work on their annual programmes, which can be easily counted 
and attributed to their performance. This conflict of interest had an impact on the selection of 
indicators, and the other factor connected with this issue is the causality or performance 
attribution problem. 
Looking from the perspective of the national government, the conflict of interest between the 
MoHA and sector ministries led to the symbolic use of the evaluation: to celebrate regional 
autonomy  every 25th April (i.e. announce the rankings of local governments and give 
certificates to the mayors/districts heads). The functional use could not be carried out because 
resource allocation to local governments is still managed by the MoF, which has continued to 
                                                 
95 For some regions, due to their specificity, directing resources to develop areas that fall into the category 
‘optional functions’ might be a better development strategy. 
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use a different formula to distribute funding to local governments. Considering the local 
government perspective, the conflict of interest resulted in the reporting of the EKPPD being 
limited to a routine activity without the information being used to inform local policy-making 
processes. This finding demonstrates empirical evidence for the conceptual framework 
established by Tillema et al. (2010) to analyse the influence of stakeholders’ interests on the 
use of performance information (see Figure 3.2). It is clear that there was symbolic use (i.e. to 
celebrate autonomy day) and proactively decoupling performance information done by local 
government.   
9.3    Academic Contributions and Practical Implications  
9.3.1    Academic Contributions 
Theoretical contributions 
First, this study contributes theoretically to the development of the literature on public sector 
performance measurement systems research in the context of developing economies, by 
drawing insights from both the functional and institutional approaches to researching public 
sector performance measurement systems. In addition, this study also borrows insights from 
theory in another field (i.e. political economy theory). The previous two studies focusing on 
the Indonesian context (i.e. Akbar et al., 2012 and Mimba et al., 2013) rely on institutional 
theory (i.e. Neo-Institutional Sociology). Employing both perspectives, this study is able to 
demonstrate the complex and non-linear interactive effects of three classifications of factors, 
technical, organisational and institutional, on the design, implementation and use of 
performance measurement systems in the developing economies.  
Second, this study shows the situation in which the phase of ‘implementation’ can be clearly 
distinguished from those of ‘design’ and ‘use.’ As discussed in chapter 2, one difficulty with 
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the literature on performance measurement is its inconsistent use of the term ‘implementation.’ 
Some scholars define this as ‘design’ (e.g. Cavaluzzo and Itter, 2004); others define it as ‘use’ 
(e.g. De Lancer Julner and Hozler, 2001). Exploring what can be included in the 
implementation stage was the call of Van Helden et al. (2012). This study demonstrates how 
the term ‘implementation’ can involve substantive steps which differ from those undertaken at 
the ‘design’ and ‘use’ stages of performance measurement. A clear differentiation between the 
design and use phases was possible in this study because the measurement system examined 
involves very complex processes; different steps are undertaken at different levels of 
government (national, regional and local), and at each level many different activities are 
required. Thus, many steps are taken before the final performance index produced and can be 
used (for example, determining the status and ranking of local government, designing capacity 
building programmes, assisting with decision-making in relation to the merging/abolition of 
low performing districts/municipalities).  
Steps such as data collection undertaken at the local government level and data analysis carried 
out by the regional and national governments, up to the production of the EPPD Index, cannot 
be regarded merely as intermediary phases, given the substantive efforts and resources required 
to carry them out. This study thus contributes to a demonstration of the characteristics of a 
performance measurement system, whereby we can clearly distinguish between design, 
implementation and use.  
The study bridges three main streams of literature on public sector performance measurement: 
accounting, public administration and public management literature. The lack of 
communication among scholars working in different disciplines is one reason for the gap in 
performance measurement literature highlighted in Van Helden et al. (2008; 2012). Hence, I 
have tried to bridge two different angles of literatures (developed and developing economies), 
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as I believe that both contexts share similar core technical and organisational factors. By doing 
so, this study has been able to demonstrate how institutional factors (that is, the specific 
characteristics) of developing economies influence the core technical and organisational factors 
of performance measurement. In addition, this study contributes by bringing literature from 
different fields (development, political economy and local government) into the performance 
measurement literature discussion. The purpose has been to explore the history of the concept 
of performance measurement in the context of developing economies. Taking insight from 
these fields has also helped to explain the interests of international donor agencies in relation 
to performance measurement in developing economies.  
Empirical Contributions  
First this study demonstrates different forms of institutional isomorphism in relation to the 
design, implementation and use of performance measurement systems in the context of 
developing economies, which were manifested in: 
1) Coercive isomorphism:  
- MohA developing the new measurement system because it was mandated by 
the law (Law 32/2004) (apart from the normative isomorphism from 
international donor agencies) 
- National government imposing the new performance measurement systems on 
local governments through regulation.  
2) Normative isomorphism:  
International donor agencies persuading MoHA as the leading ministry to manage 
regional autonomy functions (i.e. decentralisation) through workshops, seminars, 
training and provision of local and foreign consultants. Local consultants and senior 
officials at MoHA dealing with the development received their education in the West 
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(e.g. the US and UK). Their education experience in the West influenced their way of 
thinking and they took ideas applied in the West such as performance measurement.  
3) Mimetic isomorphism: 
- Development team searching for measurement methodologies applied in other 
countries (i.e. Canada) 
- Local government copying other local governments that were ranked better in 
the evaluation on how to make the performance report for the EKPPD due to 
lack of technical guidelines and trainings 
Thus, this study provides empirical evidence of different ranges of the institutional 
isomorphism formulated by DiMaggio and Powel (1983). Consistent with their suggestion, I 
found that the three types of isomorphism can be present and show influence at the same time. 
This study expands the previous study (Akbar et al., 2012) that demonstrates mimetic 
behaviour at the local government level only; local government tried to imitate best practices 
of performance measurement systems from other local government. They specify that local 
governments from outside Java tend to copy practices from local government inside Java that 
they consider to be much more advanced.  
This study provides empirical evidence for the influence of informal practices and corruption 
(supply side) on performance measurement systems, which expands the findings of Mimba et 
al. (2013) which do not capture evidence of these influences, as they acknowledge themselves. 
Next, this study provides empirical evidence for some forms of measurement challenges that 
have never been examined in the context of developing economies, such as causality issues, 
and comparability of measures. This study also provides empirical evidence for how complex, 
non-linear interactive effects of technical, organisational and institutional factors, which can 
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be considered as a part of my original contribution as no existing study focusing on the 
developing economies has done this. 
Another original contribution of this study relates to the documentation of how performance 
measurement initiatives were disseminated in the context of developing economies. These 
initiatives can be distinguished into three main periods, as summarised in Table 9.4 below. 
 
Period Event Characteristic of Performance 
Measurement Introduced  
1980s Rise of interest among international 
donor agencies in promoting 
performance measurement to 
developing economies (recipient 
countries)  
Performance measurement at the level 
of projects funded by international 
donor agencies 
1990s Renewed interest of international 
donor agencies in accelerating 
performance measurement in 
developing economies (recipient 
countries) 
Establishing synergy between the 
national performance measurement 
system of the recipient countries and 
international donor agencies’ 
performance measurement systems  
2000s Transformation of performance 
measurement in developing 
economies  
Reliance on the tracking of MDG 
targets and poverty reduction 
programmes alongside the national 
performance measurement systems 
 
Table 9.4 Periods of performance measurement initiatives in developing economies 
Source: Developed by author, based on the findings of the study 
 
The root of performance measurement in developing economies has a close relationship with 
development discourse. More specifically, it relates to the needs of international donor agencies 
such as the World Bank to ensure the effectiveness of development aid directed to developing 
economies. Thus the early engagement of developing economies (recipient countries) in 
linking inputs to outputs was connected to the projects funded through development aid. The 
requirement to measure the performance of projects funded by international donor agencies 
was expected to strengthen the performance measurement systems of the respective agencies. 
International donor agencies started to show an interest in performance measurement because 
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of their need to demonstrate accountability for the development aid spent in developing 
economies by donor countries. This became imperative as the scarcity of development aid 
increased. This requirement of developing economies to collect data on the performance of 
projects funded through development aid started in the 1980s. 
In the 1990s, it was realised that establishing performance measurement capacity in developing 
economies was as important as building the capacity of international development agencies in 
performance measurement. During this period, the World Bank formulated its ECD, which 
contained strategies to accelerate performance measurement in the context of developing 
economies. These strategies included: 
(i) How to generate internal demand for performance measurement in developing 
economies; 
(ii) How to transfer the skills needed to embrace performance measurement in 
developing economies; 
(iii) How to ensure performance measurement is put in place in developing 
economies, and  
(iv) How to ensure performance measurement is utilised by developing economies. 
This study has demonstrated how these strategies work in the case of the new performance 
system applied in Indonesia to assess local government performance in the context of 
decentralisation. 
Finally, in the 2000s international donor agencies launched the transformation of performance 
measurement in developing economies, building synergy between performance measurement 
in these economies and performance measurement of international donor agencies, in an 
attempt to engender a sense of reliance on the national performance measurement system on 
the part of developing economies. This transformation related to a change in principles 
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regarding how development aid should be managed, which included an increased sense of 
ownership on the part of developing economies to manage the development aid they received 
and integrate funding into the national budget. As a result, accountability as regards funding 
became included in the national budget cycle.  
This study also shows that performance measurement in the context of developing economies 
can be assessed through the notion of neoliberalism. By doing so, it helps us to understand the 
possible interest that international donor agencies have in promoting performance 
measurement in developing economies. Neoliberalism has been shown to be the paradigm 
which international donor agencies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
first adopted when supporting developing economies. In the 1990s this then shifted to the 
concept of good governance. However, good governance and neoliberalism are not unrelated 
concepts. Good government can actually secure the neoliberalist agenda. Thus, when the World 
Bank changed its development paradigm to one of good governance, the underlying paradigm 
did not change. As discussed in Chapter 3, even after the 2007/8 financial crisis, neoliberalism 
is still the development paradigm used by the World Bank; it is merely a different phase of 
neoliberalism.  
The contribution of this study in terms of the three major themes found in the stages of 
performance measurement (design, implementation, use) is outlined below. Firstly, this study 
expands the existing literature which focuses on performance measurement in the context of 
developing economies (Mimba et al. 2007) by demonstrating how public sector reforms can 
influence performance measurement in different ways. Mimba et al. (2007) have suggested that 
‘decentralisation’ and ‘direct election’ reforms can lead to increased demand for performance 
information, as elected leaders can use performance measurement to communicate results to 
local voters. In this sense, the connection between reform and performance measurement is 
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positive. However, this study also finds that performance measurement is aimed at reversing 
decentralisation (providing recentralisation) through re-exerting control over the authority of 
local policymakers (that is, elected leaders), and in this sense the connection is negative. 
Moreover, the finding of this study that political reasons dominate the initiation of a 
performance measurement system contributes to a response to Van Helden et al. (2012) who 
suggest exploring the political rationale behind the design of a performance measurement 
system. 
This study demonstrates how the characteristics of the institutional context of developing 
economies identified in Mimba et al. (2007) (such as the high incidence of informality) magnify 
the challenges of performance measurement as identified by Jones and Pendlebury (2010, 
chapter 2). The influence of informality is felt, for example, in the difficulties in obtaining 
reliable data; the resultant use of unreliable data to report performance means that the measure 
of performance was similarly unreliable. Performance evaluation based on unreliable data is 
meaningless.  
Both developed and developing economies share core factors (technical and organisational) 
which influence performance measurement. The characteristics specific to developing 
economies (that is, institutional factors) however, magnify the challenges of performance 
measurement in these economies. This study has demonstrated how some institutional factors 
have affected technical and organisational factors, which in turn have increased the challenges 
of measuring performance in Indonesia. 
Reliability of output measures has been a challenge for performance measurement even in 
developed economies, as discussed in Jones and Pendlebury (2010, chapter 2). However, the 
serious deficiency in capacity (technical and organisational) in developing economies increases 
this issue.  In this study, availability of data was more inconsistent, a situation made worse by 
an unsupportive work culture and systems (resulting in, among others, high staff turnover and 
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a high incidence of informality). High staff turnover made it hard to obtain data (even when it 
was available) as this tended to be attached to an individual and moved with them. In addition, 
informal practice implied that the recorded data did not necessarily reflect the actual situation 
being reported upon.   
Similarly, causality establishment is still an essential problem of measuring performance in 
developed economies. This relates to the nature of outputs/outcomes of a public sector 
organisation and is a cross-cutting departmental problem, making it difficult to attribute 
performance to a specific department or organisation. No doubt this is a problem also 
encountered in developing economies.  A particular reform, however, the direct election of 
district heads/mayors, increased the issues of causality. In this sense, performance is thus not 
only difficult to attribute to an organisation/department but also to a specific, elected leader. 
Interestingly (but perhaps not surprisingly), elected leaders were concerned with the issue of 
causality because it related to attribution of the performance of a district/municipality to his/her 
name. The elected leader preferred a performance measurement system which could 
communicate their achievement during their term of office, rather than one which rewards the 
next elected leader as a result of the performance of the current leader, or a system which 
punishes him because of the performance of the previous elected leaders. It has been seen, 
therefore, that the direct election of the district head/mayor influenced performance 
measurement in terms of the choice of indicators. Output indicators were preferred over 
outcome indicators by elected leaders. On the other hand, national government was interested 
in outcomes of its policy (that is, decentralisation). This finding demonstrates how a conflict 
of interests among stakeholders has influenced the choice of indicators.  
In developing economies, the challenge in terms of narrowness of output measures becomes 
bigger as the development gap across regions tends to be larger than that among regions. With 
the absence of a mechanism to adjust performance, comparability of performance indicators is 
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considerably low. For comprehensiveness versus concision in reporting and controllability of 
performance, developing economies are likely to share equivalent challenges. However, 
although cost measurement is still a challenge for developed economies, developing economies 
still have long way to go to reach the stage where an accrual accounting system can be fully 
implemented.    
In terms of comprehensiveness versus concision in reporting, the literature suggests that the 
designers of a performance measurement system face a trade-off between balancing the 
tendency to create a large number of performance indicators (to ensure that they capture the 
overall performance of the object being measured) and the consideration of using simple 
measures which are easy to understand by non-specialists. The specific issue faced by designers 
in the case of the new performance measurement system in Indonesia was the desire to 
emphasise obligatory functions (which was the interest of national government) balanced with 
a need to emphasise the priority of local government (which often fell into the category of 
optional functions). As national government placed greater emphasis on obligatory functions, 
many of these KPIs have been developed to measure these, and very few (only one or two) for 
each optional function. At the same time, some districts/municipalities have achieved a great 
performance in terms of optional functions, and this in the long term will contribute to the 
improvement of obligatory functions. The government developed very few KPIs for optional 
functions, partly because the burden on local government to collect data would be heavier, and 
partly because of the difficulties in formulating the measures. However, for local government, 
the existence of only a few KPIs to measure optional functions means that this aspect of its 
performance is not fully captured.   
Next, this study contributes to an improvement of our understanding of the state of performance 
measurement system operating in developing economies. In specific relation to the ‘design’ 
theme, this study also contributes to the literature by: 
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1) Providing a systematic discussion of the impact of various types of contingencies 
on the design stage of a performance measurement system in the context of 
developing economies; 
2) Giving attention to the methodological limitations of a performance management 
system. 
These two points are highlighted in Van Helden et al. (2012) as areas to be investigated further, 
a part from exploring the political rationale behind the design of a performance measurement 
system mentioned earlier. In relation to methodological issues, the findings of this study 
support Hood’s (2007) argument regarding of the validity and reliability of complex composite 
measurements systems.  
The study addresses gaps in the literature highlighted by Van Helden and Reichard (2013) by: 
1) Explicitly assessing the influence of institutional context on performance 
measurement; 
2) Outlining the contradictions and inconsistencies between design, implementation 
and use of the new measurement system applied in Indonesia, and describing how 
these contradictions and inconsistencies resulted in confusion for stakeholders in 
terms of in which direction this new measurement system should be taken, this 
study contributes to an understanding of interdependencies at different stages of 
performance measurement;  
3) Investigating contingency factors that influence different phases of a performance 
measurement system;   
4) Demonstrating empirical evidence of contingency factors at the level of individual 
decision makers; the factors related to the influence of educational background and 
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professional experiences of elected leaders on shaping their vision and mission 
statement.  
Finally, this study presents different forms of distorted behaviour which can emerge from the 
implementation of a performance measurement system in the context of a developing economy 
(see Table 9.5). Empirical evidences of dysfunctional effects of performance measurement in 
the context of developing economies are new findings in the literature.  
 
No. Type of distorted behaviour Comments  
1. Local government intentionally delayed 
reporting KPIs by submitting narrative part 
of the performance report only, without 
KPIs 
Due to unavailable data and problematic 
system design 
2. Evaluators misused field visit to seek for 
bribery 
Performance measurement applied under 
the corrupt system, also opened an 
opportunity for corruption 
3. Local government offering to host the 
regional autonomy celebration in exchange 
for its status to be lifted up to the top 10 
best performer category 
The interest to gain a good name 
4. Local government hired consultants from 
Financial and Development Supervisory 
Body that also acted as its evaluator 
 Individual misused implementation 
for personal/organisational interest 
(Development Supervisory Body 
side) 
 Under-developed performance culture 
(local government side) 
Table 9.5 Forms of Distorted Behaviour 
Source: Developed by author, based on findings 
 
9.3.2    Practical implications 
Governments of developing economies are often tempted to embrace management techniques 
applied by developed economies (such as performance measurement) without considering the 
capacity needed to implement the system. One reason for this is that the demand for 
performance measurement in developing economies is often created by external stakeholders 
(more specifically by international donor agencies) through demand generating activities.  If 
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the real purpose of measuring performance is to improve the quality of public services, taking 
out a loan to establish a performance measurement system may be an unwise decision, as the 
gap in public services among different regions or among different types of services in 
developing economies tends to be very obvious, both in terms of quantity and quality, even 
without performance measurement taking place.  
The resources needed to repay a loan used to establish performance measurement may be better 
used to provide (or improve) delivery of services. Indonesian citizens in Papua for example 
would gain immediate benefit from a new school, hospital or road rather than from a new 
performance measurement system which the government does not have a capacity to 
implement (indeed, capacity immediately declined once support from international donor 
agencies ended). Organisational factors can be improved more easily than institutional factors, 
which are not so easy to change, partly as they are related to culture and values. Technical 
factors are also not easily dealt with (for example, metric difficulties or challenges of non-
financial measures are not easy to address). Thus, where the public services gap can be easily 
identified (that is, without needing to implement a costly performance measurement system), 
governments in developing economies need not rush to embrace performance measurement.  
It may be better for developing economies to focus first on a) developing the necessary capacity 
to implement performance measurement and b) reducing practices which are inconsistent with 
performance culture, such as informality and corruption (for example, by improving a 
country’s work system by establishing a formal mechanism to hand over tasks and 
responsibility when there is staff rotation). Building performance measurement capacity cannot 
happen overnight. It requires sturdy supporting infrastructure to be in place. Performance 
measurement needs to start with improving basic systems and infrastructure (such as database 
management and accounting systems). When these essential conditions are not present, 
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implementing a performance measurement system is likely to be a waste of precious public 
resources. One reason why the practice of performance measurement increases significantly in 
developed economies is because of the advancement in information communication 
technology. At the same time, ICT systems and infrastructure in developing economies are not 
as advanced as those owned by developed economies. Establishing a performance 
measurement system which involves a large volume of quantitative data is thus not a sensible 
choice for developing economies.     
The government of Indonesia has been experimenting with performance measurement to solve 
a problem which is highly political in nature. From the beginning, decentralisation policy in 
Indonesia has been highly influenced by political considerations; the decision to grant 
autonomy to local instead of provincial government was the most political aspect of Indonesia 
decentralisation policy. The requirement for elected leaders to clearly formulate their vision 
and mission has led to over 500 different visions statements set as targets by regions across the 
country. Part of the government’s task is thus to try and unite these different vision statements 
through performance measurement: a difficult objective to achieve.     
In many ways, the new Indonesian performance measurement initiative faces tough challenges. 
The insufficient capacity of national government to implement the initiative raises a question 
for stakeholders at the local and regional government levels about the commitment of national 
government to continue with the implementation. Stakeholders have been demotivated at the 
local government level.  Their commitment and support is also influenced by the intended use 
of the initiative which is, more specifically, threatening their interests. The intended use of the 
performance initiative aims to achieve convergence of both local and national goals. On the 
other hand, local interest is to pursue local goals. The intended use is inconsistent with the 
circumstances of regions which are very diverse. The fact that local governments still continue 
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to pursue their own goals even several years after the new performance measurement initiative 
has been implemented shows that the measurement initiative is not effective.  This is when we 
look at from the perspective of the national government that aimed for restructuring local 
government in Indonesia. However, when we look at it from the perspective of local 
government, in fact, local governments are still able to follow their own local democratic 
agendas. 
With the existence of corrupt systems and high incidence of informality, the use of a customer 
satisfaction survey may provide more useful information about the results of decentralisation 
policy than a self-assessment system. Procedures such as field visits to cross-check data can 
worsen the situation, providing an opportunity for misuse by evaluators. Moreover, for a 
country as diverse as Indonesia, applying a clustering system for regions and procedures for 
performance adjustment are critical, otherwise comparability of measures will be significantly 
affected. However, development of this kind of procedure is not easy. There is a long way to 
go for Indonesia as a developing economy to reach this stage. Therefore, making comparisons 
among regions may be something that is not suitable to be applied in Indonesia at the moment; 
it may be more appropriate for the government to focus on improving the regulatory framework 
first. This could result in a reduction in the potentially conflicting regulations which can cause 
difficulties in performance measurement implementation. Finally, although the new 
measurement system applied in Indonesia involves complex procedures and employs some 
advanced measurement techniques, the way performance is conceptualised is incomplete from 
an accounting perspective. This also needs to be addressed.  
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9.4    Expectations: Revisit 
As indicated in the introductory chapter, I expected to contribute to the literature at three levels: 
theoretical, empirical and methodological. Using the conceptual framework derived from both 
functional and institutional approaches in researching public sector performance measurement 
systems, I achieved two expectations: to contribute at the theoretical level and at the empirical 
level as discussed in the previous section. Contribution at the methodological level, however 
could not be achieved due to the design of the study changing during the course of the study 
from a mixed methods to a case study research which takes a more interpretive approach.  
Hence, the development of the conceptual framework was initially informed by studies using 
contingency-based approaches (functional approaches), and then brought in insights from 
institutional approaches in researching public sector performance measurement systems (non-
functionalist approaches). This idea was consistent with Chenhall (2003), who state that the 
purpose of contingency frameworks is to map variables that influence the effectiveness of 
accounting tools, which can include cultures and power, which are the concern of the 
institutional argument drawn from sociological theories (NIS). As the actual performance was 
not examined in this study, this study eventually could not be considered as a ‘true’ 
contingency-based study, but falls into the category of constrained-contingency-based studies. 
An ideal contingency-based study should demonstrate how design fits with context and then 
assess the impact on the real performance (Chenhall, 2003; Otley, 1980; Van Helden and 
Reichard, 2013). The constrained-contingency approach means that the study only examines 
the match between the design of performance measurement systems and their context, without 
taking into account whether performance measurement systems have an impact on an improved 
performance (Van Helden and Reichard, 2013). 
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Finally, the complex conflict of interest among different stakeholders cannot be shown from 
the conceptual framework that adopted a performance measurement systems phases approach 
and therefore, the work of Tillema et al. (2010) has been used for further analysis of this 
particular finding.  
9.5    Limitations of the study  
Given the limited time and resources available to complete a PhD project, the full range of 
stakeholders could not be included in this study. The investigation covered national, regional 
and local governments; however, the emphasis was on national and local government. At the 
national government level, I focused on the Ministry of Home Affairs; the views of sector 
ministries were not included. Moreover, the views of other stakeholders, such as citizens and 
members of the various parliaments, were not included, and those of donors were obtained 
from documentary analysis, rather than first hand.  
This study has referred to developed and developing economies, referring to the World Bank 
classification of its member countries. This might be too broad. For example, variations exist 
between developing economies and these would thus benefit from reclassification. As this 
study brings together literature from the fields of development and political economy with 
performance literature, the context of developing economies is used interchangeably with the 
recipient countries of the international donor agencies. However, it may be that not all 
developing economies are answerable to international development agencies such as the World 
Bank.   
Furthermore, as the performance measurement system studied in this research is specifically 
designed within the context of decentralisation policy, the findings of this study might be less 
applicable to developing economies which have not undergone decentralisation. Also, the 
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characteristics of decentralisation are likely to vary from one developing economy to another. 
Therefore, the findings of this study may only be relevant to a context where the nature of 
decentralisation is similar to that of Indonesia. Finally, the conclusions of this study have been 
influenced by the perspectives it has employed to examine performance measurement. If a 
different lens is used, different conclusions may be drawn.   
The findings of this study only show the connection between the driver of performance 
measurement and the notion of neoliberalism. However, evidence of whether the neoliberal 
agenda has been protected as a result of the implementation of this new performance 
measurement system in Indonesia has not been captured. Moreover, this study does not capture 
evidence of whether the EKPPD is used to monitor the progress of MDGs in Indonesia. What 
was evident was only that MDG indicators informed the choice of indicators adopted by the 
EKPPD. Finally, the span of time did not allow us to observe a full cycle of the new 
measurement system, and this study therefore only found evidence of minor improvements 
made to the system design after the learning process which occurred between the first year and 
second years of implementation.  
Finally, there was difficulty in assessing some of the local authorities. This is one of the 
challenges of case study work, probably made more difficult by the fact that the performance 
measurement system was still in use at the time this research was conducted. The fact that the 
interviews were concentrated in one province was one of potential limitations of the study.  
9.6    Conclusions 
This is a considerably comprehensive study of performance measurement in the context of 
developing economies, covering three different phases of performance measurement: design, 
implementation and use, and identifying the different elements involved and the factors 
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influencing each phase. Moreover, the study has investigated evidence from three different 
levels of government: national, regional and local government. Therefore, triangulation is 
achieved not only by collecting evidence from a range of sources (interviews, documentary 
analysis, observation) but also by confirming evidence about the same issue obtained from 
different stakeholders and survey questionnaires. Informants included the key appointment 
holders directly involved during the design stage of the system (i.e. the chair of the new 
performance measurement initiative) and those directly responsible for the on-going 
implementation process (i.e. the chair of evaluators at the national level and the head of 
governance unit at regional and local levels).   
The case study revealed a number of contradictions and inconsistencies at different stages of 
the new measurement system, and ways in which these contradictions and inconsistencies led 
to the system’s ineffectiveness. For example, the system was designed to achieve a politically 
difficult objective (that is, to reorganise local government in Indonesia through merger or 
abolition of districts/municipalities incapable of implementing decentralisation policy). 
Moreover, its intended use has a serious implication for Indonesian local governments (which 
face losing their autonomy rights); at the same time, 1) performance measurement encountered 
several methodological issues, and 2) technical and organisational capacity to implement the 
measurement system was inadequate at every level (national, regional, local) of government. 
These two major problems compromised the reliability of the performance index produced by 
this new measurement system, a reliability which has also been affected by other factors, such 
as a high level of incidence of corruption and informality (institutional factors).  
The crude measures of performance adopted in order to determine the status of each local 
government and classify them into very high, high, medium and low performers are 
inconsistent with the degree of importance of the objective to be achieved. In other words, if 
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an objective is considered important, then a greater degree of care should be put into the design 
of the performance measures than the one currently employed. National government should 
not put local government in a situation where it risks losing its autonomy rights using 
performance measures which have not been carefully designed, a methodology of performance 
evaluation which is not robust, and the implementation of a measurement system which is not 
correct. Reorganisation of local government after autonomy has been granted is a very difficult 
objective96 to achieve, even if national government employs its utmost efforts to do so. In fact, 
implementation of the system lacked support from stakeholders at the national government 
level itself97, demonstrating a conflict of interest among different stakeholders. The EKPPD 
thus faced a serious deficiency in stakeholder support which prevented the achievement of its 
establishment objectives.  
The new performance measurement system being implemented was very ambitious in 
comparison to the capacity to implement it, and therefore the failure of the system built up.  
There was deficient capacity at all levels, local, regional and national, to implement the system, 
which was a waste of public resources that could have been used to improve the actual public 
services. This problem could have been avoided if the system had been introduced gradually, 
starting on a small scale, for example, piloting the system into a few local governments first 
and assessing what could be improved before implementation at the national scale.  
                                                 
96 This is particularly the case given the long history of regions fighting to gain autonomy rights from national 
government.  
97 Lack of support from sector ministries. Only one ministry [MoHA] and one government body [the Financial 
and Development Supervisory Body] implement the system, out of six ministries and four government bodies 
mandated by the regulation to be involved in the implementation.  
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9.7    Lessons Gained from the PhD Process 
A PhD is a long and lonely journey: we need to devote three to four years to work on the same 
topic. Within those four years, I experienced ups and downs; that is why self-motivation and 
strong determination are really important. One of my colleagues even had to give up in her 
second year as she found how challenging the PhD journey could be. It was very important that 
we spent time thinking carefully about the topic to work on; it should be an interesting one as 
we will work on it for years. A good plan from the beginning is important, especially related 
to the availability of funding. For example, if a scholarship is only available for three years, we 
have to set out either to complete the PhD within three years or manage the spending wisely to 
ensure there will be enough money to survive for another year. Without a good plan, then the 
final year of the PhD can be very hard; finishing the thesis while struggling financially, which 
is a common situation for many PhD students, from what I observed. A PhD requires sacrifices; 
for example, we might be not have time to socialise. If we are not careful, the PhD can damage 
our health. Many of my colleagues shared their experiences on how their health differed prior 
to and after the PhD. As mentioned earlier, the PhD requires determination; being a clever 
student alone is not enough.   
I came from a practitioner background before starting my PhD, not an academic, to frame my 
way of thinking in a theoretical basis. That was why the hardest part of my PhD was defining 
my conceptual framework and deciding what theories to use to interpret my findings. I could 
not think of anything that was easier than I expected, as the PhD is indeed a difficult process.  
The analysis and writing up the thesis always takes longer than expected; therefore, it is 
important to allow sufficient time for these stages. In terms of the approach in writing a thesis, 
I think a paper-based thesis seems better than the big book approach. First the advantage of 
writing a paper-based thesis is that it can help us to get publication faster; it is feasible to get 
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publication during the PhD because once one paper is finished, we can send to a journal. 
However, taking a big book approach requires extra effort to craft a paper from the thesis. 
Second, a paper-based thesis may consist of three or four papers; each paper has its own theme. 
It is easier to work on three or four small themes rather than one big theme (i.e. big book 
approach) because writing coherent arguments from the start to the end and making sure all 
chapters are well-connected in 80,000 words is very difficult.  For a paper based-thesis, each 
paper can have its own theory and method. However, this can depend on supervisors’ 
preferences and also common approaches used by departments.    
Qualitative research, especially case study research, involves a lot of writings and re-writing.  
Therefore, it is better to not do it if someone is better at explaining things using numbers: 
perhaps quantitative approach will be better. Convincing arguments in qualitative research 
depend on the ability to construct different pieces of evidence in sentences, not relying on 
numbers as in a quantitative study.  Therefore, before deciding to do qualitative research, it is 
important for the researcher to make sure that they are a good writer, especially those where 
English is not their first language; otherwise, we will struggle to write the thesis.  
Finally, when we are writing the thesis, we are so close to it that we struggle with the detail of 
matters we discuss in the thesis. This can lead to failure in looking at the thesis as a bigger 
picture. Therefore, the earlier we can produce the first draft the better; then we can step back, 
take a distance from the thesis and look at it like the examiners will look at it. By doing this, 
we can see the big picture and make a significant improvement in the thesis.  
9.8    Potential for future research 
Given the limitations of the study, there is room for further research either by this researcher 
or others. Indonesia itself presents a very large context for work, and the same study could thus 
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be carried out in other provinces or expanded to include views from a larger range of 
stakeholders (such as other ministries, local parliaments, citizens or international donor 
agencies). Research at the regional government level could be expanded to explore stakeholder 
perspective in terms of their double roles within the new performance measurement system. 
Future research could also investigate the evidence, if any, of the implications of the system 
for the neoliberal agenda.   
It would also be interesting to investigate the implications of the very recent political change 
in terms of the local democratic system applied in Indonesia98, for example, how the attitude 
of districts heads/mayors to the top-down performance measurement system approach might 
change when the direct election system is abolished. This could help to clarify the mixed results 
of the current study in terms of local government appreciation of the EKPPD system. Evidence 
indicated that this was low, but there was also evidence indicating the interest of individual 
local governments in reaching the top of the league table. Future research could also examine 
how the ‘assessment’ stage causes significant improvement in design and implementation to 
the performance measurement system.  
A similar study could be conducted in other developing economies where decentralisation 
policy has been implemented and a local government performance measurement system 
established. This would enable a comparison between the intended use of the performance 
measurement system in other developing economies with its intended use in the Indonesian 
context. Investigating performance measurement in the context of developing economies 
which are not answerable to the World Bank would also present an interesting area for future 
research.   
                                                 
98 On 25 September 2014, the Indonesian parliament approved a law to abolish the direct election system for heads 
of districts/mayors. These will now be elected by local parliament, as was the case during 2001-04. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX I 
CASE STUDY PROTOCOL 
Section 1: Overview of the Case Study  
This study aims to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the EKPPD system, which is the first 
component of a comprehensive package of the new performance measurement initiative introduced in 
Indonesian in 2008 known as EPPD (introduced through Government Regulation No. 6/2008). The case 
study will explore and explain the EKPPD system in terms of (i) the reasons why the system was 
developed (ii) the characteristics of the system design (iii) the effectiveness of the implementation and 
(iv) the use and usefulness of the system.  
Indonesia is likely to struggle with the EKPPD implementation because even in the context of developed 
economies, performance measurement still faces challenges. The challenges are likely to be higher in 
the context of developing economies because of low institutional capacity and other characteristics that 
are inconsistent with performance culture (i.e. high corruption and informality).   
Key readings:  
1. Mimba, S.H.N.P., Van Helden, G.J. and Tillema, S. (2007) Public sector performance 
measurement in developing countries. Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change, 3 
(3): 192-208. 
2. Cavalluzzo, K.S. and Ittner, C.D. (2004) Implementing performance measurement innovations: 
Evidence from government. Accounting, organizations and society, 29 (3): 243-267. 
3. Propper, C. and Wilson, D. (2003) The use and usefulness of performance measures in the public 
sector. Oxford review of economic policy, 19 (2): 250-267.  
4. Jones, R. and Pendlebury, M.W. (2010) Public sector accounting. 6th.Essex: Peason Education 
Limited. 
 
Section 2: Contacting Key Informants and Field Word Arrangements 
Procedures to contact key informants 
Access to key informants should be obtained through:  
1. Personal network: 
Contact the available network that can open access to: 
- The Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) and get access to informants at MoHA 
through the ‘gate keeper.’  
- Governor of C province and get help to open access to districts heads/mayors within C 
province. 
- A province and districts/municipalities within WJ province 
  
2. International Fellowship Program (IFP) network  
Contact the IFP fellows who can open access to SS province  
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3. The University of Birmingham Alumni Network 
Contact University of Birmingham Alumni in Indonesia who can open access to key 
informants for investigation at the national level.  
- An ex PhD student of doctoral supervisor that was involved in the design process of 
the system and acted as a local consultant assigned by CIDA to help the development 
of the EPPD. 
- Alumni holding a position at MoHA 
 
Fieldwork Arrangements 
Investigation for sources of evidence should be undertaken at three different levels of government: 
1. National Government  
2. Regional Government  
3. Local Government  
Start the investigation at the national government level first, and then move on to the regional and local 
level.  
Type of evidence to be expected  
 Informants to be interviewed 
The first source of evidence to be included in this case study will be semi-structured interviews 
with key informants at different levels of government. Key informants to be interviewed and the 
roles in relation to the EKPPD include: 
1. Key appointees at the national government who were involved in the EPPD 
development  
2. Key appointees who have been involved in the EKPPD implementation at: 
- National government  
- Regional government  
- Local government  
3. Users of the information produced from the EKPPD at: 
- National government  
- Regional government  
- L ocal government  
 Events to be observed:  
1. Process of performance report preparation at local government (performance 
report to be used for performance evaluation using the EKPPD system).  
2. Meetings to discuss budget proposal at the local parliament (PPG 
municipality, 2 December 2011)    
3. Workshop of reporting performance according to the EKPPD system (WS 
province, 27 February 2012) 
 Any other documents to be reviewed on the site  
1. Reporting Manuals for the purpose of the EKPPD  
2. Evaluation Manuals under the EKPPD System 
3. Examples of Evaluation Reports by the National Evaluation Team 
4. Examples of Evaluation Reports by the Regional Evaluation team 
5. List of the national ranking for evaluations conducted in the period 2008-
2011)    
6. Performance reports made by local government for the purpose of 
performance evaluation using the EKPPD system (performance reports of 
2007-2012) 
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7. Performance reports made by local government under the previous 
performance measurement system 
8. Local government strategic plan document 
9. Local government mid-term plan 
10. Local government budget 
11. Profile of districts/municipalities participating in the study 
12. Statistics of districts/municipalities participating in the study   
 
 Questionnaires 
Use questionnaires to collect more data (to support the qualitative data). The design of 
questionnaire is attached at the end of this protocol) 
Expected preparation prior to site visits  
There is some specific information to be reviewed before going into the field: 
 General idea about the system design of the EKPPD (what aspects are to be measured, how to 
measure, reward and punishment systems).  
 Stakeholders of the EKPPD as defined by the regulations.  
 Results of previous evaluations (e.g. national rankings of local and regional government).  
 
Section 3: Protection of Human Subject 
Protection of human subjects involved in the conduct of research is very important; research should not 
cause any harm to the research participants. Therefore, informants should be fully informed of (i) the 
objectives of the research, (ii) how the data will be treated and used and how the research outcomes will 
be disseminated. Consent from informants should be obtained before research can be started.  Therefore, 
before begin the interview: 
1. Provide the informants with the ‘research participant information sheet’ containing the 
relevant information about the research and give them sufficient time to read the information 
and to ask for any clarification.  
2. Ask informants to sign the consent form. 
The procedures have been reviewed and approved by the University Research Ethics Committee (the 
ethical review application is provided in Appendix III).  
 
Section 4: Data Collection Questions 
1. Why was the regulation on the new performance measurement initiative (EPPD) issued?  
Source of evidence:  
Semi-structured interviews with key informants involved in the development of the EPPD: 
- CIDA consultant assigned to help the EPPD development   
- The chair of the EPPD development team 
- Members of the EPPD development team 
 
2. How was the EPPD developed? 
Source of evidence: 
Semi-structured interviews with key informants involved in the development of the EPPD: 
- CIDA consultant assigned to help the EPPD development   
- The chair of the EPPD development team 
- Members of the EPPD development team 
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3. Who were involved in the development process of the EPPD? What was the role of each 
actor involved? 
Source of evidence: 
Semi-structured interviews with key informants involved in the development of the EPPD: 
- CIDA consultant assigned to help the EPPD development   
- The chair of the EPPD development team 
- Members of the EPPD development team 
 
4. What steps are involved in the EKPPD and where are the steps undertaken?  
Source of evidence: 
o Semi-structured interviews with key informant involved in the implementation 
process of the EKPPD at: 
- National Government  
- Regional Government 
- Local government   
o Manual of performance reporting for the EKPPD 
o Manual of the EKPPD evaluation  
 
5. Who are stakeholders involved in the implementation of the EKPPD and their roles?  
Source of evidence: 
o Documents: 
- Government Regulation on the EPPD 
- Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 73/2009 
- Circulation letters of the Minister of Home Affairs 
o Semi-structured interviews with key informants involved in the EKPPD 
implementation at: 
- National government  
- Regional government 
- Local government   
 
6. What are problems encountered during carried out those steps? Why did the problem 
emerge?  
Source of evidence: 
 Semi-structured interviews with key informants involved in the implementation process 
of the EKPPD at: 
- National government  
- Regional government 
- Local government   
 
7. Is there any evidence of that the information produced from the EKPPD has been used to 
inform policy-making processes? If there is, what use has been made of it? If there is no 
evidence, why? 
Source of evidence: 
o Semi-structured interviews with key informants at the Regional Autonomy 
Directorate at MoHA and another related directorate. 
o Semi structured interviews with policymakers at the regional and local 
governments 
o Documents: 
- Reporting Manuals for the purpose of the EKPPD  
- National evaluation reports 
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- Regional evaluation reports 
- Manual of financial transfers (from national to local government) 
- Local government strategic plan 
- Local government mid-term plan 
- Local government budget 
 
8. What are the stakeholders’ opinions about the measurement techniques adopted in the 
EKPPD? 
Source of evidence: 
Semi-structured interviews with:  
- Members of the EKPPD national team 
- Members of the EKPPD regional team 
- Members of the EKPPD local team 
 
9. What are the stakeholders’ expectations for the future direction of the EKPPD? 
Source of evidence: 
Semi-structured interviews with key informants at: 
- National Government  
- Regional Government 
- Local Government  
 
Section 5: Outline of Case Study Report 
The planned outline of this case study report as follows: 
1. Introduction  
2. Literature Review 
3. Methodology 
4. Context 
5. Findings 
5.1 Development  
 5.1.1 Main reasons of its development  
 5.1.2 Actors involved in the development  
 5.1.3 Process development  
5.2 System design 
 5.2.1 Conceptualisation of performance  
 5.2.2. Measurement techniques 
5.3 Implementation  
       5.3.1 Process implementation 
       5.3.2 Contingency factors of implementation 
5.4. Use and Usefulness 
 5.4.1 Evidence of use/non-use 
 5.4.2 Reasons for use/non-use 
 5.4.3 Dysfunctional effects 
 5.4.4. Expectations 
6. Discussion and conclusion  
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Department of Accounting and Finance 
School of Business 
UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM 
Birmingham 
 
………………………………. 
 
To: District head/mayor of .................. 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
 
My name is Vima Tista Putriana. I am currently a PhD student with the School of Business at the University of 
Birmingham in the United Kingdom. My doctoral research is titled ‘Performance Measurement for Local 
Government in Less-Developed Economies: Indonesia as a case. Specifically, I will study the implementation of 
the Evaluasi Kinerja Penyelenggaraan Pemerintah Daerah  (EKPPD) or Evaluation of Local Government 
Performance as a part of a comprehensive performance measurement system introduced by the Government of 
Indonesia through Government Regulation No. 6/2008 which is known as Evaluasi Kinerja Penyelenggaraan 
Pemerintah Daerah  (EPPD)  or Evaluation of Local Government Governance.  
 
The study will cover the investigation on (i) the reasons behind the new performance measurement initiative, (ii) 
the characteristics of the new performance measurement system design, (iii) implementation of the system by 
different stakeholders (local, regional and national governments), (iv) the use and usefulness of the system, (v) 
local government’s response to this new imposed performance measurement system and (vi) the implications for 
local and national governments.  
 
In this regard, I would like to invite key government officials involved in this new performance measurement 
initiative to participate in this research project. This mostly involves face-to-face interviews. For further 
information please refer to the attached participant information sheet. 
 
For your further consideration, I provide some supporting documents: 
a) The permission letter to conduct this research from the Directorate of Politics and Nation Unity, the 
Ministry of Home Affairs; 
b)  Recommendation letter from the General Secretary of Regional Autonomy Directorate, Ministry of 
Home Affairs; 
c) Recommendation letter from my university; and  
d) Participant information sheet 
I look forward to your favourable response to this research. I have provided below my contact details should you 
require more clarification. 
 
Thank you. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
Vima Tista Putriana 
PhD Student in Accounting and Finance 
Email:  
Mobile:  
Noted By: 
 
Professor Rowan Jones 
Lead Supervisor 
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12nd November 2011 
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
Re-Vima Tista Putriana 
 
This is to confirm that Vima Tista Putriana is currently a candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy 
Degree (PhD) in Accounting at the University of Birmingham. Vima is researching on 
Performance Measurement for Local Governments in Less-Developed Economies with a 
specific focus on Indonesia. Vima has completed the first phase of her study and is about to 
embark on the data gathering stage of the research. This involves field work as she is required 
to access the relevant authorities as part of the research. 
The study is important as the performance measurement system that has recently been 
introduced to Indonesian local governments is of interest to all countries, especially those with 
less-developed economies. Vima’s study therefore aims to provide a better understanding of 
how performance measurement systems operate in the context of less-developed economies 
and what can be done to make such systems work. I can assure you that all information collected 
will be kept confidential and that the names of individuals or organizations involved will not 
be revealed in the thesis.  
 
I will therefore appreciate if you can assist Vima by providing her with all necessary access in 
order to conduct her study 
Yours faithfully, 
 
 
 
Professor Rowan Jones (Supervisor) 
Department Accounting and Finance 
Birmingham Business School 
University of Birmingham 
University House 
Birmingham, B15 2TT 
The United Kingdom 
Email:  
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
SURVEY  
About   
Implementation of the EKPPD System 
 
This survey seeks your opinion on the EKPPD system as the new system introduced by the 
government to assess local government performance in Indonesia. The system is based on the 
Government Regulation No. 6/2008. Specifically, this survey focuses on: 
1. Difficulties encountered by your local government in reporting key performance 
indicators (KPIs) of the EKPPD system based on your experience in administering the 
KPIs reporting activity.  
2. The use and usefulness of the key performance indicators in informing the policy 
making process  
 
Guideline to complete the questionnaire: 
1. In this survey, there is no right or wrong answer because it asks your OPINION 
2. Could you please complete all the questions. 
 
Note:  
All information provided in this survey is kept confidential and will not be discussed with or 
be given to any other party.  
 
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED TO REPORT KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 
Guideline: Please cross one of the boxes that is applicable to the condition at your local 
government  
 
A. DATA PROBLEMS  
 
Code: 
 404 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements: 
 
1. Working units that often supplied incomplete data was one of difficulties in reporting KPIs 
 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral  
 Disagre 
 Strongly disagree 
 
2. Working units that often supplied invalid data was one of difficulties in reporting KPIs 
 
 Strongly agree  
 Agree 
 Neutral  
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
3. For certain KPIs, the availability of data depends on an external party (i.e. Statistics Office 
data). This was one of difficulties in reporting KPIs.  
 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral   
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
4. For certain KPIs, the availability of data should wait for another reporting activity to be 
completed first (i.e. financial data). This was one of difficulties in reporting KPIs.   
 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral  
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
5. Certain type of data are not updated regularly (e.g. the width of opened green space area). This 
was one of difficulties in reporting KPIs.   
 
 Strongly agree  
 Agree  
 Neutral   
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
6. Certain type of data had never been collected prior the first implementation of the EKPPD 
(e.g. number of houses). This was one of difficulties in reporting KPIs.  
 
 Strongly agree  
 Agree  
 Neutral   
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
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7. High frequency of staff rotation, included staff managing data at working units, was one of 
difficulties in reporting KPIs because data tend to be attached to the individual holding the 
data.  
 
 Strongly agree  
 Agree  
 Neutral   
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
 
8. The capacity of human resources at the level of working units influences the way they 
interpret KPIs  
 
 Strongly agree  
 Agree  
 Neutral   
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
 
9. A lack of ICT was one of difficulties to obtain data in a timely manner.  
 
 Strongly agree  
 Agree  
 Neutral   
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
 
B. KPIs and FORMAT 
 
To what extent that you agree or disagree with this statement: 
 
10. Many KPIs of the EKPPD have been poorly designed. Therefore, it was difficult to decide 
which data was required to complete them. This was one of difficulties in reporting KPIs.  
 
 Strongly agree  
 Agree  
 Neutral   
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
11. Reporting formats often change. This was one of difficulties in reporting KPIs. 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree  
 Neutral   
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
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12. Changes in the format and other technical aspects were often notified late (e.g. when KPIs 
had been completed).  
 
 Strongly agree  
 Agree  
 Neutral  
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
 
13. The timeliness of reporting KPIs of the EKPPD is the same with other main reports that 
local government should produce (i.e. financial reports, accountability report of district 
head/mayor to local parliament, and LAKIP). This one of difficulties in reporting KPIs. 
 
 Strongly agree  
 Agree  
 Neutral   
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
14. A lack of technical guidance on how to complete KPIs (e.g. for working units running 
more than one function) was one difficulties in reporting KPIs.  
 
 Strongly agree  
 Agree  
 Neutral   
 Disagree  
 Strongly disagree  
 
 
 
 
C. DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT REPORTS  
 
 
15. There are many different reports that local government should produce and submit every 
year. You are required to put the reports mentioned below in order (1-4) according to the 
degree of importance of the report for stakeholders in your local government.  
 
Please write ‘1’ in the relevant box if the report is the first priority for stakeholders in your 
local government, or ‘2’ if the report is the second priority, ‘3’ if the report is the third 
priority and ‘4’ if the report is the fourth priority.  
 
 LAPORAN KEUANGAN  
 LKPJ     
 LAKIP     
 LPPD     
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To what extent to you agree or disagree with statements below: 
 
16. Performance evaluation under the EKPPD system has no financial consequences. This 
was a reason why the KPIs and evaluation results also have no influence on strategic 
decision making processes at the local government  
 Strongly agree  
 Agree 
 Neutral   
 Disagree   
 Strongly disagree  
 
17. The accomplishment of the visions and missions of the district head/mayor stated in the 
local mid-term plan is more of a priority than the achievement of a high EKPPD index.  
 
 Strongly agree  
 Agree  
 Neutral   
 Disagree   
 Strongly disagree  
 
 
 
 
D. COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
Could you please write any comment or suggestion related to the EKPPD implementation and use and 
usefulness in the space provided below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS SURVEY 
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CONTACT PAGE  
 
Thank you for your participation in completing this questionnaire. We are interested in knowing 
further of your views and opinions that are very valuable for this reseach. To be able to contact 
you in the future, could you please kindly provide us with your contact details: 
 
(To ensure the confidentiality of your answer, this contact page will be immediately 
separated from your answer) 
 
Name   :  ............................................................................. 
District/Municiplaity :  .............................................................................. 
Mobile Number  :  .............................................................................. 
Email Address :  .............................................................................. 
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APPENDIX II 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
Table A.II.1 Interview Schedules for investigation at the National Level 
Informant Role in the relation to the EKPPD Date   
(1) INF1/NG An expert involved in the design process. 9th December 2011 
(2) INF2/NG Senior official involved in the design process.                      23rd December 2011   
(3) INF3/NG Senior official involved in the design and implementation  13rd December 2011  
(4) INF4/NG Senior official involved in the implementation stage. 14th December 2011 
(5) INF5/NG Official involved in the implementation stage.              26th December 2011                              
(6) INF6/NG Senior official involved in the drafting of another 
regulation that has a connection to the PM system under 
studied.                              
16th December 2011 
(7) INF7/NG Senior official who was expected to be one of users of the 
information produced from the PM system under studied. 
15th December 2011   
The same as No. 3 
above 
Senior official involved in the design and implementation.  24 January 2012                      
Total: 7 
Informants 
 Total: 8 Interviews 
 
Table A.II.2 Interview Schedules for the investigations at the Regional and Local Levels 
Informant  The Role in Relation to the EKPPD Date   
Province A: 
Regional level: 
-   
Local level (municipality) 
(1) INF1/A/x Senior official in charge of the EKPPD implementation 4 January 2012 
(2) INF2/A/mx Senior official in charge of LAKIP 4 January 2012 
(3) INF3/A/mx Staff involved in implementation. 4 January 2012 
(4) INF4/A/mx Staff involved in implementation. 4 January 2012 
Province B: 
Regional level: 
(5) INF1/B Senior official involved in the implementation  12 January 2012  
(6) INF2/B Senior official involved in the implementation  14 January 2012 
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(7) INF3/B Staff involved in the implementation  13 January 2012 
(8) INF4/B Staff involved in the implementation  
(9) INF5/B Staff involved in the implementation  15 January 2012 
Local level: 
Local level: (municipality) 
(10) INF1/B/my Senior official expected to be involved in the 
implementation   
16 January 2012 
(11) INF2/B/my Official involved in the implementation  12 January 2012 
(12) INF3/B/my Staff involved in the implementation 16 January 2012 
Province C: 
Regional level: 
(13) INF1/C Expected user and to lead the implementation  1 March 2012 
(14) INF2/C Official in charge of the implementation  29 February 2012 
(15) INF3/C Official involved in the implementation  9 March 2012 
(16) INF4/C Official involved in the implementation 
Local level: 
Municipality 1 
(17) INF1/C/m1 Local policy maker 6 March 2012 
(18) INF2/C/m1 Senior official involved in the implementation  9 February 2012 
(19) INF3/C/m1 Official involved in the implementation  9 February 2012 
(20) INF4/C/m1 Junior official involved in the implementation 9 February 2012 
(21) INF5/C/m1 Staff involved in the implementation 9 February 2012 
(22) INF6/C/m1 Staff involved in the implementation 6 March 2012 
(23) INF7/C/m1 Senior official involved in the implementation 2 February 2012 
(24) INF8/C/m1 Official involved in the implementation  10 February 2012 
The same as No. 
21 above 
Staff involved in the implementation 21 March 2012 
(25) INF9/C/m1 Official involved in the implementation 31 January 2012 
The same as No. 
21 above 
Staff involved in the implementation 21 March 2012 
(26) INF10/C/m1 Official in charge of LAKIP 21 March 2012 
Municipality 2 
(27) INF1/C/m2 Local policy maker 3 December 2011 
(28) INF2/C/m2 Official involved in the implementation 29 March 2012 
(29) INF3/C/m2 Staff involved in the implementation 29 March 2012 
(30) INF4/C/m2 Senior official expected to be user of the performance 
information 
25 April 2012 
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(31) INF5/C/m2 Junior official involved in the implementation  25 April 2012 
(32) INF6/C/m2 Junior official involved in the implementation 27 April 2012 
(33) INF7/C/m2 Senior official involved in different forms of performance 
reporting activities  
21 February 2012 
Municipality 3 
(34) INF1/C/m3 Official involved in the implementation 17 February 2012 
(35) INF2/C/m3 Junior official involved in the implementation 17 February 2012 
(36) INF3/C/m3 Staff involved in the implementation 17 February 2012 
The same as No. 
34, 35 and 36 
 27 February 2012 
Municipality 4 
(37) INF1/C/m4 Senior official involved in the implementation 24 February 2012 
(38) INF2/C/m4 Junior official involved in the implementation 24 February 2012 
(39) INF3/C/m4 Junior official involved in LAKIP 24 February 2012 
District 1 
(40) INF1/C/d1 Local policy maker 1 March 2012 
(41) INF2/C/d1 Official involved in the implementation 1 March 2012 
(42) INF3/C/d1 Junior official involved in the implementation 20 February 2012 
(43) INF4/C/d1 Policy implementer (health) 20 February 2012 
District 2 
(44) INF1/C/d2 Local policy maker 6 March 2012 
(45) INF2/C/d2 Junior official involved in the implementation 29 February 2012 
(46) INF3/C/d2 Official expected to be involved in the implementation  12 March 2012 
(47) INF4/C/d2 Senior official involved in the implementation 13 March 2012 
(48) INF5/C/d2 Staff involved in the implementation 13 March 2012 
(49) INF6/C/d2 Staff involved in the implementation 13 March 2012 
(50) INF7/C/d2 Staff involved in the implementation 13 March 2012 
The same as No. 
45 above 
Junior official involved in the implementation 13 March 2012 
District 3 
(51) INF1/C/d3 Local policy maker 5 March 2012 
(52) INF2/C/d3 Senior official involved in the implementation 7 March 2012 
(53) INF3/C/d3 Official involved in the implementation 7 March 2012 
(54) INF4/C/d3 Senior official expected to be involved in the 
implementation and use  
7 March 2012 
(55) INF5/C/d3 Senior official involved in the implementation 7 March 2012 
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The same as No. 
54 above 
Senior official expected to be involved in the 
implementation and use  
7 March 2012 
(56) INF6/C/d3 Junior official involved in the implementation 7 March 2012 
Province D: 
Regional level: 
(57) INF/D Key appointment holder in charge of the EKPPD 
implementation  
6 May 2012 
(phone interviews) 
Local level 
-   
Province E: 
Regional level: 
(58) INF/E Key appointment holder in charge of the EKPPD 
implementation 
10 May 2012 
(phone interview) 
Local level 
-   
Total:  58 
Informants  
 Total:  52 
Interviews 
TOTAL: 60 INTERVIEWS
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The Business School 
 
Interview Consent Form 
Performance Measurement for Local Governments in LessDeveloped Economies: 
Indonesia as a Case 
 
Part A: Interviewee 
 
Name of interviewee: _________________________________________________ 
 
Location of interview: _________________________________________________ 
 
Before proceeding with the interview, please read and sign the following declaration to 
indicate you have consented to participate in this interview. 
 
I hereby declare that: 
 I have agreed to be interviewed for the purpose of seeking my feedback on 
Performance Measurement for Local Governments in Less Developed Economies: 
Indonesia as a Case 
 The purpose and nature of the interview has been fully explained to me and I 
understand the ways in which the research findings for this project will be used. 
 Any questions regarding the interview and all aspects of the research project have 
been answered to my satisfaction. 
 I understand I may withdraw from the interview at any time and I have the right to 
refuse to answer any questions which make me feel uncomfortable. 
 I understand that all personal details will be kept confidential and stored separately 
from the main research findings. I am also assured that all participants will   remain 
anonymous during the presentation of the research findings. 
 
Signature of interviewee: ________________________________________________ 
 
Date: ________________________________________________________________ 
 
Part B: Interviewer 
 
Name of interviewer: ___________________________________________________ 
 
 I have explained all aspects of the project as well as the rights of the interviewee.        
I believe that the consent given is informed and that he/she understands the nature of 
the research and how the data generated from this project will be used. 
 
Signature of interviewer: ________________________________________________ 
 
Date: ________________________________________________________________ 
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Department of Accounting and Finance 
School of Business 
UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
1. The Study  
Title Performance measurement in local governments in Less-Developed 
Economies: The case for Indonesia 
Researcher Vima Tista Putriana 
Lead Supervisor Professor Rowan Jones 
Co-Supervisor Dr. George Georgiou 
  
You are invited to participate in this study which is being conducted in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the PhD in Accounting and Finance for Vima Tista Putriana. In order to help you make an informed decision, 
this information sheet outlines the reasons why the research is being conducted and what it will involve. Please 
read the following sections carefully and feel free seek clarification from the researcher involved. 
 
2. What the research is about? 
The study intends to evaluate the new performance measurement system for Indonesian local governments, 
also known as Evaluasi Kinerja Penyelenggaraan Pemerintah Daerah (EKPPD), as a part of a larger 
performance measurement initiative introduced through Government Regulation Number 6, 2008 (Evaluasi 
Penyelenggaraan Pemerintah Daeah or EPPD). The study will cover the EKPPD’s design, implementation, use 
and impact, etc.  
 
 
3. Who is involved? 
The study will involve five to six key informants at the central government level who deal with the design, 
implementation and use of the EKPPD, particularly those from the Ministry of Home Affairs and members of 
the national team in charge of the implementation of the EKPPD implementation or key informants who have 
knowledge or relevant information in relation to the EKPPD system. Then, key appointment holders in charge 
of the regional evaluation at regional government level and key appointment holders in charge of reporting 
performance for the purpose of the EKPPD evaluation at the local/regional government level.   
 
 
4. What will happen if I take part and what are the implications? 
If you agree to participate in this study, approximately two hours of your time should be scheduled for the 
interviews to take place. All interviews will be audio-recorded. If you do not wish for such recordings to take 
place or you object to some parts of the process being recorded, please let the researcher know at any point 
during the interview. Once the transcript of the interview is completed, a copy will be sent to concerned 
participants so as to seek their consent prior to further processing of the information in the research 
endeavour. Once you confirm your decision to take part in this study, you may retain this information sheet 
for your records. You will also be asked to sign and hand in the consent form attached to this information 
sheet. Please be reminded that you will have the right to withdraw from the research process at any time 
you wish to without any consequence to you. If you do decide to withdraw yourself from the process, please 
inform the researcher by any means possible, for example via email, telephone, letters, etc. Please be assured 
that if you withdraw from the research process at any point of time, data concerning your participation will 
be deleted from the study.  
 
 
5. What are the risks involved? 
It is estimated that there is no potential risk in this study. 
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6. What benefit can I receive from the study? 
Although you may not directly benefit from your participation in this research, the findings will, however, assist 
in addressing the limited academic attention placed on performance measurement for Indonesian local 
governments.  
 
7. Confidentiality and Anonymity 
You will remain anonymous and information regarding your identity will be properly coded. Pseudonyms will 
be used for all references to your narrative. However, if you wish, your name can be reflected in the 
immediate written outputs and publications that may arise from this research. In addition, your personal 
details will not be passed on to any other parties. Unless written consent is given, no direct quote with your 
name will be made in the final report. All quotes will thus remain anonymous.  
 
8.Data Protection and archiving  
All data arising from the interview (i.e. audio files, transcripts, etc.) will be treated as confidential. These data 
will only be accessible to the researcher and her supervisors; and will be kept in a locked cabinet at her 
home. All files stored in the personal laptop, where the data will be analysed, will be password and 
encryption protected. All data, whether physical or electronic, will be properly disposed of ten (10) years 
after the end of the study.  
 
9. Research dissemination 
The major written output of the study is the PhD thesis. The study may also be presented at academic 
conferences and published in academic journals. A soft copy of the thesis will be forwarded to the 
researcher’s sponsor.  
 
10. Who is conducting and funding the research? 
The research will be solely conducted by Vima Tista Putriana. She was born and raised in Padang Panjang city, 
West Sumatera, Indonesia.  
Vima, a World Bank Fellow from the University of Indonesia through the Japan-Indonesian Presidential 
Scholarship (JIPS) programme is a Doctoral Researcher with the University of Birmingham. As the sponsor of 
her three- year scholarship grant, the World Bank-JIPS is the direct funder of the study.  
 
11. Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has received clearance from the ethics Committee of the Business School and the University of 
Birmingham.  
 
For further information and other concerns, please contact: 
Vima Tista Putriana 
Mobile:  
Email :  
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet and for considering taking part in the study. 
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APPENDIX IV 
FULL LIST OF KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
Table A. IV. 1. Key Performance Indicators of the EKPPD System (Policymaker) 
Aspect Focus No Key Performance Indicators Formula Type of Data Performance 
Achievement 
Notes 
(1) Peace and 
Public Order 
Local ordinance on spatial 
planning 
1 The existence of local 
ordinance on building permits 
Local ordinance on 
building permit exists or 
does not exist 
If the local ordinance exists: state the 
legal form: number and year of the 
local ordinance  
Exists/does 
not exist 
 
2 Ratio of houses having a 
building permit 
Number of houses having a 
building permit is divided 
by total number of houses 
- Number of houses having a 
building permit by the end of 
201x…..units 
- Total number of houses by the 
end of 201x……units 
%  
3 Availability of local ordinance 
on spatial planning 
Local ordinance on urban 
planning exists or does not 
exist. 
If the local ordinance exists: state the 
legal form: number and year of the 
local ordinance 
Exists/does 
not exist 
 
Local ordinance on 
citizenship 
4 Obtaining a citizenship card The length of processing 
time of  a citizenship card 
Legal basis: 
Number and year of the local 
ordinance 
Number of 
days 
When the local 
ordinance does not 
regulate the length of 
processing time, the 
data can be supported 
by Standard 
Operating Procedures 
(SOP) 
5 The costs of obtaining a 
citizenship card  
The costs of obtaining a 
citizenship card stated in 
the local ordinance 
Legal basis: 
Number and year of the local 
ordinance 
Amount of 
the charge 
(IDR) or free 
When local ordinance 
does not regulate the 
costs, it can be 
supported by SOP 
Local policy on social 
police 
6 Ratio of social police to total 
number of population 
Number of social police 
per 10,000 population 
- Number of social police (with 
status of civil servant) by the end 
of 201x 
- Total population by the end of 
201x 
per 10,000 
population 
 
Local policy on sex 
workers and movable 
traders 
7 The existence of local 
ordinance on sex workers and 
moveable traders 
Local ordinance on sex 
workers and moveable 
If the local ordinance exists: state the 
legal form: number and year of the 
local ordinance  
Exists/does 
not exist 
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traders exists or does not 
exist 
Local ordinance on 
cleanliness of the city 
8 Existence of local ordinance on 
cleanliness of the city 
 
 
 
Local ordinance on 
cleanness of the city exists 
or does not exist 
If the local ordinance exists: state the 
legal form: number and year of the 
local ordinance 
Exists/does 
not exist 
 
(2) Harmony  and 
effectiveness of 
relationship 
between the local 
and national 
governments and 
among local 
authorities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Report submission to the 
national government  
9 Timeliness of performance 
report submission (based on the 
Government Regulation 
number 3/2007) 
The report submission is 
on time or not 
Proof of report submission:  
Number and date of cover letter of the 
report submission 
On time/not 
on time 
 
Financial performance 
report submission 
10 Timeliness of financial 
performance report submission 
(based on the Government 
Regulation number 8/2006) 
The report submission is 
on time or not 
Proof of report submission:  
- Number and date of cover letter 
of financial reports submission 
- Number and date of cover letter 
of performance reports 
submission 
 
On time/not 
on time 
 
 
 
 
Implementation of 
Minimum Service 
Standard (MSS) 
11 Functions whereby the MSS of 
the respective functions have 
been implemented 
Number of functions 
whereby the MSS of the 
respective functions have 
been implemented 
Functions that have been implemented 
by local government …..functions, 
that consist of: 
1) Function………….. 
2) Function………….. 
3) Function………….. 
4) Function………….. 
5) Function………….. 
6) Function………….. 
Number of 
functions 
 
Relationship among 
regions 
12 Cooperation and partnership 
with other regions 
Number of Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoU) that 
are still valid until 201x 
Number of Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoU) that are still 
valid until 201x consist 
of………MoU, with details as 
follows: 
1) MoU with……..on…. 
2) MoU with…….on…. 
3) MoU with…….on…. 
4) Etc. 
 
Number of  
MoU 
 
(3) Harmony of 
local policies and 
the national 
government’s 
policies 
Synchronisation of  local 
and national development 
implementation  
13 Synchronisation of 
development priorities 
Number of local 
development priorities is 
divided by the number of 
the national development 
priorities99 
- Local development priority (local 
government work plan) 
- The national government’ 
development priorities 
%  
                                                 
99 Programme priorities of the national government include: (1) bureaucratic reform and governance (2) education (3) health (4) poverty eradication (5) food resilience (6) infrastructures (7) investment climate and 
business climate (8) energy (9) environment and natural disaster management (10) the under-developed, the islands located nearest to the country border and post-conflict regions and (11) culture, creativity and technology 
innovations.  
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Responsibility  14 Obligatory functions that are 
implemented by local 
government  
Number of functions that 
are implemented by local 
governments are divided 
by 26 (total obligatory 
functions according to 
government regulation 
number 38/2007), times 
100% 
 
Number of obligatory functions that 
are implemented in 201x 
% Match with the plans 
and budget 
documents of 201x, 
the revised local 
budget and financial 
reports. 
Finance 15 The approval of 201x budget 
(the time)  
Timeliness of local budget 
approval 
If the approval is on time, state the 
legal form: number and date of the 
local ordinance on local budget of 
201x (the latest should be 31st 
December 200x-1) 
On time/not 
on time 
It is classified as 
delayed (not on time) 
if the approval is 
after 31st of 
December of 200x-1 
16 Existence of local ordinance 
related to local financial 
management (based on 
government regulation number 
58/2005) 
Local ordinance on local 
financial management 
exists or does not exist 
If the local ordinance exists: state the 
legal form: number and year of the 
local ordinance 
Exists/does 
not exist 
 
17 Expenditure on basic services Expenditure on basic 
services is divided by total 
expenditures, times 100% 
Expenditure for basic services in the 
local budget of 201x 
1) Education function  IDR                 
2) Health function  IDR                       
3) Environment function IDR           
4) Public works function IDR           
5) Social function  IDR                        
6) Labour force function   IDR            
7) Cooperation function   IDR            
8) Social police function   IDR            
9) Civil registration &citizenship 
function       IDR                              
Total basic services expenditures IDR                                                     
Total expenditure in the local                 
budget of 201x    IDR                             
%  
18 Expenditure on education and 
health  
Expenditure on education 
and health is divided by 
total expenditures, times 
100% 
Expenditure on education and health 
in local budget of 201x: 
1) Education function             IDR                
2) Health function                   IDR               
Total expenditure on education               
and health                                   IDR 
Total expenditure in the local                  
budget of 201x                            IDR               
%  
Public services 
 
 
 
 
19 Existence of local ordinance on 
public services standard, based 
on laws and regulations 
Public services standards 
exist or do not exist  
If the standards exist, state the legal 
form: number and date of the local 
ordinance on public services standard 
Exist/do not 
exist 
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Human resources   20 Ratio of civil servants to total 
population 
Number of civil servants is 
divided by total population 
in the city 
- Number of civil servant in 2010 
- Total of population of 2010 
Ratio   
 21 Information system for human 
resources management 
 
 
Database of human 
resources is available or 
not available  
If database on human resources is 
available, state the name of the 
database   
Available/not 
available 
 
Organisation  22 Arrangement of working units Formations of working 
units, based on government 
regulation number 41/2007   
Number of working units: 
1) Local government 
secretariat………….…units 
2) Agencies……………...units  
3) Bodies…………………units 
4) Offices………………...units 
5) Hospitals ……………...units 
6) Sub-districts …………...units 
Number of working units     ...units 
Number of 
units 
 
(4) Effectiveness of 
relationship 
between local 
authority and local 
parliament 
Regulations 23 The local ordinances that were 
issued in a year  
Number of local 
ordinances that were issued 
in 201x 
Number of local ordinances approved  
in 201x was……local ordinances (list 
is attached) 
Number of 
ordinances 
 
The proposed regulations 
in a year 
24 Local ordinances proposal that 
were approved  by local 
parliament in 201x 
Number of proposed local 
ordinances is divided by 
number of approved local 
ordinances in 201x 
- Number of local ordinances that 
were proposed in 201x 
- Number of local ordinances that 
were approved by local 
parliaments in 201x 
%  
(5) Effectiveness of 
decision making 
process by local 
parliaments and the 
follow up of the 
decisions  
Follow up of local 
parliament’s decisions  
25 Local parliament’s decisions 
that were followed up 
Number of local 
parliament’s decisions that 
were followed up is 
divided by number of local 
parliament’s decisions that 
were made in 201x, times 
100% 
- Number of local parliament’s 
decisions that were followed up 
in 201x 
- Number of local parliament’s 
decisions that were made in 201x 
%  
(6) Effectiveness of 
decision making 
process by the 
mayor and the 
follow up of the 
decisions 
Follow up of the mayor’s 
decisions 
26 The mayor’s decisions that 
were followed-up 
Number of the mayor’s 
decisions that were 
followed-up is divided by 
number of the mayor’s 
decisions in 201x, times 
100% 
- Number of the mayor’s decisions 
that were followed-up in 201x 
- Number of the mayor’s decisions 
in 201x 
%  
Follow up of the mayor’s 
regulation 
27 The mayor’s regulation that 
were followed-up 
Number of the mayor’s 
regulation that were 
followed-up is divided by 
number of the mayor’s 
regulations in 2010, times 
100% 
- Number of the mayor’s 
regulations that were followed-
up regulations in 2010 
- Number of the mayor’s 
regulations in 2010 
%  
(7) Obedience of 
local governance to 
laws and 
regulations 
Local ordinances that were 
cancelled 
28 Number of local ordinances 
that were cancelled 
Number of local 
ordinances that were 
cancelled is divided by 
number of local ordinances 
that were submitted to the 
Local ordinances that were cancelled 
are …..consisting of: 
1) Local ordinance 
number…year 201x on…. 
%  
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government for the 
evaluation, times 100%  
2) Local ordinance 
number…year 201x on…. 
3) Local ordinance 
number…year 201x on…. 
4)  
(8) Intensity and 
effectiveness of 
public consultation 
related to strategic 
local policies  
The existence of local 
regulation on public 
consultation 
29 The existence of the district 
head/mayor’s regulation on 
public consultation  
The district head/mayor’s 
regulation on public 
consultation exists or does 
not exists 
If the regulation exists, the number of 
district head/mayor’s regulation 
Exists/does 
not exist 
 
Local government media 
accessible to the public  
30 Availability of information 
media owned by local 
government that can be 
assessed by the public 
Availability of information 
media that are regulated by 
the  district head/mayor’s 
regulation 
If media are available, state: 
-name of the media and  
-number of the regulation  
Available/not 
available 
 
(9) Transparency in 
utilisation of 
transfer funds 
Absorption  of general 
allocation fund 
31 Proportion of general allocation 
fund that can be utilised 
compared to what was planned 
Amount of general 
allocation fund utilised 
compared to amount of 
transfer in form of general 
allocation fund, times 
100% 
- General allocation funds utilised 
in 201x 
- General allocation funds 
budgeted for 201x 
%  
Expenditure budget 
financed through general 
allocation funds 
32 Proportion of public 
expenditure compared to 
general allocation funds 
Amount of public 
expenditure is divided by 
general allocation funds, 
times 100%  
- Direct expenditure in the local 
budget of 201x 
- General allocation funds 
budgeted for 201x 
%  
Proportion of expenditures 
in the local budget 
33 Direct expenditures to total 
local budget 
Total direct expenditures is 
divided by total local 
budget, times 100% 
- Direct expenditure in the local 
budget of 201x 
- Total expenditures in the local 
budget of 201x. 
%  
(10) Intensity, 
effectiveness and 
transparency of the 
exploration of 
original local 
income and 
loans/local bonds 
 
Proportion of original local 
income 
 
 
 
 
34 Proportion of original local 
income compared to total 
revenues within the local 
budget  
Amount of original local 
income is divided by total 
revenue (realisation), times 
100% 
- Amount of original local income 
in the local budget (realisation)  
- Total revenues in the local 
budget (realisation) 
%  
(11) Effectiveness 
of planning, 
execution, 
management and 
accountability and 
monitoring of local 
budget.  
Truth and fairness of 
financial reports  
35 Audit opinion on financial 
report  
Type of opinion issued by 
the Supreme Audit Office 
on the audit of financial 
reports  
- Audit opinion on financial report 
of 200x-2 
- Audit opinion on financial report 
of 200x-1   
 
Type of audit 
opinion of 
year 201x-2 
and 201x-1 
Opinion: 
1) Unqualified  
2) Qualified 
3) Disclaimer  
4) Adverse  
Audit opinion on the 
financial report of 
200x is provided 
during the field visit 
for the respected 
year. 
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Proportion of residual 
income 
36 Ratio residual income to total 
revenues  
Amount of residual income 
is divided by total revenue, 
times 100% 
- Residual income of 201x 
- Total revenues of 201x 
 
%  
Expenditures realisation  37 Proportion of expenditures 
(realisation) to budgeted  
Realised expenditures is 
divided by budgeted 
expenditures, times 100% 
- Expenditures of 201x 
(realisation) 
- Expenditures of 201x (budget)  
%  
Monitoring by local 
inspectorate  
38 Follow up the audit findings on 
financial reports  
Number of audit findings 
of the Supreme Audit 
Office addressed until the 
end of 201x 
- Number of audit findings until 
the end of 201x-1  
- Number of audit findings 
addressed until the end of 201x 
%  
(12) Local potency 
management 
The map of potential 
sources owned by local 
government  
39 Proportion of original local 
income (realisation) to potential 
sources owned by local 
government  
Amount of original local 
income (realisation) is 
divided by the value of 
potential sources owned by 
local government, times 
100% 
- Amount of original local income 
(realisation) in 201x 
- The value of potential sources 
owned by local government in 
201x  
 
%  
Increase of original local 
income  
40 Increase of original local 
income 
Increase/decrease original 
local income from the 
previous year, times 100% 
- Total original local income in 
201x-1 
- Total original local income in 
201x 
%  
(13) Innovation in 
governance  
Awards  41 Awards from government 
received by local government 
in 201x 
Number of awards 
received from the 
government in 201x 
Number of awards…, consists of: 
1) ….. 
2) ….. 
3) etc. 
Number of 
awards 
 
Procurement  42 E-procurement  Implementation of e-
procurement 
When e-procurement has been in 
operation, mention the month and 
year it was started  
Exists/does 
not exist 
 
Local competitiveness  43 Number of investment 
approvals 
Number of investment 
permits in 201x 
Number of investment permits 
approved in 201x 
Number of 
permits 
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Table A. IV. 2. Key Performance Indicators of the EKPPD System (Policy Implementer Level- General Administrative Aspect) 
Aspect Focus No Key Performance Indicators Formula Type Of Data Performance 
Achievement 
Notes 
      Function 
1 
Function 
2 
 
(1) Technical 
policies of functions 
implementation 
National programmes 
attached to sector 
ministries that have to be 
implemented by local 
government organisations 
1. Number of national 
programmes that have to be 
implemented by local 
government organisations 
Number of national 
programmes that can be 
implemented by local 
government organisations 
divided by national 
programmes times 100% 
-Number of national 
programmes  
- Number of national 
programmes that can be 
implemented by local 
government organisations  
% % Should refer to the 
national 
programmes of 2010 
for each functions  
Consistency with technical 
policies issued by the 
government through sector 
ministries  
2. Availability of standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) 
Available or not available  If available, state how many 
SOPs are available and 
provide the details.  
Available 
or not 
available 
Available 
or not 
available 
 
(2) Obedience on 
laws and 
regulations 
Number of local 
ordinances that have to be 
implemented by local 
government organisations 
according to ministries’ 
regulations 
3. Ratio of implementing 
regulations available to 
implementing regulations that 
have to be carried out according 
to ministries’ regulations  
Number of implementing 
regulations available is 
divided by number of 
implementing regulations 
that have to be carried out 
times 100% 
 % % Minimum service 
standard on : 
1. Health 
2. Social security 
3. Education 
4. Environment 
5. Family 
planning 
6. Women’s 
empowerment  
(3) Organisational 
arrangement  
 
 
 
 
  
Filling the organisational 
Structure  
4. Ratio of positions and echelon  
filled   
Number of positions filled 
divided by number of 
positions available  
 % %  
5. Availability of functional 
positions in the organisational 
structure  
Functional positions are 
available or not available  
 Available 
or not 
available  
Available 
or not 
available 
Please refer to the 
latest condition of 
organisation by the 
2010 
(4) Staff 
management 
Competence level of 
human resources in 
implementing local 
government organisations 
tasks that are relevant with 
related functions 
6. Municipality civil servant ratio Number of civil servant in 
local government 
organisation to total 
municipality civil servants 
- Number of civil servant 
in local government 
organisations 
- Number of civil servant 
in the municipality  
Ratio  Ratio Please refer to the 
latest conditions of 
the organisation by 
2010 
 7. Officials100 that have meet the 
criteria of leadership trainings 
Number of officials that 
have meet the criteria of 
leadership trainings is 
divided by total number of 
 % %  
                                                 
100 The term of officials here refers to civil servants assigned to a working unit with a certain managerial position 
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officials of working units, 
times 100% 
 8. Officials that have meet the 
criteria to hold their respective 
position 
Number of officials at a 
specific grade (echelon) 
that meet the criteria to 
hold that position divided 
by number of officials at 
that specific grade 
(echelon), times 100% 
- Number of officials at a 
specific grade (echelon) 
and meeting the criteria 
to hold that position 
- Number of officials at 
the respective grade 
(echelon) 
% %  
(5) Planning and 
development  
Completeness of planning 
documents owned by a 
working unit  
9. The existence of planning 
documents at a working unit. 
- Strategic planning 
- Annual planning 
- Budget planning 
Planning documents are 
available or not available 
within a working unit. If 
available, state the name of 
documents 
If the documents exist, state 
number and name of 
documents: 
1)….. 
2)….. 
3)…... 
Number  
and type 
of 
document 
Number 
and type 
of 
document 
 
Synchronisation of 
programmes started in the 
local government 
organisations’ work plan 
and programmes stated in 
the local government’s 
work plan  
10. Number of programmes stated 
in the ‘work plan’ document of 
local government that are not 
accommodated in the ‘work 
plan’ document of a working 
unit.  
Number of programmes 
stated in the ‘work plan’ 
document of local 
government that are not 
accommodated in the 
‘work plan’ document of a 
working unit divided by 
number of programmes 
allocated to be the work 
programmes of the 
respective of the  working 
unit according to the local 
mid-term plan, times 100% 
- Programmes stated in 
the ‘work plan’ 
document of local 
government that are not 
accommodated in the 
‘work plan’ document 
of a working unit 
 
- Programmes that should 
be included in the 
‘work plan’ document 
of the working unit 
according to the local 
mid-term plan 
% %  
Synchronisation between 
the ‘work plan budget’ 
document and the ‘work 
plan’ document of a 
working unit. 
11. Number of programmes stated 
in the ‘work plan’ document 
that are not accommodated 
within ‘work plan budget’ 
document of a working unit 
Number of programmes  
stated in the ‘work plan’ 
document that are not 
accommodated within 
‘work plan budget’ 
document of a working 
unit is divided by number 
of programmes in the 
‘work plan budget’ 
document of a working 
unit, times 100%. 
- Number of programmes  
stated in the ‘work 
plan’ document that are 
not accommodated 
within the ‘work plan 
budget’ document of a 
working unit 
- Number of programmes 
in the ‘work plan 
budget’ document of a 
working unit 
 
% %  
Planning, programmes 
execution and budgeting  
12. Number of programmes stated 
in ‘work plan’ document of a 
working unit that are not 
accommodated in the ‘budget 
execution document’ of the 
respective working unit.   
Number of programmes 
stated in the ‘work plan’ of 
a working unit that are not 
accommodated in the 
‘budget execution 
document of the respective 
working unit, divided by  
- Programmes stated in 
the ‘work plan’ of a 
working unit that are 
not accommodated in 
the ‘budget execution 
document of the 
respective working unit.  
% %  
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Number of programmes 
included in the ‘budget 
execution document’ of the 
working unit, times 100% 
- Programmes included 
in the ‘budget execution 
document’ of the 
working unit, 
(6) Local financial 
management 
Budget Allocation 13. Proportion of working unit 
budget to total expenditures in 
the local budget 
Budget allocation for a 
working unit divided by 
total local budget, times 
100% 
- Total budget for a 
working unit  
- Total expenditures in 
the local budget. 
 
% %  
Capital expenditure  14. Proportion of capital 
expenditures to total 
expenditures of working unit 
Capital expenditures 
divided by total 
expenditures of the 
respective working unit 
- Capital expenditure of a 
working unit 
- Total expenditures the 
respective working unit 
% %  
Maintenance expenditure 15 Proportion of maintenance 
expenditure to total goods and 
services expenditure of a 
working unit 
Maintenance expenditure 
of a working unit is 
divided by total goods and 
services expenditure of the 
respective working unit 
- Maintenance 
expenditure of a 
working unit 
- Goods and services 
expenditure of the 
respective working unit.  
% %  
16 Proportion of maintenance 
expenditure to total expenditure 
of a working unit 
Maintenance expenditure 
of a working unit is 
divided by total 
expenditure of the 
respective working unit 
- Maintenance 
expenditure of a 
working unit.  
- Total expenditure the 
respective working unit 
% %  
Financial reports 17 Existence of financial reports of 
a working unit  (Balance sheet 
and notes to financial statement) 
Financial report exists or 
do not exist at the working 
unit 
If financial reports exist, 
state number and names of 
the financial reports. 
Exist/do 
not exist 
  
(7) Local asset 
management 
Assets management 18 The existence of assets 
registration at a working unit 
Assets registrations exist or 
do not exist at the working 
unit 
 Exist/do 
not exist 
Exist/do 
not exist 
 
Assets utilisation 19 Unutilised assets  Number of unused assets 
divided by assets possessed 
by the working unit, times 
100% 
- Unused assets 
- Assets possessed  
% %  
(8) Public 
participation  
Forms of facilities for 
public participation 
available  
20 Number of information 
facilities: 
1. Announcement 
board 
2. Complain post 
3. Leaflet 
4. etc. 
Number of information 
facilities  
State type of facilities: 
1)….. 
2)….. 
3)…. 
4)…. 
5)….. 
Number 
of 
different 
types of 
facilities 
available  
Number 
of 
different 
types of 
facilities 
available 
 
Responsiveness towards 
public participation 
21 The existence of citizen a 
satisfaction survey 
Results of citizens a 
satisfaction survey exist or 
do not exist 
If the survey exists, state the 
name of the survey 
Exists/ 
does not 
exist 
Exists/ 
does not 
exist 
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Table A. IV. 3. Key Performance Indicators of the EKPPD System (Policy Implementer Level- Achievement of Minimum Service Standards) 
Functions No
. 
Key Performance Indicators Formula Performance 
Achievement  
Notes  
Obligatory Functions 
(1) Education 1. Nursery education Number of students at nursery education
Number of children  aged 4 − 6 years 
 × 100% 
%  
2. Literacy rate Citizens aged ≥ 15 years old that are literate
Total citizens aged  ≥ 15 years 
 × 100% 
%  
3. Absolute participation number 
(elementary school or equivalent) 
Number of students aged 7 − 12 years at elementary school
Number of citizens aged 7 − 12 years 
 × 100% 
%  
4. Absolute participation number 
(junior high school or equivalent) 
Number of students aged 13 − 15 years at junior high school
Number of citizens aged 13 − 15 years 
 × 100% 
%  
5. Absolute participation number 
(senior high school or equivalent) 
Number of students aged 16 − 18 years at junior high school
Number of citizens aged 16 − 18 years 
 × 100% 
%  
6. Discontinued rate (elementary 
school or equivalent 
Number of students discontinued their education at elementary school or equivalent
Number of students at the same elementary school from the previous year
 × 100% 
%  
7. Discontinued rate (junior high 
school or equivalent) 
Number of students discontinued their education at junior high school or equivalent
Number of students at the same level of junior high school in the previous year
 × 100% 
%  
8. Discontinued rate (senior high 
school or equivalent) 
Nuumber of students discontinued their education at senior high school or equivalent
Number of students at the same level of education in the previous year
 × 100% 
%  
9. Completion rate (elementary 
school) 
Number of students completed their education at elementary school or equivalent
Number of students at the highest level of elementary school in the previous year
  × 100% 
%  
10. Completion rate (junior high 
school) 
Number of students completed their education at junior high school or equivalent
Number of students at the highest level of junior high school in the previous year
  × 100% 
%  
11. Completion rate (senior high 
school) 
Number of students completed their education at senior high school or equivalent
Number of students at the highest level of senior high schoos in the previous year
  × 100% 
%  
12. Continuation rate from 
elementary school to junior high 
school 
Number of new students at the first level of junior high school
Number of students completed elementary school from the previous year
 × 100% 
%  
13. Continuation rate from junior 
high school to senior high school 
Number of new students at the first level of senior high school
Number of students completed junior high school from the previous year
 × 100% 
%  
14. Teachers meeting degree 
qualification 
Number of teachers having the qualification of Diploma − IV or first degree
Number of teachers at elementary school or equivalent, junior/senior high school or equivalent
 × 100% 
%  
(2) Health 15. Midwifery complications treated Number of complications handled within a specific work area & specific period of time
Number of pregnant women with complications within the same work area &the same period of time
 × 100% 
%  
16. Deliveries assisted by midwifes Number of deliveries assisted by midwifes within a specific work area & period of time
Number of deliveries within the same work area & period of time
 × 100% 
%  
17. Universal child immunisation 
(UCI) coverage 
Number of UCI villages
Number of villages
 × 100% 
%  
18. Babies with bad nutrition treated Number of babies with bad nutrition receiving treatment at local health center in a specific time period
Number of babies with bad nutrition in the same work area and the same period of time
 × 100% 
%  
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19. Tuberculosis cases found and 
treated 
Number of new tuberculosis cases found and treated within the same work area in a year
Number of predicted tubercolusis cases within the same period of time
 × 100% 
%  
20. Dengue haemorrhagic fever cases 
found and threated 
Number of dengue haemorrhagic fever cases found and treated within a certain work area in a year
Number of dengue haemorrhagic fever cases found within the same work area & period of time
 × 100% 
%  
21. Health services provided for poor 
patients 
Number of visits of poor patients to a health center
Number of poor population in the district/municipality
 × 100% 
%  
22. Babies visits Number of babies visited served according to the standard within a specific work area & period of time
Number of babies delivered alive within the same work area & period of time
 × 100% 
%  
(3) Environment 23. Garbage collection Volume of garbage handled (M3)
Volume of garbage produced (M3)
 × 100% 
%  
24. Control on implementation of 
‘environmental analysis impact’ 
Number of companies that are subject to environmental analysis impact that have been monitored
Number of companies that are subject to enviormental analysis impact
 × 100% 
%  
25. Garbage disposal points per 
thousand population 
Capacity of garbage disposal points (m3)
Number of population
 × 100% 
%  
26. Law enforcement  Number of environmental cases solved
Number of environmental cases
 × 100% 
%  
(4) Public Works 27. Miles of road in good condition Miles of road in good condition
Total miles of road
 × 100% 
%  
28.  The width of district irrigation in 
good condition 
Width of irrigations in good condition
Total width of irrigations
 × 100% 
%  
29. Households equipped with 
sanitation facilities 
Number of households having sanitation facilities
Number of households
 × 100% 
%  
30. Dirty area The width of dirty area
Total area
 × 100% 
%  
(5) Spatial planning 31 Opened green space area The width of opened green space area
Total authorised area for buildings 
 × 100% 
%  
(6) Planning  32. The existence of local strategic 
planning stipulated by local 
ordinance 
- Exist/do not 
exist 
 
33. The existence of local mid-term 
plan stipulated by local ordinance 
or district head/mayor’s 
regulation 
- Exist/do not 
exist 
 
34. The existence of a local 
government work plan (annual 
plan), stipulated by the district 
head/mayor’s regulation 
 Exist/do not 
exist 
 
35. Translation of programmes 
included in the local mid-term 
plan to local government work 
plan (annual plan) 
Number of programmes included in the local government work plan
Number of programmes stated in local mid − term plan that have to be implemented in the respective year 
 × 100% 
%  
(7) Housing 36. Households having access to 
clean water 
Number of households having access to clearn water 
Total number of households
 × 100% 
%  
37. Dirty housing area The width of dirty housing area 
Total width of the area
 × 100% 
%  
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38. Habitable housing Number of habitable houses 
Total number of houses in the respective local government 
 × 100% 
%  
(8) Youth &Sport 39. Youth gathering facilities (except 
owned by private sector) 
Number of youth gathering facilities 
Number of population 
 × 1000 
Per 10,000 
population 
 
40. Sport facilities  Number of sport facilities within a district
Number of population 
 × 1000 
 
Sport facilities are: 
1. Football field       =  
2. Basket Ball field  = 
3. Volley Ball field  = 
4. Badminton field   = 
5. Swimming Pool   = 
Total                    = 
Per 10,000 
population 
 
(9) Capital 
Investment 
41. Increase/decrease of capital 
investment 
Realisation of capital investment in 201x − realisation of capaital investment in 2010x − 1 
Realisation of capital investment in 201x − 1
 × 100% 
%  
(10) Cooperation 
&SMEs 
42. Active cooperation Number of active cooperation 
Number of total cooperation 
 × 100% 
%  
43. Micro and small businesses  Number of micro and small businesses 
Number of small medium enterprises
 × 100% 
%  
(11) citizenships 
and civil 
registration  
44. Ownership of citizenship card Number of population having a citizenship card 
Number of population obligated to have a citizenship card (> 17 years old or married men and women)
 × 100% 
%  
45. Ownership of date birth 
certificate 
Number of population having a birth certificate 
Total population
 × 1000 
Per 1,000 
population 
 
46. Implementation of citizenship 
card based on unique family 
number 
Has been implemented/not yet been implemented Yes/No  
(12) Labour 47. Employment rate  Number of population in employment 
Number of population of productive age (15 − 64 y. o)
 × 100% 
%  
48. Job seeker placement rate  Number of job seekers that got placement 
Number of registered job seekers 
 × 100% 
%  
(13) Food resilience  49. Regulation on food resilience  The existence of regulations on food resilience either in the form of local ordinance or the district head/mayor’s regulation or 
other form of regulation 
Exist/do not 
exist 
 
50. Availability of staple food Average avaiability of staple food (kg)  
Number of population 
 × 1000 
Per 1,000 
population 
 
(14) Women’s 
empowerment and 
child protection 
51. Women’s participation in 
government institutions 
Female workers in government institutions 
Number of female workers 
 × 100% 
%  
52. Women’s literacy rate aged ≥ 15 
y.o 
Women aged ≥ 15 years who are literate
Total women aged ≥ 15 years 
 × 100% 
%  
53. Women’s employment rate  Number of female labourforces under umployment 
Number of female labourforces
 × 100% 
%  
(15) Family 
planning  
54. Prevalence of active family 
planning participants 
Number of family planning participants 
Number of couples of reproductive age
 × 100% 
%  
55. Poor families Number of poor families 
Number of families
 × 100% 
%  
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(16) Transportation 56. Vehicle (road transportation) Number of vehicles 
Number of passengers
  
…  
(17) 
Communication and 
information 
57. Local government website Available or not available Available/not 
available 
 
58. Exhibition  Number of exhibitions per year ...times   
(18) Land  59. Width of land that has been 
certified  
Width of land that has been certified  
Width of land that should be certified
 × 100% 
%  
60. State land cases that have been 
solved 
Number of cases that have been solved  
Number of cases that have been registered
 × 100% 
%  
61. Location permits that have been 
solved  
Number of location permits  
Number of proposals 
 × 100% 
%  
(19) Nation unity 
and Politic 
62. Political education at local level Number of political education activities Number of 
activities 
 
63. Coaching on Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) and Youth 
organisations  
Number of education activities (coaching) on Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Youth organisations Number of 
activities 
 
(20) Regional 
autonomy  
64. Management information system 
of local government  
Number of management information systems created by the respective local government  Number of 
information 
system 
 
65. Citizen satisfaction index  Existence of citizen satisfaction survey Exists/does 
not exit 
 
(21) Society and 
village 
empowerment  
66. Family activator organisation101   Number of active family activator organisations  
Number of total family activator organisations 
 × 100% 
%  
67. Integrated Unit Service102  Number of active Integrated Service Unit  
Number of total Integrated Service Unit 
 × 100% 
%  
(22) Social care 68. Facilities to take care of orphans, 
the elderly and homeless   
Number of facilities to take care of orphans, the elderly and homeless   Number of 
facilities 
 
69. Management of people having 
social welfare problems 
Number of people having social welfare problems that are handled  
Number of people having social welfare problems
 × 100% 
%  
70. People having social welfare 
problems that received assistance  
Number of people having social welfare problems that were given assistance  
Number of people having social welfare problems that should be provided with assistance
 × 100% 
%  
(23) Culture  71. Art and culture festival/exhibition  Number of art and culture festivals/exhibitions Number of 
festivals/exhi
bitions 
 
72. Facilities to organise art and 
culture festivals/exhibitions 
Number of facilities to organise art and culture festivals/exhibitions Number of 
facilities 
 
73. Artefacts and cultural/historical  
places that are protected and 
maintained  
Number of artefacts and cultural or historical places that are protected and maintained 
Number of artefacts and cultural or historical places that are owned by local government 
 × 100% 
%  
(24) Statistic 74. Availability of local government 
statistics 
 Available/not 
available 
 
                                                 
101 Family activator organisations exist at village level; thus one village usually has one family activator organisation (the members of the organisation are all women). 
102 Similar to a family activator organisation, the integrated unit service also exists at village level. The common activities include, for example, the routine weight measurement of children under five years old and 
nutrition improvement programmes (monthly activity).   
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75. Availability of data on  gross 
regional domestic product 
 Available/not 
available 
 
(25) Archive  76. Application of standard archive 
system 
Number of working units that have applied standard archive system  
Number of working units 
 × 100% 
%  
77. Activity to improve the quality of 
human resources in archive 
management 
Number of activities undertaken to improve the quality of human resources in archive management Number of 
activity 
 
(26) Library 78. Book collection available at local 
library  
Number of book titles available at local library  
Number of books available in the local library
 
Ratio  
79. Number of library visits Number of visits to the library in 1 year  
Number of population that should be served
 
Ratio  
Optional Functions  
(1) Marine and  
Fisheries  
1. Fish production Fish production (IDR)  
Local target (ton) 
 × 100% 
%  
2. Fish consumption Fish consumption (kg)
Target (kg)
 100% 
%  
(2) Agriculture  3. Productivity of rice or other local 
staple food per Ha 
Production of rice or other local staple food (ton)
Total area of rice field or other local staple food  (ha)
  
Ratio  
4. Contribution of agricultural sector 
to Regional Gross Domestic 
Product 
Contribution of agricultural sector to regional gross domestic product 
Total Regional Gross Domestic Product
 100% 
%  
(3) Forestry  5. Rehabilitation of critical land and 
forest 
The width of critical forest and land rehabilitated  
Total width of critical forest and land
 100% 
%  
6. Forest damage The width of forests damage 
The width of forests 
 100% 
%  
(4) Energy and 
mining resources 
7. Illegal mining The width of illegal mining solved
The width of illegal mining 
 100% 
%  
8. Contribution of mining sector to 
Regional Gross Domestic Product 
Contribution of mining sector to regional gross domestic product 
Total Regional Gross Domestic Product
 100% 
%  
(5) Tourism  9. Tourist visits Number of tourists per year  Number of 
tourists 
 
10. Contribution of tourism sector to 
Regional Gross Domestic Product 
Contribution of tourism sector to regional gross domestic product 
Total Regional Gross Domestic Product
 100% 
%  
(6) Industry 11. Contribution of industry sector to 
Regional Gross Domestic Product 
Contribution of industry sector to regional gross domestic product 
Total Regional Gross Domestic Product
 100% 
%  
12. Industry growth  Number of industries in 201x − number of industry in 201x − 1 
Number of industry until 201x − 1
 100% 
%  
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(7) Trade 13. Contribution of trade sector to 
Regional Gross Domestic Product 
Contribution of trade sector to regional gross domestic product 
Total Regional Gross Domestic Product
 100% 
%  
14. Net export Export value –import value US$...  
(8) Transmigration  15. Transmigration (independent 
initiative)103 
Number of transmigration (independent initiative) 
Number of transmigration 
 100% 
%  
                                                 
103 Transmigration or moving people from an area of high density population to a low density population area is usually a government-led programme.  
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